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The 5th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety was held
in Karlsruhe on September 9-13, 1984; it was attended by some 500
scientists and engineers from 25 countries. The conference was jointly
sponsored by the European Nuclear Society (ENS), the American Nuclear
Society (ANS), the Canadian Nuc1ear Society (CNS)and the Japan Atomic
Energy Society (JAES). The meeting was further endorsed by. and
organized in cooperation with. the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Commission of the European
Communities (CEC). Host organizations were the Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft (KTG) and the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK). The
meeting was the fifth in aseries of international meetings in the same
subject areas with ANS and ENS as primary sponsors.
The Karlsruhe reactor safety meeting was held to reflect on the present
status of engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants and to
represent the findings of international safety research.
Seven invited experts of international reputation outlined the present
state of the art in survey lectures. Moreover. more than 200 technical
and scientific papers selected from 280 submitted papers, dealt with
recent findings in reactor safety technology and research in the.
following areas: safety systems and functions optimization; man machine
interface and emergency response; code development and verification;
system and component behavior; fuel behavior during severe accidents;
core debris and core concrete interaction; fission product behavior;
containment response; probabilistic risk assessment. We wish to thank
all speakers for their valuable contributions.
The meeting was concluded by a panel discussion on "Progress and Trends
in Reactor Safety Technology and Research - What Has Been Achieved to
Date? - What Remains to Be Done?"
Ir
It is not possible to acknowledge individually all persons who
contributed to the meeting. We are greatly indebted to H.H. Hennies,
President of the German Kerntechnische Gesellschaft (KTG), and J.M.
Hendrie, President of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) who served as
General Chairmen, and to A. Birkhofer as Chairman of the Technical
Program Committee. Many thanks are due to the members of the Steering
Committee, the Technical Program Committee, the Review Committee and the
Organizing Committee.
The 6th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety was
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SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
ARE INTEGRATED PARTS
OF THE KWU KONVOI PROCESS INFORMATION SYSTEM
(SPDS Functions are parts of the KWU-PRINS)




As a consequence of the TMI accident it is US practice
for Safety Parameter Display Systems (SPDS) to be
required by the NRC for old fashioned control rooms.
In Germany the extended Safety Systems with their high-
ly developed "Leittechnik" (I&C) and the human factors
oriented control room design using "Kleinwartentech-
nik" (miniaturized control room equipment) meant that
there was no urgent requirement for backfitting of
control room equipment.
For many years however the desirablity of having flexi-
ble overview as weIl as extended detail information
with pictorial and abstraction features and easy and
quick access throughout the large-size control rooms
in German plants has been recognized. Developments
over the last years now make it possibile to add on
extensive computer driven VDU-sytems to the three
German KONVOI NPPs (Isar 11, Emsland and Neckarwest-
heim 11) thereby creating the Process Information
System "PRINS".
The new system is driven by multiple computers at dif-
ferent locations controlling about 30 full-graphic,
high resolution Video Display Units. They are arranged
singly and in three "mxn - Information Panels." distri-
buted about the control room and present all thinkable
kinds of display formats with more than 1000 separate
pictures.
The display of only single "Safety Parameters" or even
complete "Safety Goal Information" on single or multi-
ple VDUs in parallel is only one aspect of this compu-




Following the TMI accident one of the "lessons learned"
resulted in the NRC requirement for computerized operator aids
such as the Safety Parameter Display System to allow better ac-
cident handling in plants with old fashioned control rooms - and
also for plants where only limited numbers of protective actions
are automated.
For thes~ reasons, control rooms in German plants did not
require any-Qrgent alteration or backfitting. The German Reactor
Safety Commission (RSK ~ ACRS) did, however, recommend the
consideration of long-term improvements to information on satura-
tion pressure/temperature, coolant outlet temperature, reactor
vessel water level and primary system status with the aid of
VDUs. Also quicker access to the contents of the Operating
Manual and still higher (!) automation of protective tasks were
recommended.
The plants operating in Germany already have very advanced
Safety Systems and high-level intelligence Leittechnik Li, 2, 3,
47 for normal as well as accident situations.
They have human factors oriented "Kleinwartentechnik" - control
rooms which feature miniaturized hardware on control panels and
boards with extensive use made of mimic diagrams.
There has, nevertheless, been for many years a strong
des ire to optimize the information (and control) capabilities.
This information capability includes the following:
- paramount plant status and trend information
- control/protection system status and action information
- transient management and optimization of operation
- maintenance monitoring and directing.
PRINS FEATURES
Ongoing developments in computer based video display sys-
tems now permit the design of an overall information system of
high diversity, based on 20 years of NPP research, development
and design, construction, extensive commissioning and long-term
operating experience with different types of NPPs: the Process
Information System (PRINS) LS}.
The system consists of all information equipment already inclu-
ded in the "Kleinwarten type" control rooms of NPPs in operation
in conjuction with a new computer driven information system with
multiple Video Display Units distributed around the control
room.
This new part of the system (Fig. 1) will be applied to the
three KONVOI Plants Isar 11, Emsland and Neckarwestheim 11 and
to Brokdorf NPP. There are to be some simplified forerunners
installed in the NPPs Biblis, Grohnde and Philippsburg 11, two
ofthese plants scheduled for backfitting to the same status as








~~~~:~ __ ~~ Computerized part of the













~~~~~~ __~: KWU KONVOI Main Control Room cross section
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Four distributed da ta acquisition computers - located in the
four rooms of the redundant Leittechnlk equipment - sampIe about
2000 analog (1+5 sec scanning) and 10 000/16 000 binary (10 ms
resolution) signals and transmit them all to both of the data
processing computers.
These "host computers" feed 30 VDU-controllers (32 bit and with
high computational capabilityJ and a number of other recording
devices.
The 30 VDUs are located in the Main Control Room (Fig. 2) ,either
singly or in mxn-arrangements at three locations. Two of these
locations are in front of the two plant operators and the third
of these (with scope for extension) is to the left of the
reactor operator: this is the "Information Panel".
The VDUs have full graphic features-wlth-üp-lö-7-independent 10-
gic planes, high resolution, high repetition frequency and a re-
fresh time of about a second. Best estimate call-up time for a
format is about 2 to 3 seconds, highly sophisticated formats
requiring a little longer. There are numerous display formats
(Fig. 3) used to genera te and store about 1000 separate pictures
wi th widely varying complexi ty and content. "Single" as weIl as
"picture group" calls together with "hierarchical" and "proxi-
mity search" capabilities permit rapid access to the most inte-
restlng plcture (set) at the rlght moment. (Fig. 4)
The engineering and programming activities for this system have
already taken and ~till will take several hundred man-years.
Simulator based qualification and plant operation will need
further work and shall contribute to the perfection of the
system which is designed to be highly flexible so as to allow
for changes and extensions and also for backfitting of
sJ_m_p}_iJJ_e_~_v_e_r_s_~0_n3_to plants already in-operä1:1öö-:---
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~~~~~~ __ ~~ First proposal for the KWU KONVOI PRINS keyboard
PRINS SPECIAL DISPLAY FEATURES
A number of essential differences between PRINS and previous
systems follow, together with the main system properties:
minimization of alphanumeric information by transforming
this into pictorial displav formats up to a high abstraction
level
display of several formats in parallel to form superpictures
or arrays of different formats (e. g. trend logs displayed
vertically using VDU columns, overviews with related detail
information,system pictures to complement logic or trend logs
sufficient space available for monitoring of different com-
plexes by using more than one display unit for information
and easy shiftinq of important information to prefered
locations and of unimportant information to ·parking
positions·
possibility of high abstraction levels for display formats
for expert use and interpretation as well as system and
equipment oriented information levels for operators or
maintenance specialists.
mini-picture menues (pictogramsl displayed to assist in the
select~on of further helpful information
the full extent of plant information is used for all kinds of
overview or detail formats
large computational capacity for preprocessing and signal re-
duction as well as iteration for strategy optimization
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OPERATIONAL TASKS OF PRINS
The flexibility and scope of the PRINS allows experts as well as
the operators to perform the following tasks in an adequate
manner:
1. optimum plant operation
- optimizing efficiency by parametric studies
- minimizing the severity of operational transients and
scheduled changes
- generating data for later analysis of experience gained
2. monitoring status and trend of SYStBffiS and components to
detect small deviations at an early stage (and thereby
prevent these deviations from increasing in size) by:
- comparison of redundant information
- verification of consistency in complementary information
- monitoring of overview and detail information at the same
time and for different locations (e.g. during tests and
maintenance work).
- comparing information at different levels of abstraction
3. to alert operators to increasing abormalities by providing
mini picture menues (pictogram sets) to assist in rapid and
uncomplicated selection of more relevant formats or format
arrays (displaying possible complementary information so as
to give the required information scope).
4. to be guided by adequate display of the relevant parts of
the operating manual, continuously updated with actual plant
data and intentionally reduced to the extent which is of in-
terest in the present state of the plant:
- control and safety system functions in power operation
- safety functions secured and/or protective goals reached
with considered allocation of appropriate priority levels
(set of formats)
- well-known operational occurrences identified and
displayed
- proposals for alternative strategies with manual actions
in operational or accident situations (including
communication for external help) made by showing different
possibilities for how to proceed (success paths).
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY FUNCTIONS
Bearing all the above features of PRINS in mind, it is evident
that it is an ideal system for displaying the status of "Safety
Parameters" or even complete information on how to reach
and observe "Safety Goals", particularly during such accident
handling which can only be taught by theoretical training or
training on simulators:
Here the entire concept of accident handling is of importancel
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In KWU NPPs highly automated and reliable mechanical and Leit-
technik systems first transfer to and hold the plant in a safe
status in the case of design basis events and accidents. Increa-
sing deviations from normal status first activate the optimized
automatie Controls, then the more reliable Limitations - with
their early and soft but intelligent countermeasures and
finally the Protection and Safety Systems - with their simple
but very higly reliable measures.
There is a 30 min time limit specified for these automatie
actions in severe accidents (and in most cases the measures a~e
even valid for a number of hours). This means that the
operating crew has time to make long-term decisions - and to
take external advise where necessary.
But there are no objections to act earlier - if the crew is
very sure to be on the "right way". For in our opinion sophis-
ticated information systems of the PRINS type make it possible
to reduce the length of the above mentioned automatie accident
handling period in a number of cases. This can, however, not be
interpreted as a requirement nor does it imply that further
operator aids, such as computer driven pictorial information,
have no advantages or are of no assistance.
On the contrary, additional systems are extremely effective!
The basis of the recommended strategy for accident handling
laid down in the Operating Manual is as folIows: supervision of
performance of the automatie actions at first, followed by moni-
toring of _,,-b_o_\l.t.J_O_"::"'S_a_f_e_t'y__G_o_a_l13~' (a specified fraction of the
total ·of about 100 "Information Goals") and finally deciding the
necessary manual actions with careful consideration of the
feedback effects of these.
"Safety Goals" are here understood as tasks which must be
sustained for plant compliance with basic safety criteria. They
are not event or accident-specific. The information for one sa-
fety goal may be displayed by between one and eight Pictures.
Here the benefit of an integrated Info-System is obvious, as
this not only shows the ultimate permitted limit, but also has
the capability and space to show trends, margins to limits,
priority of conflicting parameter combinations and also to dis-
play diverse information about the same event. A further
feature here is that this system is not restricted to use in
accident situations: during normal operation plant surveillance
and operational aids train the operating crew and inform them
about and familiarize them with the system.
INFORMATION EXAMPLES
KWU specialists in conjuction with customer personnel have spe-
cified about one hundred "Information Goals" across the entire
plant and for all occasions. These include the "Safety Goals"
mentioned previously.
Each of these goals gives paramount information about its spe-
cial aspects. It has been attempted to concentrate the informa-
tion as much as possible in each VDU-format (Fig. 5-10). But
there is only limited space available while keeping this infor-
mation readable and easily intelligible including advice on
rapid access to complementary information (~'2~33j~j}J_~~~!~E~')'
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Figure 6:Actualized "Part Load Diagram"








Figure 7: Goolant inventory and heat transfer information
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~~~~~~__ lQ~ Dynamic Action Status of
some (Reactor) Limitation
Systems

















































The call for presentation of an information goal is given by a
functional pushbutton on the keyboard. The selected VDU then
shows the one representive or the "pictogram set" for this
info-goal on the selected VDU. (a possible unrealistic-
combination of a set of 8 pictures is shown in Fig. 11) ano-











The operators recognize these simplified pictograms which bear
no alphanumeric descriptions (!), and they select those pictu-
res which they think could be of assistance on free screens,
arranging them in their order of selection or "shifting" them
later on to match their momentary needs.
This information mayaIso include procedural advice, displaying
"success paths" with all appropriate da ta on actual status and
associated limlts, so contributing to the process of knowledge
based-behaviour in accidental situations as intended by the
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MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE ENHANCEHENT UNDERTAKEN
BY EDF TO HINIHIZE HUHAN ERRORS
R. MARCILLE
Electricite de France / SPT
75384 PARIS FRANCE
ABSTRACT
The analysis of operator' s behaviour during incidents has highlighted the
need of improving the interface between operators and systems. EDF deci-
ded to implement in all his PWR units a safety panel to assist operating
teams for : detecting the events by identification of parameters which actua-
ted protective actions and initiated safety actions - assisting the diagnosis
by selecting a procedure - assisting in application of the procedure
assisting the safety engineer to apply astate oriented supervision
- giving informations to the crisis teams.
To complete the safety panel, EDF decided to improve 900 HW PWR control
rooms as follows : - critical review by consultant, - test of various propo-
sals on a full scale mock up, and operators approval, - definition of rede-
sign principles conducting to exchange of support platen and new distribution
of instruments and controls.
Such works are to be performed during refuelling outages, without exten-
sion of their duration.
INTRODUCTION
The analysis of incidents and accidents which have occurred at nuclear power
plants in France and elsewhere has highlighted the need for improvements in a
number of areas related to post accident operations ; for example :
- Better organization of post accident operations
- Improvement in the form and content of operating procedures
- Hore effective assistance for operators through the provision of safety
panels
- and better control room design.
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OPERATION ORGANIZATION
To understand the French Philosophy of safety panel, it's necessary to say
some words about the first two topics.
Three types of actors are involved in operation organization :
- The team of operators with its shift supervisor in charge of applying pro-
cedures. They perform all the operation steps and act according to four
stages :
Detection of events,
Confirmation of automatic actions,
Event diagnosis and selection of the procedure to be applied,
Application of operating procedures.
- The safety engineer, calIed for to the control room upon detection of an
event, watches the trend of the NSSS parameters, thanks to a surveillance logic
diagram independant of the event. Under definite state criteria, he can :
Request from operators additional actions to be performed without either
disturbing or forsaking altogether the procedure under way.
Ask the operators to abandon the procedure under way and to apply an
emergency procedure with a view to safeguard the core and limit radioactive
releases through all the means at their disposal, irrespective of the future
facility availability. While the operators are performing the emergency proce-
dure, the safety engineer goes on monitoring the trend of the main parameters
through specific means and according to determined criteria.
- Crisis teams, made-up of top-level specialists, they can be summoned by
the plant superintendant within a few hour's time. These specialists divide into
two teams
A local crisis team that joins the technical support center of the dama-
ged plant,
Anational crisis team that convenes in Paris.
The safety panel is aimed at assisting in their tasks these three types of
actors.
THE SAFETY PANEL ARCHITECTURE
The safety panel includes :
- A computer with data collection and input devices for processing and
transmission to three data communication terminals for each of the three
actors.
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These systems are not redundant and'are not indispensable to operators.
Nevertheless, two important functions are duplicated by redundant means for
the operators
- A serie of annunciators directly connected to the plant protective relay
circuitry, displays the status of the main safety functions and components.
- A microprocessor directly connected to the temperature and pressure sen-
sors indicates core outlet maximum temperature and subcooling margin.
Two terminals are located in the control room :
- one for the operators, close to the main board where the NSSS is control-
led
- the second one for the safety engineer, deliberately located in a corner
of the room because the safety engineer has not to check what the operators are
doing.
SAFETY PANEL UTILIZATION BY OPERATORS
If an event occurs, the first stage for the operators is to understand
what is happening and whay is the status of the plan ?
The first goal of the safety panel is then to point out very clearly to the
operators the time sequence of the failures which initiated safety actions.
Upon detection of a cause or an order for action, a picture is automatically
displayed on the operator terminal.
It sets forth :
- the identification of the physical parameters, which actuated the protec-
tive action and the time of the occurrence.
- The safety action or actions initiated on each of the trains. Such picture
is updated as successive protective systems are called upon.
In a second stage, the operators must check that the automatic systems have
opera ted satisfactorily. They are helped by the previous picture which gave
after a delay, the account of the right or wrong execution of each protective
action.
Should the account prove fautly execution, they can call synoptic pictures
of the safeguard systems on a second screen.
This picture displays: the component's position and their possible discre-
pancy with respect to a reference position. The operators can then try to remedy
the defects in the automatic system by triggering individual actuators from the
control room or by requesting local control operations to be carried out.
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In the third stage, a distinctive picture set up in the form of a logic
diagram helps the operators in selecting the procedure to be applied.
For each logigram test based on values of physical parameters, such assis-
tance is implemented through proposal of an answer that the operator must vali-
date by consulting the normal control devices. These diagrams are exactely the
same as in the diagnosis procedures.
In the last stage, the operator's safety panel screens are therefore used to
present displays designed to help the operators to implement the redrafted post
incident procedures.
These new procedures resort to utilize some diagrams X, Y. Such diagrams are
rarely used, then the safety panel assists operators by displaying pictures
using the same figures as the procedures.
The display includes the current operating point as weIl as the position of
the operating point during the previous 30 minutes and its expected position
over the next ten minutes.
For exemple, the plot of pressurizer level v subcooling margin has a green
zone permitting the operator to reduce safety injection and a red zone requiring
safety injection to be increased.
Similar displays are available showing primary pressure v temperature
permitting to cool down or to heat the primary circuit.
The safety panel aids also in the application of surveillance procedures,
for instance effective core cooling through residual heat removal system.
SAFETY PANEL UTILIZATION BY SAFETY ENGINEER
In the same way as for operators, the safety panel displays pictures in the
form of logic diagrams to assist the safety engineer in performing his state
oriented surveillance procedures :
- du ring performance of event-oriented procedures,
- during performance of the emergency procedure.
SAFETY PANEL IN THE ON-SITE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
On site, the crisis team in the technical support center has at its disposal
its own safety panel terminal giving access to all the displays available on the
safety engineer and operator terminals as weIl as a set of 40 curves giving a 30
minute time his tory of trends in the main NSSS parameters.
In the future it is expected that the National Technical Support Center will
also have a display of the main parameters and their progress over time. This




Tests and validation programs have been performed to verify the consistency
of the logic used in the first two stages (event detection and confirmation that
automatie actions have operated properly).
Further, functional validation using a simulator is scheduled for the end of
1984. This will aim to validate panel performance during the other two stages :
fault diagnosis (third stage) and assistance with the application of post-inci-
dent procedures (fourth stage).
EDF's thirty-four 900 MWe PWR's and its four simulators will be equipped
with the safety panels by the end of 1985. It is possible to proceed with
installation of the panels before completion of the validation tests because
final adjustements will essentially consist in alterations to the software.
Meanwhile, operators are to be trained in post-accident operations on simulators
which are to be equipped with safety panels identical to those which will be
installed at the plants themselves.
CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENT
To complete the creation of the safety panel, EDF has undertaken a study to
improve 900 MW PWR Control room.
EDF engaged a consultant to perform a general ergonomie diagnosis of the
control room. This review began in October 1980 and the main results, in April
1981 were :
- No upsetting of the control room, because, in the initial layout of the
desks and boards, the standardization and functional regrouping has been com-
plied with.
- Necessity of studying enhancements of the panels and desks to
Make easier the recognition of controls
Reduce risks of mistakes
Have a better relationship between controls
Have a better general integration
- And for that, building a full scale mock-up permitting to submit the
improvements to many operators.
In May 1982, after definition of the set of principles and rules, the mock
up of the new control room was terminated and all the improvements were approved
by many operators and ergonomists.
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The main principles and rules observed are described now.
- The generalization of functional regrouping methodology consists in colo-
red zones containing various functionally linked controls and instrumentation
with a general title, framed by a thick line, with secondary zones framed by
thinner lines, with if necessary its own title. To each functional zone one of
ten colors was assigned, Le., three ·shades of blue, green and beige, plus a
general sand colored background. These colors do not represent any special
coding system. They are intented to make it easier to distinguish one zone from
the other ones.
- The functional distinctions made in the horizontal platen are carried over
to the vertical platen as much as possible, by extending lines and colors, to
integrate horizontal and vertical controls.
Without chart-recorders, all controls are positioned in a functional zone.
- Standardized distribution defines functional hierarchy. Direct analog con-
trols are placed on the right and on a lower position of the analog setpoint
device.
Status lights are positioned up and near the associated switches. Controls rela-
tive to situation risk are positioned in the upper part of the plates.
- The shape and size coding defines control function
Pumps, air-compressors, fans, that is to s~y all running machines have
round labels.
Valves have rectangular labels.
- The label's color are green and orange for safety train A and Band white
for non-safety train A.
- Inside some functional colored zones, to improve relationship between con-
trols, the controls are placed as a mimic in the good positions "open" or "run".
To improve the functional understanding of the system, some grey symbols are
included in the mimic. These symbols figure passive components like tanks and
heaters.
- To have a better understanding of the labels, we limit the number of words
used as strictly necessary, sometimes no word is necessary on a control label
because the title of the zone is self supporting.
Applying such principles requies the shifting of the components, essentially
within the same platen and, consequently, the removal of all the components,
exchange of support plate and new installation of the components.
Such works are to be performed du ring planned shutdowns for refuelling
without extension of their duration. For that purpose, a strict scheduling must
be worked out to prioritize modifications of platens, according to the status of
the unit and the technical specifications.
A module remains inoperable from the start of the work and ti II the manda-
tory requalifications of its last components have been completed.
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For each platen, the modification implementation is recorded in a document
including :
- Functional contrainsts of each of the systems pertaining to it.
- Provisional operating instructions used as substitutes to the normal ones
while the platen is out of service.
- The procedure of requallfication for all the components, standard proce-
dures for the components to be found in great number, particular procedure
specific to each particular component.
It took four weeks to carry out the first modification on Unit 3 of
DA}WIERRE Nuclear Plant, with complete fuel unloading in August 1983.
It took only ten days to carry out the second modification on Unit 4 of the
same plant, in April 1984.
Planned modifications will affect :
- In 1984 : 4 units in operation, one simulator, 4 units under construc-
tion.
- In 1985 and 1986 : 8 units in operation and one simulator.
- and in 1987, the last 4 units in operation and the last simulator.
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INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ANO INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN FACTORS OF NUCLEAR POWER
Part 1: NORDIC COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RELIABILITY
Björn Wahlström




The safety of nuclear power is in many way relying on the
condi tion that human actions are carried through timely and
without errors. Investigations indicate that human errors are the
main, or an important contributing cause, for more than half of
the incidents occurring. This fact makes it important to try to
understand the mechanisms behind the human errors and to
investigate possibilities for decreasing their likelihood. A
Nordic cooperation was star ted 1977 in this field and the present
phase of the project will be completed in 1985. The work is
divided into the following fields
- human reliability in test and maintenance
-'safety oriented work organizations
- design of information and control systems
- new approaches for information presentation
- experimental validation of man-machine interfaces
- planning and evaluation of operator training
In the paper abrief description of the project is given and some
preliminary results are presented in more detail.
1. INTRODUCTION
Extended Nordic cooperation was started in 1977 in the field of
nuclear safety. This cooperation is partly financed from project funds
of the Nordic Council of Ministers and partly from national funds in
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The safety programme was
originally divided into five program areas of which one was Human
reliability. The first phase of the program was finished in 1981 and
was followed up with a second phase which is due for completion in
1985.
The first phase (cf./l/) of the work was divided into the
following projects
- a system and job analysis
- control room design
- human reliability
- operator training
The second phase is based on the findings of the first phase, however
some of the inve~tigations are carried through into more detail. The
findings included ,the following:
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- Human errors committed outside the control room have a large share
as causes for unsafe conditions at nuclear power plants. Errors made
during test and calibration activities can also introduce common mode
failures in cases where several redundant systems are made
unoperational at the same time.
- Another important cause for common mode failures could be the work
organization when routines are badly structured or have been allowed
to deteriorate. Maintaining the efficiency of a safety oriented
organization for handling safety threats is thus achallenge for the
nuclear industry.
- The design process leading to an automation concept for a nuclear
power plant and to the lay-out of the control room is an important
phase. Errors made in this process can cause serious deficiencies in
the man-machine interface. The management of the design process and
the use of computer aided design methods have potential benefits for
improving the quality of design.
- The present methods for information presentation in the control rooms
of nuclear power plants are based on conventional approaches
regardless of the used technology. The advent of cost efficient
computers makes it however possible to base the man-machine interface
on completely new approaches.
- It is necessary to validate experimentally the systems proposed for
the man-machine interface in nuclear power plants before they are
ready for full scale implementations. The problems are then to
establish the performance measures and to collect and analyze the
data from the experiments.
- Human error data can be collected during simulator training and that
information can be used to improve the feedback given to the
trainees. In addition the diagnosing of complicated transients is a
critical task influencing the safety of a nuclear power plant and is
therefore a task to which emphasis should be given during the
training.
2. PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM THE CURRENT NORDIC PROJECT
2.1 TEST AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
The goal of the project was to investigate the possibilities
- to select an optimal test interval for standby components
- to identify important risk contributions of human errors
during test and calibration.
Detailed descriptions of actual test and maintenance practices and of
ten selected incidents have been worked out as apart of the project.
The results indicate that there is a risk of decreased
availability for standby systems as a consequence of a too frequent
testing /2/. There also seems to be need for tests aimed at a more
accurate identification of different time dependent fault mechanisms.
The work on test and maintenance is also concerned with:
- relationships between probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and risk
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management - i.e., which human risk contributions can be expected to
be covered by a pre-construction PRA as weIl as which contributions
will have to fall under a risk management (RM) program during the
operational phase of the plant. This creates the need for a
well-documented PRA for use during RM.
- deriving requirements for and developing tools for the identification
of potential human risk contributions. For well-structured
activities - such as test and calibration - the Work Analysis /3/
method was generated and used.
- providing aids for risk management in the form of systematic
post-event analyses of incidents involving human malfunctions as a
feedback mechanism from actual operating experience.
2.2 WORK ORGANIZATION
The goal of the project has been to develop an understanding of
how the work organization will influence the safety of a nuclear power
plant. The subproject has been divided into the follolying main tasks
- the establishment of an organizational theory
- collection of case stories
- development of checklists for the search for
organizational deficiencies.
The basis resourcies of an organization are the value system, the
decision making and executive system, and the information system (cf.
/4/. The value system has an influence both on how the organization is
prioritizing different goals and on how the individuals are responding
to those goals. Many of the human erros made in connection with power
plant operation can be shown to be due to organizational deficiencies.
An important class of the organizational deficiencies are associated to
different limitations in the information system. The checklist
developed are intended to make it possible for the organization to
maintain its efficiency by a regular review of organizational factors.
2.3 TRE DESIGN PROCESS
The goal of the project is to assess how the design quality
could be improved and how computers could be used as design aids. The
project is divided into the following tasks
- an assessment of present design practices
- the conceptualization of an idealized design process
- assessment of the use of computer aided design methods
- implementation of a demonstration system
The reults indicate several benefits from the use of computers
during the design process for the construction and verification of the
design data base (cf. /5/). The computerized methods should certainly
be used for all new designs, and it seems even beneficial to
computerize parts of the design data base as a retrofitting for old
plants. The project also is investigating the flow of information
during the design process i.e. when and by whom it will be genera ted
and who will be using it. In documenting the design it is important
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to describe the link between the requirements and the technical
solutions.
2.4 COMPUTERIZED OPERATOR SUPPORT
The goal of project is to establish a basis for the design of
computer-based decision aids for supporting the monitoring and
supervisory control of complex technical systems such as nuclear power
plants, chemical plants, etc.
At the conceptual level, work is being carried out on the
establishment of a design and evaluation basis for the allocation of
the decision tasks between the operating staff and the computer -
especially in situations that affect availability and safety. This
requires studies of the strategies as weIl as structure and forms of
knowledge utilized by the operators in coping with the system.
On the experimental side, the Generic Nuclear Plant (GNP) /6/
facility has been created to carry out experiments related to these
conceptul problems. One of the areas dealt with is the assessment of a
display approach utilizing mass and energy pictures based on a
multilevel flow modelling (MFM) method /7/. This results in a
consistent functional representation of the plant and, among other
things, leads to a systematic identification of control tasks,
information requirements, etc.
2.5 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
The goal of the project is to use simulators in order to access
different proposals for suggested man-machine interfaces.
The validation of new solutions for man-machine interfaces has
to rely on a careful design of experiments. It was thus necessary to
develop experimental methods and experimental equipment as apart of
the project. The following four phases should therefore included:
- analysis of proposed concepts and definition
of performance measures
- training of persons for the experiment
- experimentation and data collection
- analysis of collected data
The results indicate that the analysis of data may become very
time consuming and efforts should therefore be made to analyse tha raw
data by means of computers. The approach in using the multilevel flow
models has been assessed as apart of the project /8/.
2.6 OPERATOR TRAINING
The goals of the project is to develop methods for
- collection of data on human errors during
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simulator training
- training for diagnosing complicated events.
The full scope training simulators in Finland and Sweden will be
used during the project.
Results indicate that it is possible to collect data on human
errors committed in the control room and their causes. The method also
has the benefit of providing additional training feed back to the
trainees.
Diagnosing of plant events is very complicated task. Results from
experiments indicates that different fault finding strategies are
utilized in different situations. The teaching of explicit search rules
for identifying faults has a potential for improving diagnosing
performance. The project is also trying to identify such rules as they
are used by skilIed operators.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The Nordic cooperation in the human reliability field is
presently in its final reporting phase. \fuen it has been completed a
total of about 40 persons years will have been spent on the projects.
The results will point the way to improving the human factors
aspects associated with the various phases of a nuclear plants life
cycle i.e. design, operation, maintenance, modification etc. The final
reports of the projects will be available from the participating
organizations
- Ris~ National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark
- Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland
- Institute for Energy Technology, Halden, Norway
- Swedish State Power Board, Stockholm, Sweden
- Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
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ABSTRACT
The written control room procedures used during nuclear power
plant operation is one of important component contributing to the
safety of the plant. The approach for the emergency operating
procedures (EOPs) has until recently been to write detailed
procedures for a number of events. This event-oriented approach
has however its drawbacks and new approaches have been suggested.
The paper describes a survey of approaches to EO~s used in
different NEA countries, prepared by the CSNI PWG on operating
experience and human factors.
INTRODUCTION
Operator actions during a reactor incident can be decisive to
regaining control of the plant, or to minimizing any consequent damage
and risk to the public. In recent years, with the increasing
recognition of the importance of the human factor in safety, the
content and form of the procedures provided to operators to co pe with
emergency situations have come under increasing scrutiny.
The content of the procedures relies on the best estimate for how
the plant will behave under adverse conditions and the difficulty is
then to write procedures which are applicable to all the situations
relevant. The form of the procedures, their layout and readability are
also important because such factors will influence the way they are
used by the operators.
This paper describes arecent review of various new approaches
being considered to the design and validation of emergency operating
procedures (EOPs), and to training operators in making the best
possible use of them. The study was conducted by a special NEA Task
Force of experts, which was set up early in 1983 under CSNI Principal
Working Group No. 1 (Operating Experience and Human Factors). In 1983
the Task Force compiled and assessed descriptions of EOP-related
practices in eleven NEA countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United
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Kingdom and Uni ted States. The study showed up the particular
importance of several factors in procedure design, in particular the
significant additional guidance provided by new types of procedures
keyed to accident symptoms, critical safety functions or operating
conditions rather than simply specific sequences of events. Additional
conclusions from this review are described in the following sections.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT FORM AND
USE OF EOPs
For most countries, it is impossible to identify one unique
"national" philosophy underlying the design and intended use of EOPs,as
several reactor types are used, which are supplied by different vendors
and exploited by different utilities. The Task Force nonetheless tried
to identify some important features in the various EOP approaches
developed recently.
Recent guides for EOP preparation exist (or are in preparation) in
several countries. A number of quidelines have been published in both
France and the United States. Generic technical guidelines are also
being developed by Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendors and
owners' groups. Utilities in Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium and
Japan tend to use NSSS vendors' guidelines, when applicable.
Operating procedures must be authorised by licensing authorities
in the Netherlands and Switzerland (at least for the most important
EOPs), and in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the other nations
surveyd, the writing, approval, backfitting and modification of EOPs
are internal utility matters. However, the regulatory authorities must
be kept informed of the most important modifications, and they can
suggest changes if felt necessary. The process by which EOPs are
modified generally involves different hierarchical levels, according to
how important the alterations are.
VALIDATION OF CONTENT OF EOPs
In order to ensure the effectiveness of EOPs under real emergency
conditions, the EOPs should be both verified and validated (that is,
demonstrated not only to be free of errors, but also to accomplish the
ultimate goal). In verifying and validating procedures, all other
factors which can affect total preparedness for situations (e.g.
organisation and training of operators, new instrumentation, etc.)
should be evaluated as well as the EOP design itself.
Use of simulators seems essential in validating procedures, and
should include simulation of real accidents which have occurred,
two-phase thermal-hydraul ics and random failures, in order to test the
continued applicability of the EOP and relevance of the contingency
actions. The design of experimental matrices for EOP validation
(conditions on parameters under which the EOPs are tested) should also
be studied for use in optimising EOPs.
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Validation carried out on full scope training simulators seems to
be a viable approach as reported from some of the countries. The
validation of EOPs to be used in situations behind the design basis
accidents (DBAs) will however require a further development of the
reactor accident codes.
HUMAN FACTOR CONSIDERATION IN PREPARING EOPs
Psycholinguistic approaches and typographical arrangements are
specially considered in the various guidelines for preparing EOPs
mentioned above. Several principles based on human factors
considerations are common to these different sets of guidelines:
- Instructions should be short and simple, with a precise use of
conditional and logic statements;
- Explanations of the reasons for operator actions are not
included in the EOP itself (but in associated technical
background documents);
- The EOPs are sometimes presented in a multiple column format,
including a column for notes and contingency actions;
- Flow charts and diagrams are used.
In most countries, computers are normally used only to record the
chronological sequence of events during an emergency. No utility has
introduced computer-assisted presentation of EOP text. A few advanced
applications of computers are being developed, and it seems likely that
the use of computers will increase in the future both for the
preparation of procedures and for their presentation to the operators.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO EOP DESIGN
Whil st the now-classical "event-oriented" approaches to EOP design
have long been used in most countries, "non-event-oriented" approaches
have recently been intensively studied and developed, and are now in
the process of being introduced in France and the Uni ted States. The
"event-oriented" procedures are in principle written one procedure for
each of the events considered. The selection of the correct procedure
is usually guided by a graphic decision tree aiding the operator to
diagnose the event. The "non-event-oriented" approach has been
introduced as a remedy to some of the problems observed with the
"event-oriented" approach.
The "non-event-oriented" approaches include the "symptom" and
"function" oriented.approaches developed in the Uni ted States, and the
"state" approach under study in France. The classical "event-oriented"
approach and the new approached can be described as
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(1) event-oriented approach: at an early stage of the transient,
the operators should ldentify what type of event has occurred
on the basis of the information given by the instrument
measurements and take remedial action as defined in the
procedure;
(2) non-event-oriented approaches:
- symptom-orlented approach the procedure defines a set of
symptoms which are an indication that something abnormal
has occurred. The operator can then take remedial action
according to the procedure and additional information
collected without knowing exactly what type of event
occurred;
- function-oriented approach the procedure defines a limited
set of safety related functions (Core cooling,
subcriticality etc.) which have to be maintained during the
operation and how these could be restored if put in
danger;
- state-approach the procedure defines a set of critical
state varlables and how the operators should take actions
to return the plant state from an unsafe region to a more
stable state.
DEFICIENCIES DF EVENT-DRIENTED PROCEDURES
It has been recognised that the event-oriented EOPs cannot fully
cope with the operational needs in the case of an unforeseen incident
because
- event-oriented procedures can cover only a limited number of
plant malfunctions,
- human errors in diagnosing the event or controling it could
render the operator stuck in an incorrect procedure.
The non-event-oriented approaches are directed to more general safety
goals and could therefore cover also cases with multiple plant
malfunctions. One non-event-oriented procedure is also applicable to
several events which makes the practical handling of the procedures
more easy. The event-oriented approach is crucially dependent on the
correctness of the initial diagnose of the event. The
non-event-oriented approach tends to give more guidance and time for
the diagnose and the resulting procedures tend to be more robust for
human errors.
The gravity in the impact of possible deficiencies of
event-oriented procedures depends on the reactor type, the degree of
plant automation or operation methods.
In spite of the deficiencies with the event-oriented procedures
they will offer however an optimal sequence of remedial actions when
the event has been diagnosed with sufficient accuracy. This will
probably at least with respect to easily diagnosed events lead to some
kind of mix between both approaches.
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LATEST APPROACHES IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED
STATES
The Task Force reviewed in some detail two newly-developed
approaches to overcoming these deficiensies; the function-oriented
procedures of the Westinghouse owners' group (United States), and the
physical state-oriented procedures of EdF (France).
One similarity between these approaches is that efforts are being
made to maintain the compatibility of new procedures with the existing
EOPs, so that the new approach does not pose any drastic changes to
operators' tasks. To ensure this, the existing procedures are improved,
taking account of human factors, and then the new procedures based on
new concepts or methods are added to extend the events which the EOPs
can cope with.
The new approaches facilitate the detection of operators' errors,
and also include optimal recoveryactions for such errors. Operators.
can thus take appropriate actions for these human errors without
knowing the actual causes of the event.
Whilst the objectives and the final results of approaches seem
equivalent, there are important differences in the logic applied. In
the Westinghouse approach, the six most significant "Critical Safety
Functions" (CSFs), are monitored in sequences with the help of status
trees prepared for each CSF.
On the other hand, in the French state-oriented procedures, a
physical state of the plant at any time is defined in terms of a matrix
of all the plant parameters being monitored and the availability of the
safety system functions. Operating procedures are provided for each of
these states in the matrix (called the "Ul grid"). The French approach
does not specifically stipulate the contingency actions to take if
additional events take place, because as the state evolves, different
operating procedures corresponding to the new state are called into
play. The Ul procedures are used until the plant reaches a stable
state.
CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the differencies in the use of the EOPs in the
different countries surveyed it seems to be a broad consensus on their
importance and the main principles of their use. It is important to
assess the EOPs not in isolation but as apart of the whole work
situation, where the control room, staffing principles, training, other
operational support and documentations also play important roles.
With respect to the development of EOPs one could note that:
- procedures are now assessed from both technical and
human-factors point,of view;
- the need to introduce non-event-oriented procedures is well
understood; however, the necessary preliminary step to do so are
not yetwell established in all countries.
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The approch for assessment and validation will in different
countries take a course which is depending on
- used approaches for control room design (non-computer based or
computer based)
- the organisation of the operating crew and their
responsibilities
- the role and influence of regulatory bodies in the preparation
of EOPs
- simulators available for the validation of EOPs
- used training methods for the introduction of new procedures
- new plant constructions
EOPs is continued in the next future, within the CSNI principal working
group activities, by application to some real cases.
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SIMULATOR MODELLING OF THE PWR
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Technical University of Brno
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Tr. Obrancu miru 65, 6D2 42 Brno
Czechoslovakia
ABSTRACT
The project of the mathematical modelling of physical proces-
ses in the PWR for the 1st Czechoslovak full scope simulator
of the nuclear power plant is given. The mathematical models
formation issues from the formulation of basic laws and equa-
tions of nuclear physics, thermodynamics and mechanics of
liquid. Numerical analysis of this problem leads to the choise
of one-step explicit difference schemes for the numerical
solution of differential parts of the mathematical model. The
special programme system SIMULACE enables numerical simula-
tion of plant transients in the PWR in real time including
simple incorporating other simulator models of the nuclear
power plant.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of the mathematical modelling of a nuclear power
plant components for a full scope simulator purposes is specific
by the existence of great number of physical quantities to be mo-
delled, the requirement of modelling a wide spectrum of operational
regimes and the necessity of achieving the operational level of the
simulation precision at the securing of the simulation in real time.
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The necessity of the full scope simulator for nuclear power
plants with WWER 440 reactors in the Czechoslovakia has been given
by the present state and the outlooks of the further development
of the Czechoslovak nuclear power complex. Specifications of the
WWER 440 reactor: thermal power 1375 MW, electrical power 440 MW,
number of control rods 37, number of fuel assemblies 349, number of
pins per assembly 126, concentration of fresh fuel 1.6-3.6% U 235,
coolant borated water, operating pressure 12.25 MPa, coolant flow
-1 09000 kgs ,coolant temperature at inlet 276 C, coolant temperature
at outlet 296 0 C, number of circuits 6.
The 1st Czechoslovak simulator for nuclear power plants with
WWER 440 reactors is built in Brno and its operating is planned in
the 2nd half of 1984. Principal application spheres of this simula-
tor are all phases of granting the operational licences to the
relevant worker groups of nuclear power plants. Specifications of
the computer system of that full scope simulator: 2 our own digital
computers RPP 16 (main memory 128 kbyte, disk store 15 Mbyte)
complimented with special analog system.
FORMATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE REACTOR
The stage of the mathematical model formation of the PWR
represents the adequate application of conservation laws for mass,
momentum and energy, equation of state, equations of neutron and
xenon balances, initial and boundary conditions and relevant cons-
tituing relations on the problem to be solved. In a general case,
is the complete mathematical model of the PWR represented by a
system of nonlinear partial differential, integrodifferential and
nondifferential equations and relations conditions, which must form,
from the point of the solution possibility, a closed system of
equations. Hence it is not real, and for the simulator requirements
advantageous, to simulate numerically in real time that model of
the PWR without a adequate simplification.
For our own full scope simulator the approximation of the
reactor core by means of a system mutually not reacting channels
appears to be sufficient with a simplified geometric configuration
is used t3/. The simulation of the physical behavior of the entire
reactor core is obtained by means of a suitably celected parametric




STRUCTURE OF THE REACTOR CORE MODEL
By the application of general formulations of fundamental
laws and relations of the continuum mechanics and nuclear physics
on the considered physical model (a one-dimensional channel consis-
ting of n-section), while respecting the simplifing assumptions, we
can obtain the following system of equations of the mathematical
model:
from the substantial form of the conservation law for mass we then
have for the coolant (the index cl:
O(fc Sc) +~-O
a't' oz
-3 2where ~ (kgm ) is the mass density, S (m ) the cross section, ~(s)
the time, G (kgs- l ) the mass flow rate, z (m) the Cartesian coordi-
nate of the channel;
the substantial form of the conservation l;w for momentum leads
for the coolant to:
n l. i ~ S 2}
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where 1 (m) is the lenght, h (m) the height, p (Pa) the pressure,
I'vfr (-) the friction coefficient, d (m) the diameter, I (-) the
coefficient of local losses, ~ (-) the velocity parameter, index j
is the index of the j-th channel section, n denotes the total
number of channel sections;
from the conservation law for energy we obtain for the fuel (the
index f):
~Tf =_1_ [citv (~f ~rad Tf )+ hiJ
u't Cftf
where T (K) is the temperature, c (Jkg-lK- l ) the specific heat
capacity, ~ (kgm- 3 ) the mass density, ?v (Wm-1K- l ) the termal con-
ductivity, qv (wm- 3 ) the heat power source;
and then have for the coolant:
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where in addition w (ms- 1 ) is the velocity, z (m) the Cartesian
coordinate of the channe1, qs (wm- 2 ) the heat f1ux density to the
coo1ant, Os (m) the wetted circuit, S (m2 ) the cross section;
the equation of state reduces for the fuel:
tf = cOnst
and gives for the coo1ant:
where as function kc is used the po1ynomica1 function;
the equation of the neutron balance gives:
dn (,J-ß ~. C




where n (m- 3 ) is the neutron density, ~ (-) the reactivity, ~(-)
the portion of delayded neutrons, A (s) the mean time of the ins-
tantaneous neutron origin, ~ (s-l) the decay constant, C (m-3 ) the
nuc1eus concentration, the index i is the index of the i-th group
of delayded slow neutrons, m denotes the total number of de1ayded
neutron groups;
the equation of the xenon balance leads to:
where ~ (-) is the relative yield, Lf (m-
1 ) the total macroscopic
cross section for fission, ~ (m- 2s- 1 ) the partic1e flux density of
neutrons, indexes I and Xe refer to I 135 and' Xe 135;
the conditions of uniqueness:
these determine geometric, physical, initial and 1imiting peculia-
rities of the problem to be solved.
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MATHEMATICAL APPROXIMATION OF THE PWR MODEL
In regard to the different character and numerical peculiari-
ties of the mathematical model equations, the next stage of the
model formation is the selection of a suitable mathematical appro-
ximation.
For energy equations of the fuel (3.1) and of the coolant
(3.2), the approximation has been selected by the quasistationary
method, the basic idea of which is the assumption of a weak time
dependence of the space component of the thermal fields solution
within a certain, limited time interval. For the modification of
time depending equations of the short termed kinetics of a nuclear
reactor (5), the approximation by the method of the singular per-
trubation analysis has been used, which with the help of the inner
and outer asymptotic solution development eliminates the numerical
stiffne$of the initial system of differential equations.
After the above mentioned mathematical approximations, the
mathematical model of the PWR is formed by 9 submodels (Fig. 1),
consisting of the sequence of differential sections (the system of
linear and nonlinear ordinary differential equations of the 1st
order), and nondifferential sections' (the systems of algebraic
relations and logic conditions).
PROGRAMME SYSTEM
Before the final classifying of formed mathematical models of
indiVidual components of the nuclear power plant (reactor, steam
generator, turbine, etc.) in the software of own nuclear simulator,
their accouracy is checked, and the selection of the advantageous
numerical methods is carried out. For this purpose, the special
programme simulation system SIMULACE has been assembled and debuged
[3/, which after a simple incorporation of these mathematical
models enables their real time simulation by the selected numerical
method from a system of 5 programmed one-step explicite methods
(the Euler's of the 1st order, the Runge-KuttoV's of the 2nd order,
the Heune's of the 3rd order, the Gill's of the 4th order and the
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Fig. 1 Strukture of the reactor model
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NUMERICAL RESULTS
The eorreetness seleeted approaehes to the problems solution
of the simulator mathematieal modelling of antieipated and abnormal
plant transients in PWRs of the type WWER 440 has been tested by
the numerieal simulation of 38 different, stationary and nonsta-
tionary, operational regimes. The simulation ealeulation was made
by the Euler's explieite metod with the different ~teps of the nu-
merieal integration of differential parts of individual mathemati-
eal submodels.
The results of the numerieal simulation of one group of nonsta-
tionary operational regimes, eaused by the failures of the main
eireulation pumps with the subsequent operation of the automatie
reaetor power regulator are enelosed in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Values
of represented parameters of the reaetor are relatived to the nomi-
nal parameters. Used symbols: NR the heat power, Ge the mass flow
rate, tel the eoolant temperature at inlet, t e2 the eoolant tempera-
ture at outlet, Pe2 the eoolant pressure at outlet, the index 0 re-
fers to nominal value of the parameter.
CONCLUSIONS
The earried out eomparison of obtained results to the experi-
mental results aeeomplished at the nuelear power plant Vl at
Jaslovske Bohuniee /4/ and 3-D ealeulations for the nuelear power
plant V2 /6J have shown for the full seope simulator purposes the
suffieient agreement of the reaetor fundamental parameters, whilst
aehieving simultaneously the simulation in the real time (the time
faetor of about 0.3).
The profound theoretieal analysis of the solved problems ena-


























Fig. 2 Results of the plant transient simulation
in the PWR of the type WWER 440 - failure
of all eireulation pumps with the subsequent
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Fig. 3 Results ,of the plant transients simulation
in the PWR of the type WWER 440 - failure
of one eireulation pump with t~e subsequent
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SIMULATION FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR TECHNOLOGY
J.D.Lewins
University of Cambridge
Cambridge CB4 1PZ, England
ABSTRACT
Rapid deve10pments in digital computers have allowed nuclear
reactor simulators to take an important role in the nuclear
power design and operating industry. The Cambridge
international meeting on nuc1ear reactor simulators c1arified
national attitudes to simulator use in areas of design,
training, accident study and licensing. Papers given to the
meeting were usefu1 in making a first approach to a philosophy
for the methododlogy of simulator design and their verification
and validation.
INTRODUCTION
The Institution of Nuclear Engineers organised an international
conference entit1ed Simulation for Nuclear Reactor Technology at Cambridge,
9-11 April 1984. It was attended by over 150 specialists for many countries
and the material covered in the four sessions will be of interest to those
concerned with thermal reactor safety in many aspects.
REACTOR DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
The simulation of reactors for design purposes has gone b,eyond the
original concept of static reactor physics coupled with elementary neutron
kinetics, to a full-scope simulation of reactors so as to display their
dynamic behaviour. At first sight, there is a difference of requirement
between the present Uni ted Kingdom single-phase gas-cooled reactors and the
greater challenge of LWRs with their emphasis on two-phase flow. Dr Wulff and
his co-authors from the US Brookhaven Laboratory outlined their special
simulation developments on the AD10 processor for BWR technology and A.D.Alley
and co-workers from General Electric offered similar insights into the Liquid
Meta1 dynamic simulators. Yet it was clear that the difference between such
studies and simulation in gas-cooled systems is actual1y less marked since the
1atter, being steam-raising plant, imply that the simulation of boiler
dynamics is as much apart of the overall plant representation as the reactor
core. What was interesting then in Professor Jeffries' case study of boiler
dynamics was the illustration of a different approach to two-phase f10w
problems using a linearized technique and employing the Uni ted Kingdom (UK)
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) suite of programs, DYMEL.
Two further papers in this session dealt with the problem of two-phase
flow simulation. The first was from Belgium's Mol Centre, with de Greef giving
an efficient description of both pressurizer and heat exchanger of a PWR in
terms of their common-form equations. The second was one of a pair of papers
from Canada on the PHWR-CANDU system in which Dr Kahn described the simulation
763
study, rig verification and design changes brought about in the 660 MW(e)
design. The simulation study revealed an unexpected coolant oscillation, with
potential consequences of downgrading reactor power. An experimental rig
confirmed both the problem and the efficacy of the design modification to
correct the situation. It was brought out in the discussion of this paper how
difficult it had been to convince management of the seriousness of the
simulation study when analysis by existing codes had apparently not shown any
such divergent oscillations. It was a human part of the story to hear that
previous studies had indeed predicted such oscillations but these had been
attributed to "machine error" and patched out of the programs. When the
analyst has justifiable and sufficient faith in his programs to reject such a
"fix", we can indeed say that simulation for ·design and analysis has come of
age.
Underlying the particular illustrations of reactor design simulation,
valuable as they were, is a more difficult question of the purpose of such
simulation and the methodology by which a simulator might be verified and
accepted. Such questions were addressed again during the conference and in
relation to accident studies and the philosophy of training.
TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
Dr Stammers, an industrial pyschologist, set the scene for a study of
simulators in training and operations. He pointed out that it is as important
to study the effectiveness of simulators for their psychological role as their
physical accuracy. The point was further illustrated by papers from the head
of the CEGB Nuclear Power Training Centre (Peter Myerscough), a paper by
Scoland of the Westinghouse Corporation (presented by Walsh) and by M.Felignes
from Electricite de France. It is evident that all utilities now see a major
role for full-scope simulators in training although some variance remains in
respect of a different emphasis on plant specific and plant generic models.
This difference, between specific or generic, was tackled several times
in the meeting. Part of such discussion showed that there was considerablY
more PWR operating experience originating in the UK than the role of the
Sizewell Inquiry into the proposed first CEGB PWR might suggest, in that the
Royal Navy has experience of operating some 20 small PWR submarines and indeed
was able to contribute considerably to the meeting in respect of training
based upon simulators.
A reflective and philosophical paper, pointing out a number of weaknesses
in so-called full-scope simulators, was given by Eugene Thames. He contrasted
the nature of the TMI-II accident with its long-term development over a
critical period of at least 48 hours with the limited ability of present
simulators to do more than illustrate a specific accident condition a~d the
immediate action that operators might take to correct for it. In reality,
accidents of a serious nature can have long and slow developing histories.
Thames asked the critical question, whether such a training of operators in
unreal simulated conditions was satisfactory.
A paper from the CEGB's Wylfa station (the largest commissioned Magnox
reactor) discussed a special purpose simulator and its role in providing for
the correct choice of emergency cooling.
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SIMULATION METHODS, LANGUAGES AND TECHNIQUES
In one sense, the conference had already focussed on an underlying
technical problem, the simulation of two-phase flow. Papers on the second day
brought attention to another problem: the difficulty of securing stable
numerical behaviour over adequate time intervals arising from the "stiff"
nature of the coupling of the various physical components from prompt neutron
behaviour to slow graphite temperature transients.
Budd's paper from the CEGB gave a practical solution to this problem in
what he called "local eigenvalue protection" though this approach was not
without dispute. .Two interesting papers from Scotland (where the South of
Scotland Electricity Board is commissioning the Hunterston-B AGR with a
full-scope simulator) carried solutions to these problems through to a working
result.
We were also able to hear of applications of simulators to ass ist
operations, in Dr Horne's paper on the essential systems integrity monitor and
an account of Finnish work by Hanninen and Miettinen for primary circuit
accidents in a training reactor.
General discussion in the Conference raised two points in which national
practices differed. There was some puzzlement from North America that UK
practioners should not use modern purpose-written simulator languages for
digital computing work but expressed a preference· for FORTRAN. The UK
philosophy seemed to put more emphasis on the need to maintain the program
during the necessary plant life of the simulator (say up to 40 years for the
station it represents) and the need for clear structure in the programming.
Surely this is true, in the sense that CPU power and computer speed are
unlikely to be overriding limitations as the years bring further rapid
advances in computer hardware. Good programming in this context is far more a
matter of good structure, to make it apparent what the program is actually
doing, than clever tricks to speed the simulation.
Both sides, however, accepted the desirability of using fundamental
physics rather than empirical fitting, particularly where the simulator is to
be used to extrapolate into unverifiable accident conditions. There was much
less agreement on the methodology of validation for full-scope simualtors.
Essentially, one must ask what the purpose of the simulator iso Is it then
proper to represent a "best estimate" model and determine how the reactor will
most probably behave in an accident, or to employ what might be called a "best
accident" model to include pessimism that allows for the dangerous accident to
be that which departs from "best estimate" behaviour?
FUTURE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR SIMULATION
Discussion was stimulated by Wachtel's paper, giving the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's view of developments of the role of simulators in
licensing. The first thing we have to absorb is that the purpose of such
simulators is, now, not training but operator licensing. Wachtel anticipated
that in about three years it would be mandatory to test a reactor operator on
a simulator, but he was careful to avoid the term "plant-specific" and used




Major points that arose from the meeting included: firstly, the need to
identify the purpose of the simulator and, in many cases, the lack of critical
study of whether existing simulators met such a specific purpose. Secondly,
there was the challenging problem of two-phase flow simulation with its
continuing basis of empiricism in heat-transfer correlations. There remained a
divergence of views on how to deal with " s tiffness" in speeding machine
convergence and an even bigger uncertainty in just how to go about
verification and validation of simulators. It remained an unanswered question
perhaps, what objective criteria can be written into a purchasing contract.
Proceedings of the Conference (ISBN 0 521 27785 4) are published by the
Cambridge University Press for the Institution of Nuc1ear Engineers (ed
D.G.Walton) .
766
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS
IN EC COUNTRIES
'f. Eckered
Nuclear Safety Board of the Swedish Utilities
Box 5864 S-102 48 STOCKHOLM Sweden
W. Essler
Commission of the European Communities
Rue de la Loi 200 B-1049 BRUSSELS Belgium
ABSTRACT
The TMI-2 accident in March 1979 became a starting point for a
reconsidering of the levels of ambition for Emergency Planning
and Preparedness (EPP) in many countries. At the same time
that accident lead to new and deepened studies of the basis
for accident analyses and for emergency preparedness.
Many existing or planned EPP measures are based on assumptions
concerning accident sequences, release of radioactivity and
accident consequences which in many cases are far too pessi-
mistic. A higher level of ambition for EPP measures based on
these assumptions does therefore not seem to be justified.
The present criteria and practices for EPP in the EC countries
have recently been brought together in studies made (or under
preparation) for the Commission of the European Community.
Some results of these studies will be presented and proposals
will be given for a harmonized approach to EPP, with special
attention to the needs of EC countries.
INTRODUCTION
In many countries the accident at the TMI-2 reactor at the end
of March 1979 became a starting point for studies and action in the
area of Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Mostly, safety autho-
rities started to question the efficiency and appropriateness of
the existing measures but at the same time as the TMI-2 accident
underlined the need for revisions of procedures for Emergency Plan-
ning and Preparedness (EPP) it also created a new basis of knowled-
ge for judging what EPP were needed. Unfortunately, the new infor-
mation and knowledge have emerged slower than the need for it. The
pressure for improvement of EPP, which was both a technical and a
political pressure, came so soon that the new information which
should be the basis for the changes was not yet available.
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Countries of the European Community have been cautious in
their implementation of new requests for EPP measures which has
given them the opportunity to learn from what has been tried in
other countries and to study needs and consequences more in detail.
THE TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL BASIS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING
AND PREPAREDNESS
Nuclear facilities are designed, constructed and operated in
such ways that the probability for a serious accident is extremely
small.
However, general safety and political considerations and the
experience of incidents during nuclear power reactor operation jus-
tify effective emergency planning and preparedness programmes. It
is much more difficult to say on what level of ambition the effec-
tive EPP programme should be placed.
Two entirely different technical approaches could be chosen.
The first is to rely on extreme conservatism. In thatcase "a model
accident" should be assumed independent of its probabilities. That
"worst possible accident" should then be used for defining what
emergency measures would be needed. Probably you would then get an
EPP programme which would be fit for handling more difficult situ-
ations than would ever occur. The other approach would be to start
from a best estimate of a range of possible accidents. That would
quite naturally lead to EPP programmes being much less ambitious
and more flexible than in the former case. You could anyhow show
that they would be sufficient for all reactor accidents which would
reasonably occur. In both these approaches you would get an EPP
programme which would be much more ambitious than corresponding
programmes for any other - or at least almost every other - acti-
vity in society of comparable risks.
Technical approaches, as described above, are of course the
only possible for establishing the basis for the choice of techni-
cal EPP measures - and most of those are technical. At the same
time it is self-evident that political considerations and political
decisions lie behind all EPP programmes.
When considering the technical and non-technical basis for the
choice of a general "EPP ambition level" and of different EPP mea-
sures, the following aspects are important:
- Risk scenarios
- Protective actions
- Sensitivity of emergency planning assumptions
- Costs and benefits of different protective actions.
It is evident that with the existing knowledge several diffe-
rent risk scenarios can be chosen to describe not only a "best
estimate accident" in nuclear power reactors but also to describe
"the worst possible accident". The choice of a risk scenario is
decisive for the consequence picture of the assumed accident. It
is also evident from recent studies and experiments that previous
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analyses of core-melt accidents have over-estimated the consequen-
ses of many accident sequences, including a core-melt. Most in-
teresting; anyhow, is that estimated radioactive releases from a
severe accident probably have been too high. The uncertainty is the
degree to which it has been overstated. Ongoing work will remove
that uncertainty, but probably not entirely until some years from
now.
In JUly 1984 the ANS Topical Meeting "Fission Product Be-
haviour and Source Term Research" gave a picture of the many on-
going international research activities concerning severe acci-
dents. In our view it was evident that there is now a widespread
agreement on th~ technical questions:
- Reactor containments can resist severe accident sequences
better than assumed in the WASH-1400 study
- Some of the most violent sequences can be excluded for
physical reasons
- Fission products from the reactor core are captured in the
reactor more efficiently than assumed earlier and source terms
will therefore be smaller
However,
- There are accident sequences which will decrease the efficien-
cy of the containment, and
- The source terms and the activity released to the environment
will thus depend on what kind of nuclear power plant is in-
volved.
An illustrative comparison of the impact of a "WASH-1400
accident" and an accident with smaller release factors has been
made at EPRI:
IMPACT OF SMALLER RELEASE FACTORS RELATIVE TO WASH-1400
(Iodine and particulates considered)
WASH-1400 1/5 1/10
Number of early
injuries 1 0.032 0.002
Number of latent
cancer fatalities 1 0.35 0.22
Area interdicted
more than 10 years 1 0.11 0.037
It is evident that a reduction of the estimated releases by a
factor of ten, or even less, would markedly affect the basis for
present EPP programmes. The EPP areas which are of special interest
in this situation are
769
- The size of the emergency planning zone (EPZ)
- The conditions mandating evacuation or sheltering of the
public or parts of it
- Public alerting and warning systems requirernents
- The possible distribution and use of stable iodine tablets.
There is a choice of suitable protective actions when a
release has occurred or when there is a threat of arelease.
Very few studies of the cost effectiveness of different coun-
ter-measures to a nuclear accident have been performed. Even stu-
dies of the cost of counter-measures are rare.
Some counter-measures could apriori be considered to be cost
effective because there are no realistic alternatives to them.
These are:
- Emergency planning
- Simple personnel protection measures
- Control of access to contaminated areas
A second category of counter-measures, when judged on a cost-
benefit basis, is sheltering. Sheltering can be done in existing
buildings, where great parts of the population will stay already
when an emergency situation is declared. The costs for sheltering
will be lowas long as it is imposed for relatively short periods
of time. Also risks and harm associated with it will be low.
Others of the counter-measures should be subject to more de-
tailed cost-effectiveness considerations. These are:
- Evacuation
- Distribution of stable iodine tablets
- The size of emergency planning zones (EPZ)
- Installation of warning- and alarm systems
- Bans on food consumption
- Decontamination of land.
Recent studies show clearly that the cost-effectiveness of the
distribution of iodine tablets can be strongly questioned. Also in
the United States and in Sweden where preplanned stockpiling and
predistribution of those have been applied, safety authorities are
reconsidering their attitudes.
The most important "protective action" for the health of the
public is not included in Emergency Planning and Preparedness. It
is the safety functions of the nuclear installations, deterrnined by
design, construction, operation and management, which will be the
primary contribution to the protection. This is self-evident, but
must anyhow be underlined in any discussion about EPP. Planning for
emergencies will seldorn produce plans which can be applied word by
word on areal emergency, but good planning will produce an ability
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for correct, improvised actions in an cmergency. Therefore, plan-
ning as such might be one of the most effective protective actions.
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES
The EC countries and also some other countries have answered a
questionnaire from the Commission of the European Communities on
off-site emergency planning and preparedness. The questionnaire
covered the follmling i tems:
- The planning basis, i.e. the kind of accident conditions
considered
- Organization and responsibilities
- Emergency facilities and functions
- Emergency response measures and means
- Accident assessment
Training, drills and exercises
- Records keeping
- Guidelines and criteria for emergency measures.
The answers to this questionnaire ar; at present being brought
together into a summary report describing national positions and
practices.
The "Emergency Reference Levels" (ERLs) used in different
countries (also non-EC countries) are given in the tables below. It
must be noted that a policy applied in some countries is that
general ERLs should not be used, but that the need for counter-mea-
sures should be judged from case to case depending on available
information. In some countries the ERLs are recommended values, in
others they are mandatory. In for instance the UK and the FRG ERLs
are defined as ranges. If predicted dose equivalents exceed the
lower level, implementation of the counter-measure is desirable,
but not essential. There is also a higher level at which counter--
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The "CEC Guideline" in the two tables abo':'e refers to the
ERLs proposed as broad dose ranges in a CEC guide "Radiological
Protection Criteria for controllIng doses to the public in the
event of accidental releases of radioactive material" (V/5290/82
EN, July 1982).
Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) can be defined as the areas
around a nuclear installation for which planning is recommended to
ensure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect
the public in the event of an accident. The EPZs required in some
countries are given in the table below.
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The CEC has set up a working party on trannfrontier emergency
planning. Its terms of reference are:
- to collect information on existing bilateral contacts and
agreements between Member States on transfrontier emergency
planning and on experience gained therefrom;
- on the basis of the information thus obtained to draw up a
report setting out the most important aspects of emergency
planning which require to be covered by bilateral agreements
between Member States.
Bilateral agreements have been made between EC Countries con-
cerning reactors situated close to borders involving Belgium, Den-
mark, France, FRG, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. There are also
agreements between EC and non-EC countries. Between the Nordic
Countries there are agreements on consultations before decisions
about border installations and on mutual assistance. The IAEA is
preparing a multilateral agreement on mutual assistance in accident
situations.
AN APPROACH TO HARMONIZATION
The distribution of risk around a nuclear installation de-
pends on population density, land use and similar parameters, but
of course not on whether anational border passes close to Ule ins-
tallation. The emergency preparedness in one country at one side of
the border could differ from that on the other side, and the pro-
tection of the public could then be of different quality on diffe-
rent sides of the border. Attitudes to emergency preparedness are
so similar in the EC countries that this situation would probably
not occur. Further harmonization of criteria and practices in the
EC countries will decrease the risk that divergencies in EPP in two
neighbour EC countries should cause public anxiety.
There are areas where harmonization between countries might be
difficult due to differences in administrative or organizational
patterns, like
- Organization and responsibilities
- Emergency facilities and functions
- Monitoring during and after an aceeident.
On the other hand, these areas are not those in which the
greatest advantages of harmonization could be found.
There are other areas, however, where harmonization is more
needed and could be more easily achieved, like
- Emergency Assessment and Notification
- Communications: Organization, Procedures
- Emergency Planning Zones
- Evacuation
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- Other Counter-Measures than Evacuation
- Training, Retraining and Emergency Exercises
- Public Information.
On the other hand some of the areas where harmonization could
be achieved ought to be treated with caution because the basis for
decisions is still insufficient. Decisions about changes of the EPP
situation, which have far-reaching consequences, ought to be avoi-
ded for the time being in the area~:
- Action levels
- Emergency Planning Zones
- Evacuation organization
- The use of stable iodine tablets.
More specifically a number of recommendations can be given in
areas where harmonization is possible:
* Etnergency Reference Levels (ERLs) should to be used as criteria
for decisions during at least the first phase of an accident
concerning
- sheltering
- distribution of stable iodine tablets (or ordering of con-






An ERL should never be used as the one and only criterion for a
decision about iodine tablet consumption, evacuation or any
other far-reaching counter-measure. These decisions should be
founded on all available information about the accident situa-
tion to the extent that it is practically possible to take the
information into account.
When defining Emergency Action Levels (or "Criteria") for the
use of the nuclear utility, a clear distinction should be made
between those intended to put the site emergency plan into func-
tion and those intended for a general off-site emergency.
The characteristics of Emergency Planning Zones are very much
dependent on assumptions about accident sequences, source terms
and release behaviour. Taking into account the rapid reconsider-
ation of these elements in the total risk scenarios, changes of
present EPZs should be avoided during the few more years be fore
the less Conservative assumptions for these elements have been
confirmed.
Adecision about evacuation of any population should be taken
only if such an evacuation has been preplanned or if time is
available for careful planning, or if other counter-measures are






Plans should be established to cope with possible unplanned and
spontaneous evacuation by parts of the population.
Sheltering in buildings where members of the public live, work
or dweIl should be considered as a first choice of counter-
measure.
Distribution of stable iodine tablets (normally potassium iodi-
de) should not be made in advance of an accident to households
in the vicinity of a nuclear installation.
An agreement should be set up between the EC countries on how
mutual aid in an emergency situation in one country should be
organized. The agreement should cover, inter alia:
- Assistance from experts travelling to the site of the
accident or working from their horne country
- Equipment and materials to be sent to the site
- communication means to be used between the EC countries
during the emergency situation
Financial and legal arrangements for the support given,
both as concerns personnel and equipment.
The basis for harmonization is of course a common assess-
ment of what is important and what is not for achieving a suffi-
cient protection of the public. Therefore, a general recommendation
is that the ongoing work to verify best estimate values and suffi-
cient safety margins for parameters forming the basis for EPP
should be encouraged and followed closely. Until the results of
this work areavailable - which will be within some years from now
- EPP efforts should be concentrated on measures which have a low
sensitivity to variations in assumptions of accident parameters.
Furthermore, priority should not be given to measures of which the
possible benefits are small compared to the costs and where the
existing planning and preparedness could be judged to be sufficient
in the short term.
***
The views presented in this report are those of the authors.
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BRUCE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 'A' OPERATIONAL REVIEW FOR
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT WITH FUEL FAILURE SCENARIO
Dr. Salah Hassanien (p.Eng.)
Ontario Hydro, Bruce NGS 'A' Operations
Box 3000, Tiverton, Ontario, CANADA NOG 2TO
ABSTRACT
Bruce Nuclear Generating station 'A' is a four 826 MWe CANDU (PHWR) unit
station with a single Negative Pressure Containlnent System.
The operations staff carried out a review to re-assess the operations
required to maintain the accident unit and the unaffected units, in a
safe shutdown state for an extended period of time following a major Loss
Of 'Coolant Accident with fuel failures. Prime considerations were; safe
unit shutdown, fuel cooling, containment of radioactivity, essential
systems availability, accessibility and reliability, personnel evacuation
and operating and emergency procedures following such an accident.
The review identified design and procedural modifications required to
enhance the capability of the station systems and staff to control the
consequences of such a major accident.
INTRODUCTION
This work describes the rationale and the process which was undertaken by
the operating staff at Bruce Nuclear Generating station 'A' (Bruce NGS
'A') to review the operability and the actions required to nlaintain the
accident unit and the non-accident units, in a safe shutdown state for an
extended period of time (ie, 6 months) after a Loss Of Coolant Accident
(LOCA) with fuel failures. The same rationale and process can be adapted
to assess the essential systems operation and the operating procedures
required to enhance the capabilities of any nuclear generating station to
control lhe consequences of such a major nuclear accident.
Bruce NGS 'A' is owned and operated by ontario Hydro in the county of
Bruce on the eastern shore of Lake Huron, Ontario, Canada. The station
has four Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) units of the CANDU type
designed by Atomie Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) with a unit maximum
eontinuous rating (gross) of 826 MW electrieal equivalent [lI. There is
a single Negative Pressure Containment System (NPC) for all the four
reaetor units, the fuelling duet, central fuelling area, pressure relief
ducts, pressure relief manifold and vaeuum building, all intereonnected
together (Figure 1). The Emergency Coolant Injection System (ECI) is
designed to refill the Heat Transport system and keep it refilled after a
Loss Of Coolant Aecident (LOCA). The ECI System is eommon to all four
units. The present ECI System design is being upgraded by the addition
of a high pressure injection eapability. The new high pressure ECI will
be commissioned in 1984 and 1985. Figure 2 shows the flow diagram of the
present ECI System.
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In 1980 the design groups at AECL and Ontario Hydro re-evaluated their
assumptions for the radioactivity released from the reactor core to the
vault atmosphere and Heat Transport System following a Loss Of Coolant
Accident with fuel failure, using very conservative assumptions.
Consequently, predictions could be made on the resultant releases of
radioactive nuclides from the fuel and their transport and distribution
in various plant systems. The design groups then calculated the
radiation fields within and around the station and assessed the effects
of these fields on the integrity of the material, systems and equipment
under prolonged exposure conditions following a major LOCA. Existing
shielding provisions were also evaluated as well as provisions for
monitoring radiation after such an accident. This work constituted the
design review for the station (2).
On the basis of the data from the design review, the operational staff
undertook a detailed review on the operations necessary to maintain the
accident unit in a safe shutdown state for a prolonged period of time
(ie, more than 6 months following the accident). Also, because of the
fact that there is a single Negative Pressure Containment (NPC) System
and a single Emergency Coolant Injection (ECI) System, the non-accident
units would have to be shutdown in a controlled manner within a few hours
after the accident and be maintained in a safe shutdo~l state until both
NPC and ECI Systems are repoised.
On the basis of both the design and the operations review, several design
modifications and modifications to existing operating procedures were
recomrnended. Interim and permanent solutions were reviewed jointly by
the design groups, engineering and operations staff for effectiveness,
cost and implementation. The implementation of most of these solutions
was completed resulting in a greatly enhanced capability of the station
systems, equipment and personnel to effectively control the consequences
of such a major accident.
RATIONALE
In order to deal with the consequences of the postulated accident, ie,
major LOCA with fuel failure, operations staff should ensure the
following:
1. That capability of the station systems to perform the following
functions:
a) to automatically shutdown the accident unit and to shutdown
in a controlled manner the unaffected units, and to
maintain excess negative reactivity for an extended period
of timej
b) to maintain fuel cooling and heat sinks for extended
periods of timej
c) to contain radioactive nuclidesj
d) to supply water, air and power to essential systems.
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2. That the station emergeney proeedures and the operating
proeedure cover, in detail, all the aetions required after the
aeeident to maintain the units in a safe state, to ensure pub1ie
safety requirements are met, and to minimize radiation exposure
to operating personne1. Also, to cover evaeuation of
non-essential personne1 and the eontinuation of the essential
personnel, ie, Contro1 Room Operators, to perform maintenanee
requirements and samp1ing of essential systems.
3. To ensure that there are adequate shie1ding provisions so as no
exposure limits are exeeeded for operating personne1 during and
after the aeeident.
4. That the requirements for Post-LOCA radiation monitoring are met
[3J. These requirements ensure that all releases to the
environment are monitored and eontro11ed. Also, they ensure
that the exposure to the operating staff or the pub1ie will not
exeeed any regu1atory limits.
SYSTEMS REVIEW
The design review assessed the systems on the basis of eomponent and
material integrity under aeute and pro1onged radiatfon exposure
eonditions. Operations assessed the systems in term of whether they will
be required to operate after an aeeident and to ensure the re1iability of
these systems.
The systems were reviewed with respect to:
1. The System Function
Whether the system is required to shutdown, maintain fuel
coo1ing, contain radioactivity, maintain a heat sink, maintain
spent fue1 coo1ing, provide an essential supply of air, power or
water.
Whether the system is required to operate immediately after the
accident or not.
Whether the system will be required to operate for a short or a
10ng duration fo110wing the accident.
2. System Status After the Accident
Whether the system is fired, poised, shutdown er continuing to
operate. For examp1e, Shutdown System 1 will be automatica1ly
fired and will not be required to be repoised again. The
Emergency eoeling Injection recovery will be automatica11y
started and will be required to operate continuous1y.
3. The Effect of the Accident on the System
For examp1e, the containment systems and the Emergency eoo1ant




For systems to be samp1ed and maintained,i t is important that
they be accessib1e to Operators in terms of radiation fie1ds.
The system will be fu11y accessib1e if the fie1ds around it are
1ess than 200 mrem/h. The system will be partia11y accessib1e
for maintenance if the fields do not exceed 2 rem/ho In this
case, high hazard procedures will be in effect to carry out the
required maintenance.
5. System Component Redundancy
The majority of the systems, particularly safety and safety
re1ated systems, have been designed with some component
redundancy to ensure high systein reliabili ty. For examp1e, to
maintain 10ng term coo1ing of the spent fuel, the Primary Spent
Fue1 Bay Cooling System has 3 pumps and 3 heat exchangers, on1y
two of aach are required for the system to be fu1ly operational.
6. Back Up Systems to Essential Systems
For each of the essential systems, the back up and/or
alternative systems were fully assessed for accessibility,
operabi1iLy and maintainability.
7. Common Services Reliabi1ity
The reliabi1ity of the systems required to supply power, water
and air to the essential systems and to the station services
such as power to instruments and 1ights, breathing, service and
instrument air were assessed to ensure continuing supply of
common services on the same basis as safety and safety related
systems.
8. Mai ntenance Call-Ups and. Sampli ng
All necessary call-ups service 01' maintenance call-ups and
sampling requirements for each system were evaluated in terms of
need, frequency and the required field operation. The objective
of this was to reduce field actions to the minimum to avoid
unnecessary radiation exposure. All sampling with the exception
of the samp1es required for operator action will be suspended.
This review resulted in 22 recommendations for design changes, most1y to
increase shielding 01' to change some systems operations from loca1 to
remote operation, 01' to re10cate some component of a system to a more
accessible area in terms of radiation fields following a LOCA.
PROCEDURES REVIEW
Fol10wing a LOCA, the protective systems in the accident units will
operate automatical1y. There are other actions required from the Contro1
Room and fie1d operators as weIl as other station personneI. The short
term actions are:
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1. To ensure that the emergency is announced and that restricted
areas are identified.
Z. To ensure that all the emergency procedures for personnel
assembly and accounting, Search and Rescue are active.
3. To ensure that in-site and off-site emergency procedures are
active.
4. Tostart up two standby generators to ensure added security of
back up power supply.
5. To terminate all fuelling and safety system testing on the
unaffected units.
6. To terminate any DZO transfer from the affected unit if it is
i~ progress to conserve DZO supply.
7. To shutdown all the other three unaffected units as soon as
possible following the accident in a controlled manner by load
reduction.
8. To put all the unaffected units in a guaranteed shutdown state
(moderator overpoisoned and Heat Transport System is cooled).
9. To restriet access to areas of high radiation fields and suspend
all unnecessary field actions.
10. To dispatch survey teams to measure radiation fields in the
station and outside.
11. To evacuate all the non-essential personnel via routes
previously identified where radiation fields after survey are
less than ZOO mrem/h.
Following the short term actions to bring the accident and non-affected
units to a safe stable state and to ensure safety of station personnel
and the public, the operators will concentrate on maintaining the safe
state of the units and minimizing any releases to outside the station.
The operators will have the services of a large resource pool of
management and technical experts. Some ad hoc solutions may be devised
to deal with specific problems and/or component breakdown of a system.
A thorough review of all the procedures in the Abnormal Incidents Manual
and essential systems Operating Manuals [4], Radiation Protection
Procedures [5], in-site and off-Site emergency plans [6] was carried
out. Only minor modifications to the existing procedures were required
and these were issued. The procedure for a major LOCA in the Abnormal
Incidents Manual was expanded to reflect the· information from this
operational review.
SHIELDING REVIEW
The overall objectives of the review of the adequacy of existing
shielding for Post-LOCA were:
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1. To permit continuous occupancy of the main Contro1 Room. Hence,
additional shie1ding was insta1led in the vicinity of the
Control Room to limit the dose to less than 10 mrem/hr at any
time after the accident. This ensures that the potential
radiation dose uptake of a Control Room operator is less than 3
rem/quarter of a year.
2. To allow safe evacuation of non-essential personnel from the
station. The ECI recovery phase will start 15 minutes after the
accident, during which time personnel will be at or on route to
their assembly areas. Evacuation from the assembly areas will
be via designated routes where the dose rate will be less than
200 mrem/h. Evacuation will take 20 - 30 minutes.
3. To facilitate any field operation that is required after the
accident. Hence, shielding adequacy depends on where and when
the action will take place.
The radiation fields in the station were estimated and mapped in the
design reviews for the postulated accident. The unshielded radiation
shine from the Emergency Cooling Injection (ECI) header was unacceptably
high during the recovery phase, ie, recirculating the emergency core
coo1ing water through the reactor core. While it was considered that the
source term is highly conservative, the shielding calculations were based
on dose rates occurring half an hour after recovery starts, since these
are the highest probable rates. Generally, the dose rate will drop by a
factor of 3 after about 3 hours due to decay of short lived radioactive
nuclides, and by factors of 4 and 7 after one day and one week from the
accident respectively. In addition, after the installation and
commissioning of the High Pressure ECI header the dose rate will be
reduced by a factor of three due to the increased thickness of the header.
Oije of the most important recommendations of both the design and
operationa1 reviews was to erect shielding around the existing ECI
header. The shielding on both sides of the header was constructed of 20
cm of heavy concrete blocks on the north side and 60 cm standard concrete
blocks on the south side of the ECI header. (Figures 3 and 4)
RADIATION MONITORING REVIEW
The Design Group, with input from Operations, prepared a detailed list of
the Post-LOCA Radiation Monitoring functional requirements. The main
requirements were:
1. Performance and control monitoring of all the gaseous and liquid
effluents from the station to the environment.
2. Contro1 monitoring of all penetrations of the containment
envelope which would provide a pathway to the environment.
3. Environmental monitoring outside the station.
4. Warning system for hazardous areas within the station.
5. Personne1 radiation monitoring, dose control and contamination
control within the station.
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Performance monitoring is required to ensure that the regu1atory limits
on a110wab1e releases under accident conditions are not exceeded.
Contro1 monitoring is required to provide the operator with adequate and
time1y warning so that contro1 action can be taken to ensure that
regu1atory limits will not be exceeded. Operations assessed the existing
Radiation Honitoring Systems in terms of:
1. Meeting the functiona1 requirements.
2. Ability to measure the Post-LOCA radioactivity level or operate
in the Post-LOCA environment.
3. Manual operation, samp1ing, maintenance of the Monitoring System.
4. Adequacy of personne1 radiation monitoring and warning equipment
and dose contro1.
5. Equipment and procedures for contamination contro1.
The review pointed out some deficiencies, particu1ar1y with respect to
monitoring the noble gases which will be re1eased through the
contaminated exhaust system stack at anlounts exceeding the range of the
measuring instrumentation. Some re10cation of existing monitors was also
recommended to reduce the background radiation to the instrument and
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HEAT TRANSPORT INVENTORY MONITORING
FOR CANDU-PHW REACTORS
E. Hussein, J.C. Luxat
Ontario Hydro
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5G lX6
ABSTRACT
A computer-based DZO coolant inventory monitoring system
proposed for implementation on the digital computer controllers
at Ontario Hydro's CANDU generating units is discussed. By
monitoring process parameters and utilizing
probabilistically-based decision algorithms, timely indication
of any significant loss of DZO inventory willrbe provided to
the operator. The monitoring is performed in a co-ordinated
manner such that DZO los ses from either the heat transport
system or the inventory control system can be detected.
INTRODUCTION
At Ontario Hydro's CANDU generating units a great deal of attention is
paid to detecting heavy water coolant losses from the heat transport system
and the interfacing inventory control system. Presently, local indicators
such as pressurizer and DZO storage tank levels and moisture detectors are
used to detect coolant losses. However, it is desireable to have an
indication of the global, rat her than the local, coolant inventory in order
to account for coolant redistribution between different sYstem components
and to avoid any ambiguity that may result from conflicting local
indicators. This paper discusses a system that has been proposed at
Ontario Hydro for estimating the total mass inventory of the heat transport
system. This system is useful as an operator-aid for diagnosing the status
of the heat transport system. The function of this inventory monitoring
system is similar to that of the coolant level measurement in light water
reactors, where also a direct evaluation of the available coolant inventory
is provided.
CANDU HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
Figure 1 shows a simplified heat transport circuit of a typical CANDU
unit, in this example a unit at the Darlington Nuclear Generating station
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which is under construction. The heat transport system main circuit
consists of two figure-of-eight loops. Each loop contains two pumps, two
steam generators, two reactor inlet headers, two reactor outlet headers and
inlet and out let feeders for each of 240 fuel channels. Within a loop there
are two flow passes through the reactor core such that the coolant flows in
oppos~te directions in adjacent channels.
Each loop removes heat from half of the 480 channels in the reactor
core. Heavy water is fed to each of the fuel channels through individual
inlet feeder pipes and from each fuel channel through individual out let
feeder pipes to the horizontal reactor outlet headers. Each reactor out let
header is connected to a steam generator which is in turn connected to the
suction of a heat transport pump. Each pump delivers heavy water to the
corresponding inlet header.
FIGURE 1
A Typical CANDU Heat Transport System - Simplified Flow Sheet
Interfacing with the main heat transport circuit is the heat transport
pressure and inventory control system which contains the pressurizer, bleed
condenser, D20 storage tank and a feed and bleed circuit connecting to the
heat transport system. When the reactor is at power, pressure is controlled
by the pressurizer with inventory being adjusted by the feed and bleed
circuit. The bleed condenser can receive steam bleed from the pressurizer
and liquid bleed and relief from the heat transport system.
Other systems that interface with the main heat 'transport circuit have
not been shown in Figure 1. These systems are not described here since they
do not directly affect the heat transport inventory in the main circuit.
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In order to provide reliable control and monitoring of the heat
transport system, many process parameters are measured at different
locations in the main heat transport circuit and the pressure and inventory
control system. Pressure, temperature and liquid level (where appropriate)
are among the measurements obtained from different components in the HT
system. These measurements are input to unit dual computer control system;
used for direct digital control of reactor power regulation and a number of
process parameters, as weIl as for alarm annunciation and data display.
MONITORING APPROACH
The availability of many measured process parameter measurements in the
computer control system has motivated the development of computer based
systems for monitoring the coolant inventory. This eliminates the need to
install either new measurement loops or a data link facility to the control
computers. The pressure-tube design of the CANDU system does not permit the
use of a single parameter that can directly reflect the global coolant
inventory of the heat transport system. This is in contrast to light water
reactors where measurement of the coolant level in the pressure vessel can
provide a direct indication of the heat transport inventory.
Although the main objective is to monitor the coolant inventory inside
the main heat transport circuit, it is desirable to monitor the D20
inventory in the interfacing pressure and inventory control system. The
status of the latter system provides a direct indication of the amount of
coolant leaving or entering the main heat transport circuit. The proposed
monitoring approach can be systematically presented as shown in Figure 2.
External monitoring is provided by estimating the available coolant
inventory in the interfacing inventory control system, termed the ex-loop.
Coolant inventory changes in the main heat transport circuit (termed the
in-loop) are compensated by feed or bleed from the ex-loop, and monitoring
the latter provides indirect monitoring of the former. Reliance on
monitoring the ex-loop inventory might not be sufficient, particularly when
a loss of inventory occurs in the ex-loop itself (analogous to the TMI event
where inventory loss occured via the pressurizer relief valve). Therefore,
it is desireable to provide direct monitoring of the in-loop inventory.
Since the in-loop and eX-loop are interconnected, monitoring both systems
accounts for any mass exchange between them and provides an overall
inqication of the status of the HT system. The following Sections discuss














Internal and External Monitoring of the
Heat Transport System
EX-LOOP MONITORING
The ex-loop inventory is comprised of the coolant in the pressurizer,
bleed condenser and D20 storage tank. For each of these major components,
pressure, temperature and liquid level.measurements are available. This
enables direct estimation of the eX-loop inventory as follows:
Mex-loop
3
E Volk (Lk)/vk (Pk' Tk)'
k = 1
(1)
where the sUbscript k refers to one of the three components considered, Vol
is the liquid volume of the components estimated using the liquid level
measurement, L, and v is the specific volume of the' coolant evaluated using
the pressure, P, and temperature, T, measurements.
Equation (1), in addition to providing a simple and a straightforward
method of estimating the ex-loop inventory, gives a global indication of the
status of the eX-loop that accounts for coolant distribution among the
different components. This, of course, is better than relying on a
single-component measurement, (either the pressurizer or D20 storage tank
levels), to determine the status of the loop.
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INTERNAL MONITORING: THE INTEGRAL METHOD
Analogous to the method used for monitoring the ex-loop inventory, the
in-loop inventory can be provided by estimating the mass available in
individual components in the HT-loops, with the sum (integral) giving the
total in-loop inventory. In each of the figure-of-eight loops, one can
identify the following components: the reactor channels and feeders, inlet
headers, outlet headers, steam generators and HT pumps. The in-loop mass
inventory can be then evaluated using the expression:
Min-loop
2 N
L: L: VOlij I Vij (Pij' Tij)'
i=l j=l
(2 )
where i refers to the figure-of-eight loop considered, usually two loops,
refers to the particular component in the loop, N is the total number of
components per loop, Vol is the component volume and v is the specific
volume of the component estimated using the measured component pressure, P,
and temperature, T. Since two-phase flow (boiling) regions can be
encountered near the exit of the reactor channels, particular attention is
given in the calculations to account for the vapour content. One should
also note that the 120 reactor channels and feeders in a flow pass through
the core are considered as a single lumped component.
As evident from equation (2), thermodynamic relationships are required
for the subcooled and saturated specific volumes, as well as for the
enthalpies employed in the two-phase flow calculations. Also computer
storage has to be allocated for the signal processing of the measurements
associated with the components. These factors make this method demanding in
terms of computer resources and reduces its suitability for adoption in
operating reactor units where computer resources are usually limited.
Because of the summation process involved, the method is called the integral
method to distinguish it from the differential method presented, in the next
Section, which is designed to minimize computer resources. Additional
details on the integral method are reported elsewhere [1].
INTERNAL MONITORING: DIFFERENTIAL METHOD
This monitoring method takes advantage of the fact that inlet feeder
mass flow rate measurements for selected reactor channels are available to
the control computers. The average value of these measurements in a flow
pass provides an estimation of the inlet flow rate. Flow measurements in a
closed loop can be then utilized to check the continuity of mass flow around
the loop and provide indication of loss of coolant from the loop. Also, the
deviation of the flow measurements from the nominal flow rate at the given
operating conditions can give an indication of the status of the heat
transport loop. These monitoring methods are discussed in more detail later
in the Section, after discussing the prospect of utilizing a flow-related
measurement that is also available to the control computers.
~
Recent LOFT experiments [2) indicated that changes in heat transport
pump power and consequently pump-motor current, can be utilized in
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monitoring coolant inventory. The pump-motor current is a measurement that
is available to the control computer and is taken as an indicator of the
mass flow rate through the pump. A significant inventory loss would result
in a decrease in the coolant mass flowing through the pump and consequently
a reduction of the load on the pump-motor which is directly reflected by the
motor current. The pump-motor currents in the heat transport system are
treated in the inventory monitoring process in a fashion similar to that
employed for flow rate measurements.
The first check applied in the differential method is based on a
continuity principle which implies that the mass flow rate between two flow
monitoring stations in a loop should be equal if no mass addition or
reduction is introduced in the section between the two stations. A loss of
flow in that section would then result in a difference in the flow
measurements equivalent to the rate of loss. The second check used in the
monitoring process is called the "expected" mass delivery. If a specific
mass flow rate is expected at a given flow monitoring station at given
operating conditions, and a lower flow rate is measured, then this indicates
a loss of flow upstream the monitoring station. The nominal loop flow rate
is used as the expected value and it is evaluated independently as a weak
function of the reactor operating power level.
Using the inlet feeders aB the flow monitoring stations for the mass
flow measurements and the heat transport pumps as the monitoring stations
for the pump-motor current measurements and applying the continuity and the
expected mass delivery checks discussed above, a computer algorithm is
developed and reported in detail elsewhere [3].
In addition to the simplicity of the differential method, it also
provides information regarding the location at which the loss occurs
relative to the monitoring stations. The differential nature of the process
makes it more susceptible to measurement noise, as compared to the integral
method. The effect of noisy measurements is to raise the value of the
threshold loss rate in the in-loop above which the loss can be confirmed
with a high degree of confidence by the detection algorithm. However, given
the fact that coolant losses in the in-loop are directly compensated by feed
from the ex-loop, monitoring the latter provides coverage for the small loss
rate not covered by the in-loop differential monitoring. Here, one should
re-emphasize the importance of the in-loop monitoring for detecting losses
in the ex-loop that result in coolant flow out of the main heat transport
circuit. A loss such as this is detected only by the in-loop monitoring.
The integral monitoring method provides a system that is less susceptible to
measurement noise and consequently capable of detecting smaller in-Ioop
losses. On the other hand, the differential method is simpler and is less
demanding of computer resources. Therefore it can be more easily
implemented in an operating unit.
THE LaSS DETECTION PROCEDURE
The main pur pose of the inventory monitoring system is to determine
whether a decrease in available coolant inventory has occurred. The
procedure used to detect any signficant decrease in coolant inventory is








In an on-line monitoring system fluctuations in the measured data with
time are expected. These observed fluctuations generally are a result of
internal and external random noise that cannot be controlled. Therefore, it
is important to filter or smooth out the measurements before utilizing them
in any decision making process. The filtering process has been implemented
as a simple first order digital filter, using the exponentially weighted
moving average [1] given by:
Zt = AZt + (1 - A) Zt-Llt (3)
where Zt is a measurement obtained at time t and Zt refers to the
filtered value, LI t is the time interval and A is a filtering parameter
appropriately chosen to provide acceptable smoothing of the measurements.
This simple filtering process can be applied to all the measurements without
requiring the storage of a long train of the history of the measurement as
is the case for most smoothing digital filters.
The filtered measurements are then utilized in the inventory monitoring
calculations discussed in the previous Section, resulting in an estimation
of the inventories in the ex-loop, Mex ' and the in-loop, Min' as weIl as
their rates of changes, Mex and Min' respectively.
Note that if the integral monitoring method is used Min would be
obtained directly while a simple differentiation process would result in an
estimate of the rate Min' On the other hand, the differential method
would result in an est·imate of i1in' from the flow rate measurements, and
then a simple integration process can be used to obtain the mass in the
loop, Min' The pump-motor current va lues in the differential method do
not directly result in an estimate of the mass inventory, rather they
provide an indicator that is proportional to the available mass. This
indicator is utilized in the loss detection process in the same fashion as a
mass inventory estimate.
The estimated mass and rate of change of inventories are utilized to
detect any deviation from the nominal state at the given operating
conditions. Let US designate the nominal mass in a loop by Mo and the
corresponding rate of change by Mo' (the latter is usually equal to zero
at steady state operation but can have non zero values during reactor warmup
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or cooldown). Detection of a deviation from the nominal state is confirmed
by a sustained deviation of the estimated parameters from their nominal




= 8 (Mt - M ) 2 + (l - 8.) cr 2
o t-llt '
(4 )
where cr 2 is a deviation (variance) parameter and 8 is an arbitrary
weighting parameter. Note that relationship (4) is analogous to the
moving average process of equation (3), and consequently cr~ is a moving
average estimate of the deviation from nominal. Similarly, estimation of
.2
Pt' the deviation of the rate of change from nominal is also obtained.
Based on the va lues cr~ and a~ adecision is made regarding the status
of the loop considered (ex- or in-loop) at time t. Since cr~ and ä~ are
moving average values, the decision taken is based on the history of the
system, rather than an individual instaneous measurement. The estimated
deviation values can be used in a simple decision making algorithm that
detects deviation from the nominal state if the deviation exceeds a
prescribed threshold value. Alternatively, one may use a more elaborate
algorithm based on probabilistic considerations; such as the one proposed in
reference [1] or one of the discrimination and classification methods
described by Hand [4]. The output of the decision algorithm is an
unambiguous indication regarding the status of both the ex-loop and the
in-lo~p that can be displayed to the operator in a timely manner.
ASSESSMENT OF MONITORING SYSTEM
The inventory monitoring system discussed above has not yet been
implemented or tested in actual operating conditions. However, in order to
assess its capabilities, aseries of "simulated" plant conditions are
considered, as summarized in Table I. One of the test simulations was a
small break loss of coolant with a discharge flow rate of 20 kg/s. This
discharge rate is within the capacity of a single D20 feed pump. The
results of this simulation were employed as plant measurements, after adding
artificial white noise to simulate plant noise. As shown in Figure 4, the
inventory monitoring system confirmed the inventory loss after 50 s from the
start of the event and alarmed against coolant loss in the eX-loop. At a
further 100 s in the transient the in-loop monitoring initiated warning of
an inventory loss in the heat transport loops and 100 s later it confirmed
the loss and issued an alarm. The delay in the in-loop response is due to
the coolant make-up provided by the ex-loop.
A condition that can cause apparent loss of mass inventory in the
in-loop is coolant voiding that may be caused by an increase in the reactor
power or a reduction in heat transport pressure. In this case the inventory
monitoring system indicates an increase in the ex-loop and a decrease in the
in-loop inventory. In the case of ex-loop inventory loss due, for example,
to a pressurizer valve stuck open, the increase in the ex-loop inventory
caused by the insurge to the pressurizer from the in-loop would be detected
together with the subsequent' loss in in-loop mass.
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TABLE I----
RESPONSE OF INVENTORY MONITORING SYSTEM
FOR VARIOUS UPSET AND OPERATING CONDITIONS
Time of Confirming Inventory Loss, s
Ex-Loop In-Loop
20 kg/s break at Reactor
Inlet Header at full power
In-loop Voiding
(t depends on voiding rate)
Pressurizer Valve Stuck Open













Nominal inventory is adjusted given
the reactor power or system temper-
ature. Legitimate inventory changes
are accommodated and only genuine
inventory lasses are detected.
Maintenance Cooling Monitoring of reactor channel
temperatures is used to alert against
channel boiling
A @ t reads:
L @ t reads:
H @ t reads:
Alarm after t seconds following event initiation
Low inventory detected after t seconds













o Normal ~ Deviation Low ~Alarm
FIGURE 4
Inventory Monitoring Response to Small
Lass of Heat Transport Inventory
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During operational transients such as reactor shutdown, system
cooldown/warmup or a reactor trip, the heat transport mass inventory changes
occur due to the coolant density change. These changes are accommodated in
the monitoring process by appropriate automatie adjustment of the nominal
inventories. Since the detection process is based on deviation from the
nominal state the monitoring system exhibits an immunity to generating
spurious alarms during these operating transients.
During maintenance outage the heat transport system may be
depressurized with low coolant forced circulation. For these conditions the
monitoring methods reported here would not be applicable. However, the main
concern then is to ensure that adequate fuel cooling is available to prevent
boiling in any reactor channel. Therefore, a special algorithm is invoked
to monitor channel temperatures, which are then used to alert against
potential channel boiling.
CONCLUSIONS
A system for monitoring the heat transport mass inventory in Ontario
Hydro's CANDU reactors has been described. The system utilizes measurements
available in the unit control computers and provides the operator with
unambiguous global indication of the status of the heat transport system at
different operating conditions. Through the use of this monitoring system,
ambiguities that may arise due to reliance on local inventory indicators can
be avoided. The proposed system has not been implemented yet in an
operating unit but is being considered for application in the Darlington
generating station, as weIl as some of the other operating units.
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ABSTRACT
The Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM) has been developed as a
synthetic simulation language for process reliability or disturbance analysis
applications. A Disturbance Analysis System (DAS) using the LFM models
can store the necessary information concerning a given process in an
efficient way, and automatically construct in real time the dfagnostic
tree(s) showing the root cause(s) of occurring disturbances.
A comprehensive LFM model for a PWR pressurizer system is
presented and discussed, and the latest version of the LFM tree synthesis
routine, optimized to achieve reduction of computer memory usage, is used
to show the LFM diagnoses of selected hypothetic disturbances.
INTRODUCTlON
In order to implement diagnostic capabilities, a Disturbance Analysis System
(DAS) must utilize process models that are at the same time compact and rich in
information content.
The models used in the first prototype DASs were developed in the form of cause-
consequence diagrams or cause-consequence trees. Both techniques use the same type of
binary representation and logic gates employed by fault trees, and are similar to the
latter in terms of modeling capabilities. The quite large dimensions of the models
resulting from the early attempts to apply these types of representation to whole scale
plant systems was indicated by many analysts as a severe hindrance in the development
of DASs with e~tensive diagnostic capabilities.
LFM OVERVIEW
LFM is a new methodology intended to provide a more efficient way of
constructing process models for use in diagnosis oriented disturbance analysis systems.
At the foundation of this method is the perivation of graph models for the processes to
be analyzed. As in the "digraph method" the LFM models include the fundamental units
of nodes and edges, which are used to represent respectively process variables and
causality relations. In LFM, however, special sets of symbols and representation rules
are also used, in order to allow a fully automated fault-tree or diagnostic analysis of
complex processes. From the point of view of their general structure, the LFM models
are formed by the interconnection of two important and distinct networks, namely, the
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causality network, which expresses the fundamental physical relations of direct cause
and effect existing in a process, and the condition network, which represents in a
formally defined and organized way the conditions whose occurrence may change or
modify the course of causality flow in the causality network.
A detailed description of the LFM representation rules can be found in References
2 and 3, while a more synthetic account is given in Reference 4. We use here the simple
scheme of Fig. 1 to show an example of some essential LFM features. In this figure the
U and V nodes represent continuous variables. These are process variables or parameters
that can vary over a continuous range, reduced in LFM to 5 discretized states (0 "
normal, + 1 " moderate deviations in positive or negative direction, + 10 " large
deviationS). The C node on the other hand represents a truly binary process variable or
parameter. U and V are shown to be linked by a causality connection expressed by a
causality edge and by a multiple gain box (MGB). The +1 gain value in the MGB signifies
that the connection is normally one of direct proportionality from U to V. However, the
graph also shows through the diamond shaped text box (TB) that the binary variable C
may have a conditioning influence on the relation between U and V. More specifically,
when the condition expressed by the equality C "I is verified, U has no longer any
influence on the value(s) to be taken by V. This type of formal representation is very
effective in showing how binary variables, usually associated with primary level faults or
with the action of engineered protection devices, can affect the causality relations that
link process continuous variables and parameters to one another. LFM is also
advantageous in that it condenses in one model the representation of both process
success and failure logics, including the effect of feedback. and feedforward actions.
After being derived and stored in their condensed-information format, the LFM
models can' be routinely analyzed by computer to produce fault tree structures for
reliability analysis purposes. By additional utilization of the instrument signals coming
from the actual process modeled, the same computer routine can be employed in a DAS
to produce diagnostic trees for the identification of the root cause(s) of an existing
disturbance. This procedure is well suited for DAS implementation since it does not
require any analyst's or operator's mediation and can thus be performed on-line. Tests
performed on LFM utilization in disturbance analysis showed that a diagnosis can be
obtained by the DAS computer one second <:Ir less from the start of a disturbance.
PRESSURIZER MODEL
The pressurizer, together with the control and protection devices attached to it,
constitutes an essential system in a PWR plant. The complexity of the functions it must
perform, in keeping the primary system pressure within the working range and in allowing
for the volumetric expansion and contraction of the primary coolant mass, makes the
development of a reasonably complete LFM pressurizer model a quite challenging task,
one that can seriously test the method capabilities. We review briefly the controls and
protections that are typically employed in such a system.
The following devices can intervene in regulating the pressure for control and/or
safety purposes: a) safety valves (safety), b) power operated relief valves
(PORVs)(control/safety), c) proportional sprays (control), d) proportional heaters
(control), e) backup heaters (control). .
Pressurizer level, on the other hand, is regulated by properly adjusting the
charging flowrate from the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). This can be
done by controlling the speed of a positive displacement pump or by throttling a valve on
the discharge line C?f a centrifugal pump (when this alternative charging mode is being
used.
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In the derivation of the LFM model, the modeled range of pressure and level is the
one between the high and low pressure trip set-points and above the low level trip set-
point, which deliberately limits the modeling effort to transients before the occurrence
of reactor shutdown.
Within the selected pressure range, it was necessary to arrive at a definition of
the discrete penta-valued set needed in LFM for representation of the pressurizer
pressure (pp) "continuous variable." Figure 2 illustrates the choice that was made in
regard to this. In the selected scherne, the PORV setpoint determines the boundary
between the +1 and +10 values, whereas the midpoint between the backup heater
energizing and de-energizing set-points is used as a boundary between the -1 and -10
values. The separations between the 0 and +1 values, and between the -1 and 0 values,
correspond to the start-point of the spray flow demand program ramp, and to the
midpoint of the proportional heater demand program ramp respectively. Different
choices are possible. The set-up just illustrated, however, provide a sufficiently balanced
representation of the "normal" and "upset" conditions within the modeled range.
Figure 3 shows two portions of the pressurizer model that was ultimately
developed. Section a represents some of the principal thermal-hydraulic interactions
with the paths of the protective and control actions affecting the pressurizer pressure
and pressurizer level parameters. Seetion d shows the details of the level control
system. The remaining portions of the model can be found in Reference 3 together with
the necessary aids for its detailed interpretation. It is important to notice that, due to
the considerable complexity of the physical reality to be represented, it is necessary to
break down physical interactions into fundamental composing parts. For instance, the
driving mechanisms for variation in the system pressure pp are assumed to be either
produced by a direct outflow of steam (soF) or by volumetrie effects (VPE) that cause
steam compression or expansion and which are induced by variations in the water level.
In addition, pressure changes may be induced by changes in the balance exchange flow
(BEF) between the water and steam phases in the pressurizer. BEF normally acts as a
corrective agent on either of the other two variables just mentioned above, but is also
capable of directly inducing variations in PP. The BEF variable is driven by the
combined action of the proportional sprays (variable PSF), the proportional heaters
(variable PHA) and backup heaters (variable BHA), and is also influenced by other factors
such as the pressurizer pressure itself and the degree of pressurizer water subcooling
(variable PWS). To describe the complete interactions between these variables the
"special input box" (SIB) operators Sl and S2 are used together with the other LFM
standard operators. These are equivalent to multi-state decision tables representing the
correspondence between BEF and its input variables PHA, PSF, and BHA. The
assumptions for modeling this correspondence derive from knowledge of the relative
capacities of the heaters and sprays.
DIAGNOSTIC AND RECOVERY TREES
References 2 and 3 illustrate how the computer program TRIC (Tree Instantaneous
Constructor) implements the LFM modeling "grammar" and a complete set of "tracing
rules" to allow derivation of logic trees from the flowgraph models. To derive a fault or
success tree, TRIC only needs as input a definition of the tree top event in the form
(variable) =(value) (for example: V =+ 10). If the program is run on-line on a process
computer (as would be the case in a DAS application) process instrumentation readings
will also be used as inputs, to only allow derivation'of tree branches corresponding to the
actual events (among an those that could in theory produce the top event). When this
latter procedure is used to determine the causes of a process upset, the tree produced by
the LFM automated analysis is called a "diagnostic tree."
Diagnostic trees for two different disturbanees are presented here. The first
hypothesized disturbance is one that affects the PLCS (pressurizer level control
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system). While the PLCS is in the centrifugal pump regulating valve mode (control
option CO = Ö), it is assumed that a drift in the level controller setpoint causes a
transient to be initiated, resulting in a moderate lowering of the pressurizer level (PLD =
-1). When the disturbance is well under way, different observable variables are affected
and assume perturbed values. Figure 4 shows the diagnostic tree developed by TRIC
when taking the event PLD =-1 as the top-event and the "observed" values of the other
variables just mentioned as "boundary conditions" for the given disturbance. These
observable conditions are marked by a dot in Fig. 3 for identification by the reader. It
should, however, be understood that other observable conditions, utilized to exclude non-
active tree branches from the diagnostic derivation, do not appear in the diagnostic tree
itself.
The second hypothetical disturbance with which the pressurizer model was tested
is a transient in which a stuck-open power-operated relief valve (RVUO = T) causes the
pressurizer pressure to falllow (in the LFM -10 range). Secondary effects of this are the
actuation of the proportional and bacl<Up heaters and the disactivation of the sprays, in
an attempt by the PPCS (pressurizer pressure control system) to contrast the course of
the transient and arrest the observed decrease in the system pressure. The top event pp
= -10 was analyzed by TRIC with the use of the appropriate boundary conditions given by
the observable events resulting from the occurrence, and the resulting diagnostic tree is
shown in Figure 5.
It is worthwhile to notice that the significant part of the tree, in terms of
disturbance diagnosis, is the one on the right side under the SOF =+10 event, and shows
the disturbance root cause RVUO = T. The left side (event BEF = +1, etc.) only
describes conditions that result from, or accompany, the disturbance, and which are to be
shown for a better comprehension of the actual occurrence.
It was mentioned before that LFM permits the derivation of both fault and success
trees from the same flowgraph. The ability to derive success trees can be
advantageously used in disturbance analysis to identify recoveryactions after a
disturbance has been identified and diagnosed. For example, to obtain from TRIC a
"recovery tree" for the disturbance just discussed above, one may set the top variable pp
equal to 0 (which is the "default", unperturbed LFM value for any continuous variable),
and adjust accordingly the values of the other observable values on which pp may have
direct or indirect influence. Thus the values of the variables BHA and PHA have to be
modified into O's for consistency with the new value assumed for PP. All the other
observable variable values produced by the disturbance are, however, kept as boundary
conditions. The LFM routine can then identify possible actions that may suppress the
undesired effects of the disturbance root cause(s). The tree obtained in this fashion is
partially shown in Figure 6. The actual tree derived by TRIC includes development of
events like VPE =0 and BEF =0, which are only of secondary interest and therefore not
shown here. The desired recovery action can be seen at the low left end of the tree,
indicated by the event BVS = T (which means: PORV block valve secured), 'ANDED'
with the primary branch containing the fault event RVUO = T.
The example given above demonstrates the feasibility "in principle" of the use of
LFM-derived success trees to identify needed recovery action. Different strategies can
be envisioned to make this process as efficient as possible, so that for instance the LFM
routine could automatically avoid the development of "useless" branches such as the ones
omitted from the tree in Figure 6, and could also expressly emphasize the identified
"recovery action" in some way appropriate for ready interpretation by the operator.
As a factor relevant to the actual on-line applicability of LFM in disturbance
analysis, it is noted that, throughout the testing done with the pressurizer model, the
developed fault or success trees were produced by the TRIC code in times of the order of
1 sec on an IBM 370/3033 computer.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the application of a new approach called the Logic
Flowgraph Methodology to a fairly complex system, for the purpose of automatically
producing fault or success trees. The computer routine based on LFM is presently
operational and capable of performing this task, be it for reliability or disturbance
analysis applications. The routine itself requires about 160K of computer memory on an
IBM 370/3033. The most recent version has been partially optimized to reduce array
storage. As a result, the pressurizer model discussed here requires only an additional
160K. The previous code version required the same amount of array memory for a
system model, presented in Reference 4, which had less than 1/3 the number of LFM
modeling elements.
Since in the area of reliability and risk analysis many proven and consolidated
methods exist and are routinely used, the major emphasis of research for LFM
implementation was placed in the disturbance analysis - automatic diagnosis and
recovery identification area. We think that the results presented and discussed in the
previous sections are promising, and confirm the potential of the method for disturbance
analysis applications. Of course, before real implementation, it would be necessary to
further test the methodology and the models with real on-line, rather than simulated,
disturbances.
Open to definition remain the possible different strategies by which a user may
want to utilize the methodology within the scope of an integrated disturbance analysis
system. The choice of such strategies is expected to be influenced by contingent
practical considerations regarding a specific application area, rather than by aprioristic
theoretical arguments.
It is finally noted that for auser, LFM involves in a sense the learning of a new
"language."· In practical application to complex systems, it will also require intimate
knowledge of these systems. Consequently, the skins of trained practitioners will be
needed for successful utilization.
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Fig.3 LFM Pressurizer Model
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Fig.4
Pressurizer Level Diagnostic Tree
Fig.5
Pressurizer Pressure Diagnostic Tree
Fig.6
Pressurizer Pressure Recovery Tree
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A SYMPTOM BASED DECISION TREE APPROACH TO




Long Beach, North Carolina 28461, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
This paper will describe aDecision Tree approach to development of
Boiling Water Reactor Emergency Operating Procedures for use by
operators during emergencies. This approach utilizes the symptom
based Emergency Procedure Guidelines approved for implementation by
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Included in the paper, as background, is a discussion of the relative
merits of the event based Emergency Operating Procedures currently in
use at United States Boiling Water Reactor plants. The body of the
paper is devoted to a discussion of the Decision Tree Approach to
Emergency Operating Procedures soon to be implemented at two United
States Boiling Water Reactor plants, why this approach solves many
of the problems with procedures identified in the post accident
reviews of Three Mile Island procedures, and why only now is this
approach both desirable and feasible. The paper will also discuss
how nuclear plant simulators were tnvolved in the development of the
Emergency Operating Procedure decision trees, and in the verification
and validation of these procedures.
TEXT
The symptom based Emergency Procedure Guidelines deviate from ANS 3.2/
N18.7-1976 Section 5.3.9 in that they do not provide operator actions for
events such as Loss of All Feedwater. Rather, the symptom based guidelines
provide operator actions for decreasing reactor water level, one cause of
which might be loss of all feedwater. Thus, the operator responds to restore
reactor water level regardless of the cause of the decrease with whatever
equipment may be functional.
Since all United States Boiling Water Reactor Nuclear Plants (BWR)
currently have procedures designed to satisfy the requirements of ANS 3.2/
N18.7-1976 Section 5.3.9 and will soon be implementing these symptom based
Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Revision 3 dated December 8, 1982, currently
NRC approved for implementation, a dilemma faces them. How to integrate
procedures developed from symptom based guidelines into an existing procedure
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structure that supposed1y, by 1isting conceivab1e symptoms, enab1es the
operator to diagnose an event (or event combination), extract the correct
procedure (or procedures for multiple events), and decide which is the most
important procedure so that its immediate actions are taken first before
some other important procedures immediate actions are taken.
It shou1d be no ted that ANS 3.2/N18.7-1976 Section 5.3.9 does not address
emergency procedure actions in multiple event situations. Section 5.3.9 does
state that "when immediate operator actions are required to prevent or mitigate
the consequences of a serious condition, procedures shou1d require that those
actions be imp1emented prompt1y". If the serious condition is a resu1t of
multiple events, a situation will face the operator of trying to decide which
is the lead procedure and which are the fo110w on procedures so that the
immediate actions may be taken in the correct sequence. This is practica11y
impossible for many reasons, not the least of which is that the operator can
not remember them all nor wou1d he probab1y get the right sequence in a
multiple event emergency, since he has been trained for single events.
Short1y after the accident at Three Mi1e Is1and (TMI), the NRC formed the
Bulletins &Orders Task Force (B&OTF). This task force was responsib1e for
reviewing and directing the TMI re1ated staff activities. In conducting this
activity, the B&OTF concentrated its efforts on, among other things, the
evaluation of Generic Operator Guide1ines and the review of Plant Emergency
Operating Procedures. One of the recommendations from the B&OTF was as
fo110ws: The Emergency Operating Procedures presently in use at operating BWR
Pl ants shoul d be restructured and reforma ted on a "symptom" bas i s, as opposed
to the more "event-specific" basis on which these procedures have evolved.
The Symptom-Based Emergency Procedures would be categorized according to
general plant symptoms, such as Loss-of-Coo1ant Inventory Accidents (LOCA) as
opposed to several separate existing associated procedures such as LOCA Inside
Containment, LOCA Outside Containment, and Loss of Normal Feedwater. The
Loss-of-Coo1ant Inventory Procedure would include the essential features of
those existing procedures associated with LOCA Inside Containment, LOCA
Outside Containment, and Loss of Normal Feedwater, but wou1d make use of the
fact that the initial operator responses for the latter procedures are similar.
The Essex Corporation of Alexandria, Virginia made a study of the TMI
Emergency Operating Procedures and had the fo110wing comments: The procedures
were deficient in content and format; inconsistencies existed between the
procedure action statement and actual equipment nomenclatures; instructions and
action se1dom indicated system response; an excessive burden was p1aced on
operator memory; no charts or graphs on parameter response were provided;
confusion existed as to which procedure applied; and the procedures were
deficient in diagnostic information.
Since TMI is a pressurized water reactor and the findings might be con-
sidered by some to be not app1icable to BWR, a review of a typical US-BWR's
Emergency Operating Procedures as developed in accordance with the ANS 3.2/
N18.7-1976 Section 5.3.9 would reveal the following (using the same evaluation
criteria that Essex Corporation used on TMI).
The procedures are event oriented.
They do not contain guidance on which procedure applies or is the
lead procedure in multiple event conditions.
They rely excessively on operator memory.
System response is seldom indicated.
Diagnostic information is presented in a generally long list of
symptoms at the beginning of each event procedure.
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They contain many cross-references to other procedures.
They contain few charts or graphs.
Usability with multiple failures is poor.
Operator awareness of total plant conditions would be questionable
when multiple event conditions required use of the procedures.
As indicated in ANS 3.2/N18.7-1976 Section 5.3.9, it is extremely diffi-
cult to distinguish between procedures prepared for the purpose of correcting
off-normal conditions which in themselves do not constitute actual emergency
situations, (but which conceivably can degenerate into true emergencies in the
absence of positive corrective action), and procedures required for coping
with true emergencies that have already occurred. For the purposes of the
Emergency Procedure Guidelines, the potential emergency conditions that are
considered are those conditions that threaten the integrity of the reactor co re
or primary and secondary containment, or could threaten to cause harm to plant
personnel and to the public. The following categories of events (or event
combinations) are considered as examples of potential emergencies:
Loss of coolant from identified and unidentified sourees, from small
loss to design basis-accident loss.
Reactor transients and excursions.
Failure of vital equipment.
Loss or degradation of vital power sourees.
Abnormally high radiation levels.
Excessive release of radioactive liquid or gaseous effuent.
Malfunction of reactivity control system.
Loss of containment integrity.
Conditions that require the use of standby liquid poison systems.
Any and all of these conditions may require immediate actions to be taken
by the operator to prevent further degradation and consequent automatie or
manual reactor scram. Thus a possible approach would be, indeed the one taken
and described in this paper, to extract from all the Emergency Operating
Procedures required by ANS 3.2/N18.7-1976 those actions to be taken prior to
reactor scram and assemble them into Abnormal Operating Procedures, and those
actions to be taken after scram and assemble them into the Emergency Operating
Procedures. This approach allows the Emergency Procedure Guideline symptom
based instructions required prior to scram to be integrated with the Abnormal
Operating Procedures and the Emergency Procedure Guideline symptom based
instructions after scram to be integrated with the other procedural actions
into the required Emergency Operating Procedures. In the e~ent that the
reactor is scrammed automatically or manually, due to a potential danger, the
entry condition to the Emergency Operating Procedures would be REACTOR SCRAM.
From this point, the Reactor Operator would follow a predetermined sequence of
steps which specify immediate actions for operation of controls or confirmation
of automatie actions that are required to stop the degradation of conditions
and mitigate their consequences. The steps which the operator performs include
the fo 11 owi ng :
The verification of automatie actions.
Assurance that the reactor is in a safe shutdown condition.
Determination that the reactor coolant system pressure boundary
is intact.
Confirmation of the availability of adequate power sourees.
Confirmation that containment and exhaust systems are operating pro-
perly in order to prevent uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
Notification of plant and off-site personnel of the nature of the
emergency.
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A further advance in the development of symptom based Emergency Operating
Procedures exists in the decision tree format used by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) in the formulation of the Emergency Operating
Procedures for the space shuttle. This concept, translated into the BWR
Emergency Operating Procedures here described is depicted (in example step
form) in Figure 1.
As shown, several key decisions are made immediately by the operator (note
that these decisions are consistent with the Emergency Procedure Guidelines).
Is Reactor Power less than 3% (no represents a condition that could
threaten the integrity of the reactor core).
Is Drywell Pressure less than 1.8 psig (no represents a condition that
could threaten the integrity of the Primary Containment).
Is Auxiliary Power available from Startup Auxiliary Transformers (no
represents a condition that could threaten core, containment, and
publ ic).
Is Reactor Vessel level above -30 inches (no represents a condition
that could threaten the integrity of the reactor core).
- Was the Mode Switch in run prior to Scram (a decision which dictates
the actions to be taken in the startup mode where violent transients
are not expected).
Appropriate actions are presented on the other Paths indicated, Path 1,
Path 2, Path 4, Path 5. While not evident here, ALL Paths have the same
initial key decisions so that no matter which Path the operator picks up at
the time of scram, he will be led to the correct Path for his conditions.
The five Paths consist of operator actions keyed from decisions on
availability of plant systems, verification of appropriate automatic actions,
with the steps themselves being prioritized on each Path in the same manner
that the initial key decisions prioritize for the operator which Path to be on.
The Paths are immediate actions and cover roughly one half to one hour of time
into the emergency. After that, as Figure 1 depicts, the operator is led to
an End Path Manual which contains, among other things, the subsequent actions
from all the deposed event based Emergency Operating Procedures required by
ANS 3.2/N18.7-1976 Section 5.3.9. The immediate action Flow Chart Paths
generally cover operator actions for the following groupings of events:
(Refer to Fi gure 1)
Path 1 - Malfunction of Reactivity Control System
Path 2 - Transients from Low Power (Mode Switch in Startup)
Path 3 - Transients from High Power (Mode Switch in Run)
Path 4 - Loss of Coolant, Failure of Vital Power Source, Failure of
Vital Equipment, Abnormally High Radiation
Path 5 - Loss of Coolant, Loss of Primary Containment Cooling,
Excessive Radioactive Release, Abnormally High Radiation
Advantages of the symptom based Emergency Operating Procedures in Flow
Chart Path format are;
Immediate operator actions visible and prioritized in Flow Chart
Path form.
- Reduced reliance on operator memory since all immediate actions are
visible at all times.
- All Flow Chart Paths guide the operator to the correct procedure,
in proper priority of actions.
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Removes confusion as to which procedure applies; only one exists
and operator" is automatically led to it.
Improves awareness of total plant conditions since many decision
diagnostic steps are present.
Improves decision making process since operator is now constantly
keyed to be aware of plant conditions.
Improves training for emergencies since symptoms are basis, multiple
event emergencies can be practiced which were not possible before.
The basis for the Flow Chart Paths, briefly mentioned previously to stop
the degradation of plant conditions, is accomplished by use of Key Parameters
(see Figure 1). The Key Parameters (these key decisions are symptom
evaluations) set the overall priority of operator actions, are identical on
each Flow Chart Path, and their evaluation basis is as follows:
Verify reactor nuclear shutdown or take steps as indicated on Flow
Chart Path 1 to affect nuclear shutdown of the reactor while
attempting to gain control of reactor water level and pressure.
Verify the absence of a threat to the Primary Containment or take
steps as indicated on Flow Chart Path 5, once reactor nuclear shutdown
is verified or accomplished, to initiate containment' control systems
while attempting to gain control of reactor water level and pressure.
Verify the absence of a threat to adequate core cooling possibly
caused by failure of high pressure injection systems, total loss of
AC power (inclusive of partiallosses), break outside primary contain-
ment, stuck open relief valves (SORV) or take steps as indicated on
Flow Chart Path 4 once reactor nuclear shutdown is verified or
accomplished and the absence of a threat to the primary containment
i s verifi ed.
Determine the state (or states) of expected plant transient response
by identifying the position of the reactor mode switch prior to scram
(more violent transients are expected from the run mode than from the
startup mode) and the operator actions are prioritized by this on
Flow Chart Paths 2 and 3.
Thus, the operator has made an immediate determination of the state of
the plant. He has determined whether a malfunction has occurred to the
reactivity control systems, whether a malfunction or rupture has occurred
inside the primary containment, whether AC power is available and whether a
rupture outside primary containment or a stuck open relief valve has occurred,
or whether he has merely sustained a transient scram from high or low power
1evel .
It should also be noted at this point that the wording of the Key
Parameters results in insuring that the operator remains on the proper Flow
Chart Path once he has been led there by his symptom (Key Parameter) evalua-
tions. Indeed, at this point the question of what operator action is to be
taken if a Key Parameter changes state after the operator has made his initial
evaluation, becomes appropriate. The answer lies in the following example:
A scram has occurred, the Flow Chart Paths entered, the initial evaluation of
Key Parameters has led the operator to Flow Chart Path 3 (transient trips from
high power) and while taking actions, drywell pressure increases above 2 psig.
What action should be taken? The operator is trained to respond to a change
in a Key Parameter, which he constantly monitors for changes after Flow Chart
Path entry, by returning to the top of the Flow Chart Path he is on and
re-evaluate all of his Key Parameters since a change in any one may result in
a change in a higher priority Key Parameter. Thus for this example, he would
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be re-routed from Flow Chart Path 3 to Flow Chart Path 5. A review of Figure 1
and the Key Parameter (and its hierarchical position} associated with High
DryweIl Pressure will reveal that once on Flow Chart Path 5, the operator is
not permitted access to any other Flow Chart Path, but is led to the End Path
Manual for Flow Chart Path 5 after completion of the immediate actions even if
other Key Parameters were to change (loss of AC power, for instance, operator
action steps are contained on Flow Chart Path 5). The Key Parameter of
Reactor rluclear Shutdown will not change once it is verified or is achieved
following the scram entry conditions.
Once the evaluation of Key Parameters has resulted in Flow Chart Path
selection, the operator encounters additional Key Parameters which require the
same return to the top of the Flow Chart Path for re-evaluation of ALL Key
Parameters, but which do not result in a Flow Chart Path change, un1ess a
consequent result occurs, i .e., if C10sed Coo1ing Water to the Drywe11 is lost,
and the reactor is hot, Drywe11 Pressure will increase causing its associated
Key Parameter to change causing a F10w Chart Path change due to High DryweIl
Pressure, not due to the Loss of Closed Coo1ing Water. Other of these Key
Parameters are associated with Plant Service Water, Control Air, and Fires.
The purpose of addressing support systems avai1abi1ity (ca11ing their
significant parameter out as a Key Parameter ensures that the operator remains
constant1y aware of their operability status) on the Flow Chart Paths are as
fo 11 ows:
They enable operation of other systems, e.g., Plant Service Water
enab1es operation of the Reactor Feedwater Pumps (lube oil is coo1ed
by service water).
They enable other systems to control other Key Parameters, e.g.,
C10sed Cooling Water to the Drywe11 ena51es the removal of heat from
the Drywell controll ing both temperatureand pressure.
They force the operator to get ahead of the plant 5y monitoring
their operability. Under current procedures, he is behind the plant.
Something must first fail to be recognizeab1e as requiring operator
attention or action to be taken (in the accident sense that is, as
opposed to normal operations).
They of themse1ves are symptoms of plant degradation and represent a
potential source of damage to plant equipment that may be necessary
for accident mitigation and as such are worthy of operator vigi1ance,
especially during accidents.
Their avai1abi1ity or non-avai1ability result in the establishment of
the various decision tree paths, e.g., since air is a cheap and
convenient mode of operation of such va1ves as are associated with
the condensate deminera1izers on some BWR's, the non-avai1ability of
air means the non-availability of the condensate demineralizer and
consequent temporary 10ss of the condensate and feedwater systems.
With existing event based procedures, these support system procedures are
generally included in the Emergency Procedures category (Loss of All Plant
Service Water cou1d certain1y be 100ked upon as an emergency). The operator's
attention to this particu1ar Emergency Procedure wou1d vary from a high degree
of attention if its 10ss was the first event that occurred to a 10w degree of
operator attention if its loss were to occur during some event combination
sequence 1ike the fo110wing: Load Reject Scram, Bypass Valves Fai1 Open, MSIV
C10sure, and consequent Loss of All Feedwater,and then the annunciator alarms
indicating Loss of All Plant Service Water. The operator's attention is not
going to be instant1y focused on this annunciator. In fact, he might not
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recognize its receipt at all, as it would be another of the many annunciator
alarms he is already receiving. Indeed, the probability exists that for this
transient event combination (one that has a fair probability of occurrence)
damage would most certainly be sustained by plant equipment that received
cooling water from the Plant Service Water system. However, if one argues
that all of this equipment has its own protective trips, then not the least
that could occur in the above situation would be the operator completely
missing the need to execute another Emergency Procedure with its own immediate
actions. If one carries this examination a little further, since the operators
currently are required to memorize and execute Emergency Procedures immediate .
actions from their memory, the various operator crews (typically 5 or 6 shift
crews of operators) would probably execute the required immediate action steps
in different sequences since individual memory is a poor determinant of
commonality of action under high stress emergency conditions. Thus, besides
the concept behind the Flow Chart Paths of stopping the degradation of plant
conditions, the making visible to the operator the immediate actions reduces
the uncertainty associated with reliance on his memory. It also requires that
he monitor system status not currently required, thereby reducing the potential
for equipment damage. Perhaps most important, by making his required
immediate actions visible reduces the potential for error due either to failure
to recognize that procedural action is required or once recognized, taking
immediate action based upon reliance on memory alone and commiting errors df
omission.
As previously mentioned, the basis of the Flow Chart Paths (the immediate
action) is to stop the degradation of the event combination in progress. As
such, the restoration of the support systems (Closed Cooling Water for
instance) is not carried out on the Flow Chart Paths, it is however, accom-
plished in the End Path Manual which the operator enters upon completion of the
immediate actions. Thus, on the Flow Chart Paths, the operator verifies system
availability, or if indicated loss is apparent, attempts to start the standby
components, and if unsuccessful, putting the system in a known configuration
by taking immediate action to trip equipment serviced by the lost support
system. In the case of Plant Service Water, this would mean a trip of the
feedwater and condensate pumps, placing reliance on other high pressure injec-
tion systems, or should they be unable to maintain Reactor Water Level above
a desired level, the Flow Chart Paths (as does the EPG) would direct the
operator to blow down the reactor and start his low pressure injection systems.
As the operator(s) complete adecision tree on a given Flow Chart Path,
they will be led to an End Path procedure in the End Path Manual provided for
actions subsequent to those immediate actions the operator has completed on
the Flow Charts. Each End Path procedure is specifically developed for each
possible decision tree on the Flow Charts.
Currently in the United States, Carolina Power and Light at its Brunswick
Nuclear Station and Georgia Power at its Hatch Nuclear Station have either
implemented or are currently developing the Flow Chart Path approach described
herein. Philadelphia Electric and Boston Edison are either developing or have
implemented other Flow Chart Path approaches. While the various Flow Chart
Path techniques may vary, and the actions contained on the various Flow Chart
Paths may also vary, what is significant in this effort by the above mentioned
utilities is their efforts to improve the operator responses to degraded
emergency operating situations by use of Flow Chart decision trees.
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Emergency Operating Procedures Verification
Emergency Operating Procedures Verification cQnsists of ensuring that the
Emergency Operating Procedures (Flow Chart Paths and End Path Manuals) are
technically correct (ßccurately reflecting the Plant Specific Technical
Guidelines), that they are written correctly and that controls and instrumen-
tation called out in the Emergency Operating Procedures actually exist and
verbatim nomenclature has been used. Emergency Operating Procedure verifica-
tion is performed prior to the start of operator training. This process
identifies any deviation from the Plant Specific Technical Guidelines,
describes any analysis performed to determine the safety significance of the
deviation, and provides a technical justification for the plant specific
approach, as required.
Since verification will be completed prior to initial Eroergency Operating
Procedures implementation, any discrepancies found during verification will
also be completely resolved prior to approval and iropleroentation of Rev 0 of
the Emergency Operating Procedures. Note that verification is a two-phase
process. Phase 1 is performed prior to start of operator training and covers
the entire set of Emergency Operating Procedures. Phase 2 is the verification
of individual revisions entered during training resulting from the validation
program.
Emergency Operating Procedure Validation
Emergency Operating Procedure Validation ensures that the language and
level of information presentation in the Flow Chart Paths and End Path Manuals
are compatible with the qualifications, training and experience of the
operating staff, and that there is a high level of assurance that the proce-
dures will work, i.e., the procedures guide the operator in mitigating tran-
sients and accidents. Emergency Operating Procedure Validation is performed
in parallel with operator training.
Many man-weeks are spent in the plant specific simulator, with participa-
tion by Shift Technical Advisors and reactor operators, developing and
validating the Flow Chart Paths decision trees (utilizing multiple-event
scenarios extensively) before operator training begins. This work is fully
documented including a list of multiple-event scenarios run and significant
results. During operator training (over approximately a 1 year period),
many additional man-weeks will be spent in the simulator with evaluation of
operator response and operator feedback included in the validation of the
Flow Chart Paths decision trees.
Actual plant walk-throughs are conducted on a case basis to ensure that
the simulator represents the plant correctly and that in-plant name plates are
used for proper nomenclature of equipment. Extensive table-top.reviews are
performed during development, especially utilizing the Shift Technical Advisor/
reactor operator member of the development team, and arecord of problems and
resolutions is kept. Additionally, initial operator training is conducted in
classroom table-top use of the Flow Chart Paths and End Path Manuals, and
operator feedback recorded. Note that simulator scenarios are chosen randomly
until all possible Paths down the Emergency Operating flow Chart Paths are
followed, thus ensuring complete coverage.
Documentation includes records of operator comments, changes made as a




There aresevera1 types of symb.o1s on each chart. Refer tQ Figure J.
Decision or Question Symbol
This block a1ways contains a question which must be answered yes or no.
The question will concern a specific parameter, setpoint, switch position, or
system condition (symptoms),
Information Symbol
This block contains information which may be usefu1 to he1p the operator
diagnose the event combination that has occurred or is occurring.
Performance or Action Symbol
This block contains a specific action or command which the operator should
perform. It will consist of a verification of automatic action or a command
to take action such as "verify certain pumps in service", "place system in
service" or "remove specific equipment from service".
Path to Path Arrow Symbol
These symbols aid the operator in finding the correct entry point into
another F10w Chart Path when directed there from a path. These arrows have
unique shapes which are designed to aid in rapid1y 10cating the entry point
when changing from one F10w Chart Path to another.
F10w Chart Path to End Path Procedure Arrow Symbol
These symbols direct the operator from the F10w Chart Path he has comp1eted
to the correct section of the End Path Manual, The symbols contain the numbers
that correspond to the appropriate section of the End Path Manual.
In summary, the paper discusses the relative merits of the event based
Emergency Operating Procedures current1y in use at United States Boi1ing Water
Reactor p1ants, The body of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
Decision Tree approach to Emergency Operating Procedures soon to be imp1emented
at two United States Boi1ing Water Reactor p1ants and why this approach solves
many of the problems with procedures identified in the post accident reviews
of Three Mi1e Is1and procedures. The decision tree F10w Chart format is
possib1e now because of the deve10pment of symptom based Emergency Procedure
Guide1ines. It is desirab1e to enhance the visibi1ity of procedura1 guidance
for improved operator usabi1ity.
The paper also discusses how nuc1ear plant simulators were invo1ved in
the deve10pment of the Emergency Operating Procedure decision trees, and in
the validation of these procedures.
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RECENT RESULTS FROM THE U.S. SEVERE ACCIDENT
SEQUENCE ANALYSIS (SASA) PROGRAM
Robert T. Curtis and Bharat B. Agrawal
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
ABSTRACT
The SASA program provides deterministic analysis of risk dominant
sequences to evaluate sources of uncertainty, the effectiveness of
accident management strategies and the utility of changes to plant
configuration or procedures. It is an integral part of the U.S.
program to reduce risk from severe accidents. Detailed analysis
which include a review of BWR ATWS sequences, a study of the effec-
tiveness of feed and bleed and studies of plant recovery after core
damage is presented. The paper presents results from these studies
and their safety implications.
INTRODUCTION
The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) led to the reorientation of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) research priorities and the development of a seyere
accident research program. Part of this program is the Severe Accident Sequence
Analysis (SASA) program. The SASA program seeks to improve the understanding
of reactor accidents in order to develop better strategies to prevent, manage
and mitigate severe accidents. Insights into safety issues are gained by apply-
ing best-estimate state-of-the-art methods of analysis to investigate in detail
the progression of events in risk dominant accident sequences and, thereby
develop guides to evaluate possible operator procedures. The studies concen-
trate on both the initiating events through early core damage and the later
phases of the accident, i.e., core melt, fission product release and transport
through containment failure. Significant attention is directed at the iden-
tification of alternatives which might terminate the accident and lead to
recovery.
The SASA program selects the risk dominant sequences for each plant from
appropriate probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) programs such as the Accident
Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP),l the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program
(IREP) and the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program (RSSMAP).
These risk-dominant sequences provide the framework for calculation and analyses
of complex accident sequences in which critical equipment performance and opera-
tor actions are simulated. The SASA program is contributing to the development
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of probabilistic methods by supporting ASEP with deterministic, best estimate
analyses of severe accidents using the available state-of-the-art thermal
hydraulic, phenomenological, fission product behavior and consequence codes.
The ongoing SASA program studies presented here are: accident sequence
analysis for BWR anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) and a study of the
effectiveness of feed and bleed for decay heat removal in PWRs.
DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS OF THE ATWS STUDY
The goals of this study are to (a) make realistic determination of the
time-dependent progression of events from the initiating event through core
uncovery, meltdown and containment degradation (b) investigate appropriate
operator actions and their timings to prevent containment failure and/or core
damage and (c) determine if operator actions contained in emergency operating
procedures are adequate to manage the accident and determine what information
and operator actions are needed to mitigate accident consequences.
The dominant sequence for the ATWS is the Main Steam Isolation Valve
(MSIV) closure followed by failure to scram. The MSIV closure was chosen
because of its relatively high frequency and severe challenge to heat removal
and containment integrity systems.
An ATWS preliminary study2 has been completed using the BWR-LACP code
developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.' A simulation working session in
conjunction with the Human Factors program showed that with training, the
operators can effectively shutdown the core by:
a. Lowering and maintaining the indicated water level at the top of
the core.
b. Manual Insertion of Control rods.
c. Injection of Sodium Pentaborate Solution.
With the MSIVs shut, all steam generated by the at-power reactor is
conveyed into the pressure suppression pool (PSP) via safety relief valves
(SRVs) as shown in Figure 1. The MSIVs require about 4 sec to close. As
the valves close, automatie reactor scram fails and reactor vessel pressure
increases, causing void collapse in the core and thereby inserting positive
reactivity. Core power increases rapidly, causing high pressure and the open-
ing of all reactor vessel relief valves. The recirculation pumps trip on high
reactor vessel pressure [1120 psig (7.82 MPa)] about 5 s after the beginning
of MSIV closure, converting core flow from forced to natural circulation. The
reduced core flow immediately causes an increased temperature of the water
moderator in the core and consequently, increased voids and negative reactivity.
Reactor power decreases and some of the SRVs close, stabilizine reactor vessel
pressure at the relief valve setpoint [about 1120 psig (7.82 MPa)]. Feedwater
flow reaches zero shortly thereafter since the steam supply to the feedwater
turbines is lost when the MSIVs are shut.
Without feedwater (FW) the reactor vessel (RV) water level decreases
until the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Co re Isolation
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Cooling (RCIC) pumps are automatieally aetuated. The HPCI and RCIC pumps aet
as FW pumps and that their eombined rate of injeetion determines the reaetor
power. The term "reaetor power" implies the steaming rate from the RV
expressed as a pereentage of the steaming rate at normal full operation. All
of the steam produeed in the RV is diseharged through the SRVs to be eondensed
in the PSP. During the first 15 minutes of ATWS, the PSP temperature is
inereasing from 90°F to 190°F. When the PSP level inereases 7 in. the HPCI
pump suetion is automatieally shifted from eondensate storage tanks to the PSP.
The inereasing PSP temperature ehallenges the ability of the HPCI system to
keep pumping sinee the HPCI turbine lubrieation oil is eooled by the water
being pumped and the operating limit for the lubrieation oil is 140°F.
After HPCI syst~m failure, the total vessel injeetion is insuffieient
to replaee the water inventory loss with the eore eritieal and generating
28% thermal power (Figure 2). Upon reeeipt of the' low water level signal the
low pressure eoolant injeetion (LPCI) and eore spray pumps start but do not
immediately injeet, sinee the vessel is still pressurized. The vessel water
level eontinues to deerease, reaehing the top of the aetive fuel (TAF) before
automatie depressurization system (ADS) aetuation. The ADS aetuation opens
six SRVs and initiates a rapid depressurization of the RV. The rapid loss of
vessel water inventory eompletely uncovers the core within one minute. With
the core uncovered the thermal power subsides to the decay heat level. When
vessel pressure decreases to below 418 psia at 20 min., the condensate booster
pumps (CBPs), begin pumpingwater to the RV. The LPCI and the Core Spray pumps
begin injection within 10 sec. of the CBP flow and recovers the core in about
20 sec.
The recovery of RV water level provides enough moderator for the core to
sustain criticality. Continued increase in water level causes power excursion
by building excess positive reactivity. The increasing power and pressure is
broken when pressure reaches the relief valve set points and all SRVs open,
limiting vessel pressure to the neighborhood of 1100 psia. Whenever the RV
pressure is above 418 psia there is no injection by the low pressure systems.
The combined RCIC and control rod drive hydraulic systems (CRDHS) injection of
700 gpm is insufficient to prevent a steady decrease in vessel water level.
When the vessel pressure decreases to below 418 psia the CBPs and LPECCS pumps
are again able to inject. This cycle of vessel depressurization and power
excursion and repressurization of the RV is repeated until the drywell failure
due to overpressurization in 37 min.
The progression of MSIV-closure initiated ATWS accident sequence in which
operator actions play a dominant role is discussed here. The control room
operators would recognize the initiation of an ATWS by the existence of a
combination of scram signals and continued indication of reactor power on the
average power range monitors. The effective means for the operator to insert
negative reactivity is by the standby liquid control systems (SLCS). This
system is designed to permit sodium pentaborate solution into the RV at a rate
of 56 gpm. At an injection rate of 56 gpm it would take about 80 min. to pump
the total volume of 4550 gals. of sodium pentaborate solution from the storage
tank into the RV. The reactor can thus be brought to hot shutdown.
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The BWR Owners Group emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs) instruct the
operator to reduce vessel injection as necessary to lower the downcomer water
level to the top of the core. The co re thermal power is about 9% with the
downcomer water level lowered to the TAF and with the RV fully pressurized.
Accordingly the EPGs specify that the operator should restore the RV water
level to the normal operating level after the amount of sodium pentaborate
required for hot shutdown has been injected.
The Commission has approved the Final Rule on ATWS, unanimously supporting
the following provisions for BWRs:
a. Each BWR .must have an alternate rod injection (ARl) system that is
independent and diverse from the reactor trip system (RTS).
b. Each new BWR must have an automatic SLCS with flow capacity of 86 gpm
of 13 weight percent of sodium pentaborate solution. This applies to
plants granted a construction permit after August 1, 1984 and for
plants granted a construction permit prior to August 1, 1984 that
have already been designed and build to include this feature.
c. Each BWR must provide diverse means of recirculation pump trip (RPT)
automatically under conditions indicative of an ATWS. This safety
feature will result in a reduction of reactor power from 100 percent
to 30 percent following a transient (failure to scram). This proposed
requirement has already been implemented on all operational BWRs.
The Commissioners agreed that the new systems should not have to be fully
safety grade but should have some quality assurance and testing requirements.
Utilities will have 6 months as of August 1, 1984 to submit to NRC a proposed
schedule for meeting the above requirements. NRC officals expect that most
plants will meet the requirements within 3 years.
A more detailed analysis of system thermal hydraulic and core neutronic
conditions up to core damage and containment failure for ATWS are presently
underway using the RELAP5, RAMONA-3B and SCDAP codes. RELAP5 results will be
benchmarked using RAMONA-3B with 3-D neutronics capability coupled with non-
homogenous, nonequilibrium thermal hydraulics.
DESCRlPTlON AND RESULTS OF THE FEED AND BLEED STUDY
The SASA program recently completed an analysis of shutdown decay heat
removal using feed and bleed techniques for PWR in support of Unresolved Safety
lssues A-45. 3 The accident sequences considered are loss of feedwater induced
by loss of offsite power (LOSP), and loss of feedwater (LOFW) transients. The
feed and bleed process refers to the direct removal of decay heat from the
primary system utilizing the high pressure injection system and the pressure
relief system. The TRAC-PF1 code was used in this analysis to enhance our
understanding of the capability of PWRs to remove decay heat using feed and
bleed in accidents in which all secondary cooling has been lost. The PWR
plants analyzed are: Zion (W), Oconee-1 (B&W), and Calvert Cliffs (CE).
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During the extensive LOFW studies for the Oconee-1, Calvert Cliffs-1, and
lion-1 reactors, it was determined that a limited number of plant features are
most important in defining accident signatures and the outcome of recovery
techniques. The recovery techniques examined were feed only (the ECC systems
inject coolant at the power operated relief valve (PORV) setpoint) and feed
and bleed (the PORV is locked open and the ECC systems inject coolant at an
increased rate because system pressure is decreased).
The primary plant feature determining event timing for the primary heatup
rate are the reactor trip time and steam-generator-secondary inventory. The
primary plant features determining the timing and success of feed and feed-and-
bleed cooling operations are the PORV capacity and the ECC system flow charac-




Oconee Cl iffs lion
Steady State power (MWt) 2584 2700 3250
Total SG secondary inventory (kg) 35,000 124,700 173,840
Number of PORVs One Two Two
Rated PORV capacity (kg/s) 12.8 38.7 53.0
ECC flow (kg/s) at PORV setpoint 27.2 8.3 15.6
Comparing the base case transients (Table 11), Oconee had the shortest
heatup time, which was two to three times faster than that of Calvert Cliffs
or lion. The base transients showed that the LOSP event had a significantly
slower heatup time than the LOFW event. In the LOFW event, the reactor does
not trip immediately and the reactor coolant pumps continue to operate. These
two effects increase heatup rates.
All three plants were successful in the feed mode in stabilizing reactor
conditionsj however, the timing window of success was different. For both
Oconee and lion, the feed mode was successful if initiated as late as the loss
of core-subcooling margin. The high-head flow-injection capability of the HPI
systems in these plants makes this possible. However, for Calvert Cliffs,
with its high-head low-flow safety injection (SI) capability, feed cooling
must be established by steam-generator dryout. Although this requires that
feed be initiated earlier (at steam-generator dryout vs. at loss of co re sub-
cooling), the actual time delay is at least 20 min from the start of the
initiating transient (LOSP, LOFW). This is at about the same time that the
loss of core subcooling occurs in Oconee for the LOFW event. For lion, with
the greatersteam-generator inventory, the loss of co re subcooling would occur
after 30 min for the LOFW event. Delayed reactor trip times of up to aminute




Oconee Cl iffs Zion
S.G. time to dryout - LOFW event (min) 3.3 20.8 51. 3
S.G. time to dryout - LOSP event (min) 10.0 58.3 69.5
Core heatup begins - LOFW event (min) 36.7 70.0 104.7
Core heatup begins - LOSP event (min) 50.0 133.3 138.3
The feed-and-bleed mode can be used successfully in all instances where
the feed mode has been determined to be successful: for Oconee and Zion, up
to the time of loss of core subcooling; for Calvert Cliffs, up to the time
of steam-generator dryout. If feed is initiated later than these times,
significant core voiding may have occurred already, with the possibility of
fuel/cladding damage. If feed is initiated after possible core voiding, the
PORV should not be locked open until core subcooling has been reestablished
since locking open the PORV under partially voided core conditions could
hinder water-level recovery.
For each of the three plants examined, using detailed thermal-hydraulic
studies it was found that there was a span of time within which a feed-and-
bleed procedure could be applied successfully to effect a transition from
reactor trip to hot standby. For the transition from reactor trip to hot
standby, success is defined as the attainment of a stable primary system
having the following three characteristics. First, the primary system'
pressure is above the actuation pressures for both the low pressure injection
(LPI) system and accumulators. Second, the primary system and vessel mass
inventories are stable or increasing. Third, the cladding temperatures are
near primary liquid saturation temperatures with no departure from nucleate
boiling. For the transition from reactor trip to hot shutdown, success is
defined as the completion of a controlled primary-system depressurization and
cool down to achieve conditions permitting long-term cooling using either the
residual heat-removal system or the LPI system taking suction from the contain-
ment sump. Figure 3 denotes success or failure criteria as follows:
SI: Success in transition from reactor trip to hot standby (accomplish-
ment of the first success criterion).
F1: Failure in transition from reactor trip to hot standby (failure of
the first success criterion).
S2: Success in transition from reactor trip to hot shutdown (accomplish-
ment of the second success criterion).
F2: Failure in transition from reactor trip to hot shutdown (failure of
the second success criterion).
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Although the viability of a feed-and-bleed operation has been determined for
three specific plants, the objective of TAP A-45 is to eventually identify all
plants for which feed-and-bleed procedures can be successfully applied.
The SASA program will continue to analyze dominant sequences derived
from risk assessment studies for specific plant designs to evaluate areas of
uncertainty, to access prevention and mitigation of core melt during severe
accidents. Major phenomenological test programs will be used to produce data
that can be used to evaluate SASA results.
REFERENCES:
1. A. M. Kolaczkowski et al., Interim report on Accident Sequence Likelihood
Reassessment (Accident Sequence Evaluation Program), February 1983.
2. R. M. Harri ngton et al., ATWS at Browns Ferry Unit One - Acci dent Sequence
Analysis, NUREG/CR-3470, July 1984.
3. B. E. Boyack et al., Los Alamos PWR Decay-Heat-Removal Studies Summary
Results and Conclusions (to be published).
Codes:
BWR-LACP: AN ORNL developed simulation program for BWR Accident Analyses to
provide plotted studies of the plant response to operator actions.
HECTR: Integrated analysis of hydrogen burns in containment.
RELAP: Integrated analysis of thermal hydraulics of the reactor primary
and secondary cooling systems.
TRAC: A multi dimensional analysis method to investigate two phase thermal
hydraulics behavior of the primary and secondary reactor coolant
systems.
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A set of precalculated doses for the PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor)
accident categories of the U.S. Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) have been
published recently by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This paper
summarizes the information in the publication. Whole body and thyroid doses are
presented for a selected set of weather cases. For each weather case these
calculations were performed for various times and distances including three
different exposure pathways--cloud (plume) shine, ground shine and inhalation.
During an emergency this information can be useful since it is immediately
available for projecting offsite radiological doses based on reactor accident
sequence information in the absence of plant measurements of emission rates
(source terms). It can be used for emergency drill scenario development as
well.
INTRODUCTION
In the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear power plant it would
be necessary to obtain an early projection of doses that members of the public
might receive in the event of arelease of radioactivity. All nuclear power
plants in th~ Uni ted States are required to develop and maintain dose projection
capabilities. Various methods are available to obtain such estimates. This 2paper summarizes one such method of projection, recently published by the NRC ,
which is based on precalculated doses and dose rates for a set of postulated
accident sequences. Doses and dose rates were calculated for each of the
postulated releases and for each of the meteorological conditions and sheltering
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case§ ~hgsen. The CRAC (Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences)
code' , was used to generate the dose and dose rate information.
ACCIDENT CATEGORIES
Essentially four core melt/containment failure combinations can occur and
are addressed in the dose calculations:
o Core melt followed by containment failure;
o Containment failure followed by core melt;
o Simultaneous failure of all cooling modes, with core melt and
containment failure occurring almost simultaneously; and
o Containment bypass scenarios, where releases from the core travel
through open plumbing paths to the atmosphere.
For each of these cases, a spectrum of releases and timings of releases can
occur.
The· spectrum of accidents considered is that represented by the so called
PWR (3ressurized Water Reactor) accident sequences of the Reactor Safety Study
(RSS) . These accidents encompass a full range of postulated degraded core and
core-melt accidents ranging from simple cladding failure, where the plant
containment systems remain essentially intact, and for which the releases of
radioactivity to the atmosphere would be relatively small, to extremely severe
accidents for which large fractions of the core inventory of radionuclides are
postulated to be released to the atmosphere. The release categories are
designated PWR 1 through PWR 9. The most severe accident class, PWR 1, is
comprised of two parts, PWR 1A and PWR 1B to cover the possible outcomes of a
ground level release or a high energy release for which an elevated puff would
be expected.
The estimated release fractions and timings of possible releases for the
RSS accident categories have been questioned by some experts and major research
efforts are underway to re-assess accident source terms. Since the PWR 1 and 2
sequences would involve very rapid releases and very high release fractions,
revised (reduced) source terms, if any, should be encompassed within the PWR 1-8
or BWR 1-5 accident categories. If more than minor interpolation is required
for newer ~ource terms, these calculations should be revised or supplemented in
the future. It should be known that during an actual emergency it would be a
very tenuous speculation to accurately predict the eventual release of
radioactivity to the environment even if the accident sequences were known
perfectly.
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ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT ANO METEOROLOGICAL CONOITIONS
The possibility of a variety of meteorological conditions during arelease
to the atmosphere and subsequent transport away from the release point provides
the potential for a wide range of off-site consequences for each postulated
release. This continuous spectrum was approximated by discrete meteorological
conditions. Plots of doses are labeled, for example, according to windspeed,
atmospheric stability class and occurrence of rainfall .
The atmospheric transport in CRAC is calculated by a Gaussian plume model
whose vertical and horizontal dispersion parameters are functions of atmospheric
stability class. The Pasquill-Gifford-Turner atmospheric dispersion
classification scheme (denoted by the letters A through F) is used to relate
types of atmospheric turbulent dispersion to easily observed co?d~tions of the
atmosphere: windspeed, day or night conditions and cloud cover'. Refer to
Table 1. A few examples will illustrate how the information in Table 1 can be
used to determine astability class. First, read footnote 1 in Table 1: for
heavy cloud cover, the Pasquill-Gifford stability class is 0, or neutral
stability. Further, for moderate to high windspeeds, the stability class is
also 0 for the most part (see bottom line of Table 1). ~Indeed, 0 stability is
the most prevalent stability class. Now note the area of the table below the
dashed line. here, higher windspeeds would prevail and the stability class
would be neutral (0) under most conditions, day or night. However, given strang
sunlight and moderate windspeeds better dispersion than "normal: would be
expected, and the stability class would be B or C. Additionally, given 5-10 mph
windpseed and a cloudless night, poorer than average dispersion would be
expected (E stability). Low windspeed conditions can induce either greater or
less than normal (0 stability) disperson. Observe the area above the dashed
line in Table 1. For low windspeeds, dispersion would be greater than normal
during the day and less than normal during the night. A long, narrow,
concentrated plume is often observed in the late afternoon on a calm sunny
evening, or on a cool calm, starry night (e.g., Class F stability). For
emergency response purposes considering all other variables and uncertainties,
the information in Table 1 can be simplified and summarized as shown in Table 2.
Oue to the particulate material in the cloud rainfall could significantly
alter the consequences of an accidental release. Ground level dose rates in the
wake of a plume could be orders of magnitude greater with rainfall , as compared
to transport in dry weather. Thus, dose calculations for dry and wet weather
cases were made. One assumption used for the rainfall cases is important to
note: it was assumed that rainfall was continuous and steady throughout the
transport time at all "downwind" locations. Interception of rainfall after
transport in dry weather was not included here, although it can be considered in
the CRAC code. Other assumptions of note were: plumes (puffs) were depleted
exponentially with travel time, ground runoff was ignored, and plume depletion
and ground deposition were the same for all stability classes, for rain cases.
Other assumptions inherent in the metorological models used for the calculations
are presented in the report.
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Extreme care must be exercised in using and interpreting the information in
the graphs especially at larger distances. It is clear that should an actual
release of sufficient magnitude ever occur, a reasonably accurate dose
assessment would require monitoring teams to locate the release(s~. Considering
the high dose rates necessary for a Protective Action Guide (PAG) to be
realized, the majofooffsite monitoring problems would involve finding and
tracking arelease . Considering further the facts that windspeeds average 5
to 10 miles .per hour, and that a two hour release could be ten to twenty miles
long over areas where the wind directions could be considerably different,
aircraft1~ould be the preferred method for plume tracking where at all
possible • The wind directions at the release point may not be adequate to
project atmospheric transport to distances of more than a few miles, especially
in complex terrain.
DOSE CALCULATIONS
Projected doses to the whole body and thyroid were calculated for a
selected set of weather conditions and release categories, (PWR 1 through 9) as
shown in Table 3 for a 2250 megawatt reactor. These dose calculations are
documented in NUREG-1062 .
The individual in accident/weather scenarios 1 through 14 is unshielded,
that is, the individual is not in a brick building, or basement, or other
enclosure which could reduce the received dose. These calculations (i.e., cases
1 through 14) are "projected doses" and can provide a perspective on "dose
savings" to be afforded by various protective measures. Several sheltering
cases, i.e., 15 through 19, with and without the occurrence of rain are included
for additional perspective. Shiblding factors for these cases are 0.75 for the
cloud pathway and 0.33 for the ground.
Doses were calculated for three pathways: inhalation, external gamma irra-
diation form the plume (cloud) and external gamma irradiation from radionuclides
deposited on the ground. Four graphs showing calculated doses at distances be-
tween 1 and 100 miles along the track of plume (puff) are displayed for each of
the postulated accident/meterological conditions. Information in the graphs can
be used to discern both dose rate and pathway contributions to doses. For
illustrative purposes see Figure 1, taken from NUREG-1062.
Inputs to CRAC included a specification of the inventory of radionuclides
and activities released to the atmosphere, the characteristics of the release
and meteorological conditions following the accident. A finite cloud dosimetry
model in CRAC was used for the cloud external gamma dose calculations. Standard
wet and dry deposition models were used to transfer non-noble gaseous material
from the atmosphere to the ground for the ground exposure dose calculations.
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The calculations of whole body dose are very sensitive to the assumption of
the length of time one remains in the vicinity of contaminated ground.
Therefore, three time periods were used in the total dose versus distance
calculations (i.e., 4-hour, 24 hour and 7 day). The cloud, ground and inhaled
components of the total dose are explicitly plotted (on the right hand side of
each figure) using the 24-hour ground exposure time assumption. The external
gamma dose from the passing cloud is assumed to happen "instantaneously."
Inhalation of radionuclides occurs over a very short time period
("instantaneously") and the dose builds up over time since the body continues to
be irradiated for extended time periods by those inhaled radionclides which
remain in the body; i .e., which are not immediately exhaled. The dose
commitment from inhaled radionuclides is calculated over an individual 's
lifespan.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In an actual emergency response situation it would be useful to base dose
projections on actual radiological ,measurements as quickly as possible.
However, for many postulated severe accident scenarios major radionuclide
emmissions would bypass at least some engineered safety features and routinely
monitored release paths. For such cases precalculated dose projections could be
immediately available when a real time dose projection model could not be used
and field measurements are absent. These dose projections are keyed on
essentially two questions. First, what are the source term characteristics (or
what are the conditions of the core/containment?) Second, what are the weather
conditions? The dose information can be useful during emergency drills, in the
emergency planning process and in the very early stages of an emergency response
situation. These calculations can be especially useful during a response
situation before arelease occurs for purposes of contingency planning based on
an assessment of the possible outcomes of the actual accident sequence.
All in all, then, these dose and dose rate calculations can be useful for
emergency planning and in the early phases of an emergency response. However,
in the post-release phase of an emergency response the best dose projections
would be based on actual data obtained from radiological monitoring and the
knowledge of plant system performance at the time.
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Table 1: Relation of Stability Classes to Weather Conditions
A--Extremely unstable conditions D--Neutral conditions 1
B--Moderately unstable conditions E--Slightly stable conditions





Surface wind Daytime or 4/83 3/8Speed cloudiness cloudiness
m/sec4 mph4
2 5 A A-B B






















1. Applicable to heavy overcast, day or night (D, or neutral stability).
2. Insolation is proportional to the amount of solar energy reaching the sur-
face of the earth.
3. The degree of cloudiness is defined as that fraction of the sky above the
local apparen~ horizoQ which is covered by clouds.
4. m/sec = meters per second; mph = miles per hour.
Table 2: Weather Classification Scheme for Emergency Response Purposes
Atmospheric
Condition
Windspeed 10 mph or greater, or heavy
cloud cover anytime
Low windspeed and few clouds -
Daytime
nighttime









Table 3: ACCIDENT SCENARIOS FOR PRECALCULATED DOSES
Stability Wind Speed
Case # Class (mph) Rain/Shelter Combinations
1 A 3 No Rai n No Sheltering
2 A 9 No Rain No Sheltering
3 D 2 No Rain No Shelteri ng
4 D 6 No Rai n No Shelteri ng
5 D 16 No Rain No Sheltering
6 E 2 No Rain No Sheltering
7 E 9 No Rain No Shelteri ng
8 F 1 No Rain No Shelteri ng
9 F 3 No Rain No Shelteri ng
10 D 2 Rain No Sheltering
11 D 6 Rain No Sheltering
12 D 16 Rain No Sheltering
13 E 2 Rain No Sheltering
14 E 9 Rain No Sheltering
15 A 3 No Ra in Sheltering
16 D 6 No Rain Sheltering
17 D 16 No Rain Sheltering
18 F 1 No Ra i n Sheltering
19 D 6 Rain Sheltering
Shielding Factars for Sheltering Cases: Cloud (0.75); Ground (0.37) .
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Figure 1: Calculated Dases Versus Distance (fram NUREG-1062)
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ABSTRACT
It is well known that the event oriented procedures do not cover every
possible accident with any number of instrument or system failures.
Their effectiveness depends on an accurate initial accident diagnosis.
This EDF-FRAMATOME Joint development lead to a set of seven unique
state oriented procedures (used with a permanent diagnostic procedure
based on permanent state criteria) which cover every possible single
or multi-event accident. These procedures use an accurate and dependa-
ble water level measurement instrumentation along with the existing
instrumentation and are not more complicated than the usual event
oriented procedures.
INTRODUCTION
The post-accident procedures presently used by the operators in the french
PWR's are based on a diagnosis of the accident-initiating incident and on a pre-
determined succession of events in the most probable sequences.
It is now ,~ell-known that this "event" oriented approach does not allow all
conceivable accident situations to be taken into account nor the diagnosis to be
reviewed and updated should the system deviate from the pattern predicted by the
first diagnosis, but the lack of direct knowledge of primary inventary requires
this predetermined approach.
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FIRST DEVELOPMENT TO IMPROVE E~ffiRGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
To improve the present emergency procedures on the 900 MW plants, a new set
of two procedures has been added :
- an ultimate one which is already based on physical states - U! -,
- a permanent monitoring post-incident procedure - SPI - (~urveillance Post-
.!.ncidentelle) •
The Ul procedure acts like a "safety net" and defines the required actions
as a function of the state of the reactor and the available systems. It is used
when the normal emergency operating procedures are no longer valid.
Criteria used to call for Ul are checked through a Permanent Monitoring
post-Incident Procedure (SPI).
SPI includes a control of the primary system status, steam generators se-
condary side status and availability, containment status and safety systems
availability (high and low pressure safety injection, emergency feedwater and
containment spray system).
This continuous post-incident superV1S10n is carried out by the safety and
Radioprotection Engineer (ISR - Ingenieur de Sure te et Radioprotection) who is
called into the control room within five minutes after ;very scram signal and
who acts completely independently of the operator's crew.
SPI allows ISR to confirm the main safety actions dictated by the "event
oriented" procedures being applied , or to decide to use ultimate one Ul.
Once the operator uses Ul, no provision is made to go back to the "event
oriented procedure". He keeps using Ul until the plant is in a safe state.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of reactor vessel instrumentation, the de-
gradation of the primary coolant inventory is detected relatively late. Conse-
quently, corrective actions are not taken in a progressive way. So, there is a
gap between design accidental situations (covered by event oriented procedures)
and ultimate degraded situations (covered by Ul procedure) for which no document
is presently suitable.
Picture 1 shows the present distribution of the different documents between
the operator's crew and the ISR after an incident on French 900 MW plants.
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FIGURE 1 PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTS IN CONTROL ROOM
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REGENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROGEDURES
A reliable reactor vessel water level instrumentation is going to be ins-
talled on each french 1300 W~ plant.
This detection is based on apressure differential measure, corrected for
the accidental containment conditions (high containment temperature). Therefore,
the primary system coolant inventory can be closely and continuously monitored.
Work has been carried on to achieve a more systematic application of the state
approach with this additional instrumentation.
OBJEGTIVES AND METHOD OF REGENT DEVELOPMENT ON PHYSIGAL STATES APPROACH
This work is still based on the same principle as U1 namely the relation
" s tate -') actions".
The two main objectives are as follow :
- to give a permanent diagnosis of the whole system to insure that at each
moment the right action is taken in order to correctly restaure the
situation of the plant,
- to generalize this approach to cover the presently existing gap between
design calculated situations and ultimate one with proper operating docu-
ments.
Briefly, these goals have been sucessfuly reached using the following
method :
Operating objectives have been defined. They are decay heat evacuation con-
trol, primary coolant inventory control, subcriticality control for the primary
side, secondary inventory coolant control and integrity for the secondary side,
integrity control for containment and availability and restoration for safety
systems.
All the available plant informations are -gathered to characterize primary,
secondary containment and circuits status.
lilien possible, measurements of a same physical "reality" are correlated to
give a best reliability in the diagnosis.
Gonsequently the use of two measurements need an intervalidation treatment
to eliminate some erratic or faulty measurement.
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FIGURE 2 DEFINITION OF PRIMARY DEGRADATION STATE
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Figure 2 shows the way to identify the state of primary degradation by the
use of saturation margin and reactor vessel ~P measurements and the physically
impossible areas which need this treatment.
The conjunction of all the different possible primary, secondary and con-
tainment status and the availability of the safety systems leads to a large num-
ber of configurations.
But all these physically different configurations of the plant can be gathe-
red in a limited number of plant states requiring the same recoveryactions for
the predefinite operating objectives.
Then the only work to do for each state is to define precisely :
- the priority on the operating objectives,
- and the right actions which allow to control these objectives.
The picture n03 sumnlarizes this method.
For the states oriented approach, the challenge is not to find the appro-
priate actions to call for in the different plant states, but to give a suitable
presentation of the operating documents to the operators.
STATES APPROACH DOCUMENTS ORGANISATION
The goal is to have a limited number of procedures, each being unlengthy
and simple to use but yet covering every possible accident with a reasonable
number of failures (instrument and/or systems failures).
In a first step of this work, each operating objective was handled apart.
Recoveryactions for each objective were collected on a same document.
Then these recoveryactions documents had to be gathered, following the
defined operating objectives priorities, in a suitable manner to be used by ope-
rators.
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The state oriented approach documents have been split into a set of seven
sequential accidental primary operating guidelines, one sequential secondary
operating guideline and one sequential containment operating guideline
o Each of these seven primary guidelines clearly includes its own operating
objective and its own specific means. They are self carrying and they are ranged
in increasing order of plant degradation.
The right primary procedure is chosen by the mean of a permanent diagno-
sis procedure based on a permanent state criteria checking. Once one of the pro-
cedure is chosen, the operator may only change it for higher plant degradation
procedure (to avoid switching back and forth between procedures).
Usually, for most simple accident without further degradation or failure,
the same self-checking procedure is used throughout the transient.
o The secondary one allows to control or restore the secondary objectives
Steam generator (S.G) water inventory and S.G integrity and to carry out the
cooling down or the temperature stabilisation actions which are eventually asked
from the primary operating guideline.
o The containment procedure allows to control or res tore the containment
integrity and to give information to elaborate the primary diagnosis (degraded
containment or not).
TRe figure 4 shows how these documents are chained.
CONCLUSION
The recent development in the symptom oriented procedure allows an exten-
sive covering of all the plant states, enables progressives actions or anti ci-
pates them so that there is no important core degradation.
The diagnosis is continuously checked from states criteria and allows to
go to an another procedure if the situation be comes wrong.
All these operational documents (verification, diagnosis and symptom
oriented operating procedures) are based upon the present definition of opera-
tor crew and ISR functions in control room.
This approach will be applied on the new french 1500 ~~ plant (N4). A deci-
sion will be taken for the application on the 1300 MW plant at the end of this
year, the training delay of the actual operating crew beeing the most important
factor of this decision. (It seems to be possible to anticipate this application
on the 1300 MW by 1990).
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FIGURE 4 "PHYSICAL STATES" OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS
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VALIDATION OF EVENT ORIENTED PROCEDURES
A. BRUNET and T. MESLIN
Electricite de France / SPT
75384 PARIS FRANCE
ABSTRACT
One of the most important "post-T~II" action carried out by EDF is the
re-writing of the incident and accident procedures.
These new procedures are based on simple initiating events and consist
of two different and complementary documents.
- An operating rule : Technical and theorical con~ents.
- An operating procedure : Practical and operational contents.
As far as the design of the new operating procedures is concerned,
many tests were performed on simulator and revealed the main basic
requirements such as :
- To separate and coordinate operations on the primary and secondary
circuits.
- To separate operating and surveillance tasks.
- To use a suitable vocabulary.
The re-writing of the new documents was realized by engineers working
in nuclear power plants.
Each new event oriented procedure is then validated as often as pos-
sible on site, otherwise on simulator.
The validation is indispensable
It guarantees the applicability of the procedure and makes the opera-
tors more confident and more efficient.
Particularly, the validations on site increase significantly our know-
ledge of the physical transients as weIl as the human behaviour.
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HISTORY
In the aftermath .of the accident which occurred in 1979 at the Three Mile
Island plant, EDF started a number of "post-nlI" actions. One of which aims to
verify the technical contents and review the format of event oriented procedures
defining the course to be followed in the event of an incident or an accident.
These new procedures are composed of two documents :
- The operating rule : supplied by both the vendor and the EDF' s Cons-
truction Department as a basic detailled and theorical document giving all tech-
nical justifications allowing to write the operating procedure.
- The operating procedure : written by the Operating Department itself, is
the action document used by the operators during the transient.
EDF's Operating Department has undertaken work covering the presentation of
these operating procedures.
The aim in this case is to improve the efficiency of teams in case of inci-
dent or accident conditions and consequent1y, the safety level.
ELABORATION
The first step was to propose new formats.
Several groups of persons worked in parallel to this end, each one follo-
wing their own methodological approach. They submitted their own proposal.
The second step, undertaken on operation simulators; led to the implementa-
tion of a comparative assessment of the different proposed models.
The goal of the simulation was to compare the effectiveness of the diffe-
rent designs of procedures :
to cope the same situation,
to dis tribute the work among the operators.
Conclusions drawn from the following observations concerned
- the procedure strategy : guidance for action,
- handling of the procedure (pages turned, reference to earlier passages,
reference to a general framework, use of index-cards, etc ••• ),
- operator's movements in the control room,
- communication between operators,
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It should be underlined that sixty-seven tests were carried out during this
comparative assessment.
It was found that the new procedures were easier to use than the old ones,
and that the greatest effectiveness was obtained with a team organized as
follow
- a shift supervisor (who has an overall view of the installation) assuming
the coordination,
- an operator performing action on the primary circuit,
- an assistant operator performing action on the secondary circuit.
In addition, the contents should be adapted to the purpose and it is essen-
tial to tell operators what they are supposed to do (and not to do) in relation
to normal operating conditions.
I}WLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
The re-writing of the new operating procedures began in January 1981 on the
basis of the results of the assessment mentioned above.
Writing tasks were distributed among all 900 m,e power plants with a stan-
dard writing guide.
This re-writing of operating procedures which necessitated the participa-
tion of 40 engineers (part-time) working in the various 900 ~e sites, was com-
pleted in July 1984.
VALIDATION
To guarantee the applicability of the new procedures, they must be all
validated.
As often as possible, the new documents are validated on site, particularly
in the case of the loss of electrical supplies.
When it is not possible, the validation is carried out on simulator.
A procedure '(alidation is split into two steps :
First, a shift team which is not aware of the selected accident makes a
diagnosis and applies the selected operating procedure. Three "technical" obser-
vers follow each operator's actions during the simulation phase. More particu-
larly, an ergonomie expert is responsible for noting stages during which the
coordination and the presentation of the instructions raise a difficulty.
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The traditional parameters recording facilities are supplemented with
- fast recorders to collect main data,
- a plotting table giving the trend of primary pressure as a function of
temperature.
The session is recorded on video-tape in order to review the significant
sequences.
The second step consists in analysing the results of the test. The shift
team and the observers meet at the end of the simulation exercise to collect the
operators' impressions and hear the observers' remarks. The observed results
lead to correct temporarily the procedure. The synthesis of these results will
later serve to improve it.
The first validation campaign on simulator started in November, 1983 and
the second took pIace in April, 1984. Each series of tests requires the partici-
pation of seventy people to validate twenty procedures.
The initial conclusions drawn from these validations show that the ope-
rators are much more confident with these new procedures, consequently, the glo-
bal efficiency has risen. For instance, when a steam generator tube breaks, the
operators are able to stop the safety injection after 45 minutes, whereas, using
the old procedures, almost one hour was necessary.
Several validations on site were carried out among which the most important
are two tests performed on plants in operation :
- Loss of the main electrical supply (400 KV) and missed "houseloading"
performed on DA}WIERRE EN BURLY unit n° 3, December 4th, 1982.
Station blackout with two emergency diesel generators in operation
performed on DA}WIERRE EN BURLY unit n° 3, August 17th, 1983. (See the paper
N° 149 : Station Blackout : A test on a plant at power - Lessons learned for
Safety Studies - by T. MESLIN - A. CARNINO - B. PAYEN - A. CAHUZAC).
Most of the others loss of electrical supplies were performed on plants
which were in hot shut-down conditions, particularly
Station blackout with only one diesel generator in operation performed on
CRUAS unit n° 1, December 3rd and 4th, 1982.
- Loss of 125 V DC power performed on CRUAS unit n° 3, October 12th, 1983.
Those validations increase significantly our knowledge of the physical
behaviour of the PWR system in case of incident as weIl as our knowledge of the
operator's behaviour under disturbed situation.
OPERATORS' TRAINING
Fortunatly, incidents and ßccidents occur seldom. Therefore, the operating
incident procedures are rarely used.
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Consequently, the operators must be motivated and trained to carry out the
procedures by specific training courses "placing them in the situation" on simu-
lators and by on job training programs.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Now, the next validation campaign on simulator relates to the following
items :
- Validation of a new supervision procedure.
This procedure is used by the safety engineer permanently during the
transient. It guarantees the control of the safe resolution of the incident and
if necessary proposes complementary actions (see paper n° 513 Man-machine
interface enhancement undertaken by EDF to minimize human errors by
R. MARCILLE).
- Study and validation of diagnosis procedures extent :
The diagnosis of the event and the choice of the associated procedure can be
quickly executed by the use of logical diagrams taking into account the various
alarms as weIl as the symptoms.
- Validation of beyond design procedures.
- More realistic scenarios including shift turnover and long term simu-
lation.
- Elaboration of a quantitative method in order to evaluate comparatively
the different procedures validated on simulator.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the validations of new operating procedures, particularly
on site, make our operators more confident and efficient, guarantee the techni-
cal contents of it, increasing significantly the safe operating of our nuclear
power plants in case of unusual event.
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FUEL DAMAGE RESEARCH OF THE USNRC
AND FOREIGN PARTNERS
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Fuel Systems Research Branch
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ABSTRACT
The Severe Fuel Damage research program is an integrated program of
large-scale integral tests in the PBF and NRU test reactors,
separate-effects phenomenological experiments in the ACRR test reactor and
in the laboratory, and corollarly analysis and model development on
in-vessel fuel and fission-product behavior under severe-accident
'conditions. The purpose of the program is to provide a data base and
validated analytical models for safety assessment and regulatory decisions
for LWR accidents beyond the design basis. Tha SFD program partners with
the USNRC include Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI).
PROGRAM BACKGROUND
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission (NRC) in conjunction with its
foreign partners has established a research program on Severe Fuel Damage (SFD)
in order to develop a data base and validated analytical models for use in
assessing the consequences of LWR accidents that involve severe core damage.
This program is a major part of the more comprehensive NRC Severe Accident
Research Program (SARP), described in NUREG-0900, which was established after
the accident at TMI-2 to furnish the Commission with a technical basis for
policy decisions for severe LWR accidents that exceed the design basis.[l]
Currently, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) are participating members in the Severe Fuel Damage research program,
and discussions on possible participation in the program are proceeding with
other countries.
General applications of the program results are to: regulatory decisions
for accidents that exceed the design basis; source-term reassessment; planning
for severe-accident management, training, and emergency response; furnishing
information to the public and to other government units during the course,of a
severe accident; and knowledge of what actually happened in the TMI-2 accident.
Specific applications of the program results are to: the assessment and
reduction of the uncertainties in safety and risk assessment; the development
and the validation testing of mechanistic accident-analysis codes for in-vessel
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severe-accident behavior; and the benchmarking of advanced fast-running
risk-assessment codes such as MELCOR.
Regulatory decisions regarding radiological source terms are usually based
on estimates of the upper bound to the source-term uncertainty range. Thus,
reductions in the uncertainty range can have regulatory implications comparable
to reductions in the best-estimate values, and thus are very significant.
. The technical issues addressed by the program are as folIows: Wh at are
the fission-product and aerosol release rates from the core during the course
of a severe accident, including the timing and chemical form, and what are the
magnitudes of the fission-product and aerosol attenuation within the reactor
vessel and the primary system? These are major questions in determining the
accident radiological source term. What are the hydrogen release rates from
the core? This is a major question in assessing containment integrity. What
are the physical and chemical states of the core and the temperature distri-
butions during the risk-significant severe accident sequences, including the
progression of core melt and the attack on reactor structure and the reactor
vessel? What are the conditions at reactor vessel failure, including the mode
of vessel failure and the spatial mass and temperature distributions of the
molten and solid core debris? This information on the state of the core and
the core temperature distributions forms a necessary basis for reliability
modeling severe-accident consequences. What are the characteristics of the
severely damaged core debris in different accident sequences? This is a
primary unknown in determining the coolability limits of severely damaged cores
by reflooding to terminate an accident.
Severe accident safety assessment and risk assessment require models and
safety analysis codes that cover the range of the risk-significant accident
sequences and the ranges of the parameters of the governing phenomena, and a
data base for model development and validation. An integrated research program
with a number of elements is required to obtain this wide range of needed
information. The integrated Severe Fuel Damage research program includes
integral in-pile tests for multiple-effect interactions at large scale in the
PBF and the NRU test reactors and at small scale in the ACRR test reactor;
separate-effect phenomenological experiments, both in-pile in the ACRR test
reactor and out-of-pile, for model development and model validation testing and
to cover the relevant accident parameter range; and analytical model and core
development and validation. Two complementary mechanistic severe-accident fuel
behavior codes are being developed as part of this program, the Severe Core
Damage Analysis Package (SCDAP), and the Melt Progression Model (MELPROG). It
is the validated models and codes that are used in the assessment of
severe-accident consequences and uncertainties
and in benchmarking risk-assessment codes, and not the experimental data
directly.
Because of recent developments, there has been redirection of the Severe
Fuel Damage research program. These developments include: (1) results of the
consequence studies for dominant-risk accident sequences in the NRC source-term
reassessment program that will be reported in BMI-21D4, [2] (2) results of the
Quantitative Uncertainty Estimation for the Source Term (QUEST) in the same
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program that will be reported in SAND 84-0410, [3J and (3) the general increase
in knowledge of the governing phenomena and the consequences of severe
accidents obtained in the last two years. The QUEST work has shown that, at
least for the SURRY TMLB' accident sequence that was studied in detail, the
uncertainty in the suspended aerosol activity in the containment is about a
factor of 100. This uncertainty was found to result primarily and in about
equal amounts from uncertainties in the in-vessel fission product release rates
and from uncertainties in the in-vessel progression of core melt that affect
both the probability of early containment failure and the fission-product
release itself. In-vessel melt progression determines the melt mass and
temperature distribution and the mode and timing of vessel failure that in
large part determine the hydrogen generation and the fission-product release
and aerosol generation. The major goals of the program redirection are: (1)
da ta and models on in-vessel fission-product release rates, chemical form, and
attenuation, and aerosol formation and transport under in-vessel conditions up
to full fuel-melt temperatues; and (2) models and confirmatory data on
in-vesse1 melt progress ion up to vesse1 fa il ure, the melt mass and temperature
distribution, and the mode and timing of vessel failure, which are incorporated
in the MELPROG melt-progression analysis code.
IN-PILE INTEGRAL TESTS
A major part of the Severe Fuel Damage research program is the series of
four large integral (multi-effect) SFD tests in the PBF test reactor on core
behavior under core-uncovery accident conditions at temperatures up to about
2500K. These tests are performed with 0.9 meter long, 32-rod bundles of test
fuel and at 68 bars pressure. They use either fresh or pre-irradiated fuel
that has been preconditioned by a week's operation at full power, in part to
build up a short-lived fission-product inventory in the test fuel, and with a
pre-test shutdown for build-up of a prototypic cesium-iodine ratio. Fission-
product release, hydrogen generation, and temperature distributions in the fuel
and the gas phase are measured during the test transients. The resultant fuel-
damage conditions are determined by post-test neutron radiography and
tomography and by post-irradiation examination (PIE).
The fresh-fuel SFD Scoping Test in PBF used an unprototypically-high steam
flow rate and slow heatup with resulting high oxidation, and was quenched from
high temperature by reflooding. The fresh-fuel SFD 1-1 test used the low steam
flow and rapid heat-up characteristic of core-uncovery transients in
small-break loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) in a PWR and was not qenched.
The SFD 1-3 and 1-4 tests are also for core-uncovery conditions without quench,
and use pre-irradiated fuel that has also been preconditioned at power prior to
the test transient for build-up of a short-lived fission-product inventory.
These tests will also have improved fission product diagnostics. Two
silver-indium-cadmium control rods will be added to the test fuel bundle in
test SFD 1-4 along with on~line aerosol diagnostics. The first three of the
PBF SFD tests have been performed, and the test series will be completed with
the performance of test SFD 1-4 in February 1985.
These integral Severe Fuel Damage tests in PBF have produced a
sub-stantial amount of data for determining and modeling the governing
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phenomena under core-uncovery accident conditions. Significant integral data
have been obtained on the rapid oxidation heating transient, with the resultant
generation of large quantities of hydrogen, fuel liquification (dissolution in
molten unoxidized metallic zircalloy) and relocation do~mward, damaged fuel
characterization, and fission-product release, transport, end deposition.
Large-scale in-pile integral tests are being continued in the Canadian NRU
reactor at Chalk River, which can accommodate bundles of 3.6 meter long
full-length PWR fuel rods. Full length tests are important for the validation
testing of the SCOAP and MELPROG codes, particularly for clad oxidation and the
resulting hydrogen generation where length scaling from the shorter PBF and
ACRR test results has uncertainties.
Four integral full-length Severe Fuel Oamage tests in NRU are currently
planned. High temperature tests HT-l and HT-2 will provide full length
validation testing up to 2100K and 2500K, respectively, of the SCOAP and
MELPROG models, particularly for rapid oxidation and hydrogen generation.
These fresh-fuel tests will be performed in 1985. The third planned
full-length NRU test, called H-max and planned for 1986, is to determine the
maximum zircalloy oxidation and hydrogen generation possible during a core
uncovery accident, that includes the effect of adverse operator action as at
TMI-2. The fourth planned NRU test, THE Saurce Term (ST) test, is a possible
full-length integral high-temperature, melt-progression, and fission-product-
release test for code validation that would use pre-irradiated fuel. A pre-
paratory test in NRU for the SFO series, test MT-6, has given excellent data on
clad ballooning.
Aseries of small-scale integral (multi-effect) Severe Fuel Oamage
experiments is also being performed in the ACRR test reactor on the governing
mechanisms involved in the development of fuel damage, fuel liquification,
debris relocation, and melt progression under core-uncovery accident
conditions. These experiments use visual diagnostics (cinematography) to give
time-continuous data on the development of fuel damage and melt progression and
on surface temperatures, as well as direct measurement by pulse Raman ,
spectroscopy of hydrogen generation inside the test-fuel bundle. The purpose
of these Oebris Formation (OF) experiments is to provide detailed
time-continuous data for the validation testing of the models in SCOAP and
MELPROG, and for the development of advanced versions of these codes. These
experiments use 0.510 long 9-or-12 rod bundles of test fuel in flowing steam,
and are modeled to represent the behavior of a 0.510 long central section in
reactor core in core-uncovery accidents. In the initial series of four
experiments with fresh-fuel, the first three cover the conditions of low,
medium, and high clad oxidation at the time of melting of the unoxidized
cladding (with resulting variations in fuel liquification), and a silver-indium-
cadmium control rod and additional aerosol-diagnostics instrumentation are
added for the fourth. The first of these experiments has already been
performed, and the four-test series will be completed in 1985.
Two later follow-on OFI experiments (Oebris Formation Irradiated) are
planned with pre-irradiated test fuel. The primary purpose of these
experiments is to provide integral data on fission-product release and aerosol
generation during the progression through two of the higher-risk accident
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sequences. Such results are needed to supplement the data fram the new
separate-effects experiments in ACRR on fission-product release rates under
specific well-defined fuel and environmental conditions, as well as the data
from laboratory separate-effects experiments. Irradiated fuel is different
mechanically from fresh fuel, and these two expel'iments will e.lso provide
irradiated-fuel data on the development of fuel damage and melt progression.
These two DFI experiments are currently scheduled for 1986.
A third DFI experiment in which the fuel is quenched by reflooaing is also
under consideration. The primary purpose of this experiment would be to deter-
mine the puff release of both hydrogen and fission-products that were qllite
high in the PBF Scoping Test which also was quenched. Data would also be
obtained on the characteristics of the core debris that results from accident
recovery by core reflooding, as at TMI-2. This would be used for assessment of
the limits on degraded core cool ability using debris-coolability models which
themselves are undergoin9 validation testing in separate-effects experiments in
the Severe Fuel Damage research program.
SEPARATE-EFFECTS PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS
Separate-effects experiments in the Severe Fuel Damage research program
include in-pile experiments in ACRR on in-vessel fission-product release rates
and core-debris coolability limits, and out-of-pile laboratory experiments by
our German program partners at KfK and also in the United States on the
thermodynamics, the kinetics, and the metallurgy of the reactions between U02,zircalloy, and steam.
The purpose of the planned new separate-effects Source Term ST) experi-
ments in ACRR, which are a major part of the redirection of the Severe Fuel
Damage research program, is to provide a data base on fission-product release
rates, chemical form, and aerosol formation, inclllding the non-volatiles, for
the most significant range of in-vessel severe-accident conditions up to full
fuel melt temperatures. Such data are needed to reduce major uncertainties
in current source-term calculations. These ST experiments impose clearly
defined conditions of temperature ramps 01' isothermal plateaus upon the
fission-heated test fuel which is in rod 01' particulate debris form, in some
cases with pre-oxidized clad. About eight tests are currently planned.
Important test variables are the states of fuel liquification, pressure,
temperature, rod debris geometry, and a check on mass-transport limitation of
the fission-product release rates. The data from these ST special-effects
experiments will be supplemented by results of the two small DFI integral tests
in ACRR that provide fission-product release andaerosol data for the
progression through the succession of states in two severe-accident sequences.
The ST experiments will start in about a year and will extend over a two-year
period.
Separate-effects experiment in ACRR on the dry-out limits on Damaged Core
Coolability (DCC) are also being performed. The purpose of these experiments
is to validate for LWR-specific conditions the advanced debris cool ability
models that have been developed in LMFBR safety research. The LWR specific
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conditions for which validation is needed are the full pressure range to 170
bars, deep debris beds, the relatively more coarse (than LMFBR) LWR core
debris, and inlet coolant flow. The first two OCC tests with relatively coarse
simulated U1R debris gave, a significantly smalleI' increase in the dry-out bed
specific power \'1ith increasing pressure than that in the standard Lipinski 1-0
dry out model, particlll arly for the finer debris. [4J The third OCC test with a
vertically-stratified debris bed and variable (from zero) inlet flow is
scheduled for mid 1985. The laboratory experiments and analysis at KfK on
debris-bed coolability are closely coordinated with and complement the ACRR
experiments and analysis.
A n~jor part of the out-of-pile separate-effects experiments associated
with the Severe Fuel Oamage research program is the research at KfK. In
addition to the work on the thel"modynamics, kinetics, and the metallurgy of the
reactions between UO?, zircalloy, and steam, this work includes pioneering
integral laboratory experiments on the development of severe fuel damage.
Laboratory experiments on zircalloy oxidation kinetics and the viscosity of
liquified fuel are being performed in the United States, along with related
laboratory experiments on fission-product release from irradiated fuel that are
not considered to be apart of the Severe Fuel Damage research program.
TMI-CORE DEBRIS EXAMINATION
Examination of the TMI-2 core debris is providing valuable and unique
benchmark data on fuel behavior under severe-accident conditions that are an
important complement to the Severe Fuel Damage research program.
ANALYSIS AND CODE DEVELOPMENT
In addition to analysis of the experimental results of the Severe Fuel
Damage research program and the development of models of the governing
processes, two mechanistic code packages are under development and validation
testing for use in severe accident safety assessment and the benchmarking of
risk-assessment codes. These two code packages have different capabilities and
different applications, and thus are complementary, not duplicative.
The Severe Core Damage Analysis Package, SCDAP, treats the state of the
core during the earlier stages of core-uncovery transients in detailed pin geometry,
and is particularly useful for analysis of recovered accidents like TMI-2.
SCDAP includes oxidation and hydrogen generation, fuel liquification,
fission-product release, and debris formation and coolabil ity following reflood
quenching. The Melt Progression model, MELPROG, treats the in-vessel
progression of core melt, liquification, and relocation in core-uncovery
accidents through the attack on the reactor internal structure and the reactor
vessel. Included are the mode of vessel failure and the initial conditions for
melt entry into the reactor cavity and the containment. Modeling to allow
analysis of BWRs as well as PWRs will soon be added to both codes. Both also
have fission-product release and transport modules that incorporate the
modeling of the TRAP/MELT fission-product and aerosol transport code.
Incorporated into MELPROG is a special fission-product module, VICTORIA, that
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will accommodate the results of current and future research on fission-product
release and that also includes the TRAP/MELT transport methodology. Both SCDAP
and MELPROG are being linked to appropriate thermal-hydraulic codes to include
analysis of this important aspect of in-vessel severe-accident behavior.
Because of the internal structure of the codes as well as for other reasons,
SCDAP will be linked with the RELAP5 thermal-hydraulic code and MELPROG will be
linked with TRAC.
Development has been completed on the MOD 1 version of SCDAP and on the
MOD 0 version of MELpROG. SCDAP MOD 1 has been tested against PBF data and has
been used in TMI-2 analysis. The integration of SCDAP/MOD 1 with the
RELAP5/MOD 2 thermal-hydraulic code and the TRAP/MELT fission-product and
aerosol transport code has also been completed. While use of the MOD 0 version
of MELPROG has begun, there are currently few experimental data available for
assessment of governing models in the code. This assessment will depend on the
future experimental results from the Severe Fuel Damage research program. The
MOD 1 version of MELPROG that incorporates the VICTORIA fission-product and
aerosol release and transport module will be completed late in 1985. Advanced
MOD 2 versions of SCDAP/RELAP5 and TRAC/MELPROG that include BWR capability
will be available in late 1986. These versions of the codes will have undergone
validation testing against experimental results from the Severe Fuel Damage
research program.
The SCDAP/RELAP5 and the TRAC/MELPROG codes in their MOD 2 versions will
provide advanced and partially validated tools for the mechanistic analysis of
in-vessel melt-progression and fission-product behavior in severe LWR
accidents. They will provide capability for direct detailed analysis of
accidents and experiments, and for benchmarking the advanced new
risk-assessment code MELCOR and other advanced codes that are developed for
risk assessment. These codes as validated also become the embodiment of the
results of the Severe Fuel Damage experimental program.
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ASSESSMENT OF SCDAP BY ANALYSIS OF IN-PILE EXPERIMENTS;







The paper presents severe fuel damage analysis using the SCDAP code
[1]. Phenomena modelIed include heat transfer, the Zircaloy-steam
reaction, fuel and clad relocation, and bundle collapse. The main
objective is to describe a comparison of a SCDAP prediction of the
Scoping Test with experimental results. Particular emphasis will be
paid to the main interesting feature, the mechanism behind the
spontaneous clad temperature excursion involving extensive oxidation
of the Zircaloy. The paper concludes with an assessment of the SCDAP
models, on the basis of the experimental comparison.
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents calculations on the PBF SFD-ST experiment, performed
at INEL EG&G Idaho Falls, using the USNRC sponsored code SCDAP. At an early
stage in the SCDAP development assessment of the Scoping Test provided insight
into the adequacy of the fundamental modelling, eg the boiling and radiation
heat transfer models, and this led to significant improvements in subsequent
vers ions of the code. This provides a sound basis for investigating the other
main phenomena, clad oxidation, fuel motion phenolnena etc, in future model
assessment.
The Scoping Test predictions given in this paper are based on best
estimate input data, using the version of the code obtained in September 1983,
from EG&G, termed SCDAP/MODO/RELEASE3 and in general incorporating only the
minimum changes that were necessary for conversion of the code from the CDC to
CRAY computers. There are three exceptions, described later, but no attempt
has been made to tune the models to fit experiment.
The experiment was characterised by a very slow heat up from saturation
temperatures of 550K to superheats between 500K and 1500K depending on axial
location. At about 200 mins a rapid temperature excursion occurred over most
of the superheated region associated with the exothermic Zircaloy oxidation
reaction. The mechanism of this rapid transient presents an interesting
question. Did it result from:
(1) a flame propagation downwards;
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(2) deterioration of local heat transfer conditions resulting from the
observed flow reduction; which might have been caused by hydrogen back
pressure in the separator?
It is not possible to assess the first mechanism using SCDAP but the
conditions necessary for the second are predictable using the code, and are
discussed below.
PROBLEH SPECIFICATION FOR THE SCOPING TEST
The input data for the calculation were mainly derived from the EG&G Quick
Look Report [2], together with some reference to test cases supplied by EG&G,
and [1]. In the analysis in the QLR, zero time was taken to be 23-00 hours on
28/10/82. The initial conditions in the SCDAP calculation are based on
conditions existing 10 minutes after this time. To avoid confusion all times
quoted will be relative to zero time in the experiment.
The test geometry is shown in Figure 1. In the SCDAP calculation the fuel
rods are grouped into components 1, 2, 3 according to different radial power
levels [2] with the shroud, see description below, as component 4. In the
finite difference discretisation the heated length 0.91m was divided into 8
equal length axial cells.
The definition of the fission bundle power is probably uncertain to within
10% [2]. In the calculations here the axial profile ta~en is that recommended
in the TRAC comparison in the QLR. The profile is skewed downwards to allow
for partial uncover of the core but only a single profile is used for the
calculation. There is considerable uncertainty concerning this parameter.
Good steady state calculations were established between 32 and 54 mins with the
fission power at 42kH, rising slowly to a peak ~ 98JM just prior to the
temperature excursion.
The energy loss to the bypass was estimated from bypass thermocouples.
For the SCDAP calcu1ation a heat transfer coefficient of 4kHm- 2K- 1 was taken
for heat flow to the bypass which is consistent with the value used in the
thermal-hydraulic model for heat transfer to subcooled liquid. A sink
temperature of 540K was assumed; this value is 'hard-wired' into the code, but
it is consistent with estimates from the bypass thermocouples.
For the thermal hydraulic calcu1ation the inlet flow his tory was taken
from QLR; The flow was constant at 16.2 gIs over most of the heat up, but
during the temperature excursion reduced by about 25%. This flow reduction
thought to be caused by back pressure, eg due to hydrogen production, is not
predictable within the limits of the simp1ified thermal-hydraulic model used
here [3] and has to be prescribed as input data. Radiation view factors and
path lengths are required and the values used Were supplied by EG&G [4].
The shroud was taken to be composed of six material layers in the
following order from outside, outer Zr shroud wall, gas gap, additional Zr
shroud wall, Zr saddle, Zr0 2 insulator and inner Zr liner. The material
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In addition to the data, three model changes were inc1uded in SCDAP. The
first was to a110w the timestep for coup1ing the therma1-hydrau1ic and
structure ca1cu1ations to vary with time. Here a 10 sec timestep was used up
to 143 mins and 1 sec timestep for the remainder of the transient. Second1y a
correction was made to ensure f10w was conserved when ballooning occurred.
Third1y the treatment of the heat transfer at the steam-mixture interface was
improved. The original treatment caused heat 10ss when the interface crossed
an axial mesh boundary.
PHENOMENA PREDICTED BY SCDAP
After the steady state hold between 32 and 54 mins, and once dry-out had
occurred, the c1ad temperatures rose steadi1y at rates between about 0.08 -
0.14 K/s unti1 just prior to the temperature excursion, as shown in Figure 2.
The steep increase in c1ad temperature at dry-out is part1y due to the coarse
axial mesh in the structure and part1y because the assumption of thermal
equi1ibrium imp1ies 100% voidage at dryout.
In the rods in all three components the maximum c1ad swe11ing occurred at
0.74m, the level of peak c1ad temperature. Loca1ised ballooning occurred first
in the rods in component 3 at 77 mins with the c1ad temperature ~ 1042K, and
within 3 minutes the rods in components 1 and 2 exhibited simi1ar behaviour.
The rods in all components ruptured at hoop strains ~~6% between 87 and 93
minutes at temperatures ~ 1090K. Indeed in this ca1cu1ation the rods in all
three components exhibited very simi1ar behaviour at simi1ar times and un1ess
otherwise stated the exact times quoted for the onset of various phenomena will
refer to component 1 rods.
It can be seen from Figure 3 that the c1ad in the upper regions was
a1ready oxidising rapid1y prior to 190 mins, the start of the f10w run down. A
sma11 inf1ection was predicted in the c1ad temperature at 0.74 m at 200 mins
which coincided with comp1ete oxidation of the c1ad at this elevation.
Increase in the temperature rise rates began at all e1evations between 194 mins
and 200 mins as the f10w reduced from 16.2 gis to 15.39 gis. After 200 mins
the f10w reduced from 15.39 gis to a minimum of 12.15 gis and this was
accompanied by a steep temperature excursion at all e1evations. It shou1d be
noted that this was even true above 0.74 m, despite the fact that during the
period from 200 mins the c1ad had comp1ete1y oxidised in this region.
By the time of bund1e quench, Figure 3 shows that at nodes half way up the
bund1e, about 50% of the c1ad thickness had oxidised. Be10w 0.17 m the c1ad
was unaffected.
Figure 4 shows the temperatures for the inner shroud. Simi1ar
temperatures rise rate increases as seen in the rod profiles are seen for the
shroud during the f10w run down. In this ca1cu1ation the shroud was not
significant1y oxidised. At 0.74 m at the position of peak c1ad temperature,
on1y about 30% of the inner liner of the shroud had oxidised by the time the
bund1e was quenched.
In this reference ca1cu1ation no fue1 re10cation in the ba1100n occurred
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COMPARISON WITH EXPERIMENT
Figures 2 and 4 show some discrepancy between calculation and experiment
during the earlier part of the transient. These mainly result from the poor
description of dryout in the SCDAP model. For this reason and because no
phenomena (eg ballooning or oxidation) occur until the bundle becomes more
uncovered, by which time the agreement is better, no attempt has been made to
optimise the thermal-hydraulic conditions during this initial period.
The onset of the temperature excursion is weIl predicted by the
calculation in comparison with experiment. In the experimental results a small
inflection is observed at 0.7 m at about 200 mins which coincides with the
termination of oxidation at this elevation in the calculation. This is good
evidence to suggest that in the experiment a significant portion of the clad in
upper region regions oxidised prior to the excursion.
The peak temperature predicted in the reference calculation at 0.74 m was
about 2370K, against the experimental maximum of about 2400K. At 0.5m the
corresponding temperatures were 2000K and 2400K respectively. At the lowest
elevation the SCDAP calculated peak temperatures in the reference calculation
only reached about l400K whereas it appears from the experimental data that
most of the clad reached high temperatures and oxidised. The 25% reduction in
inlet flow applied to the SCDAP calculation did not cause the bundle to dry
out. For this reason in the calculation a significant proportion of the lower
fuel clad and shroud liner did not oxidise at all.
However from the experimental da ta there is evidence frOm the neutron
detector signals that the bundle dried out during the temperature excursion
[5]. Further from the P.I.E. [6] it has been deduced that about 7.7% of the
fuel bundle material (2.4% U0 2and 5.3% Zircaloy clad) relocated to the bottom
third of the bundle. Analytic calculations suggest that if this material fell
into the water then it would constitute a significant heat source quite apart
from any resulting increase in the nuclear heat in this region, and this would
have contributed to increased dryout. In its final state the lower region
consisted of rod stubs with previously molten material between most of the
rods. There was considerable reduction in flow area. This would tend to cause
flow reduction and increased dryout also. Much higher temperatures would have
been predicted in the reference calculation if these effects had been
simulated. This is demonstrated in the next section by a sensitivity
calculation.
The agreement between the SCDAP calculated and measured shroud inner liner
temperatures is good up to 180 mins, when the shroud failed in the upper
regions of the bundle. At this time the SCDAP calculation predicts the inner
shroud clad is only about 10% oxidised at the peak temperature elevation, so
even if shroud failure models had been included in the calculation it is
unlikely that the shroud would have ruptured at this stage. After this time
the SCDAP calculation consequently under-estimates the heat lost to the bypass
in the upper regions, resulting in higher predicted temperatures.
The predicted coolant/pin surface temperature gradients are greater than
measured see Figures 2 and 5. A possible explanation for this, given in [2],
is that the thermocouples reading the steam temperatures could be reading high
as a consequence of direct radiation from the rods. This is not confirmed or
denied here. The overall temperature rise is reasonably predicted but the
temperatures at 0.5 mare overpredicted. This points to a discrepancy in the
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axial power profile between calculation and experiment. The use of single
profile throughout the calculation is clearly simplistic.
Figure 6 shows that oxidation started to occur earlier in the calculation
than in the experiment. However the hydrogen release rate between 175 mins and
190 mins was much higher in the experiment than in the calculation indicating
rather more oxidation in the experiment than was predicted. The shroud
ruptured during thts period in the experiment and more Zircaloy would have been
exposed to steam. The general shape of the experimental and calculated
releases is similar, but just prior to the scram the maximum rate of hydrogen
release was measured at 0.89 gis, against 0.12 gis predicted. The total amount
of hydrogen released during the experiment was estimated at 375 g against 100 g
predicted. However the complete oxidation of the Zircaloy in the fuel bundle
and shroud inner liner, and oxidation of portions of the rig such as the
fall-back barrier and Zircaloy saddles (not currently modelied in SCDAP) is
required to ac count for all the hydrogen measured in the test. The presence of
metallic Zircaloy in the debris as alluded to by Rivard [7 J and in the Quick
Look report [2 J is not consistent with this quantity of hydrogen.
The conclusion from this comparison is that the temperature escalation
above the cent re of the bundle during the flow reduction was weIl predicted in
the calculation in comparison with experiment. Unlike in the experiment, at
the lower elevations, there was little or no oxidation and rapid temperature
escalation was not predicted in the calculation.
SENSITIVITY CALCULATION WITH INCREASED DRY-OUT
The degree of oxidation predicted by the reference calculation was
generally less than experiment prior to the excursion. Not only is it
difficult to predict the timescale of rampant oxidation exactly, eg only apart
of the shroud was beginning to oxidise rapidly by the time of the flnal
excursion, but there were portions of the rig not included in the analysis,
which oxidised. This may account for why motion of fuel and structure material
occurred [5J during the final minutes of the test, but none was predicted by
the reference calculation. Any movement has a positive feed-back effect in
that more heating of the relatively unoxidised Zircaloy in the lower bundle, as
a consequence of material movement and flow blockage, could induce further clad
melting and slumping etc. Such a chain of events probably occurred because it
is thought that during the final minutes of the test there was essentially no
water remaining in the test train [5 J.
A sensitivity calculation was performed to examine the effect of increased
bundle dry-out during the temperature excursion. This was achieved by
increasing the inlet enthalpy conditions during the last few minutes in order
that by the time of quench only 12% of the lower bundle remained wetted (as
opposed to about 25% in the reference calculation).
Figure 7 shows the predicted clad temperatures. Up to 200 mins the
calculation is identical to the reference case described earlier. Also shown
are the experimental results for 0.35 m. At the 0.29 m elevation the predicted
clad temperature rose to about l700K, into the threshold region for rapid
oxidation to take place during the temperature excursion, 300K hotter than the
reference calculation and in much better agreement with experiment. At the 0.5
m elevation the temperature rose to 2300 K, above the temperature for eutectic
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formation, before the clad had completely oxidised, in contrast to the
reference calculation.
A schematic of the eutectic distribution predicted in the calculation just
prior to scram with these conditions of dry-out is shown in Figure 8. As found
in the experiment the maximum accumulation was in the lower regions of the
bundle and the breach and therefore maximum depletion occurred at 0.5 m. Some
movement of fuel/clad upwards was observed in the experiment but there are no
models in SCDAP to permit coolant drag on molten fuel or clad and consequently
no fuel or eutectic can be transported upwards in the SCDAP calculation.
The predicted hydrogen release rates just prior to the scram were 3 times
higher than in the reference calculation but still lower than estimated in the
experiment. The cummulative hydrogen releases were also still less, presumably
because oxidation of structure not modelIed in SCDAP was stfll contributing a
significant source to the total hydrogen.
SCDAP ASSESSMENT
Unlike previous vers ions of SCDAP incorporating TRAC-BDI the boiling model
was found to be energy conservative. Prediction near regions of dry-out are
poor, partly because of the thermal equilibrium assumption and partly because
of the coarse axial mesh description. Heat loss due to the numerical treatment
of radiation [8] did not arise in the Scoping Test calculations, in any
significant amount, because the large bypass heat loss kept the shroud
temperature much lower than the coolant temperature. However in principle the
problem remains.
Although the predictions of clad ballooning were reasonable here, in many
other calculations erroneous results have arisen. These tended to be because
of numerical problems in the model which in some cases produced unphysical
ballooning at too low temperatures, at too large strain, and not at the axial
elevation of peak temperature. Also the radiation model and some aspects of
the fuel relocation models assurne nominal geometry.
The qualitative predictions of the clad oxidation models seem reasonable
within the steam rich conditions of the experiment. Recent experimental data
from BatteIle North West suggests that the Urbanic-Heidrick growth rate
constants, invoked by SCDAP at clad temperatures exceeding l850K may be rather
low. However when these were increased appropriately in a sensitivity
calculation, the main features in the predictions were unaffected. Concerning
clad motion, the depletion of the cent re region and accumulation of material at
the bottom of the bundle were qualitatively predicted. The SCDAP model has the
limitation that upward relocation of material as occurred in the experiment
could not be predicted.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Within their own limitations the SCDAP models performed adequately
generally, though some shortcomings detailed earlier were identified, eg
though clad ballooning was reasonably predicted here, in other
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calculations with similar data unphysical results were obtained.
(2) The calculations indicate that a large proportion of the upper bundle
region was probably weIl oxidised prior to the temperature excursion.
(3) The calculations confirm that such a flow reduction causes a major
temperature excursion over most of the bundle. If significant dry-out is
simulated eg as occurred in the experiment, then clad motion from the
centre downwards results and overall good agreement with experiment is
predicted.
(4) The catastropic oxidation of the bundle on such a short time-scale is
consistent with deterioration of local heat transfer caused by
thermal-hydraulic feed-back effects and the steam rich conditions of the
experiment. A' flame propagation downwards mechanism is not required to
explain the events. Under flow and power conditions nearer those of the
hypothetical severe accident the oxidation rate would be reduced by steam
starvation and hydrogen blanketing effects.
Since the version of SCDAP used in this study was obtained there have been
numerous modifications and corrections incorporated in subsequent vers ions by
the code developers. The Scoping Test input data is also being currently
reviewed [9]. The calculations presented here are believed to give a broad
description of the essential features of the experiment although improved,
detailed agreement may be possible using these later vers ions of the code with
refined data.
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FIG 2 COMPARISON OF SCDAP PREDICTION OF COMPONENT 1
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FIG 6 SCDAP PREDICTIONS OF FISSION GAS RELEASE AND
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SEVERE FUEL DAMAGE TEST 1-1 RESULTS
P. E. MacDona1d, C. L. Na1ezny, and R. K. McCarde11
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, ID 83415
ABSTRACT
Aseries of severe fue1 damage tests is being performed in the Power
Burst Faci1ity to obtain da ta necessary to understand (a) fue1 behavior
and coolability; (b) fission produet release, deposition, and
transport; and (c) hydrogen release during degraded eore eoo1ing
aecidents. This report presents the pre1iminary resu1ts of the seeond
experiment of the Severe Fue1 Damage (SFD) series, Test SFD 1-1. The
measurements indicate that the test eonditions required to simu1ate
the fue1 damage and fission produce release in a 3000-MW(t) commercia1
pressurized water reactor core during a sma11 break loss-of-coo1ant
accident without emergeney core coo1ant injeetion were suecessfu11y
achieved. Such an accident is characterized by an initial slow heat-
ing rate to about 1600 K, fo11owed by a very rapid heating rate driven
by runaway meta1-water reaction that is steam 1imited in the upper
regions of the eore. The fast heatup aehieved during the SFD 1-1 test
resu1ted in oxidation of about 30% of the e1adding and shroud inner
liner and me1ting of much of the c1adding in the lower regions of the
fue1 bund1e. Significant 1iquefaetion of the U02 fue1 oceurred and
mo1ten c1adding and 1iquefied fue1 slumped to lower bund1e e1evations.
The fission produet release during this test was 1ess than during the
first experiment of the series (the Scoping Test, which was performed
at re1ative1y high steam f10w rates), during whieh near1y all of the
c1adding was oxidized. Iodine and cesium fo11owed the liquid pathway,
and most of the tellurium remained within the test bund1e.
INTRODUCTION
The light water reactor aeeident at the Three Mi1e Is1and Nue1ear Station-
Unit 2 (TMI-2) c1ear1y demonstrated that 1arge hydrogen and fission product
releases to the containment can oceur despite eurrent engineered safety systems
and proeedures. According1y, the United States Nuc1ear Regu1atory Commission
(USNRC) has initiated an internationa11y sponsored 1 Severe Fue1 Damage (SFD)
research program to investigate fue1 rod and core response, and the release and
transport of fission products and hydrogen during degraded Core eoo1ing acci-
dents. A major part of the USNRC's experimental program is being performed in
the Power Burst Faci1ity (PBF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The objective of the SFD test series is to obtain the data necessary to
understand (a) fue1 behavior under severe1y degraded conditions; (b) fission
product release, deposition and transport; and (c) hydrogen generation. Four
bund1e experiments are present1y p1anned for the SFD program. Parameters to be
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varied during the four experiments are heatup rate (amount of cladding oxida-
tion), inlet flow (hydrogen-to-oxygen ratio), cooldown rate (amount of fragmen-
tation), test rod burnup, and presence of control material. Unirradiated test
fuel rods were used in the first two experiments, and irradiated test fuel rods
were used in the third test. Both previously irradiated fuel rods and control
rods are to be included in the fourth test. The Series 1 SFD tests are sum-
marized in Table I.
TABLE L SFD SERIES 1 TESTS
Heating Inlet Flow
Test Rate (gi s) Test Bundle Cooling
SFD-ST 0.15 K/s 16 Fresh rods Quench
SFD 1-1 TMI-2a 0.6 Fresh rods Slow
S FD 1-3 TMI-2a 0.6 Irradiated rods Slow, no reflood
SFD 1-4 TMI-2a 0.6 Irradiated rods Slow, nO reflood
and control rod
a. Characterized by slow heating rate up to 1600 K and rapid heating rate
above 1600 K, driven by metal-water reaction.
Test SFD 1-1, the second test of Series 1, was completed on September 8,
1983. The SFD 1-1 experiment was designed to simulate the heatup and resulting
fuel damage in the upper half of a 3000-MW(t) pressurized water reactor approx-
imately 2 to 3 hours after initiation of a small break accident, when the core
is approximately 75% uncovered. The steam flow, power, and primary system pres-
sure within a large commercial plant would be 4 kg/s, 1.5% of full power, and
6.9 MPa, respectively. The appropriate scaled values for the approximately
1 meter PBF bundle were 0.6 gis, 8 kW, and 6.9 MPa, with as much of the bundle
uncovered as possible. These controlling parameters were successfully achieved.
(Because of heat loss through the shroud, a variable bundle power, reaching a
maximum of 35 kW, was required to produce a net bundle power of 8 kW.)
This paper presents abrief description of the SFD 1-1 test hardware and
the fission product and hydrogen sampling and monitoring system; a discussion
of the test scenario; descriptions of the thermal/mechanical behavior of the
bundle and the fission product release; and conclusions.
FACILITY AND TEST TRAIN DESCRIPTION
The PBF reactor, shown in Figure 1, consists of a uranium oxide driver core
and central,flux trap contained in an open tank reactor vessel. An independent
pressurized water coolant loop provides a wide range of coolant conditions
within the flux trap test space.
The SFD 1-1 test train consisted of 32 zircaloy-clad U02 fuel rods
arranged in a 6 x 6 array without the four corner rods. The active fuel length
in the bundle was 0.914 m, and the fuel and cladding dimensions (except length)
were similar to 17 x 17 type pressurized water reactor design fuel rods. The
test bundle was contained in an insulating shroud consisting of low density


























fuel rod enrichment of 6.2% was
selected for all fuel rods. Figure 2
shows a cross-sectional view of the
test train in the in-pile tube, and
Figure 3 shows an axial view of the
test train and in-pile tube. The
test train was highly instrumented
with 2 fuel rod centerline
thermocouples, 18 inside cladding
thermomocouples, 18 shroud
thermocouples, 6 steam probes,
3 flowrneters, 10 pressure sensors,
8 fission chambers, 2 flux wires,
1 temperature profile detector, and a
shroud penetration detector.
The test train coolant was
routed via two flow paths: (a) the
flow from the normal in-pile tube
inlet was directed upward past the
outside of the insulated shroud and
outlet superheated steam line (this
flow is called the bypass flow); and
(b) the bundle coolant entered in the
in-pile tube through aseparate line
and then passed through the bundle.
If the bundle flow rate was high, the
coolant left the bundle through a
check valve and entered the bypass
flow. The check valve was closed













Figure 2. Cross-sectional view of the severe fuel damage test train.
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The fission product and hydrogen
sampling and monitoring system is
shown schematically in Figure 4. The
sampling and monitoring system
consists of a steam sampie line,
condenser, gas-liquid separator,
6 steam sampie bombs, 6 liquid sampie
bombs, particulate filter, a
collection tank, and instrumentation.
The instrumentation consists of a
gamma spectrometer, ion chamber,
sodium iodide spectrometer, and
delayed neutron monitor located on the
steam sampie line; a gamma detector,
sodium iodide detector, and hydrogen
monitor located on the gas line
between the separator and the
collection tank; and a gamma
spectrometer and sodium iodide
detector on the liquid line between
the separator and the collection tank.
FISSION PRODUCT AND HYDROGEN SAMPLING
AND MONITORING SYSTEM
the test when the bundle flow rate
rate was low and coolant exiting the
bundle was routed through a steam
sampie line which passed through the
in-pile tube head closure. The entire
bundle effluent--consisting of steam,
fission products, and noncondensable
gases--was routed though the sampie
line to a fission product and hydrogen





















Figure 3. Axial view of the
SFD 1-1 test train
A 30-g/s liquid flow was added to
the system at the separator inlet to
act as a carrier for the fission
product activity through the liquid
line, past the gamma spectrometer and
liquid grab sampies, and into the
collection tank. A nitrogen purge gas
was also added to the separator and was
set at 68 g/min to keep hydrogen
concentrations in the gas line below 70%. Finally, an argon sweep gas system
was added to the facility to permit the introduction of gas into the bot tom of
the test bundle to move fission products through the sampie system during
periods when little or no steam and hydrogen would be released from the
experiment. The argon system was designed to provide a flow of 30 cm3/s at














Figure 4. Test SFD 1-1 fission product and hydrogen sampling and monitoring
system schematic.
TEST CONDUCT
The test consisted of bundle leakage measurements, a 3-day fuel condition-
ing and power calibration phase, a 10-day shutdown, bundle leakage measurements,
a 4-h conditioning to build up short-lived fission products, and, finally, the
high temperature transient.
Following the 4-h run, the bundle inlet coolant flow rate was established
at 0.6 gis with flow going to the fission product and hydrogen sampling and
monitoring system and the bundle power was increased gradually to 6.6 kW to
initiate boildown of the coolant in the bundle region to an equilibrium eleva-
tion of about 0.2 m from the bottom of the fuel stack (two-phase steam/single-
phase steam interface level). The bundle outlet steam temperature was about
600 K (saturation temperature at 6.9 MPa was about 558 K). The bundle power
was then increased slowly until it was about 8 kW at about 2 min into the tran-
sient (time zero is arbitrarily set at 13:30 on September 8), and was then held
constant for 12 min while the peak cladding temperatures slowly rose to about
900 K and the liquid level dropped to about 0.08 m. The bundle power was then
increased from 8 to about 14 kW at a rate of 0.6 kW/min, from 14 to 20 kW at a
rate of 1.8 kW/min, from 20 to 28 kW at a rate of 1.2 kW/min, and from 28 to
35 kW at a rate of about 2.0 kW/m. The peak cladding temperatures were about
1130 K when the bundle power reached 14 kW at 25 min into the transient. The
fission product detection system and the fuel rod interna1 pressure switches
indicated that the fuel rods ruptured between 25 and 27 min into the transient.
The cladding temperatures first reached values of about 2400 K at 31 min when
the bundle power was about 24 kW. The shroud inner zircaloy liner failed at
32 min, shortly after the cladding temperatures spiked up to 2400 K. The mea-
sured cladding temperatures remained above the zircaloy melting point until
about 38 or 39 min into the transient (7- or 8-min duration).
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The maximum bund1e power of 35 kW was reached at about 37 min into the
transient. The bund1e power was then held constant for about 3.7 min, during
which time the measured c1adding temperatures began to decrease, probab1y due
to thermocoup1e junction re1ocation to re1ative1y low e1evations. The fue1
center1ine thermocoup1es indicated that some of the bund1e remained at tempera-
tures above the zirca10y me1ting point unti1 we11 after the bund1e power began
to decrease. The bund1e power was reduced from 35 to 25 kW at a rate of
7 kW/min and from 25 to 6.6 kW at a rate of 13 kW/min, fo110wing a coo1ant
pressure increase of 0.26 MPa (rise time of 1.6 s) and an indication from the
shroud me1t-through detectors that the outer shroud wall was heating rapid1y at
about 41.4 min into the transient. The bund1e power was then further decreased
to approximate1y 4 kW over a 10-min interval.
The argon gas flush system was
turned on at 53 min, rapid1y coo1ing
the bund1e from about 950 to about
560 K. The bund1e in1et coo1ant
f10w rate was increased to about
13 g/s to refi11 the bund1e, and
the reactor contro1 rods were manua11y
inserted to terminate the experiment at
60 min and at a bund1e power of ~2 kW.
The general thermal response of the
SFD 1-1 bund1e is i11ustrated in
Figure 5, which shows the inside
c1adding surface temperature on Rod C2
at the 0.5-m elevation and the
bund1e power.
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Figure 5. Comparison of Rod C2
c1adding temperature at 0.5 m
with bund1e power.
FUEL ROD THERMAL/MECHANICAL BEHAVIOR DURING HEATUP AND COOLDOWN
Measured c1adding temperatures of the fue1 rods at the 0.35-m elevation
are almost identica1 and indicate a very rapid increase in temperature to
va1ues above the zirca10y me1ting point at about 33 min. However, rapid
temperature rises at the 0.7-m elevation on the centrally located rods began at
about 31 min, we11 ahead of the rapid temperature rises at the 0.35-m elevation
and also we11 ahead of the rapid temperature rise at the 0.7-m elevation on
rods 10cated near the bund1e periphery. The rapid temperature increase at the
0.5-m elevation on one of the centrally located rods began at about 32 min.
Therefore, it appears that the rapid temperature increase in the bund1e began
near the center at the 0.5- to 0.7-m elevation, and then spread radia11y
outward and ~xia11y downward in a manner simi1ar to a flame front propagation.
The total time at high temperature and the exact peak temperatures are
unknown, but it is probable that portions of the bund1e were at temperatures
above 2400 K for more than 10 min.
C1adding ballooning began on all six instrumented fue1 rods between 24.6
and 24.8 min at the 0.5- and 0.7-m e1evations <indicated by the abrupt changes
in the thermocoup1e traces). C1adding fai1ure was indicated by the pressure
switches on three fue1 rods at 25.5, 26.2, and 27 min. The time between
initiation of ballooning and rod fai1ure (0.7 to 2.4 min) is consistent with
expected ballooning times.
882
LIQUEFIED FUEL AND MOLTEN CLADDING RELOCATION AND HYDROGEN RELEASE
A neutron radiograph of the lower half of the SFD 1-1 test bundle is shown
in Figure 6. As indieated in the figure, a large mass of previously molten
zirealoy eladding and dissolved U0 2 fuel aeeumulated in and above the lower
spaeer grid. (A small amount of dissolved fuel also reaehed the tie plate at
the -0.03-m elevation.) The previously molten material extends about 10 em
above the grid region. Evaluation of the fission ehamber da ta indieates that
this material moved to this loeation over a 3- to 4-min period starting at
about 37 min into the transient. The material near the grid region is
relatively uniform in eomposition, although fuel pellet fragments are present
near the bundle periphery and at a few Ioeations within the bundle and
eonsiderable elosed porosity is present. This strueture suggests that peak
bundle temperatures may have reaehed values above the U02-zirealoy monoteetie
temperature of 2600 K.
The fuel bundle elevations
between about 0.16 and 0.35 m
appear to have lost eonsiderable
fuel and eladding material, whereas
the upper regions of the test
bundle above 0.35 m generally
retained their rod-like geometry,
although in a highly oxidized
state. The eollapse of the shroud
into the fuel bundle region ~t
0.12 m (shown in Figure 6) is
believed to have been eaused by
flashing of water that leaked to
the inside of the shroud and is not






Figure 6. Neutron radiographs of the
lower half of the SFD 1-1 bundle.
An overlay of the pereent of
light gases in the gaseous effluent
from the separator, the integrated
hydrogen release in grams, and the
pressure in the eoolant below the
fuel bundle is shown in Figure 7.
There is a delay time (about 6 min)
between the measured release and
the event that eaused it. The
first small peak and deeline in the
pereent of light gases released was
probably eaused, not by hydrogen
release, but by the helium from the
interior of the fuel rods whieh was
released when they failed. The
seeond peak probably resulted from
the rapid oxidation of the bundle
whieh oeeurred between 31 and
39 min and was deteeted by the hydrogen monitor between 37.5 and 48 min. This
peak was aeeentuated by the pressure spike whieh oeeurred at 41.4 min. The
pressure spike was eaused by liquefied material dropping into the pool of water
below the test bundle.
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mately 67 min is believed to have been
resultant flushing out of hydrogen.
Figure 7. Overlay of percent hydrogen
release, integrated hydrogen release,
and system (bundle) pressure during
Test SFD 1-1.
The decline in the second
hydrogen peak was probably caused
by a steam starved environment due
either to flow blockage at the
lower grid elevation or the first
pressure spike removing liquid from
the test train, or both. The third
peak in the hydrogen release was
then probably associated with the
rein- troduction of steam into the
bundle as the constant injection
pump added more water to the system
(at 0.6 gis) and flow paths
developed along or through the
shroud. The third hydrogen spike
was accentuated by the pressure
spike caused by the introduction
of the argon sweep gas. The final
small peak and decline at approxi-
















The total amount of hydrogen released during the~test was found by
integrating the mass release rate curve to obtain the total time-dependent
hydrogen release shown in Figure 7. The total amount of hydrogen measured was
71 g, which represents oxidation of about one third of the zircaloy in the
cladding and liner.
Figure 8. Comparison of delay-
corrected radiation in the steam
line, fuel centerline temperatures
in Rod B4, and the cladding surface
temperatures at 0.5 m on Rod C2.
111-Preuurelwhchu
FISSION PRDDUCT RELEASE
Figure 8 compares the steam line
radiation measurement, which has been
delay corrected to bundle time, with
the fuel centerline and cladding temper-
atures on a centrally located fuel rod
at the D.s-m elevation. The initial fuel
rod ruptures are indicated in the ion
chamber reading by an increase in radia-
tion level at about 24 to 25 min. The
increased reading spans aperiod of
approximately 4 min, indicating that
the 32 test rods ruptured during this
4-min period.










Almost no fission product release was measured by the ion chamber between
the time of rod rupture and the time that the fuel centerline temperatures
reached approximately 1800 K. The fission product release then increased from
1700 to 2400 K, during the rapid heatup period. The fission product release
continued to increase another order of magnitude during the 3.7-min hold at
peak power. Much of this increase may be associated with the fuel liquefaction
which occurred during the hold at peak power.
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The fission product release was still increasing slightly as the bundle
power was reduced. ApproximatelY 0.8 min after the power reduction began, the
pressure pulse and steam spike occurred at 41.4 min while temperatures in the
bundle were probably still above the zircaloy melting temperature. The pres-
sure pulse increased the flow rate in the sampie line, reducing the delay time
to the fission product monitors. As a result of the pressure pulse, the fis-
sion products in the sampie line were pushed rapidly past the monitors, thus
increasing the radiation reading eightfold in 75 s. Fission product concentra-
tions then peaked about 1 min later.
The fission product release decreased in proportion to fuel temperature
during the remainder of the cooldown period following the peak release at
42 min. An argon gas purge of 30 cm3/s was activated at about 53 min to pre-
vent flow reversal and provide a positive carrier for fission products out of
the bundle and into the sampie system. The fission product activity in the
sampie line, just prior to initiation of the argon flow, was rapidly pushed
past the steam line detectors and into the separator vessel upon initiation of
the argon flow. As a result, the liquid line concentrations increased tenfold,
whereas the gas line concentrations increased only slightly.
When the argon purge was terminated at 60 min, the separator dilution flow
was also terminated and bundle coolant flow was increased to approximately
13 gis. The flow in the sampie system momentarily stopped, with neither the
argon gas nor steam flowing out of the bundle. Reflood liquid slowly filled
the bundle and sampie line, replacing the argon gas. The measured fission pro-
duct concentrations again increased when the reflood liquid arrived at the
detector locations. The magnitude of the increase in the gas line was moderate
(approximately twice), but the fission product concentrations increased 12 times
in the steam line, and 28 times at the liquid detector. The largest concentra-
tion of fission products measured in the liquid line during the SFD 1-1 test
occurred during the reflood period.
Table 11 lists the isotopes identified in the steam, gas, and liquid lines.
A few of the isotopic concentrations histories at the steam line detector sta-
tion are plot ted in Figure 9. Examination of this figure suggests a general
conclusion about the observed fission product behavior; gaseous activity evolved
predominantly during the high temperature transient phase of the test, whereas
liquid activity evolved predominantly during the reflood phase. These results
suggest that large fractions of nongaseous fission products are deposited on
bundle and sample.system surfaces during the high temperature transient and are
later dissolved in the reflood liquid and washed through the sampie system.




85IIKr, 87Kr , 8%r, 8%r, 9<1cr
88ab,a 8%b,a 9ÜRb,a 90ll1Rba
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TABLE 11. (continued)
91rny,b 99Mo ,b 99mrcb
129Te ,b 131Te , 131rnre, 132Te, 133re, 133rnre, 134re
1311 , 1321 , 1331, 1341, 1351
133xe, 135Xe, 135rnxe, 137Xe, 138Xe, 139Xe
138Cs, a 139C s a
139Ba , 14ÜJla, b 141Ba
140Lab
Gas Line
8 5l11Kr, 87Kr, 88Kr, 89Kr
88Rb, a 8%b a
1311 ,c 1321 , c 1351c
133xe, 135rnxe, 135xe, 135rnxe, 137Xe, 138Xe
138Cs , a 139C s a
Liquid Line
83Br, 84Br, b 8410ßrb
85l11Kr, 85Kr ,b 87Kr, 88Kr , 89Kr
88ab,a 8%b,a 9ÜRb,a 90'"Rba
91Sr ,b 92Srb
91rny,b 95ITNb,b 97Zr ,b 9~o,b 99ITTcb
129Te , b 13lre, b 132re, 133re, 134re
1311 , 1321 , 1331 , 1341 , 1351
133xe, 135Xe , 135rnxe, 137Xe, 138Xe
138cs,a 139cs,a 140csa




a. Isotopes influenced by short-lived percent behavior.
b. Detected only after reactor shutdown.
c. Iodines were detected in the gas stream in isolated spectra taken from
84 to 105 min. Concentrations were nominally <0.1% of the steam line
concentrations.
The amount of tellurium
measured in the sampie system was
relatively small. A comparison of
these results with those of the SFD
Scoping Test suggests that the
tellurium release is influenced by
the amount of zircaloy oxidation in
the test bundle, i.e., greater
zircaloy oxidization yields greater
tellurium release. Additional
fission product release information
is presented in the paper by D. J.
Osetek et al. , "Behavior of Fission
Products.Released from Severely
Damaged Fuel During the pBF Severe













Fi~ure 9. 135Xe, 131 1, l38 Cs , and
13 Te concentrations at the steam line
spectromete~ during Test SFD 1-1.
CONCLUSIONS
The SFD 1-1 experiment simulated the fuel heatup and damage and fission
product release in the upper regions of a 3000-MW(t) commercial pressurized
water reactor during a hypothesized small break loss-of-coolant accident with-
out emergency core coolant injection which continued to peak cladding tempera-
tures of about 2400 K. The heating rate for the SFD 1-1 test was specified to
be relatively slow up to about 1600 K and rapid after 1600 K, driven by runaway
metal-water reaction in a steam starved environment.
The runaway oxidation and rapid temperature increase began near the center
of the bundle at the 0.5- to 0.7-m elevation and then spread radially outward
and axially downward in a manner similar to a flame front propagation. It is
probable that portions at the bundle were at temperatures of about 2400 to
2600 K for more than 10 min. The hydrogen release measurements indicate that
the oxidation of the bundle was steam limited during the two separate peaks in
measured release rate. A total of 71 g of hydrogen was measured, which corre-
sponds to oxidation of about one third of·the bundle fuel rod cladding and
shroud inner liner.
A large mass of previously molten zircaloy cladding and dissolved U02
fuel accumulated in and above the lower spacer grid. This material appears to
have come mainly from the 0.16- to 0.35-m elevations of the bundle. The'upper
regions of the test bundle appear to have retained their rod-like geometry.
887
Fission product release was first measured when the fuel rod cladding
ruptured, but little fission product release was measured between the time of
cladding rupture and the time that fuel temperatures reached about 1800 K. The
fission product release was proportional to fuel temperature between 1800 and
2400 K, and was then influenced by fuel liquefaction during the constant power
hold. The principal release of the gaseous fission product isotopes occurred
during the high temperature transient, but the major release of fission
products other than the noble gases occurred during the reflood and washout
period. Evidently, large quantities of the volatile fission products were
deposited on test train and sample system surfaces during the transient and
were subsequently dissolved in the reflood liquid and transported through the
sample system.
The information from this and subsequent severe fuel damage tests will be
used to assess state-of-the-art computer models and analysis techniques, improve
the understanding of fission product source terms from severe reactor accidents,
and, ultimately, support improved risk assessments and emergency planning.
FOOTNOTE
1. Sponsors of the program include Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UnitedKingdom, and United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
NOTICE
This paper·was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of
United States Government. Neither the United States Gove·rnment nor any agency
thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied,
or assumes any legalliability or responsibility for any third party's use, or
the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process dis-
closed in this paper, or represents that its use by such third party would not
infringe privately owned rights. The views expressed in this paper are not
necessarily those of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Work supported by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research, under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570.
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SCDAP CODE ANALYSIS OF THE POWER BURST FACILITY
SEVERE FUEL DAHAGE TEST 1-1
L. J. Siefken
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, ID 83415, U.S.A
ABSTRACT
The SCDAP code models the processes taking place in a reactor fuel bundle
during a severe reactor accident. This paper assesses the models in the
code using the results of the PBF test SFD 1-1. Calculated and measured
test bundle temperatures, hydrogen production, meltdown, and. fission gas
release are compared and found to be in good agreement. Calculations
indicate that oxidation in the bundle proceeds at a rate proportional to
the steam flow rate from coolant boil-off. The oxidation is confined to a
moving axial region about 10 cm in height. Runaway oxidation is termi-
nated by the flowing away of liquefied cladding. Host of the fission
product release from the bundle fuel is calculated to be due to fuel dis-
solution.
INTRODUCTION
SCDAP (Severe Core Damage Analysis Package) [1) is a computer code
designed to characterize and quantify the fuel damage processes in a reactor
core during severe reactor accidents. The code calculates the reactor Core
temperature response, hydrogen production, meltdown and fission gas release.
This paper presents the SCDAP code analysis of the response of the test fuel
bundle in the Power Burst Facility (PBF) test Severe Fuel Damage (SFD) 1-1
(2). This test measured the response of a fuel bundle subjected to conditions
typical of that in a reactor core during a small break loss of coolant accident.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, the PBF
SFD Test 1-1 is described. The second section contains a description of the
models in the version of SCDAP used to perform the calculations. In the third
section calculations and experimental results are compared and analyzed. This
section includes comparisons of calculated and measured bundle temperature,
hydrogen production, extent of meltdown and fission gas release. The con-
clusions are given in the last section.
DESCRIPTION OF SFD TEST 1-1
The PBF SFD test 1-1 was designed to investigate fission product release,
and fuel rod oxidation and damage that might occur in a pressurized water reac-
tor (PWR) during a hypothesized small break loss-of-coolant accident without
emergency core coolant injection. Specifically, the test conditions were
designed to be typical of those in the top half of a fuel bundle during the
Three Hile Island-2 reactor accident. The experiment subjected a bundle of
thirty-two fuel rods to coolant boil-off in excess of bundle inlet flow,
resulting in fuel rod uncovery, oxidation, and heatup to 2400 K. The test
bundle consisted of a 6 x 6 array of fuel rods with the corner rods removed.
Except for a length of 0.9144 m, the fuel rods were typical of fresh 17 x 17
PWR fuel rods. The test bundle was surrounded by an insulated shroud, with a
wall thickness of 2 cm, made of Zr02 and Zr.
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The fuel bundle was highly instrumented to measure temperature response,
hydrogen production, and fission product release. The temperature response was
measured by two fuel rod centerline thermocouples and eighteen subsurface clad-
ding thermocouples. The thermocouple leads ran upward from the bottom of the
fuel rods. The bundle hydrogen production and fission product release was
measured using a system consisting of a steam sampie line, condenser, gas-
liquid separator, hydrogen monitor, six steam sampie bombs, six liquid sampie
bombs, particulate filter, gamma spectrometers, and a collection tank.
The fuel bundle nuclear heat generation was controlled to compensate for
heat loss through the flow shroud. The heat generation was 6.6 kW (0.225 kW/m
per rod) during the coolant boil-off phase of the test. As the fuel bundle
temperature increased, and heat loss through the shroud increased, the nuclear
heat generation was pushed to a maximum value of 35 kW, and remained constant
at 35 kW for 230 s. The nuclear heat generation was then rapidly decreased to
initiate cooldown of the bundle.
The bundle coolant pressure and inlet flow rate remained constant during
the test. The coolant pressure was 6.9 MPa and the inlet flow rate was
0.67 gis. The inlet coolant was slightly subcooled.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SCDAP CODE
The SCDAP code is being developed at the Idaho National Engineering Labo-
ra tory under the sponsorship of the D.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office
of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The code's mission is to calculate the ther-
mal, mechanical, and chemical behavior of a light water reactor fuel bundle
during a severe accident transient. The code has models for all of the
relevant phenomena occurring in a fuel bundle during a severe accident. The
outputs of the code include: bundle temperature distribution, hydrogen produc-
tion, fuel and cladding movement, and fission gas release.
The analysis presented here was performed using a developmental version of
SCDAP/MODI/VO [3]. A short description of the models in SCDAP/MODI/VO is given
in Table I. The developmental version differed from SCDAP/MODl/Vü in three
respects. First, a factor of five multiplier was applied to the model calcu-
lating the amount of fuel dissolved by liquefied cladding. Second, the dis-
solution rate equation was eliminated and instant dissolution to the saturation
state was assumed to occur. Third, the assumed temperature at which cladding
oxide is immediately dissolved by liquefied zircaloy was changed from 2650 K to
2400 K. These changes to the code were made based upon the results of a study
of severe fuel damage exp~riments by Allison, Hagrman, and Berna [7].
In the Allison, Hagrman and Berna study, the amount of fuel dissolution
which occurred in severe fuel damage experiments was compared with the amount
of dissolution calculated by the SCDAP model. The comparison showed that the
SCDAP model may be underpredicting the amount of fuel dissolution by nearly an
order of magnitude. This discrepancy between the SCDAP model and experimental
results is considered to be due to the following two reasons. First, the SCDAP
model is based upon measurements of the amount of fuel dissolved by cladding
that is saturated with oxygen (29% atomic) prior to contact with fuel. In the
rapid heatup occurring in severe fuel damage experiments, however, the cladding
may liquefy without being saturated with oxygen. Second, the SCDAP model does
not consider the possibility of unsaturated liquified cladding diffusing along
grain boundaries and creating a nonequilibrium slurry mixture of fuel and
cladding.
TABLE I. DESCRIPTION OF SCDAP MODELS
Phenomenon
Coo1ant boi1-off
Heat and mass transport by coo1ant
in uncovered region of core
Fission product release from fue1
C1adding oxidation
Dissolution of U0 2 by 1iquefied
zirca10y
Dissolution of Zr02 by 1iquefied
zirca10y and uranium
Breach in c1adding Zr02 she11 con-
taining 1iquefied Zr-U-O mixture
Re1ocation of 1iquefied Zr-U-O mix-
ture f10wing through breach in
Zr02 she11 and downward a10ng out-




1-D quasi-steady drift f1ux model
to ca1cu1ate coo1ant swe11ing due
to steam generation; quasi-steady
heat transfer from fue1 rods to
coo1ant.
1-D quasi-steady m~de1 which
assumes coo1ant is a mixture of
steam and hydrogen; heat transfer
by convection and radiation between
fue1 rods and coo1ant mixture;
axia11y varying geometry with
consideration of c1adding
ballooning and fue1 rod me1tdown.
PARAGRASS model, which is empirica1
model derived from mechanistica11y
based GRASS model. Noncondensib1e
gases and vo1ati1e gases are
treated separate1y [4).
Cathcart-Pawe1 (temperature 1ess
than 1850 K) and Urbanic parabo1ic
rate equations. Model takes into
account oxidation limitation due to
oxygen starvation and hydrogen
b1anketing.
Transient dissolution mode1ed by
Turkos equation [5) and saturation
dissolution is mode1ed by MATPRO
[ 6).
If temperature is be10w 2650 K, no
dissolution occurs. If temperature
is greater than 2650 K, comp1ete
dissolution instant1y occurs.
Ca1cu1ation of stress in Zr02 she11.
If stress exceeds MATPRO rupture
stress breach occurs.
Motion of Zr-U-O mixture is
ca1cu1ated taking into account
gravity and friction forces.
Coo1ing and solidification of
Zr-U-O mixture is ca1cu1ated taking
into account heat conduction from




Heat conduction in fue1 rods and
contro1 rods
Heat transfer at surface of fue1




heat conduction is mode1ed using
finite element method. Maximum of
six nodes in fue1 and c1adding.
Heat transfer by convection and
radiation between fue1 rods and
coo1ant mixture is modeled. In
addition heat transfer by radiation
between fue1 rods and contro1 rods
is mode1ed.
COMPARISON OF CALCULATED AND MEASURED RESPONSE
The description of the fue1 bund1e response and the comparison of ca1cu1a-
tions and measurements is divided into the fo11owing four areas: temperature
response, oxidation and hydrogen production, me1tdown of fue1 and c1adding, and
fission product release.
Temperature Response
The ca1cu1ated and measured temperature response of a center fue1 rod in
the test bund1e at an elevation of 0.35 mare compared in Figure 1. The eleva-
tion of 0.35 m is near the axial peak of the nuc1ear heat generation. The
ca1cu1ation and measurement are seen to be in good agreement. Both the ca1-
cu1ation and measurement show a temperature increase of approximate1y 1 K/s
unti1 spontaneous runaway oxidation occurs at 1900 s. After spontaneous run-
away oxidation occurs, both the ca1cu1ation and measurement show a temperature
increase of 10 K/s. This rate of temperature increase is simi1ar to that
observed by Hagen [8,9]. The ca1cu1ation shows runaway oxidation beginning at
a temperature of 1800 K, whi1e the measurement indicates runaway oxidation
beginning at a temperature of 1700 K. The ca1cu1ated and measured maximum
temperatures are 2420 and 2400 K, respective1y. In the SCDAP ca1cu1ation,
runaway oxidation and rapid temperature increase are terminated by the f10wing
away of 1iquefied c1adding. This resu1t is consistent with behavior observed
in the Hagen experiments.
The ca1cu1ated and measured response at an elevation of 0.7 mare compared
in Figure 2. The ca1cu1ation and measurement are in reasonab1e agreement unti1
1800 s. Both show the c1adding temperature increasing at a rate of 0.5 K/s.
However, the measured c1adding temperature abrupt1y increases at 1800s due to
re1ocation of the thermocoup1e junction. The thermocoup1e leads are routed up
the fue1 rods from the bot tom and pass through the hot region. Evidence of
junction re1ocation is given by the simi1ar response of this thermocoup1e, with
thermocoup1es in the lower part of the bund1e after 1800 s. The ca1cu1ated
temperature reaches a maximum va1ue of 1870 K. Because of steam starvation,
runaway oxidation was not ca1cu1ated. The ca1cu1ated temperature begins to





















Figure 1. Comparison of calculated and measured temperatures at an





















Figure 2. Comparison of calculated and measured temperatures at an
elevation of 0.70 m.
Oxidation and Hydrogen Production
The calculated and measured cumulative bundle hydrogen production were in
fair agreement, as seen in Figure 3. The measurement shown was time shifted by
6 min in an attempt to account for the inherent time delay in the hydrogen

























Figure 3. Comparison of ca1cu1ated and measured bund1e hydrogen production.
a rate of 0.074 gis from 2100 to 2400 s. This constant rate of production is
consistent with almost comp1ete consumption of the steam entering the bund1e at
a rate of 0.67 gis. After 2400 s, the ca1cu1ated rate of hydrogen production
rapid1y decreases in response to bund1e cooldown initiated by the rapid
decrease in nuc1ear heat generation. The final ca1cu1ated and measured hydro-
gen production were 66 g and 71 g, respective1y. According to the ca1cu1ation,
36% of the bund1e c1adding was oxidized. Oxidation of the Zr 1ayer on the
shroud inner surface accounted for 23% of the hydrogen produced.
The ca1cu1ated and measured hydrogen production differ in two respects.
First, the ca1cu1ated hydrogen production precedes the measured hydrogen pro-
duction by about 200 s. Second, the measurement shows two periods of rapid
hydrogen production separated by a 450 s period of time with diminished hydro-
gen production. In the ca1cu1ation, on1y one per iod of rapid hydrogen pro-
duction occurs.
The discrepancy between ca1cu1ated and measured hydrogen production is
probab1y due to an experimental event not mode1ed by SCDAP. This experimental
event was the rapid production of steam by 1iquefied fue1 and cladding flowing
downward into liquid water at the bot tom of the bundle and quenching. The
quenching of this liquefied material created enough steam flow to cool the
bundle cladding below the temperature at which runaway oxidation occurs. As a
result, the rate of hydrogen production was diminished for aperiod of time.
SCDAP models tne downward flow of liquefied fuel and cladding, but not the
steam produced by quenching of this liquefied material. Some discrepancy
between calculated and measured hydrogen production is also due to assuming a
constant time delay of six minutes in sensing hydrogen. In reality, the time
delay was calculated to vary from two to eight minutes, with the average value
being six minutes.
During the period of intense oxidation in the calculation, the oxidation
was confined to a region of about 10 cm in height. This region propagated
downward, opposite to the directionof the steam flow. The propagation is
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Figure 4. Calculated axial variation in fuel rod oxidation.
for a center bundle rod is plot ted as a function of elevation ~t three dif-
ferent times. Initially, the oxidation was centered in the 0.35 to 0.45 m
elevation span, where the nuclear heat generation was highest. As the region
below the 0.35 m elevation continued to increase in temperature and rate of
oxidation, the tegion above began to be starved of oxygen. This starvation
suppressed the oxidation in the 0.35 to 0.45 m elevation span. At 2050 s, the
cladding in the 0.25 to 0.35 m elevation span was calculated to flow away and
oxidation resumed in the 0.35 to 0.45 m elevation span. After 2300 s, the
oxidation in the 0.15 to 0.25 m elevation span was so intense that oxidation in
the 0.35 to 0.45 m elevation span was again almost completely suppressed
because of oxygen starvation.
Meltdown of Fuel and Cladding
The calculation indicates that in the hot test part of the bundle 40% of
the fuel was dissolved and liquefied by liquefied cladding. A total of 6% of
the bundle fuel was calculated to flow downward. Most of the flowing fuel and
cladding solidified in the bottom 10 cm of the fuel bundle. These calculated
results are in approximate agreement with the posttest gamma scan of the fuel
bundle, which indicates that about 3% of the bundle fuel flowed downward and
that most of the relocated fuel solidified at an elevation of 0.1 m [10].
Fission Product Release
The calculated and measured bundle noncondensible fission product releases
(Xe and Kr) were 15 and 10-20%, respectively. The calculated release history
is shown in Fi~ure 5. The steps in the release his tory occur at the times that
fuel was calculated to dissolve. If the factor of five multiplier had not been
applied to the fuel dissolution model as discussed in the section on the SCDAP



























Figure 5. Caleulated and measured release of bundle noneondensible
fission produets.
CONCLUSIONS
The eomparison of the SCDAP/MODI/VO ealeulations with the results of the
PBF SFD test 1-1 have shown that the code aeeurately ealeulates bundle heatup
and oxidation. Both ealeulation and test result show that spontaneous runaway
oxidation oeeurs after the bundle temperature exeeeds 1800 K. During this
period of intense oxidation, the oxidation proeeeds at a rate proportional to
the steam flow rate resulting from eoolant boil-off. The oxidation is eonfined
to a region about 10 em in height and propagates in the axial direetion. The
runaway oxidation is terminated by the flowing away of liquefied eladding.
The eomparison of ealeulations and experimental results also indieates
that the SCDAP code is ealeulating the bundle meltdown and fission produet
release with reasonable aeeuraey. If a fuel bundle experienees temperatures in
exeess of 2400 K, the ealeulations and experimental results show that about
3 to 6% of the fuel i~ a bundle may liquefy and flow downward. For the SFD
Test 1-1, the ealeulated and measured noneondensible fission produet releases
were both about 15%. The ealeulations show that most of the fission produet
release oeeurs due to fuel dissolution.
The eomparison of ealeulations and experimental results suggests at least
two improvements are needed in the SCDAP code. The first is the addition of a
model to ealeulate the steam produeed by liquefied material flowing into liquid
water at the bottom of a bundle and quenehing. The seeond is enhaneement of
the model that ealeulates the amount of fuel whieh is dissolved and liquefied
by liquefied eladding. This model strongly affeets both the amount of fuel
whieh flows downward and the amount of fission produet release. The model
needs to be upgraded so that both of these variables are simultaneously brought
into agreement with experimental results.
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THE INFLUENCE OF ZIRCALOY OXIDATION AND MELTING BEHAVIOR
ON CORE BEHAVIOR DURING A SEVERE ACCIDENT
C. M. Allison, D. L. Hagrman, and G. A. Berna
EG&G Idaho
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
The influence of zircaloy oxidation and melting on core temperatures,
hydrogen generation, and fission product release is examined. The
uncertainties in phenomena important to the ~odeling üf zircaloy
oxidation and melting processes including zircaloy oxidation
kinetics, hydrogen blanketing, UOZ-zircaloy interactions, and
ZrOZ failure are estimated. These uncertainties are then applied
to a sensitivity study of a boiloff-initiated severe accident
similar to that which may have occurred in TMI-Z. The results
indicate that the major uncertainties are in the oxidation kinetics
which can contribute a factor of ten to the uncertainties in fission
product release and can affect the timing of that release.
INTRODUCTION
The influence of zircaloy oxidation and melting on core behavior during
severe accidents was evident from the examination of the TMI-Z Core subsequent
to the accident in 1979. Core visual and ultrasonic examinations [1], core
samples [Z], and analyses [3-6] indicate that the core had regions of highly
oxidized and fragmented debris and regions of prior molten zircaloy and
dissolved UOZ' This damage was a direct consequence of the rapid heatup and
embrittlement of core materials due to the exothermic oxidation of zircaloy and
other structural material.
This paper investigates and quantifies the influence of the uncertainties
in oxidation and melting phenomena (oxidation kinetics, hydrogen blanketing,
UOZ dissolution, and ZrOZ failure) on the uncertainties in core behavior
(core temperatures, hydrogen production, and fission product release). A
review of representative experiments leads to a qualitative understanding of
important phenomena. Uncertainties in these phenomena are then estimated and
used in a sensitivity study to obtain uncertainties in core behavior for a
boiloff-initiated severe accident much like that which may have occurred in
TMI-Z.
REVIEW OF REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIMENTS
A review of current experimental data from the Kernforschungszentrum
Karlsruhe, West Germany and from the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
USA, shows (much like the TMI-Z core) that zircaloy oxidation and melting can
have a significant influence on fuel behavior during severe accidents. The
ESSI series of tests [7], the ESBU-l[8] bundle test, and the Power Burst
Facility Test, SFD-ST [9], were examined. A range of behavior was observed
from no liquefaction of UO Z and zircaloy, to significant zircaloy melting and
relocation. The latter was accompanied by dissolution of UOZ' breach of the
enclosing ZrOZ shell, and subsequent flow of the molten mixture.
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In all of these tests, the type of damage (the dissolution of the UD?,
the failure of the Zr02 shell, and the flow of liquefied Zr-U-O as summar1zed
on Table I) was strongly dependent on the degree of zircaloy oxidation as shown
in Figure 1.1 For example, the zircaloy cladding in ESSI-4 and the 0.7 m
elevation of SFD-ST were either completely oxidized by the time zircaloy
melting temperatures were reached, or nearly so. This resulted in minimal
relocation of liquefied Zr-U-O. At the other extreme, ESSI-l, ESSI-7, and the
center rod for ESBU-l were only slightly oxidized at the time zircaloy melting
temperatures were reached, resulting in failure of the thin Zr02 shells and
extensive relocation of liquefied Zr-U-O.
To further characterize the zircaloy oxidation and melting behavior that
might be expected in an accident where initial heatup is controlled by Core
power and uncovery rate, it is necessary to understand the phenomena which
control such behavior. Those phenomena include zircaloy oxidation kinetics,
hydrogen blanketing and steam starvation, U02-Zr interactions, and Zr02
failure. These are discussed along with their uncertainties in the following
section.
ZIRCALOY OXIDATION AND MELTING PHENOMENA
Zircaloy oxidation is highly exothermic in steam and there are extensive
reviews and experiments which deal with the kinetics in steam [10-16]. The
reviews conclude that the oxide layer is protective, i.e. remaining in place
without spalling or cracking, over a limited range of oxide thickness at low
temperatures « 1000 K) [13,14] and throughout oxidation of cladding at
temperatures above 1250 K. The oxide remains protective at the higher
temperatures because both zircaloy and the sub-stoichiometric oxide are ductile
and can deform to accommodate volume changes during oxidation.
Oxidation of a material with a protective oxide is limited by oxygen
diffusion aCross the oxide, or by the rate of steam supply to the outer oxide
surface. When sufficient steam is available, the rate of oxygen up-take by an
oxidizing semi-infinite surface is proportional to the reciprocal of the oxide
layer thickness. A kinetics equation, shown below, can be derived from Fick's
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where x is the oxide layer thickness (m) or weight gain per unit surface area
of oxidizing metal (kg/m2), T is the oxide layer temperature (K), t is time
(s), and A and Bare constants.
A number of authors have provided data or correlations for the constants A






as a function of reciprocal temperature from these sources. The agreement at
temperatures less than 1850 K is quite good, except for the extrapolated
Baker-Just data to low temperature. At temperatures above 1850 K (where a
phase transition of pure zircaloy oxide changes the crystal structure from
tetragonal to body centered cubic and alters the diffusion of oxygen through
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Figure 2. Parabolic rate constants for zircaloy oxygen weight gain versus
inverse temperature.
the oxide to the metal) the data are also within a fairly narrow band.
However, the band is shifted to the higher rates as one would expect for the
relatively open body centered cubic oxide structure.
A fact that adds uncertainty is that Equation (1)
constant oxygen concentration on both oxide surfaces.
may not be appropriate for several conditions:
is derived by assuming
Therefore, Equation (1)
a. Cladding of finite thickness that is so heavily oxidized that a core
of unoxidized metal no longer exists in the center. In this case,
the oxygen concentration in metal near the inside oxide surface is no
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longer constant. This may explain why there was no melting during
ESSI-4; the actual oxidation would exceed the parabolic rate as the
inner surface concentration increased.
b. Oxidation of liquid zircaloy. In this case, the oxygen concentration
in metal near the inside surface is altered by rapid diffusion in
liquid zircaloy. As discussed by Olander, [26] the Zr02 may
actually thin as the zircaloy melts and the oxygen flux from the
Zr02 inner surface increases rapidly.
c. Environments with high concentrations of gases other than steam. In
this case, the oxygen concentration at the outside surface is no
longer constant, and there may be an alteration of the outside
surface by chemical reaction with other gases.
Inspection of Figure 2 and consideration of the additional uncertainties
identified above, suggest an uncertainty estimate corresponding to a variation
of nearly ±50 K in the 1400 to 1850 Krange, and at least ±100 K for
temperatures above 1850 K.
The effect of the steam environment often dominates during rapid heatup at
high temperatures. In many severe accidents, including TMI-2, the steam
generation rates are relatively low. This leads to hydrogen blanketing or
steam starvation of the zircaloy surface and, in turn, limits the rate of
oxidation. The da ta of Chung [27] suggest that the oxidation rates drop
rapidly to the steam starvation limit as the partial pressure of hydrogen
exceeds 0.5 of the total pressure. The uncertainty in the limit of 0.5 is
considered relatively large, since the data were taken at low pressures and may
vary from 0.5 to 1.0.
The effect of the interaction between U02 and zircaloy on melting and
flow behavior was shown to be important by both the in-pile and out-of-pile
tests discussed earlier. Separate effects experiments [28-34] were conducted
as early as 1966 and are still being performed to reduce the uncertainty in
U02 dissolution behavior. Analytical models [35,36] have also been developed
to calculate this behavior. The uncertainties in U02-zircaloy interactions,
however, are not yet clearly quantified for ~onequilibriumconditions. For
temperatures less than 2100 K, the uncertainties in the rate of layer growth in
the U02 and zircaloy are expected to be less than those estimated for
oxidation kinetics, since the temperature of the sampies is more easily
controlled. For temperatures greater than 2100 K, the uncertainties are much
larger, due to the attack of U02 along grain boundaries and the resulting
likelihood that strong influences of fuel morphology and cladding geometry may
exist. Limited evaluation of the integral experiments described previously
indicate that the amount of U02 interacting with molten zircaloy may be
underpredicted by nearly an order of magnitude. For ESSI-l, ESSI-7, and the
center rod for ESBU-l, where the amounts of UO Z dissolved and Zr02 failure
temperatures could be estimated, the mole fraction of UO Z dissolved in the
mixture of liquefied Zr-U-O was estimated to be 6 to 7 times that predicted
from the pseudo-binary Zr(O)-UOZ phase diagralß [31]. Using a failure
temperature of ZllO K and calculated mass of unoxidized zircaloy from the
oxygen uptake analysis shown in Figure 1, the ratio of the estimated mole
fraction to the pseudo-binary calculated mole fraction was found to be 6.0Z for
ESSI-7. For ESSI-l and ESBU-l, the ratios were 6.09 and 6.86 for Zr02
failure temperatures of 2530 and Z480 K, respectively.
Another important phenomenon which affects zircaloy behavior during a
severe accident is the failure of the ZrOZ' Available measurements of the
failure stress of Zr02 show a rapid decrease from 80 to 10 MPa in the
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temperature range 1500 to 1800 K. This loss of strength and the probable
attack by any contained metallic zircaloy on the Zr02' limit the ability of
an external oxide layer to contain liquid metallic zircaloy for long periods of
time. Unfortunately, little detailed information is known about the relative
importance of oxide stress failures and the formation of pin-holes through
oxide layers due to chemical attack. The best evidence for the time of failure
of oxide film comes from the observation as shown in Figure 1 that standing
fuel rods do not appear to heat themselves above approximately 2530 K before
the liquid zircaloy breaks free of the oxide and flows to cooler regions. A
10wer limit for oxide fai1ure due to liquid metal is provided by the me1ting
temperature of oxygen saturated zirca10y, approximate1y ZZ50 K. This leads to
an uncertainty estimate of twe1ve percent.
INFLUENCE OF UNCERTAINTIES IN
OXIDATION AND MELTING PHENOMENA
In order to quantify the relative importance of the uncertainties
associated with the phenomena discussed above, the SCDAP [37] code
(SCDAP/MOD1-Version 13) was used to perform a sensitivity analysis. The models
which represent these phenomena were varied within the previous1y estimated
uncertainty limits, and the effect of these uncertainties on predicted
temperatures, fission product release, and hydrogen generation was noted. The
base case was a simple boi10ff scenario much like the TMI-Z accident. The core
uncovery rate and decay power used are shown in the inset of Figure 3. The
fue1 rod used had the dimensions and fission product inventory of a centrally
10cated rod in the TMI-Z core. The oxidation kinetics used were Urbanic [Z4]
for temperatures greater than 1850 K and Cathcart-Pawe1'[18, 19] for .
temperatures 1ess than or equa1 to 1850 K. A reduction in oxidation due to
hydrogen b1anketing based on the da ta of Chung [Z7] was mode1ed. The UOZ
dissolution was based on the kinetics equation of Turk [35] with equi1ibrium
limits from the pseudo-binary Zr(O)-UOZ phase diagram [31]. ZrOZ fai1ure
is based on a stress failure limit for te~peratures 1ess than or equa1 to
Z650 K. The ZrOZ is assumed to be disso1ved by mo1ten zirca10y above




























Figure 3. Maximum c1adding temperature versus time for the TMI-Z base case and
five sensitivity cases.
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Description of the Effect Varied
The temperature used in the parabolic rate
equation is varied ±50 K for cladding
temperatures (T) < 1850 K and ± 100 K for T
> 1850 K.
Hydrogen blanketing effects are ignored;
oxidation is limited only by steam starvation.
u02 dissolution is set to 6 times the
UOZ solubility limit from the pseudo-binary
ZrtO)-U02 phase diagram. The rate of
dissolution is assumed infinite.
The Zro2 is forced to fail at 2250 K.
The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the maximum
cladding temperature for the base case and the five sensitivity studies. In
all cases, the peak temperature is little altered because it is limited by a
stress-induced failure of the Zr02 shell at a temperature ~2250 K. The
resulting variation in total hydrogen production and release of CsOH and CsI
into the coolant channel are shown on Figure 4. The positive variation of the
oxidation (Case 1), was consistently most influential for all computed
parameters because of the significant increase in overall heatup rate. For
this uncovery scenario the influences of hydrogen blanketing (Case 3), and
ZrOZ failure (Case 5), were negligible and therefore are not shown on the
figure. Approximately twenty-two percent of the cladding was oxidized
(compared to an estimated 40 to 50% for TMI-2) , and less than 0.003% of the Cs
and I was released to the coolant for the base case. Although not shown in the
figures, all cases indicated extensive liquefaction of the fuel rod much like
in ESSI-7. The largest amount of relocated Zr-U-O was for the case of enhanced
U02 dissolution (Case 4) with five percent relocated. In that case two
percent of the relocated Zr-U-O moved below the bot tom of the rod, with the
remaining three percent frozen on the rods. The Zr02 was breached over the
upper 1/2 to 7/8 of the rod in all cases.
CONCLUSIONS
Zircaloy oxidation and melting can significantly influence the heatup and
degradation of the core during a severe accident. The qualitative influence is
being defined by aseries of integral experiments and the examination of the
damaged TMI-2 core. Those experiments show that the heatup rates, zircaloy
oxidation, and zircaloy melting and relocation are intimately coupled. Slower
initial heatup rates and heavier oxide buildups lead to embrittlement but
maintenance of rod like geometries for temperatures greater than 2500 K. Rapid
initial heatup rates result in rapid oxidation induced temperature excursions
from 2100 to 2500 K, fuel rod liquefaction, and formation of masses of cohesive
debris with low porosity.
The uncertainties in important zircaloy oxidation and melting phenomena
can be estimated given the current state of integral and separate effects



















Figure 4. Variation in hydrogen production and CsI and CsOH release versus
time for three sensitivity cases (oxidation kinetics plus and minus
and U02 dissolution).
weIl characterized due to the large number of experiments which have been
performed. The uncertainties in hydrogen blanketing are equally weIl
characterized, even though the da ta base is extremely limited, because the
influence of hydrogen blanketing is bounded by an unlimited steam supply on one
hand and by complete steam starvation on the other. However, the uncertainties
in U02-Zr interactions and Zr02 failure are poorly established and may
change significantly as additional data are obtained.
The results of sensitivity studies are highly scenario dependent.
However, for heatup rates of 1 to 2 K/s and a core uncovery of approximately
75%, the uncertainties in oxidation kinetics are the largest contributors to
uncertainties in heatup rate, hydrogen production, fission product release, and
loss of geometry. Lesser contributors, in order of importance are: U02 '
dissolution for fission product release and loss of geometry, hydrogen
blanketing for hydrogen generation rates, and Zr02' failure for loss of
geometry. The maximum temperature is not significantly altered from the base
case scenario by these uncertainties.
FOOTNOTE
1. The scale representing the oxygen atom fraction describes the degree of
zircaloy oxidation, with the zero denoting zero oxidation and 0.67 denoting
complete conversion to Zr02' The curves were obtained from calculated oxygen
atom fractions using the oxidation kinetics described in the next section and
measured temperatures at the same elevation and time.
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ABSTRACT
In order to provide informations on fuel and core response during
severe ~ccidents, severe fuel darnage experiments are being perfor-
med in the Power Burst Facility (PBF) at the Idaho National Engi-
neering Laboratory. The first of these experiments, the PBF Severe
Fuel Darnage Scoping Test (SFD-ST), was perforrned on October 29, 1982.
The bundle and structural behavior during severe fuel damage acci-
dent were investigated by the modular prograrn system EXMEL-B.
EXMEL-B utilizes the RSYST software system as weIl as the experien-
ces of the IKE in fuel rod and core modeling (SSYST, EXMEL and
MELSIM). EXMEL-B is part of the Safety Analysis System (SASYST)
of the IKE. Results of EXMEL-B application will be compared against
the experimental data of the severe fuel darnage experiments in the
PBF. The paper will also suggest areas where further model develop-
ment and code irnprovements are necessary.
INTRODUCTION
The accident in the Three Mile Island-2 (TMI-2) reactor has clearly
demonstrated that severe accidents can be terminated successfully also far
beyond the regulatory guidelines. It also has shown, that we have to be
prepared to analyze them on a non-hypothetical basis.
As a result various experimental and theoretical programs have been
initiated to analyze the fuel rod and core behavior during degraded core
cooling conditions.
The objectives of the experimental prograrn conducted in the Power Burst
Facility (PBF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) are to
investigate the
• fuel rod and bundle behavior during severe accident conditions,
• fission product release, deposition and transport and
• hydrogen generation.
909
MODEL AND CODE DEVELOPMENT AT IKE
In order to investigate the course of severe accidents new and complex com-
puter and software techniques have to be used.
During the past years physical models and codes have been developed
which allow the assessment of various accident scenarios. All the fuel rod
and core behavior codes are part of Plant Eimulation and ~nalysis System
(SASYST) /1/, which is shown in Fig. 1. Within SASYST a module independent
graphical system of the IKE /2/ can be applied to visualize the results
obtained. Most of the figures of this paper were produced by this system.
with respect to the fuel rod behavior, Fig. 2 shows the contribution of
the IKE to the code development in the Federal Republic of Germany: the
modular program system SSYST (Eafety System) /3/ describes the b~havior of a
light water reactor fuel rod during loss-of-coolant accidents. The SSYST
code system has been developed within the frame of the Projekt Nukleare
Sicherheit (PNS) in close cooperation between IKE and the Kernforschungszen-
trum Karlsruhe. The SSYST code system consists of a number of modules which
treat heat copduction, changes in geometry, pressure in the gap between fuel
and clad, thermal hydraulic in the coolant channel and metal water reac-
tion.
The modules of the EXMEL /4/ program system allow a detailed analysis
of the fuel rod behavior under melting conditions. Modules exist for the
simulation of heat production, heat transfer, cladding oxidation, the defi-
nition of boundary conditions for the rod (including conduction, convection
and radiation), the deformation of the rod by thermal strains, the melting
of rod materials, the rupture of the cladding and the run-off of molten
material.
The modular code system MELSIM3 /5/ has been developed in order to
analyze the integral fuel rod, bundle and core behavior. The complex model-
ing of MELSIM3 includes the thermal behavior of the core or bundle surround-
ings.
MELSIM3 is also part of SASYST and represents the "best-estimate" mo-
deling in the frame of KESS-2, wh ich has been reported elsewhere /6/.
DESCRIPTION OF EXMEL-B
The modular program system EXMEL-B (see also Fig. 2) is also based on the
RSYST 'software technology.
EXMEL-B combines the advantages of both, the single rod code EXMEL and
the core wide code MELSIM3. The bundle code is designed to cover the range
of accident scenarios which lead to severely damaged fuel rods up to the
beginning of fuel rod desintegration. Thus, EXMEL-B may be placed between
the code lines SSYST/EXMEL and MELSIM3. The bundle behavior is modeled in a
two dimensional (r,z)-geometry. In each radial zone a rep,esentative fuel
rod and an associated coolant channel is modeled. This approach has been
proven to be sufficiently accurate for the bUlldle analysis.
Moreover, selected representative fuel rods may be analyzed in more
detail by the single rod codes SSYST and EXMEL within the same computer run.
The results may be fed into the EXMEL-B bundle calculation during a time
step. In the same way, EXMEL-B results of the bundle calculation may be fed
into the overall core analysis code MELSIM3, in order to allow a detailed
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analysis of selected bundles within a core wide calculation.
The fuel rod bundle region is surrounded by heat structures which model
the heat conduction in the solid material which may be separated by radia-
tion gaps. Different material compositions and boundary conditions can be
considered.
The fuel rod model considers:
• heat conduction in (r,z)-fuel rod geometry
• gap heat transfer
• deformation of the fuel rod
• metal-water reaction
• heat source and fission product release
• radiation to adJac~nt rods
• melting and slumping of fuel rod material
• strong modular coupling to fluid and structure material models.
The fluid mod~l considers:
• axial enthalpy transport
(subcooled, saturated or superheated water and hydrogen)
• swell level modeling
• chan ne1 blockage due to relocation of molten material
• hydrogen production
• steam starvation and hydrogen blanketing
• strong modular coupling to the fuel rod model.
The structure material model considers:
• heat conduction in (r,z)-geometry
• radiation between gap surfaces
• variable boundary conditions
• metal-water reaction in the solid materials
• strong coupling to bundle behavior.
With respect to the application to special experimental conditions some
data, for example heat sources, pressure, mass flow, and mixture level his-
tory mayaIso be handled as time dependent input data and have not to be
provided necessarily by the modules in EXMEL-B.
SEVERE FUEL DAMAGE EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION
The severe fuel damage scoping test (SFD-ST) has been conducted in october
1982. The test train (Fig. 3) /7/ consists of 32 fuel rods of 0.91 m length
enclosed in an insulated shroud. The test train coolant was routed downward
between the PBF in-pile tube and a flow divider to the bot tom of the test
train, and then upward passed the insulated shroud. The bundle coolant ente-
red the in-pile tube through aseparate. line and passed through the bundle.
The bundle was highly instrumented in order to measure water and steam flow,
pressure, temperatures, etc.
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At the beginning of the transient, the coolant flow and the pressure
were maintained almost constant and the power increased. These conditions
resulted in water boiloff and subsequently in a bundle heatup in the unco-
vered parts of the bundle. At the end of the experiment the power was drop-
ped and the bundle reflooded.
EXMEL-B SIMULATION OF THE EXPERIMENT
The bundle region has been modeled by assuming three representative rods in
radial direction and 40 axial meshes. Because of the different materials in
the shroud, e.g. Zr, zr0 2-insulator, Zr saddle and a double outer wall star-
ting at the radial inner surface of the shroud (s. Fig. 3), it has been
modeled as a twa-dimensional heat conduction domain. The geometrical and
material composition.of the EXMEL-B simulation model is shown in Fig. 4.
The shroud has been devided into 12 radial and 40 axial meshes. The nodali-
zation of the bundle and the shroud in axial direction has been chosen
equally in QFder to have a direct radiation coupling opportunity. The bundle
coolant inlet· flow rate, as weIl as power and pressure histories were provi-
ded as input da ta to the code EXMEL-B. This option, to specify selected time
and/or space dependent input data, allows an easy adaption of the modular
code system to specific requirements. The code interpolates the actual data
from time and/or space dependent tables by using RSYST specific, standard i-
zed routines.
The time dependent input data were taken from measured data and are
shown in Fig. 5.
VALIDATION OF EXMEL-B
The calculational results of the EXMEL-B application are based on the time
dependent inlet mass flow rate and pressure history in the test section.
However, the corresponding steam generation rate and the mixture level has
been predicted with EXMEL-B.
Therefore, from a comparison of calculated and measured results, contribu-
tions to the validation of the following models of EXMEL-B can be expected:
• the fuel rod model,
• the coupling of fuel rods by radiation in the steam covered
parts of the fuel rods,
• the fluid behavior in the steam and steam/hydrogen environment,
• the convective heat transfer modes,
• the coupling of the bundle region to the surroundings.
Fig. 6 cornpares the calculated cladding surface temperatue at the 0.7 m
level ageinst the experimental data. It is evident, that the agreement is
reasonably good.
The cladding surface temperature in the upper third of the bundle inclu-
des all the effects of spatial and time dependent processes, e.g. radiation
convection as weIl as mass flow, power and pressure histories. The slightly
higher temperature gradient between 4000 sand 10 000 s in the calculated
temperature history indicates that the heat transfer coefficient in the
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experiment will be somewhat higher than predicted by the code.
The same effect also explains the differences between the calculated
innermost shro~d temperatures and the measured data (s. Fig. 7).
CONCLUSION
The results of the EXMEL-B code application are in good agreement with
the experimental results of the PBF scoping Test. To achieve such an agree-
ment, experiences in the modeling of severe accident phenomena had to be
considered /B, 9, 10/ as well as sensitivity studies for bundle heat up
experiments /11/.
The calculational results demonstrate that the spatial, e.g. axial and
radial, and the time.dependent physical processes are modeled with the ne-
cessary accuracy and that the important phenomena have been taken into ac-
count. lt also demonstrates that the EXMEL-B code is suitable to analyze
severe accid~nt phenomena in the models. Our analysis work has shown to us
once more that the complex experiments have to be analyzed in order to un-
derstand the physical phenomena in any detail. This is especially true, if
we try to analyze the debris formation and coolability in the cooldown
phase.
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DF-l: AN ACRR SEPARATE EFFECTS
EXPERIMENT ON SEVERE FUEL DAMAGE*
A. C. Marshall, P. S. Pickard, K. O. Reil,
J. B. Rivard, and K. T. Stalker
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 87185, USA
ABSTRACT
Aseries of in-pile experiments addressing LWR severe
fuel damage phenomena is being conducted in the ACRR
reactor at Sandia National Laboratories. The ACRR
Damaged Fuel Relocation (DFR) experiments are separate
effects tests which provide a data base for the
development and verification of models for LWR severe
core damage accidents. The first experiment in this
series, DF-l, has been completed and the results and
analysis to date are discussed in this paper. DF-l
examined the effect of low initial clad oxidation
conditions on fuel damage and relocation processes.
Visual observation showed early clad relocation and
partial blockage formation at the grid spacer location
with significant aerosol production. Oxidation-driven
heating rates of 25 K/s and peak temperatures in excess
of 2525 K were observed.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Debris Formation and Re~ocation (DFR) experiments being
performed by Sandia National Laboratories consist of aseries of
in-pile separate-effects experiments that provide data for the
development and verification of models of fuel and core damage
phenomena. The DFR program is part of the integrated
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Severe Fuel Damage
Research Program [lJ. The NRC Program focuses on the development
of an improved database and analysis capability that may be
utilized in assessing the consequences of possible severe core
damage accidents in light water nuclear power plants.
The role of the DFR separate-effects experiments in the NRC
Program-is to supply data on the effects of important variables
and conditions on fuel damage progression, and the severity of
the end state attained following the damage process. The
experiments examine a range of conditions relevant to severe
accidents that are known to influence damage phenomena, including
clad oxidation states, steam (and hydrogen) flow rates, and
pressures. The emphasis of the DFR program is on the in-core
processes that affect the mode and rate of damage and the
environment for the release and transport of fission products.




In the DFR experiments, a short bundle (-O.5m) of LWR fuel
rods is fission heated in flowing steam to high temperatures.
From visual observations, from pressure, temperature, flow rate
and hydrogen measurements, and from post-test examination and
analysis of the experiment debris oonfiguration, information on
the effeots of aooident parameters and oonditions on the damage
progression, and on the end state is obtained. This information
oan be oorrelated with phenomenologioal models of the prooesses,
yielding improved and/or verified models that oan be used for
aooident analysis.
2.1 Experiment Desoription
The DFR experiments are performed in the Annular Core
Researoh Reaotor (ACRR), a pool-type reaotor with a large oentral
irradiation spaoe, at Sandia National Laboratories. The
experiment oapsule (Fig. 2-1) is installed in the oentral
irradiation spaoe for eaoh test. An external boiler-superheater
system supplies steam to the 9-rod fuel bundle in the oapsule.
Hydrogen produoed by oxidation of the fuel rod oladding is
removed by CuO reoombiner beds. The steam is oondensed and
oolleoted in the oondensate tank. Steam flow rates and axial
power profiles are adjusted to simulate reaotor oonditions during
an aooident. A visual reoord of damage progression is obtained
via oinematographio and video observation through an end-on view
port, whioh also allows radiometrio temperature measurements and
hydrogen deteotion by a pulsed ultraviolet laser Raman
speotrographio system. Hydrogen is also monitored by measurement
of temperatures attained in the oopper-oxide reoombining beds
employed in the experiments.
2.2 Test Matrix
The DFR experiment program is intended to provide data over
a wide range of oonditions studied in aooident analysis. A key
parameter in the DFR experiment matrix is the state of olad
oxidation at the initiation of severe damage. The initial
oxidation state, together with the steam flow rate, and the
system/rod relative pressure are important in determining the
ultimate oore temperatures, hydrogen generation, and the fuel
liquefaotion and 'relooation modes that determine oore damage
severity and fission produot release. The matrix parameters for
the first four DF tests have been seleoted to .provide broad
investigation of fuel response; they are displayed in Table I.
3. TEST DF-1
As disoussed in Seotion 2.2, the speoifio objeotives of DF-1
were to determine the influenoe of low initial oladding oxidation
oonditions on fuel damage progression and end state, inoluding
1. attained fuel temperatures,
2. extent of cladding oxidation,
3; mode and degree of oladding and fuel liquefaotion and
relocation,
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Low 1 Low/Med 2 +3 Examine oxidation, liquefaction,
relocation for low initial
oxidation conditions
2 Mod Low/Med + Compare fuel damage, relocation,
blockage formation, for inter-
mediate oxidation conditions
3 Mod Med/High Effect of low system pressure
and clad ballooning on damage
4 High Low/Med + Examine fuel behavior for high
initial oxidation -- possible Cr
materials test
1LOW =10 percent oxidized, High=40 percent oxidized
2Low =0.02 gis-rod, High=0.1 gis-rod
3Range: +20 to -20 atmospheres
4. type and rate of blockage formation, and
5. bundle thermal-hydraulics.
The desired test conditions were obtained by limiting the
preconditioning exposure time and cladding temperatures during
which the fuel rods were heated up in a steam environment, so
that less than about 10 percent of the cladding was oxidized in
the upper half of the bundle prior to the main phase of the
experiment.
A summary of the observations and some preliminary analysis
of the experiment are reported below; it is expected that
additional analysis of the data and post-test examinations which




Following the low-power preconditioning period during which
the upper bundle cladding attained temperatures less than 1200 K,
ACRR power was raised to 1.5 MW, and the upper-central region of
the cladding quickly attained temperatures promoting vigorous
oxidation. During this initial period of oxidation, temperatures
increased at rates from about 5 to 8 K/s. Based on temperature
indications and visual observation, the width of the oxidation
zone was quite wide, extending from well below the fuel center
nearly to the upper end of the fissile length. Figure 3-1 gives
the rod nomenclature and shows the approximate visual field seen
in the video record; Figure 3-2 gives a chronology of events
keyed to the temperature indications of the tungsten-rhenium
thermocouple located at the bundle midplane.
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The visual record shows downward motion of apparently liquefied
cladding mate~ial to the lower grid spacer as temp~ratures near
2300 Kare attained. This is followed by apparent coalescence of
rods 2 and 5, lateral motion and rod bowing. Within the next 30
seconds, large-scale motion of cooler material over hotter
regions occurs and the field of view starts to become obscured by
intense aerosol generation (see Section 3.2); maximum peak
temperatures in excess of 2500 K were recorded during this
period. (Correction of the raw thermocouple data for time and
temperature response lags is now being performed and is expected
to result in a somewhat higher peak temperature estimate.) As
temperatures declined from these maximums, the obscuration of the
visual field decreased and the highly distorted nature of the
resulting fuel debris could be observed.
Hydrogen
Measurement of the hydrogen being produced by the oxidation
during the experiment was obtained by a pUlsed-ultraviolet-laser
Raman spectrographic system. Due to the degree of obscuration of
the visual field by aerosol clouds, the measured signal can be
regarded as only a qualitative indication of the hydrogen
densities during the unobseured portions of the experiment.
A better measurement of the time-history of the evolved
hydrogen was obtained from temperature measurements in the
copper-oxide recombiner beds; these signals represent the
response of the beds to the exotherrnie chemical reduction of the
oxide and hence are a measure of the rate of recombination of
evolved hydrogen. This analysis indieated that hydrogen evolved
rapidly during the initial oxidation phase at temperatures above
1600 K, was produced at maximum rates throughout the high
temperature phase (about 5 minutes), and decreased rapidly as the
temperature fell at the conclusion of this phase. Preliminary
estimates place the total hydrogen evolved at 12 g.
Post-test Examination
Figure 3-3 is a post-test X-radiograph of DF-1. Visible in
this photonegative are 1) general retention of pellet and rod
geometry, but substantial lateral deformation (bowing) of the
fuel rods in the upper half of the bundle, and evident erosion of
some fuel pellets, and 2) a large globular volume of high-density
material surrounding a low-density zone. The globular volume is
located near the bottom of the fuel bundle and its dense portion
is positioned at the axial location occupied originally by a
PWR-type grid spaeer made from Ineonel 718.
Figure 3-4a,b shows cross-sections of the experiment taken
a) near the top of the experiment and b) through the dense
portion of the globular volume near the bottom of the bundle.
The upper cross-section shows 8 fuel pellets with evidence of
erosion and phase inhomogeneities surrounded by distended and
broken oxidized cladding shells. Pieoes of oxidized oladding not
assoeiated with pellets are also present. Substantial
displaoement of the rods from their original positions is olearly
evident. The remainder of the cross-seotion is void and there 18
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no evidenee of the ninth fuel rod.
density Zireonia shroud is seen.
Some erosion of the low
The lower eross-seetion (Figure 3-4b) shows a large mass of
material which formed a partial bloekage at the original location
of the lower grid spaeer. Liquefied material has flowed outward,
substantially eroding the zirconia shroud, and oecupying an area
more than twiee as large as the original flow passage. The
nearly-original size, shape, and positioning of the 9 fuel rods
are clearly discernible within the large mass in the original
photograph. However, most of the cladding around the rods, and
the grid spacer' which originally positioned the fuel rods in this
cross-seetion, are not seen. Visible are several small areas of
metallic material, a few shards of oxidized cladding shells, and
isolated pores (shown as the darkest ton~ at the center and left
of center in Fig 3-4b).
3.2 Analysis
Temperature Comparisons
Thermal analyses of the DF 1 experiment using state-of-the-art
computer models (SCDAP[2]/MELPROG[3])are being initiated.
Limited analysis using simple fuel rod experiment analysis models
has been performed to assess the comparisons with measured
temperatures. Comparison using existing oxidation models yields
reasonable agreement with upper bundle temperatures, but lOHer
bundle ealculated temperatures are beloH measured values.
Several refinements in the ealculations are being considered
to provide improved agreement. First, the axial distribution of
fission pOHer may have been greater than pre-test predietions
near the lOHer end of the bundle due to eondensation-eaused
moderation of the neutron spectrum.
Seeond, the indieations of the high-temperature (W-Re)
thermocouples deviate from actual temperatures beeause they Here
housed in Zireonia shrouds; correeted temperatures inferred from
analysis of their behavior may agree better Hith modeling of the
test. Initial estimates of the aetual temperatures based on
correeted thermocouple responses indieate aetual peak
temperat~res at the bundle midplane exeeed indicated values by
50--100 K, depending on the magnitude of radiative attenuation by
aerosols.
Oxidation Behavior
As mentioned earlier, the apparent zone of oxidation Has
Hide, extending from above the lOHer grid spacer nearly to the
top of the bundle. These observations are partially eonfirmed by
the presence of oxidized cladding shells in the metallographie
cross-sections.
Because of the rapid rate of cladding temperature rise
during the beginning of the main phase of the test (Figure 3-2),
total steam flow limited the extent of oxidation of the upper
portions of the bundle to about 10 percent prior to the
attainment of temperatures exceeding the melting point of
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Zircaloy-4 (2000K). Evidence of oxide thicknesses exceeding this
value, although preliminary, must be ascribed to oxidation
occurring at higher temperatures. This is consistent with the
continued rise of central and upper bundle temperatures above
2000 K and the continued evolution of hydrogen during the high
temperature period. Although considerable evidence of zr0 2
(oxidized cladding shells) remains in the upper half of the
bundle, only limited evidence of zr0 2 phases in the lower part of
the bundle is seen.
Fuel Liquefaction
Extensive liquefaction of fuel-clad species and erosion of
fuel pellets occurred during DF-1; preliminary estimates based on
cross-section photographs place the'amount of fuel loss in the
upper part of the bundle at 10-15 percent, and indicate local
values greater than 40 percent in the lower blockage region.
Fuel and Cladding Relocation
Figures 3-3 and 3-4 illustrate the largely coherent rod
structures which remained following the very severe conditions
imposed during the experiment and despite the loss of cladding
integrity throughout the bundle. Only the upper section of one
rod has collapsed to lower regions. The pellet-to-pellet
interfaces seen in Figure 3-3 are sharp, yet each intact rod has
reta(ned its structural identity. Further examination is
underway to characterize the interfacial bonds between pellets
and to understand whether this phenomenon is unique to fresh
(unirradiated) fuel.
The initial cladding motions observed in the visual record
consist of apparent flow of hot, glowing material onto the lower
grid spacer when the peak temperature in the bundle attained
about 2000 K. Later material motions consist of movements of
larger-scale (apparently) cooler material over hotter material
located in lower parts of the bundle. Because the cooler
material remains stationary and retains its shape, it is inferred
to be solid rather than liquid.
The blockage in the lower part of the bundle apparently was
formed initially as downward-flowing liquefied material
encountered the lower grid spacer and froze. Significant fuel
liquefaction and pellet erosion (greater than 40 %) occurred
later in this zone as zirconium interacted over an extended time
with fuel above the grid spacer. This material moved downward
and outward, forming the mass seen in Figure 3-4b, dissolving the
grid spacer, and leaving behind a voided region. Pores in the
blockage allowed continued flow of steam/hydrogen mixture into
the upper parts of the bundle.
Aerosols
During, the high temperature phase of the experiment, intense
aerosol clouds were observed. The aerosol generation started
when cladding began melting in the upper bundle regions and
continued during the remainder of the high temperature phase.
The source of this aerosol is believed to be volatilized tin
923
whioh is present as an alloying ingredient in Ziroaloy-4. Tin
has been identified during the post-test examination as present
in the steel mesh filters looated downstream of the test seotion.
Both the intensity and timing of aerosol produotion from
non-radioaotive souroes may affeot the oharaoter and transport of
released fission produots by either ohemioal reaotion or enhanoed
agglomeration and settling prooesses. Although the magnitude of
the effeot of suoh aerosols in an aooident situation requires
oareful analysis, it is olear that they may playa role in
determining the fate of fission produots in the in-vessel
environment.
The estimated aerosol density required to produoe the
optioal extinotion observed in DF-1 is on the order of 1 g/m 3
The total amount of tin required is therefore only a fraotion of
that available in the Ziroaloy oladding. The observed aerosol
produotion is being oompared to reoently developed models, and
the potential effeots on the ohemistry of fission produots,
partioularly tellurium, are being examined. Beoause the density
of the aerosol is suffioient to affeot radiative heat transfer to
boundaries and thermoooupie looations, these effeots are now
being inoorporated into the DF-1 analysis.
The next experiment in the series, DF-2, will provide
information on intermediate oxidation oonditions. It is
scheduled later this year.
4. SUMMARY
The objeotive of DF-1 was to determine the influenoe of low
initial oladding oxidation oonditions on fuel damage progression
and end state when LWR fuel is subjeoted to severe aooident
oonditions. The results and analysis performed to date indioate
that
1. Rapid oxidation with rates of temperature inorease of
more than 25 K/s were observed in early stages, with
peak temperatures in exoess of 2525 K ooourring after
signifioant liquefaotion, relooation and formation of a
partial blookage.
2. Low initial oxidation oonditions yield early,
large-soale relooation of oladding and formation of a
partial blookage at the lower grid spaoer looation.
3. The blookage formed at the lower grid spaoer was
extensive but suffioiently porous to allow oontinued
steam flow and subsequent oxidation and liquefaotion.
Substantial fuel liquefaotion or pellet erosion (greater
that 40%) is seen at one looation in the blookage.
4. Generation of signifioant quantities of aerosols were
observed during the high temperature stages, primarily
due to volatilized tin from the oladding. The
implioations of this phenomenon are being investigated.
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Figure 2-1 DFR Experiment Capsu1e Schematic
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Figure 3-3 Posttest Radiograph of DF-l Bundle
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ABSTRACT
As extension of investigations of the high-temperature and long-term
oxidation behaviour of Zircaloy-4 in unlimited steam, the reaction
under limited steam supply and under steam-hydrogen-argon mixtures is
being investigated. The results show that the effects of steam starva-
tion are restricted to very low steam supply rates of which the criti-
cal values were determined. Hydrogen acts as competing reactant but
no moderating effect on the oxidation kinetics at the temperature
level covered up to now has been identified. The parameter study,
which will be continued at higher temperatures, will allow to backfit
the modelling of the Zircaloy-4/steam reaction under severe accident
conditions.
INTRODUCTION
One of the important factors to be considered in severe fuel damage accident
analysis is .the external oxidation of Zircaloy-4 cladding. Investigations of the
oxidation kinetics in pure steam have been extended towards higher temperatures
andlonger durations /-1,27. Additional influences on the kinetics, however,
can be expected from ;team-consumption and hydrogen enrichment in the atmosphere.
Whereas Cathcart et al. /-3 7 found no influence of 5 Vol.-% hydrogen in steam
at 1100 and 1300oC, Furuta ~t al. /-47 in tests at 950 to 1I00oC identified
fluctuations of the reaction rates-fo; critical hydrogen/steam ratios of 0.2
to 0.4 and hxdrogen uptake above these levels. In tests at 1200 to 17000 C Chung
and Thomas /5,67 registered lower parabolic oxidation rates and hydrogen uptake
in hydrogen:co~tainingatmospheres and linear oxidation rates due to gas phase
or surface tr?nsport limitations in the case of even lower steam supply rates.
The influence of hydrogen was found to increase with increasing temperature.
Our own investigations are parametric tests under better defined conditions,
realized by stationary flowing atmospheres.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The specimens are 30 mm long sections cut from PIYR-specific Zircaloy-4 tube
material (Tab. I) of 10.75 mm outer diameter and 725 ~m wall thickness, which
are degreased, pickled in a fluoric-nitric acid mixture, and finally cleaned
in boiling distilled water. This specimen length is considered to be short
enough to allow measurements of averaging character and to avoid major changes




Ht.-% 7 L 7ppm_
Sn I. 58 0 1100
Fe 0.22 N <100
Cr 0.10 H 6
Tab. I: Chemical Analysis of Zircaloy-4 Tube Material
The test equipment consists of a furnace-heated tubular test section, an
evaporator and a condenser within a closed atmospheric pressure steam loop. One
test type is performed under steam of reduced flow velocities, realized by power
control of a small evaporator and calibrated through the total evaporation during
several hours of steady-state operation. Another test type is performed under
mixtures of steam with argon or hydrogen and argon (Fig. 1). Hydrogen and argon
are dosed by flowmeters, mixed and bubbled through the evaporator or fed into an
inlet line above the water level. By these two options and variation of the eva-
porator temperature, steam is transported in constant proportions to the gas
supply. The inert carrier gas argon allows the dosage of very low steam supply
rates without the risk of stagnant conditions, improves mixing of the atmospheres
and permits tests with high hydrogen-to-steam ratios without burning or explosion
hazards. The reduced steam supply rates are calibrated by measuring the amount
of condensate or the dew point of the atmosphere, the humidity extracted with
phosphorus pentoxide or finally the condensation at about 150 K after cooling
the atmosphere by liquid nitrogen.
Fig. 1: Apparatus for Reaction Experiments under Mixed
Atmopheres of Steam with other Gases
The specimen is inserted into the tubular quartz test section within the
laboratory furnace. If necessary, temperature overshooting is avoided by shifting
the specimen from a slightly cooler position to the constant temperature zone of
the furnace after dissipation of the heat produced at the start of the reaction.
In addition to measurement of mass increase and metallographie evaluation,




Tests in steam under redueed flow rates have been performed at 1000 and
1300oC. Fig. 2 shows the weight gain of Zirealoy-4 speeimens as funetion of steam
supply rate for 15 min at 1000oC. The steam supply rate ~s defined as the mass
of steam passing the unit
2
eross seetional area (ca. 3 em ) of the reaetion tube
in one minute, i.e. mg/ern min. For eomparison purposes the dotted line is in-
eluded, whieh represents the weight gain expeeted for unlimited steam as ealeu-
lated aeeording to the following empirieal expression developped by Leistikow
et a1. (I) :
(I)
Above the eritieal value of steam supply rate of some 13 mg/em2min (eorresponding
to 41 mg/min or 51 ml (STP)/min of total steam inlet rate, 1.3 em/s of steam
flow velocity at 10000C or 2. I mg/em2min steam supply rate per unit speeimen
surfaee area) the weight gain settles on a eonstant level, roughly in
agreement with the ealeulated value. Below the eritieal steam supply rate a
sharp deerease of weight gain with deereasing steam supply is observed. This
ean be taken for the effeet of steam starvation.
OXidation Temperature 100QoC
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Fig. 2: Mass Increase as Funetion of Steam Supply Rate
to the Cross-Seetional Area of the Reaetion Tube
(15 min, 1000oC)
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Fi§. 3 shows the correlation between weight gain and duration of oxidation
at 1000 C for three different steam supplies and in comparison to unlimited
steam. For the lowest steam supply the initially very small weight gain in-
creases sharply with increasing reaction duration. In the case of the inter-
mediate steam supply rate the weight gain kinetics can be expressed as para-
bolic function up to 15 min followed by a linear one, whereas parabolic be-
haviour persists for 60 min in case of the higher steam supply. Breakaway of
the oxide film was observed on all the specimens oxidized for 60 min and under
steam supply rates of 3.2, 12.7 and 40.7 mg/cm2min. As corresponding hydrogen
contents 2300, 1400 and 400 ppm were analyzed.
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Fig. 3: Mass Increase as Function of Duration of Oxida-
tion in Steam at different Supply Rates (2-60 min,
10000 C)
Fig. 4 shows the steam supply dependence of the weight gain for 15 min at
13000 C. Below the critical steam supply rate of some 20 mg/cm2min a sharp de-
crease of weight gain is observed. Between 20 and 60 mg/cm2min a peak is obvious,
with its maximum about 15 % above the level expected for unlimited steam. Rela-
tively high contents of hydrogen between 340 and 1300 ppm were analyzed for the
specimens oxidized in this range. But the acceleration of oxidation could also
be correlated with relatively high volume ratios of released hydrogen in these
atmospheres. At higher steam supply rates the weight gain decreases gradually
to a nearly constant level.
Tests under mixed atmospheres and comparison tests in steam have been per-
formed at 8000 C and are being continued at higher temperatures. The following
results refer to 800
0
C tests. Fig. 5 shows the time dependence of mass increase
for reactions of Zirealoy-4 speeimens in steam under high and redueed supply
rates and in argon-steam and argon-hydrogen-steam mixtures. The elose eompari-
son of the results as represented by a single eurve demonstrates, that argon
and hydrogen additions are without influenee if only suffieient amounts of
steam are provided. In eontrast Fig. 6 shows for the example of 15 min and
further redueed steam supply rates that hydrogen begins to act as a eompeting
reaetant. Espeeially in ease of the atmospheres with higher·hydrogen eontent
the hydrogen uptake of the speeimens inereases with deereasing steam supply as
expressed by the weight gain results. At the ordinate interseetions of the para-
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Oxidation Temperature 1300 0C






jfC.........., Calculated Value by KfK-Eq tar







o 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Steom Supply Rate (mg/cm?min.l






Vol. Parts in Atmosphere
and Flow Rates [ml/min]
Argon Hydrogen Steam
0 0 6200. 0 0 1500 i:!, 0 0 300. 1000 0 300











Fig. 5: Mass Increase as Function of Time of Exposure
to Steam and Gas Mixtures, Independent of Argon
and Hydrogen Additions (2 min-6 h, 800oe)
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Fig. 6: Mass Increase as Function of Steam Flow Rate
in Argon-Steam and Argon-Hydrogen-Steam Mixtures
(15 min, 8000 C)
metric curves the amounts of hydriding by argon-hydrogen atmospheres can be read.
The maxima for the atmospheres containing roughly 10 and 5 % hydrogen in combina-
tion with high hydrogen to steam ratios are explained by already appreciable oxi-
dation which however has not yet suppressed hydriding. In addition hydrogen up-
take was identified by specimen swelling (up to 3 % of linear dimensional in-
crease), exothermal heat of hydrogen solution (up to 30 K overshooting of re-
action temperature), heat of hydride formation during specimen cooling (reduced
cooling rate around 500oC), microstructural changes (transformation tendency
towards ß-Zr phase due to the ß-stabilizing hydrogen, hydride precipitation),
and hot extraction analysis (up to 9000 ppm, equivalent to the composition of
ZrH) •
Surprisingly no influence of hydrogen on the oxidation kinetics was identi-
fied. However, a slight "hydrogen blanketing", i.e. a moderating effect on the
oxidation, if existent at all at 800oC, could have been overcompensated by hydro-
gen uptake. The steam starvation limit for 15 min at 8000 C could be given as
roughly 10 ml (STP)/min, which corresponds tO 8 mg/min total steam inlet rate,
0.8 mg/cm2min of flow rate reduced to unity of test flow channel cross section
(10 cm2), 3.9 cm/min of steam flow velocity (of atmospheric pressure at 800
o
C)
or 0.4 mg/cm2min steam supply rate per unit specimen area.
A comprehensive test series in steam-argon mixtures between 2 min and 6 h
showed (Fig. 7), that only substantial reduction of steam supply results in re-
duced oxidation and shifts the parabolic kinetics towards linear. The long-term
behaviour is characterized and complicated by earlier breakaway oxidation at
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Fig. 7: Mass Increase as Function of Time of Exposure to
Argon-Steam Mixtures (2 min-6 h, 8000C)
intermediate steam supply rates, as confirmed by metallographic observation of
the defective scales and the increased hydrogen uptake analyzed.
A similar test series in steam-hydrogen-argon mixtures under comparable con-
ditions of reduced steam supply rates showed that the reduction of the oxidation
is accompanied by substantial hydrogen reaction. This complicates the interpre-
tation of the kinetic curves (Fig. 8). Compared to the dotted line for the reac-
tion with hydrogen, which first shows linear kinetics and later the constant
level of hydrogen saturation, the curves for intermediate steam supply show,
that the reduced hydrogen uptake visible for the shorter times is overcompen-
sated for the longer times by the increase in oxidation. The curve representing
50 ml/min of steam is identical with the curve of Fig. 5, so that this small
steam supply rate is already sufficient to suppress hydrogen influences. Fig. 9,
a comparison of scales and microstructures shows the trend towards ß-phase due
to uptake of the ß-stabilizing hydrogen when the steam supply is reduced below
the starvation limit.
The presently available results for 900 and 10000C of this type of tests in
mixed atmospheres have shoWn that the behaviour of Zircaloy-4 is changing gra-
dually. Fig. 10 gives the hydrogen uptake of the material from hydrogen-argon
mixtures in time dependence for the three temperatures. Because the hydrogen
saturation level is decreasing with increase of temperature, the oxidation in-
crease with temperature is expected to dominate at the higher temperatures.
Breakaway-related effects ought to disappear above 10000C, according to the
present knowledge. So the future' parametric tests at higher temperatures promise
a good chance to study in detail the "hydrogen blanketing", the moderating effect
of hydrogen on the oxidation as described in the literature, with less inter-
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Fig. 9: Influence of Steam Supply Rate on ZrOZ-Scale
Growth and Microstructure during Tests in









Fig. 10: Hydrogen Uptake as Function of Time of Exposure to
Hydrogen-Argon Atmospheres (2 min-6 h, BOO-1000oC)
CONCLUSIONS
The test results show that effects of steam starvation are restricted to
very low levels of steam supply rate, for which the critical values are deter-
mined. Hydrogen is identified as additional reactant and proves to be of impor-
tant influence only in case of limited steam supply and substantial hydrogen
content in the atmosphere. Hydrogen has to be considered as additional heat
source and embrittling agent. Oxide scale deterioration in combination with
enhanced hydrogen uptake have been identified below critical steam supplies
and in atmospheres enriched with hydrogen. In contrast to published results
no "blanketing" effect of hydrogen is identified at the lower temperature
level of the presently available results. The development of an improved
Zircaloy reaction kinetics code, for which the basis is being provided, should
treat the limited oxidation below the quantified steam starvation level and
should regard the consequences of the reaction with hydrogen. The experimental
investigations will be continued at higher temperatures.
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SEVERE FUEL DAMAGE IN STEAM AND HELIUM ENVIRONMENTS
OBSERVED IN IN-REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
S. Saito and S. Shiozawa
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
Tokai-rnura, Ibaraki-ken 319-11, Japan
ABSTRACT
The behavior of severe fue1 damages has been studied in gaseous
environments sirnu1ating core uncovery accidents in the in-reactor
experiments uti1izing the NSRR. ~vo types of c1adding re10cation
modes, azimutha1 f10w and me1t-dotvn, were revea1ed through the
parametric experiments. The azimutha1 f10w was evident in an
oxidizing environment in case of no oxide film break. The me1t-
down can be categorized into f10w-down and move-dotvn, according to
the velocity of the me1t-dotvn. Cinematographies showed that the
f1ow-dotvn was very fast as water f10ws dotvn whi1e the move-dotvn
appeared to be much slower. The f10w-down was possib1e in an
unoxidizing environment, whereas the move-dotvn of mo1ten c1adding
occurred through a crack induced in an oxide film in an oxidizing
environment. The criterion of the re1ocation modes was deve10ped
as a function of peak c1adding temperature and oxidation condition.
It was also found that neither immediate quench nor fue1 fracture
occurred upon f100ding when c1adcling temperature was about 1800 °c
at water injection. The externa1 mechanica1 force is needed for
fue1 fracture.
INTRODUCTION
The severe fue1 damage research is one of the essential items in the
fie1d of severe accident research. Severa1 programs are progressing in U.S.A.
and FRG by uti1izing PBF, ACRR or ex-reactor test faci1ities to investigate
fue1 behavior under simu1ated core uncovery accident conditions.
The behavior of severe fue1 damages has been studied simu1ating
postu1ated core uncovery accidents also in the NSRR (Nuc1ear Safety Research
Reactor) Program at Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI). The
specific objectives of the present work are to determine fue1 rod re1ocation
modes through the extensive in-reactor experiments and to study the transient
behavior of the fue1 rod damages by a specia11y-deve10ped optica1 system ["LI.
A total of 15 tests inc1uding 4 tests for cinematographies was conducted
so far under various test conditions changing peak fue1 temperature, oxida-
tion condition and so on.
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EXPERINENTAL FACILITIES AND PROCEDURE
The,NSRR faei1ity and its eapabi1ity have been reported previous1y Li!.
Brief1y, the NSRR is a modified TRIGA-ACPR (Annu1ar Core Pulse Reaetor) whose
sa1~ent feature is the 1arge pu1sing power eapabi1ity whieh enab1es to energize
test fue1 by nue1ear fission over the me1ting temperature of U02. The size of
the reaetor eore is 62 em in equiva1ent diameter and 38 em in height. The
diameter of the dry experimental eavity loeated in the eenter of the eore is
about 20 em.
Eaeh test fue1 rod was individua11y eontained within a sma11 inner eapsu1e
or surrounded by a quartz tube whieh was also eontained in an outer eapsu1e
fi11ed with water at ambient temperature and atmospherie pressure, as ShOIVll in
Fig. 1. The outer eapsu1e was p1aeed in the eentra1 experimental eavity and
the test fue1 rod was subjeeted to rapid energy deposition by pu1sing opera-
tion of the NSRR. The test fue1 rads used in the experiments were identiea1
with 14 x 14 Plo/R type fue1 rads with exeeptions of fue1 1ength and enriehment.
The design details of the test fue1 rod are provided in Tab1e I.
Tab1e I Test Fue1 Rod Design Summary
u0 2 Pellet C1adding Element
Diameter 9.29 mm Nateria1 Zirea1oy-4 Aetive fue1 1ength 135 mm
Length 10 mm Hall thiekness 0.62 mm Pelle.t-e1adding gap 0.095 mm
Density 95% TI Outer diameter 10.72 mm Filled gas He
Enriehment 10 %
A test fue1 rod was previous1y pressurized in two speeifie tests, and
e1adding was previous1y oxidized on the outer surfaee in severa1 eases.
Eaeh fue1 rod was generally instrumented with 0.2 mm O.D. Pt/Pt-13% Rh
intrinsie junetion thermoeoup1es to measure e1adding surfaee temperatures,
and same had H/H-Re sheathed thermoeoup1es to measure fue1 eenter1ine tem-
perature.
Atmospherie pressure of air was used instead of steam for most of the
oxidizing environment surrounding a test fue1 rod, due to easiness of setup
of test eondition. However, the amount of oxygen in an air environment might
not be enough for suffieient e1adding oxidation in the einematography tests
beeause üf 1imited spaee. A helium gas at atmospherie pressure was emp10yed
for the unoxidizing environment to simu1ate an extreme steam starvation
eondition.
EXPERINENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A total of 15 tests was performed in an oxidizing or unoxidizing environ-
ment ehanging energy deposition in fue1. The typiea1 temperature histories
of fue1 eenter1ine and e1adding outer surfaee measured are presented in Fig. 2.
As found in the figure, the heating rate of the e1adding is an order of 1,000
°C/s. The transient tests were generally terminated by natural eoo1ing with a
eooling rate of 35 'U 50 dC/ S • This thermal response is different from that in
LOCA's. 'However, fundamental behavior of fue1 rod damage under a severe
aeeident eondition has been obtained in the present study.
The test eonditions and major resu1ts are summarized in Tab1e 11. The
fo11owing subseetions detail the experimental resu1ts and diseuss the behavior
of fue1 rod damages.
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Tab1e 11 Summary of Test Conditions and Major Resu1ts
Energy Test Fue1 Rod Environ- Peak Mode of
Test Deposition Pre-oxide Pre- mental C1adding Fue1 Rod
No. (ca1 /g 'U02) thickness Pressurized Gas Temperature Re1ocation
(]lm) (MPa) (OC)
1 Steam 1600 '" No180 none 0.1
2 He 1800 Re1ocation
3 none Steam





6 250 "'100 0.1 Air
> 2000
7 none 7 Air 1850 '"210
8 none 0.1 He 1950
9









12 250 10 0.1 Air
13 none 0.1 He
14 30 0.1
15 1) ,3) Air 2)
Me1t-down,
220 none 0.1 '" 2000 No fracturing
Note
1) Tests for cinematographies
2) The amount of air was not enough for sufficient oxidation.
3) Water was injected after heatup.
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(1) Modes of Fuel Rod Relocation
Neither significant deformation nor melting was observed in the post-test
fuel rod which was subjected to an energy deposition of 180 cal/g'U02,
regardless of environmental gas. The peak cladding temperature was found to
be lower than the melting temperature of ß-Zircaloy. Above 210 cal/g'U02 which
resulted in cladding temperature higher than the melting temperature of ß-
Zircaloy, two types of fuel rod relocation modes were revealed: cladding
azimuthaI flow and cladding melt-down, as indicated in Table 11.
(i) AzimuthaI Flow of Cladding
In an oxidizing environment of steam, the cladding was oxidized and
azimuthaI flow of cladding was evident when the test fuel rod was subjected to
an energy deposition of 210 cal/g'U02 as seen in Test No. 3. No significant
axial flow of the cladding was observable. The post-test fuel rod appearance
is shown in Fig. 3. Peak cladding temperature was estimated from metallogra-
phies to be between the melting temperature of ß-Zircaloy and that of
oxygen-stabilized a-Zircaloy, i.e. 1850 °c and 1950 °C, respective!~. The
method of the temperature estimation has been reported elsewhere Ll/. The
cross-sections of the rod and the cladding microstructures are presented in
Fig. 4. The azimuthaI flow was apparently caused by ß-Zircaloy melting. The
solid combined oxidation layers of a-Zircaloy and Zircaloy oxide at the outer
surface are thought to have been about 100 ~m thick upon ß-Zircaloy melting,
and seem to have worked as a crucible for the melt.
Then, test fuel rods with cladding slightly pre-oxidized at the outer
surface were examined in a helium environment in Test Nos. 4 and 5 in order to
confirm the solid layer's role, as weIl as to study the fuel rod behavior under
a steam starvation condition. The test results indicated that the azimuthaI
flow occurred even in the cladding with only 15 ~m of initial oxide thickness
if the cladding temperature was between the melting temperatures of ß-Zircaloy
and a-Zircaloy. The original oxygen in the oxide phase diffuses into metallic
part of the cladding to produce oxygen-stabilized a-phase during the heatup,
therefore, the melt of ß-Zircaloy can be covered with solid a-Zircaloy layer at
the outer surface. The a-Zircaloy was as thick as approximately 100 ~m and no
oxide film was observable in the post-test fuel rod. In this case the solid a-
Zircaloy layer is presumed to have worked as a crucible.
In the next, a fuel rod with cladding previously-oxidized to almost 100 ~m
was subjected to an energy deposition of 250 cal/g'U02 in a helium environment
in Test No. 6. The azimuthaI flow occurred above the melting temperature of a-
Zircaloy. In the post-test fuel rod, the oxide layer thickness at the outer
surface was approximately 100 ~m. A small amount of air seemed to have been
included in the environmental gas of helium, therefore, the diffusion of oxygen
in the oxide phase is thought to have been compensated by the additional oxida-
tion, resulting in the same oxide layer thickness as the original one. Then,
the oxide film of about 100 ~m worked as a crucible in this case, since a-
Zircaloy was completely molten.
(ii) Melt-down of Cladding
Two types of melt-down of cladding were observed according to the velocity
of the melt-down, namely, flow-down and move-do\vu. A typical cladding flow-do\vu
was observed in Test Nos. 8 and 11 in which the test fuel rods were irradiated
in a helium environment at energy depositions of 210 cal/g'U02 and 250 cal/g'U02,
respectively. As seen in Fig. 3, the molten cladding flowed do\vu along the
rod surface and refroze in the non-heated region. Only a thin layer of
once-molten cladding remained in the heated region in contact with U02 pellets.
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The cinematography showed that the melt flowed dOlvu very fast as water does,
suggesting very low viscosity of the melt. All of the fuel pellets remained in
place during the transient, glued together by the thin layer of the melt. The
peak cladding temperature was metallurgically estimated to be between 1850 °c
and 1950 °c in Test No. 8, although the temperature higher than 1950 °c was
obvious in the very thin layer of the cladding in contact with the UOz. In
this case, no oxidation layer was observed at the outer surface, thus the melt
of S-Zircaloy flowed down. The cross-sections of the post-test fuel rod and
cladding microstructure in Test No. 8 are sholvu in Fig. 5.
In Test No. 11, the peak cladding temperature was above 1950 °C, and the
cladding was oxidized at the outer surface, since a small amount of air seemed
to have been mixed in helium. However, the thickness of the oxide layer was
estimated to be negligibly small to keep the melt within the oxide, when the
flow-dolvu was initiated just after the melting of a-Zircaloy. As can be ex-
pected from the above results, the cladding flow-down was evident when fuel
rods with the cladding previously oxidized to form oxide film of 10~30 ~m were
examined in a helium environment at an energy deposition of 250 cal/g'UOz in
Test Nos. 12 and 14. In this case, oxygen in the original oxide diffused into
the metallic region to form a-Zircaloy and the cladding temperature exceeded
the melting temperature of a-Zircaloy.
Another type of cladding melt-down was observed in Test No. 10 when the
fuel rod previously pressurized to 2 MPa I,as examined in an air to visually
observe the process of the fuel damage. Some amounts of molten cladding were
pushed out through a burst opening and moved down slowly along the outer sur-
face and froze in the non-heated region, following cladding burst. Figure 6
shows the representative pictures of flow-down process as weIl as move-down
process printed from the slow motion films. The post-test fuel rod in Test
No. 10 is shown in Fig. 3. The similar molten cladding move-down is thought to
have occurred in Test No. 7, since the fuel rod was previously pressurized to
7 MPa. As mentioned previously, the azimuthaI flow was observed in asteam,
namely, oxidizing environment. However, the cladding_melt-dolvu is also pos si-
ble in an oxidizing environment if a burst opening exists. For the same reason,
if the oxide layer breaks during the transient, the melt would come out through
the broken part of the cladding and move down along the outer surface.
The velocity of the cladding melt-dolvu and the volume of the molten-down
cladding appear to become greater with increase in temperature and decrease in
the extent of oxidation, judging from the cinematography and the post-test
examination.
(Di) Criterion for Fuel Rod Relocation
It is important to study the modes of fuel rod relocation for a postulated
LOCA-initiated severe accident, since the mode of fuel rod relocation may deter-
mine the subsequent progression of the accident. The extensive experimental '
efforts have been made in the NSRR to determine the mode of fuel rod relocation
as described in the preceeding subsections.
The test results clearly showed that the mode of fuel rod relocation was
affected strongly by
(1) energy deposition, namely, maximum cladding temperature,
(2) environment gas or pre-oxidation, namely, the extent of cladding oxidation,
and
(3) internal fuel rod pressure, namely, whether a burst opening exists or not.
The results can be summarized roughly as shown in Fig. 7. No significant
relocation was possible below the melting temperature of Zircaloy. The cladding
melting is said to be initiated at about 1300 °c by the UOz-Zircaloy reaction
Ll7. However, the solid layer is generally left outside the melt and protects
unnegligible relocation of the cladding. Therefore, the threshold temperature
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of the fuel rod relocation is thought to be the melting temperature of 'ß-
Zircaloy, independent of heating rate and environment gas. Above the melting
temperature of ß-Zircaloy, the azimuthaI cladding flow takes place if the melt
is completely covered with solid layers of approximately 100 ~m or more, since
the solid layers work as a crucible. The solid layers are Zircaloy oxide for
the temperature over 1950 oe, oxygen-stabilized a-Zircaloy and their combined
layers for temperature range of l850~1950 oe. Without significant amount of
solid layers, the cladding melt-down was observed in the experiments above the
melting temperature of Zircaloy. Minimum thickness of the solid layers to
prevent the melt-down is not obtained yet. The melt-do,Vll is possible also in
an oxidizing environment if the cladding bursts or the oxide layer is broken,
when the cladding still keeps high temperature over the melting point of
metallic Zircaloy.
In comparison with the results of the ex-reactor severe fuel damage exper-
iments performed at KfK, the fuel rod seems to be damaged more severely and the
melt-down of the cladding is likely to occur in the ex-reactor experiments. In
other words, the oxide film at the outer surface of the cladding appears to be
stronger to keep the melt within the oxide in the NSRR experiments. The dif-
ference may be agsociated with the difference in the heating rate.
No significant amount of U02 fuel relocation was observed in any of the
experiments. All of the fuel pellets were found by the cinematography to
remain in place during any of the transients, and almost all of the pellets
were in original shape in the post-test observation with an exception of frac-
turing. Metallurgically, the cladding melt, of course, included (U-rich, Zr)
metal and (U-rich, Zr) oxide in the matrix, depending on temperature, and the
U02 fuel contained apparent uranium metal and zirconium composition in some
extent. However, the amount of the U02 dissolution observed is obviously too
small to cause a significant amount of fuel pellet relocation. The peak clad-
ding temperatures attained in the present study ranged from 1600 oe to 2200 oe.
Then, a different type of the fuel rod relocation may be possible above 2400
oe, sinc~_the pseudo-binary phase diagram between a-Zircaloy and U02 developed
in KfK [2/ suggests large amount of U02 dissolution insuccessively above 2400
oe. Figure 8 shows the U02-Zircaloy reaction at the U02 / Zircaloy interface in
the meta-sample of Test No. 9. As indicated in the figure, small precipitates
of (U-rich, Zr) oxide are present in oxygen-stabilized a-Zircaloy. The concen-
tration of the precipitates changes abruptly at the dotted line superimposed in
the figure. The peak temperature was estimated metallurgically to be about
2400 oe at the interface and below 2400 oe outside the dotted line. As can be
expected from the figure, a large amount of U02 can be dissolved in the molten
cladding above 2400 oe, which might result in fuel pellet relocation.
(2) Fuel Rod'Damage upon Flooding
In a specific test of Test No. 15, water was injected just after the fuel
rod attained its maximum temperature, simulating a reflood phase to be obtained
by the delayed functioning of EeeS. The cinematography clearly showed that no
immediate quench occurred when the cladding temperature was approximately 1800
oe upon flooding. It was also found that the fuel rod was not fractured during
the transient although the molten cladding flowed down before the water injec-
tion. The post-test fuel rod was severely embrittled, then the rod was
completely broken into several pieces during the process of decapsuling arid the
broken pieces were fragmented in further smaller particles with an average
diameter of about 1 mm in the process of fuel rod handling, as ShO'Vll in Fig. 9.
These results imply that external mechanical force like hydraulic vibration
other than thermal shock or its stress is needed for fuel fracture when a fuel
rod was fixed at one side. On the other hand, fuel debris with a particle size
of about 1 mm is likely to be formed by rather small mechanical force, if a
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fue1 rod is onee heated up to the signifieant1y e1evated temperature and then
eoo1ed do~vn.
CONCLUSIONS
The major eone1usions are as fo11ows;
(1) C1adding azimutha1 f10w is evident in an oxidizing environment, un1ess
oxide film at the outer surfaee breaks or e1adding bursts. On the other
hand, e1adding me1t-down oeeurs in an unoxidizing or ineomp1ete oxidizing
environment. The oxide film break or e1adding burst resu1ts in the
e1adding me1t-down even in an oxidizing environment.
(2) The thresho1d temperature for these re1oeation is the me1ting temperature
of metallic Zirea1oy.
(3) A eertain extent of oxidation 1ayers at outer surfaee of a fue1 rod
prevents the me1t-do~vn sinee the oxidation 1ayers work as a erueib1e.
(4) The f1ow-do~vn of mo1ten e1adding is very fast as water f10ws down, whi1e
the move-down of mo1ten e1adding appears to be mueh slower.
(5) Immediate queneh or fue1 fraeture does not oeeur upon f100ding when
e1adding temperature is about 1800 °c. Externa1 meehaniea1 force is
needed for fue1 fraeture or fragmentatio~.
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Fig. 1 Schematic Arrangement of Test Section.
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Fig. 2 Typical Measured Temperature Histories of (a) Fuel Centerline







Fig. 3 Post-test Fuel Rod Appearances Showing Fuel Rod Relocation.
Once-molten ß-Zircaloy
Before Pu1sing





Fig. 4 Cross-sectional Views and Cladding Hicrostructures
in the Fuel Rod of Hhich C1adding Floued Azirrnlthally.


















Fig. 5 Cross-sectional Views and Cladding Microstructures
in the Fue1 Rod of Which C1adding Floued Doun_
(Test No. 8, 210 cal/g-U02, inHe1ium)
Fig. 6 Representative Pictures Printed fram Slow Motion Films,
Shouing a) Flow-down and b) Move-down.
(Time indicates the time after pu1sing.)
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Fig. 7 Simplified Criterion for Cladding Relocation.
Fig. 8 U02-Zircaloy Reaction at U02/Zircaloy
Interface, Showing Abrupt Change in
Amount of U02 Dissolution.
(Test No. 9, 220 cal/g'U02, in Air)
5mm
Fig. 9 Fuel Rod Fragments
after Flooding Test.
(Test No. 15,220 calh\'U02'
in Air, Water Injected)
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ABSTRACT
The ESSI-l fuel rod heatup and melting experiment was analysed by
the SSYST-EXMEL Code System. The analysis revealed good agreement
between calculations and experimental results up to the heavy bur-
ning of the Zr-H 20 reaction. During this analysis several areas
were identified, where improvements of SSYST-3 were necessary to
allow satisfactory interpretations of the NIELS-CORA melting ex-
periments. These improvements will enable the SSYST system to m0-
deI fuel rod behavior under seVere accident conditions, that is
up to about 2 500 K. The improved system SSYST-4 is under valida-
tion by recalculating several of the ESSI-experiments with special
emphasis on ESA-l.X and ESSI-4. The present paper discusses the
main improvements of SSYST and demonstrates the importance of the
new modeling by comparisons of calculated and measured data.
INTRODUCTION
The code system SSYST was originally developed in a common effort by
the University of stuttgart (IKE) and the PNS of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Re-
search center. The original purpose of the system was the detailed analysis
of fuel rods under LBLOCA conditions (maximum temperatures less than 1500 K)
/1/. An improved version of the system (SSYST-2) was made available by PNS
for the NEA data bank /2/.
Recent development of SSYST resulted in a package to perform statistic
analysis and a more detailed modeling of the zirconium oxidation process.
This version of the system is known as SSYST-3 and concludes the modeling of
LBLOCA behavior in SSYST /3/.
·Work performed under contract of Projekt Nukleare Sicherheit (PNS)
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The behavior of fuel rods in higher temperature ranges (severe fuel
damage) was originäll y investigated experimentally by Hagen /4/ and modeled
in the EXMEL system /5/. The increased interest in understanding of severe
fuel darnage resulted in the planning of series of fuel rod melting experi-
ments in the NIELs and CORA setups of Hagen. The new experiments can partly
be analysed by a combination of SSYST and EXMEL modules. This was demonstra-
ted by an analysis of the ESSI-l experiment. However, the analysis also
revealed the necessity of further improvements and adaptions of the module
system and the data acquisition. As all the previous versions, the new
system SSYST-4, uses the RSYST-l software technique /6/. The envisaged pur-
pose of SSYST-4 is to analyse single rods under LOCA- and SFD-conditions.
SSYST-4 MODULE SEQUENCE FOR SFD SIMULATION
During SFD-accidents temperatures up to 2500 Kare reached. Therefore
under SFD conditions physical effects become relevant, which had not to be
modeled in the frame of earlier SSYST vers ions. Tc simulate the behavior of
fuel rods during the heatup and melting phase presently new models which
treat these effects are added to SSYST-3 to build SSYST-4.
Besides the refinements in physical modeling adaptions of modules to
better fit geometries of the experimental setups became necessary. This will
allow a better understanding of the new experiments and also help to analyze
more precisely the qualitative experimental results.
Earlier vers ions of most of the new SSYST-4 modules have been available
as part of the EXMEL system and are now included into the SSYST-3 environ-
ment. The resulting module sequence, which used for calculation of the ESA-
1.X experiment, is shown in Fig. 1. Only a short description of the modules
will be given.
MODULE EWQUEL
The module serves to determine the spatial density of heat sources in
electrical heaters and fuel rod simulators. Measured electrical tens:on or
current can be used as input. Due to the modular concept of RSYST additional
heat sources may be added through other modules.
MODULE DEHN
The module considers radial thermal expansion effects in fuel rods
and in multi-layer rod simulators. The outermost gap is treated separately.




WALTRA2D solves the transient heat transport equation for a 2-dimensio-
nal (r,z) grid and, thus, is a generalized version of ZET-2D. The genera-
lization, necessary for modeling SFD experiments, concerns the consideration
of radiative heat transport in axial gaps, anisotropie heat conduction, and
more complex interfacing with the rest of physical models.
MODULE OXI
In a similar sense, this module is a generalized version of ZIRKOX.
Main changes are the consideration of steam starvation and of oxidation on
all free surfaces. In the case of 2-sided oxidation, which occurs in expe~i­
ments, this means simulation of 2 oxidation fronts, which may meet some-
where. Another distinguishing feature of OXI is the extension of modeling to
an arbitratry number of oxidable materials distributed over the free sur-
faces.
MODULE BOFF
This new module serves to model heat and mass transfer between oxidiz-
ing cladding and steam in a coolant channel under boil-off conditions. It is
a single-channel model, and - as typical for SFD conditions - steam velocity
is assumed to be low.
The purpose of BOFF is to model the concentration of steam and genera-
ted hydrogen in the channel near the cladding surface. Of special interest
are the phenomena of steam starvation and hydrogen blanketing, which influ-
ence decisively oxidation kinetics under SFD conditions.
The model considers convective heat transfer between channel and sur-
face and radiative heat transport between opposite surfaces. Zircaloy oxida-
tion contributes to both, the heat balance in the gas volume near a surface
and to a change of the local steam/hydrodgen concentrations. Special ver-
sions of the module exist which allow the simulation of other coolant gases
like Ar, He or oxigen.
MODULE SABAN
SABAN is a first attempt to model the formation of liquified phases,
e.g. dissolving a surface layer of UO by molten zircaloy. Also modeled is
the accompanying so-called candling, f.e. downflow of liquified rod areas
and freezing out in lower, colder zones.
Essentially, SABAN treats the liquified phase of molten Zircaloy and
dissolved fuel as being contained by a shroud of zro2 • Dissolving of the
fuel is handled, quite conveniently, as a diffusion process with appropriate
diffusion coefficients depending on temperature /5/.
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DESCRIPTION OF ESSI-l EXPERIMENT
The ESSI-l experiment is part of an out-of-pile program using electri-
cally heated fuel rod simulators. The temperature escalation was caused by
the exothermal zirealoy/steam reaetion, whose reaetion rate inereases expo-
nentally with the temperature.
Different oxide layers as a major parameter to influenee the tempera-
ture esealation were obtained by varying the heatup rates and steam exposure
times /7/. Fig. 2 shows the side cross seetion of the fuel rod simulators
with shroud and insulation. The fuel rod simulator eorresponds to German PWR
dimensions. The length of the simulator was 0.25..m. To simulate the exother-
mal reaetion energy of neighbouring rods a zirealoy shroud was instaled
around the fuel rod simulators.
To inhibit radial heat losses the simulator and shroud were surrounded
by fiber ceramie insulation eonsisting of zro 2 and A1 20 3/Si02•
preheated steam was led to the shroud through a double tube system at
the lower end of the annular ehannel surrounding the fuel rod simulator.
Temperatures on the surfaees of the rod and shroud were measured by two
color pyrometers 140 mm above the lower end of the rod.
Test ESSI-l was intended to have a minimum initial oxide thiekness and
thus the rod was heated in argon, until the surfaee temperature reached
about 2000 K. Only then steam was introdueed. The rod temperature inerease
due to the zirealoy/steam reaetion inereased the rod resistanee, whieh
caused a deereased eurrent and input power. After the reaetion stopped,
steam eooling signifieantly lowered the rod temperature, deereasing the
resistivity and thus increasing the input eurrent and power.
The ESSI-l experiment was chosen to define both further modeling and
data aquisition needs.
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CALCULATIONAL RESULT
The heatup phase was reealeulated with different mass flows in the
eireumferential flow ehannels to simulate the influenee of natural convee-
tion around the insulation. Higher mass flows led to an axial asymmetrie
temperature distribution in the fuel rod simulator. The temperature of the
rod before the esealation oeeured was also lowered significantly by this
measure /8/.
It eould be also seen from the ealeulations that the axial temperature
asymmetry is strongly influeneed by the boundary eonditions at the upper and
lower bound of the fuel rod simulator.
During the oxidation phase the distribution of vapor inflow was varied
between the two eireumferential ehannels. Vapor input only to the ehannel
between rod and Zr-shroud lead to the temperature history shown in Fig. 3,
whieh agreed best with the measured temperatures. With 10 % of the vapor
mass flow in the seeond ehannel between zr-shroud and insulation a strong
temperature inerease eould be noted. The reason is the doubling of the re-
leased oxidation energy by allowing a two-sided oxidation of the zr-shroud
to take plaee. As the rod and shroud were not preoxidized, a strong metal-
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water reaetion used all the oxigen in the lower third of the ehannel between
shroud and insulation. Loeally the temperature in the shroud raised above
the elad temperature and resulted in an inerease of elad temperature by
radiation eoupling.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ESSI-l CALCULATIONS
The following eonelusions were drawn from the ESSI-l ealeulations.
• As in earlier eomparisons /5/, good overall agreement eould be reaehed
between measured and ealeulated temperatures during the heating phase.
However, the loeal temperature history is strongly influeneed by initial
eonditions, e.g. initial temperatures, boundary eonditions, e.g. mass
flow of gas or heat flux at the upper and lower ends of both, rod and
shroud, and material properties, e.g. heat eonduetivity in the insulation.
• The temperature esealation during the oxidation phase appeared to be
limited during both, experiments and ealeulations.
• Modeling in the past did not allow a detailed explanation of the
limiting effeets. Several eoneurrent effeets were identified, whieh
have to be investigated simultaneously. To distinguish between dif-
ferent effeets, both, loeal temperatures and loeal oxigen supply have
to be modeled quite aeeurately. Therefore, a more detailed deserip-
tion of the oxidation proeess seems to be desirable only, if a re-
fined deseription of the loeal steam and H2 supply from both, a ther-
malhydraulie and a diffusion point of view is available.
As a eonsequenee from these eonelusions, a new series of experiments was
designed. It is ealled ESA-l.X. The main goal of the new experiments is to
have experiments with weIl understood and doeumented initial and boundary
eonditions and to provide a variety of measured data to further improve the
ealeulational models.
DESCRIPTION OF ESA-l.l EXPERIMENTS
The ESA-l.X experiment series was designed to take intoaeeount the
results and eonelusions, that were drawn after reealeulating the ESSI-l
experiment. The different experiments of this series are performed with
varied atmospheres. ESA-l.l used argon during the whole experiment, whereas
vapor and oxigen atmospheres are planned for further experiments.
The geometrieal design differs from that of the ESSI-l experiment. The
seeond flow ehannel was removed to supress the influenee of additional heat
sourees by oxidation, or the influenee of natural eonveetion flow in that
ehannel. The Zr-shroud is in the same position as in the ESSI-l experiment.
The insulation is in direet eontaet with the outer surfaee of the shroud.
At eonstant flow rate, argon flows at the bot tom end into the ehannel
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during the whole experiment. The flow rate as weIl as the temperature of the
heated argon was measured to have a defined flow situation. Top, bottom and
outer boundary conditions defined the temperatures of tungsten heater, clad,
shroud and insulation, which were measured during the whole experiment.
Additional temperatures were measured at different axial positions on the
shroud and clad surface as weIl as in the flow channel and in the insula-
tion. The measurements were performed using thermocouples and color pyrome-
ters.
The ESA-l.l experiment was carried out in 3 major phases. The first
phase of 6000 s with nearly no electrical power input was done to have
appropriate initial conditions. During the second phase with a duration of
approximatelly 2700 s a temperature equilibrium with clad surface tempera-
tures of 740 K was reached. In the third phase (2400 s) the electrical power
input was raised continuously from 100 to 2700 W. Selected measured tempera-
tures are shown in Fig. 4.
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CALCULATIONAL RESULTS
The recalculation of the ESA-l.l experiment was Gtarted after the first
6000 s of experiment time. Initial and boundary conditions were estimated
from measured temperatures at the boundary and in the different axial and
radial positions of the experimental facility. The energy source distribu-
tion was calculated fram the measured electrical current and the actual
temperature dependent resistance of the tungsten heater. In comparison with
the ESSI-l modeling the number of modules could be reduced, because the
module BOFF for the second channel as weIl as one heat conduction module
WALTRA2D for the separated insulation could be removed.
The consideration of the copper electrodes, which was necessary in the
ESSI-l recalculation could also be removed by considering the measured tem-
peratures at the upper and lower end of the rod simulator as boundary condi-
tions. These simplifications lead to astrang reduction of computational
costs compared to the ESSI recalculations. (problem time to computer time
was approximately 50 to 1 on a CRAY-l M).
The comparison of the calculated and measured clad and shroud tempera-
tures showed an excellent agreement as can be seen in Fig. 5. The measure-
ment points are located at an axial height of 150 rnrn. The srnall differences
during the first 1500 s of the recalculation result from presumed axial and
radial temperature distributions on rod, shroud and insulation. These tempe-
ratures might have slightly differed from the real initial conditions.
At other axial levels with measured temperatures the same good agree-
ment of clad and shroud surface temperatures was noted. A variation of mate-
rial properties of the zro
2
fiber insulation revealed a strong influence on
the temperature history. A similar effect was much weaker on the ESSI-l
recalculation, because of the decoupling of the second flow channel. Calcu-
lations with different values for the radiation emissivity were performed to
simulate the influence of varied oxidation of clad and shroud. The result
were notable changes of the surface temperatures even at the low temperatu-
res of the second phase of the experiment. The best agreement between measu-
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8ured and calculated temperatures was obtained asuming an emissivity of
nonoxidized Zr at lower temperatures changing to zro2 property at higher
temperatures.
As thefirst experiment of' the ESA-l.K aeries was done in argon atrnos-
phere no energy production by metal/water reaction occured.
As the calculations used measured temperatures as boundary conditions,
the computations could only be done as long as the therrnocouples delivered
values.
The temperature distributions in the fuel rod simulator, as weIl as in
the Zr-shroud and insulation at the end of the calculation time are snown in
Fig. 6 and 7.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ESA-l.l CALCULATIONS
• Temperature distributions during the experiment can be reproduced al-
most as accurate as the measured results. However, this requires a good
understanding of the experiment and a fairy good knowledge about initial
and boundary conditions.
• The weIl defined boundary and initial conditions in the ESA-l.l ex-
periment were also necessary to separate effects of the various pa-
rameters influencing the temperature distribution. Thus, the ESA-l.l
experiment and recalculations will be the basis to analyze ESA-l.X
experiments under oxidizing atrnospheres.
• Several effects are still not yet understood completely. They cause
differences of measured and calculated temperatures in the order of
50 K. This will be investigated further.
• An extension of the analyses to higher temperature ranges (after melt-
ing of the thermocouples at the boundaries) is in preparation.
These conclusions are also supported by calculations, which were done f"r
the ESSI-4 experiment.
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ABSTRACT
A new computer code for the analysis of BWR degraded core phenomena,
MELRPI, has been developed at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute under
sponsorshi p by Oak Ri dge Nat i ona1 Laboratory. The MELRPI code uses a
mechanistic approach to modeling such phenomena as heat transfer,
coolant thermal-llydraulics for a partially or fully uncovered core,
metal oxidation, and the meltingjrelocation of individual core
materials. The purpose of this paper is to highlight differences
between MELRPI and the MARCH code, including both the modeling
concepts and results. The TQUV BWR accident scenario was used for
the numerical comparison. It has been shown that these two codes
yield considerably different results.
INTRODUCTION
Because of substantial differences in systems design, the course of a
core meltdown accident in a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) may be considerably
different from that in a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). Consequently, the
analysis of such accidents requires computer codes specifically designed for
each reacto r type.
The most common analytical tool used in the United States for the overall
analysis of degraded core accidents in Light Water Reactors (LWRs) has been
the MARCH code. Although MARCH was originally developed for PWRs, it has also
been applied, after some modifications, to BWRs. In particular, a BWR version
of MARCHl was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Since the
original modeling concept has not been substantially changed, the BWR version
of MARCH still uses a number of simplistic, nonmechanistic models.
*Work sponsored by the Severe Accident Sequence Analysis (SASA) Program at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the Containment Systems Research
Branch at the Division of Accident Evaluation, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Resea rch.
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In order to overcome some of the deficiencies implicit in MARCH, the
MELRPI code has been developed at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. MELRPI
can be used for the analysis of the in-core phenomena during a severe BWR
accident, including core heatup, degradation and meltdown, and the release of
molten debris into the lower plenum. The various mathematical models used in
MELRPI2-4 are mechanistically-based. They account for such BWR core
components as chan ne1 boxes and crucifo rm cont ro1 rods. Al so, a new
thermal-hydraulic model for the coolant has been developed specifically for
I3WR geomet ry.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the differences between MARCH
and MELRPI, including both the modeling concepts ~nd the results obtained from
these two codes. It has been widely hypothesized that MARCH gives conserva-
tive results. This, however, has not been substantiated by comparisons with
other analytical tools. In this paper, we show various differences between
the MELRPI and MARCH results, in such core parameters as temperature and
molten mass of various materials, hydrogen production, etc.
DESCRIPTIDN DF MELRPI
The MELRPI computer code addresses a wide range of problems specific to
the BWR design and important for a realistic assessment of the consequences of
severe accidents. Abrief description of the basic modeling principles used
in the development of MELRPI is given below.
Core Noda 1i zat ion Scheme
The I3WR core geometry is modeled by using a two-dimensional, multi-
material core nodalization scheme. In the axial direction the core is divided
into a user specified number of sections. Each radial zone represents an
annulus (except for the cylindrical central zone) containing canisters, fuel
rod bundles, and control rods. The number of canisters in each zone can also
be set up by the user. Each individual radial zone is represented by an
ave rage fue 1 rod su rrounded by two sect ions of channe1 walls and a cont ro1 rod
between the adjacent zones. The two sections of channel wall in each node are
used to distinguish between the different wall temperatures at the inner and
oute r bounda ry of each radi al zone.
Core Heat Transfer
The above mentioned nodalization scheme constitutes the basis for a
two-dimensional (nodal) model for core heat transfer. Specifically, the
following modes of heat transfer are taken into account:
• Transverse Direction. Heat conduction between the fuel and cladding,
heat convect1on and radiation between the fuel rodsjchannel boxesjcontrol
b1ades and the cool ant, and the rma1 radi at ion between the fue 1 rods,
channel boxes, and control blades;
• Axial Di rection. Node-to-node heat conduction in the fuel, cladding,
channel boxes, and control rods.
Concerning the heat transfer outside the core it is assumed that the
outer sections of the channel wall in the last radial zone radiate heat to the
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core shroud, while the top and bottom nodes radiate heat to the upper and
lower vessel structures, respectively. At present, no out-of-core elements of
the reactor pressure vessel are modelled in MELRPI, thus the temperatures of
the above-mentioned structures are evaluated as follows. The core shroud and
the upper structure temperatures are taken as the minimum of the local coolant
temperature and the melting temperature of stainless steel. The coolant
temperature, in turn, is calculated as either the average steam/hydrogen
tempe ratu re in the oute rmost rad i al zone (f0 r the core sh roud), or the steam/
hydrogen mixture temperature (for the upper structures). The lower structure
is assumed equal to the saturation temperature, since it is assumed that there
is always some water left at the bottom of the lower plenum.
The overall multi-node, multi-material model for core heat transfer is
given by a system of first order differential equations for such state
variables as the: temperatures, amount of oxidized materials, and amount of
molten materials.
Coolant Thermal-Hydraulics
Because MELRPI has been developed mainly for the analysis of long-term,
slow transients, the model of coolant thermal-hydraulics is limited to the
phenomena occuring in the reactor core after the core starts uncovering. In
general, two axial core regions are considered: the single-phase/two-phase
pool, and the dry steam/hydrogen mixture region. In order to account for the
fact that individual fuel bundles are separated from one another by the
channel walls, the coolant flow and heat transfer parameters inside the
canisters, such as, the evaporation rate, void fraction, and the height of
swollen pool level, are evaluated separately for each radial zone. On the
other hand, since all radial sections of the interstitial region are
interconnected, and the amount of heat transferred into the coolant in this
region is relatively small, only one, single-phase level, is evaluated for the
enti re bypass region. In order to make MELRPI compatible with the MARCH code,
another option has also been developed, in which one time-dependent pool level
for the enti re core can be used as an input parameter.
In the submerged portion of the core, the following modes for heat
transfer are considered: single-phase natural convection, nucleate boiling,
CHF, transition boiling, and stable film boiling.
In the uncovered core region, a one dimensional model is used in modeling
the steam/hydrogen mixture flow. For a given flow rate of saturated steam at
the top of the pool, the model evaluates the superheat of the steam flowing to
the upper nodes, as well as the rates of steam consumption and hydrogen
production due to metal/water reaction. The oxidation rate for both the
cladding and canister walls is calculated in MELRPI by the ZRWATR subroutine
of MARCH. In addition, a separate model is used for stainless steel
oxidation.
Fue1 Rod Fa il ure Crite ri a
Three different fuel failure modes are considered in MELRPI. Two of them
deal with clad breach, the thi rd one is related to fuel rod slumping and
rubble bed formation. It is assumed that clad rupture occurs when the
calculated stress reaches some limiting value. A specific clad failure
mechanism depends on whether the difference between the fission gas pressure
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inside the clad tube and that of the coolant is either positive or negative.
In the case of the former a hoop stress criterion for balooning and rupture is
used, while a buckling criterion is applied for the latter. The fuel rod
slumping criterion applies when, due to zirc melting and oxidation, the
cladding wall section in any particular node is unable to support the weight
of the materials in the nodes above. As a result, the node may collapse,
forming a localized rubble bed. In MELRPI, the onset of rod slumping is
evaluated by using a beam buckling criterion.
Molten Material Relocation Model
In order to account for the relocation of molten zirc and stainless
steel, flowing over the walls of fuel rods, canisters, and control rods, a
liquid slug model is employed in MELRPI. This model evaluates such parameters
of the falling liquified material as: velocity, temperature, and freezing
rate. If the core is completely uncovered, the portion of molten material
that did not freeze reaches the.lower core support plate, and may be dropped
into the lower plenum. If the core is only partially uncovered, the molten
material is assumed to freeze instantaneously when reaching the pool level.
In either case, the thickness of the frozen crust is used to calculate the
reduction in the area for coolant flow.
Rubble Bed Model
lf the conditions for rubble bed formation are met in an arbitrary node,
the intact geometry model for this node is replaced by a rubble bed model.
MELRPI uses two basic criteria for rubble bed formation •
• the fuel slumping cMteMon,
• the quenchi ng cri te ri on, whi ch can be met when hot fue1 rod
surfaces are suddenly rewetted due to a rising pool level.
The model for a rubbl ized node is characterized by such parameters as,
the node porosity, average temperature, and mass of component materials.
It is assumed that molten materials, such as zircaloy and stainless steel, are
instantaneously released from the rubbl~zed node. The node height is a
function of the node porosity and the mass of solid components, and it can
vary with time (specifically, decrease due to melting). When the only
component in anode is U02' and it starts melting too, it is assumed that the
molten fuel fills up the pores in asolid debris. The melting process can
propagate both upwards and downwards, with the bottom of the molten fuel
region being located at the bottom of the lowest node to reach the melting
temperature of U02' When molten fuel appears in the bottom nodes of the core,
it starts leaking to the lower plenum.
RESULTS OF NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS
The MELRPI computer code was extensively tested for various accident
scenarios. The results reported in this paper have been obtained for a TQUV*
*From the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, T = transient, Q = failure of
normal feedwater system to provide core make-up water, U = failure of the HPCI
to provide core make-up water, V = failure of low pressure ECCS to provide
core make-up water.
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sequence, with stuck-open relief valve. Such a transient has been selected
for the analysis in order to compare the MELRPI calculations with those of the
MARCH code. The results obtained from an improved BWR version of MARCH were
provided by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In order to make the
two codes compatible, the input parameters to MELRPI, such as the
time-dependent system pressure, core steam inflow, and two-phase swollen level
history, were taken directly from MARCH and are plotted in Figure 1. Both
codes used the ANS curve to eval uate the decay heat power of the reactor.
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Figure 1. MARCH results used as input to MELRPI.
Two specifi c runs were made with MELRPI. In the fi rst run, the core
nodaliation scheme was identical as in MARCH (i.e., 20 axial nodes and 5
radial nodes) and so was the power distribution. In particular, a bottom-
peaked axial power distribution was assumed with the axial peaking factor of
1.19, and a dromedary shape \~as imposed in the radial di rection with the
radial peaking factor of 1.10. Calculations were made over the time period
from 0 to 70005. The calculations were stopped after fuel temperature in the
hottest node reached the melting point of U02 (assumed as 3033K). It should
be also rnentioned here that the MARCH calculations \~ere stopped after about
55005 (i.e., when 75% of the core materials were completely melted).
The second run utilized a simplified core nodalization scheme, 5 axial
and 3 radial nodes. Using the same input parameters as in the previous case,
calculations were performed until 20,0005 after the accident began. The
purpose of this run was to study the sensitivity of calculated parameters to
the nodalization scheme used, and also, to obtain long-term results without
excessive computer expense.
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The results of computer calculations for both runs, as compared with
those obtained from MARCH, areshown in Figures 2 through 6. The variations
of the fuel temperature for three different locations along the central radial
zone: bottom (axial node 1), middle (axial node 10), and top (axial node 20),'
as calculated by MELRPI (20 x 5 model), are shown in Figure 2. It is inter-
esting to note that the maximum axial fuel temperature is initially reached in
the top-most node, which gets uncovered first. This axial temperature distri-
bution eventually changes, so that the melting temperature of U02 is reached
fi rst in the central node, due to its higher decay heat generation rate. The
bottom node temperature remains below those of the central and upper nodes
because of two ma in reasons. One of them i s the noda1 decay heat gene rat ion
rate (nodal pecking factor = 0.46). The other reason has to do with radiation
heat transfer to the cold (i .e., saturation temperature) lower structures.
Next, the midplane temperature in the same radial zone is plotted in Figure 3
for two MELRPI nodalization schemes, node (10,1) for the (20 x 5) model and
node (3,1) for the (5 x 3) model, and compared with the MARCH result. As it
is seen, both models used in the MELRPI calculations yield similar results for
this particular core region. Such a conclusion is not always true, however,
as will be shown later. For both nodalization schemes, the fuel temperature
obtained from MELRPI rises faster then that from MARCH, especially after the
threshold temperature for oxidation (~1250K) is reached. Since these two
codes use the same models for oxidation heat generation, it appears that the
above mentioned difference is caused by differences in the thermal-hydraulic
modeling used in both codes. For instance, in MELRPI, the coolant temperature
in the dry region (filled with a superheated steam/hydrogen mixture) is
evaluated using mechanistic time-dependent energy and continuity equations,
while in MARCH it is calculated in a very simplistic manner. Also, it should
be noted that the MARCH calculated fuel temperature is limited to 2673K
(4352F), which is the user-supplied melting temperature for a mixture (U02'
Zr, and Zr02) of fuel rod materials, and is significantly lower than the
me1ti ng poi nt of U02' Thi s 1imitat ion has been used in MARCH because the fue1
and cladding are treated there as a lumped mass and are assumed to remain in
place with unaltered geometry until a given (user-specified) fraction of the
entire core has become molten.
A typical comparison between the coolant temperatures in the middle of
the central radial zone, obtained from MELRPI versus MARCH, is shown in Figure
4. The increase in the temperature calculated by MELRPI closely follows the
fuel temperature, including the steepening of the gradient due to the onset of
metal/water reaction. As can be seen, the coolant temperature history
obtained from MARCH is considerably different from that calculated by MELRPI.
In particular, the calculated temporary temperature decrease beginning at
about time 3600s in the MARCH results has no known physical basis. The large
decrease at time 4500s occurs because the fuel-cladding mixture is predicted
to be molten at this time; since a molten node would not actually remain in
place, a user-input switch has been positioned to cut off heat transfer from
each node whenever it becomes molten. This approach was necessary in MARCH
because there is no provision in the code for consideration of the effects of
rubble bed formation or fuel relocation I'lithin the core.
The amount of hydrogen produced in the reactor core, is shown in Figure
5. Again, a significant difference exists between the MELRPI and MARCH
calculations. The model used in MELRPI assumes that, upon melting, the
metallic zircaloy gradually drops to the bottom of the core and then is being
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Figure 4. Coolant temperature at the core center; comparison
between MELRPI and MARCH calculations.
released to the lower plenum. Hence, its oxidation is limited, and so is the
hydrogen production rate. For MARCH results, the metaljwater reaction begins
earlier because of the lumped mass approach for the fuel and cladding, which
produces higher cladding temperatures during the period when the only energy
sou rce i 5 decay heat. Once the meta1jwate r react ion begi ns, howeve r, the
lumped mass approach artificia11y restricts the cladding temperature increase,
subsequently reducing the hydrogen generation rate. This is seen in Figure 5
for the period from about 24005 to about 33005. The rate of increase of the
total amount of hydrogen established at that time remains almost constant
thereafter. The main reason for that is the assumption made in MARCH that a11
the meltiny nodes remain in place, so that the oxidation process of both solid
and molten zirc continues in each node until this node becomes completely
molten. Although the existing version of MELRPI does not calculate a certain
additional amount of hydrogen that can be produced from the moltenjfreezing
zi rc oxidation occuring at the bottom of the core and in the lower plenum, it
should not drastically change the present MELRPI results. Hence, the mass of
hydrogen, as calculated by MARCH, seems to be too conservative.
Another comparison between MELRPI and MARCH is shown in Table-l. Given
there is the accident history, described in terms of the time sequence of some
characteristic stages of core degradation and meltdown. As can be seen, the
MARCH calculations yield considerably different results from those obtained
from MELRPI. Also, substantial differences are observed betwen the two
nodalization schemes used in MELRPI. The former differences are mainly caused
by the fact that lumping a few non-uniformly heated nodes into a single node
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MElRPI (20X5) MElRPI (5X3) MARCH
Cladding Fai 1ure 1020 1940 --
Start of Zi rea 1oy Ox i dat ion 2420 2420 2748
Sta rt of Stainless Steel 2980 2980 3360
Melting
Start of Zi realoy Melting 3340 3060 3360
50% of Stainless Steel I~elted 3180 3080 3666
50% of Zirealoy Melted 3580 3220 4277
Sta rt of Zr02 Me lt i ng 6020 5860 --
Start of Fuel Melting 6740 6660 3666
10% of Fue1 Me 1ted -- 14,580 --
16% of Fuel Melted -- 20,000 --
75% of Core Materials Melted -- -- 5687
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Sol id
t=6,740s t=12,020s t=16,900s t=20,000s
Figure 6. Fuel melting progression as calculated by MELRPI, (5X3)
nodalization scheme; - reactor core center line.
As a supplement to Table 1, Figure 6 presents a schematic .of the progres-
sion of fuel melting until 20,000s, obtained from the (5 x 3) nodalization
scheme in MELRPI.
CONCLUSIONS
A comparison between the MARCH and MELRPI computer codes has been per-
formed. The results obtained show substantial differences in the predicted
course of the TQUV accident of a boiling water nuclear reactor. The MARCH
results seem to be particularly conservative in two aspects of the calcula-
tions, the progression of core meltdown and the production of hydrogen. Both
of these aspects are very important for the analysis of the overall conse-
quences of severe reactor accidents.
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IN-VESSEL HYDROGEN GENERATION ANALYSES WITH MARCH 2
Peter Cybulskis
Battelle's Columbus Laboratories
Columbus, Ohio 43201 USA
ABSTRACT
The results of MARCH 2 calculations on the dependence of hydrogen
generation during the in-vessel phase of severe reactor accidents
on various modeling assumptions are presented. The specific factors
examined include: the effective core liquifaction temperature,
assumptions regarding channel blockage on melting, meltdown model
and core slumping variations, core debris particle size and config-
uration. The overall extent of reaction is generally found to be
limited by the availability of steam for the reaction. Thus, model-
ing assumptions that lead to increased steam production during the
core overheating process lead to the prediction of enhanced extent
of reaction; model assumptions that limit steam production or the
access of steam to unoxidized cladding tend to reduce the extent of
reaction.
INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA's) of various reactor designs have in-
dicated that the accumulation and combustion of the hydrogen generated during
severe reactor accidents can result in significant threats to containment integ-
rity. The hydrogen burn that occurred during the Three Mile Island, Unit 2
(TMI-2) accident [1), while not a threat in itself, served to call attention to
the possible implications of hydrogen burning during reactor accidents. As a
result of these concerns, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
imposed requirements [2). that certain types of containment designs include hydro-
gen control systems capable of accommodating the hydrogen that may be generated
during severe reactor accidents. The magnitude of the challenges to the con-
tainment as weIl as the potential effectiveness of hydrogen control systems,
such as deliberate ignition, can be dependent on the timing, rate, and magnitude
of the hydrogen release to the containment. There is considerable controversy
regarding the extent of hydrogen generation that would be associated with acci-
dents leading to core melting and the ability to confidently predict such phe-
nomena. Some recent studies [3,4) have indicated that hydrogen mitigation
measures, such as deliberate ignition, may not be completely effective in the
event of complete core melting. This paper presents the results of aseries of
MARCH 2 [5) calculations on the dependence of hydrogen generation during the
in-vessel phase of severe reactor accidents to various assumptions regarding
the behavior of the overheated reactor core.
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BACKGROUND
The prineipal faetors that affeet the predietion of in-vessel hydrogen
generation inelude the chemieal reaetion eonstants, the availability of steam,
the surfaee area available for reaetion, and. the buildup of the reaetion pro-
duets zireonium oxide and hydrogen. The generation of signifieant amounts of
hydrogen implies that portions of the eore are heated to temperatures approaeh-
ing melting, whieh in turn implies uneovery of signifieant fraetions of the eore
for prolonged periods of time. With the initial eore geometry intaet, the sur-
face area available for reaetion is weIl defined and the amount of steam avail-
able to reaet with the overheated portions of the eore would be determined by
boiloff from the eovered portions of the eore, radiation from the uneovered and
overheated portions, and in some eases, flashing due to eontinued depressuriza-
tion of the primary system. As long as the initial eore geometry ean be assumed
to be substantially maintained, the eore thermal hydraulies (ineluding steam
generation) are believed to be reasonably predietable. The predietion of hydro-
gen generation up to this point ean be done with reasonable eonfidenee. [6]
When the initial eore geometry is distorted and lost, substantial uneertainties
arise as to the rates of steam generation as weIl as the surfaee area available
for reaetion. Fuel movement within the eore ean lead to inereased steam genera-
tion as the debris eontaets water as weIl as leading to flow blockages; the for-
mer would tend to enhance eladding oxidation while the latter would tend to
limit it. Such effeets are highly uncertain and ditfieult to prediet. After
some progression of eore melting, materials may begin to fall onto the lower
eore support struetures and into the vessel head. The manner in whieh the over-
heated core materials reloeate out of the eore region and into the bottom head
is very uncertain. The generation of steam from the interaction of the debris
with water in the bottom head can lead to the rapid oxidation of overheated but
steam-starved regions of the eore that have not slumped at that time. Also,
the unreaeted Zircaloy in the debris may undergo oxidation in the vessel bottom
head. This paper explores the effeets of a variety of modeling assumptions
during the above phases of the aeeident progression on the predieted extent of
in-vessel hydrogen generation.
MARCH 2 MODELING ASS~WTIONS
The MARCH 2 modeling of Zirealoy-steam reaetions has been previously
described. [7] Based on this work, it was eoneluded that predietion of the
overall extent of reaetion is not sensitive to the partieular rate constants
utilized, with those of Urbanic-Heidrick [8] being reeommended and utilized in
the present analyses. The buildup of high local eoncentrations of hydrogen,
while leading to appreeiable loeal effects, was found to have a small influence
on the predietion of eore-wide extent of reaetion. The availability of steam
for the reaetion together with geometry/surfaee area eonsiderations are believed
to be the most sensitive faetors affecting the predietion of in-vessel hydrogen
generations and are the main topies explored in this paper.
The MARCH code does not attempt to mechanistieally deseribe the deforma-
tion and movement of overheated and/or liquified fuel materials. Instead it
provides several simulations of possible eore damage progression scenarios to-
gether with a number of user-seleeted options regarding the effects of core
deformation on steam flow and metal-water reaetions. The particular faetors
considered in this study inelude:
1) Effeetive eore melting (liquidus) temperature, 2090-3150 K.
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2) Complete as weIl as no blockage of flow channels upon node liquifac~
tion.
3) Meltdown model and core slumping variations, including gradual (region-
wise), coherent, and node-by-node fuel slumping.
4) Debris particle sizes for interactions in the bottom head of 12.7 and
1.27 mm.
5) Homogeneous mixing of metal and oxide phases of the debris in vessel
head, as weIl as segregation of metallic Zircaloy.
ACCIDENT SCENARIO CONSIDERED
The calculations described here were performed for a pressurized water
reactor (PWR) transient accident sequence in which coolant makeup to both the
primary and secondary systems is lost and'core overheating and melting take
place at high system pressure. The timing of the events for the reference case
is given in Table I. The timing of the events through core uncovery was invari-
ant for all the cases considered; the onset of core melting and the subsequent
core slump, head dryout, and bottom head failure were found to vary somewhat



















The results of the analyses conducted·are summarized in Table 111. The ex-
tent of cladding reaction and the fraction core melted for Case 1, the reference
case, are illustrated in Figure 1. This case assumed a core liquifaction tem-
perature of 2550 K, continued metal-water reactions after melting (incomplete or
no blockage), debris particle siz~ in the bottom head of 12.7 mm , homogeneous
distribution of metal and oxide phases within the debris in the vessel head, and
utilized meltdown Model A with regionwise fuel slumping. It may be noted that
these assumptions are similar to those in the BMI-2l04 analysis. [3] From Figure
1 it can be seen that the extent of reaction increases quite rapidly after core
uncovery while steam flow through the core is relatively high; as most of the
core becomes uncovered, the steam flow decreases and the extent of reaction
levels off at about 19 percent. An abrupt increase in the extent of reaction
takes place when the melt front within the core intercepts the water level; the
energy fram the increased metal-water reaction accelerates core melting, with
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TABLE II. PREDIGTED VARIATIONS IN EVENT TIMING
Time in Minutes
Gase Start Me1t Start Slump Go11apse Vesse1 Dry
1 118.3 146.3 147.8 152.8
2 118.3 152.5 153.0 158.5
3 118.3 152.5 153.0 158.8
4 118.3 146.3 147.5 153.0
5 118.3 152.5 153.3 162.5
6 117.0 140.0 141.0 147.0
7 117.0 140.0 140.5 147.0
8 118.3 152.8 153.3 159.8
9 121.5 176.3 176.8 181.8
10 118.3 157.3. 157.8 162.0
11 121.5 156.8 157.5 163.5
12 118.3 123.8 149.8
the eriteria for initial fue1 slumping being met at 146.3 minutes. At that time,
33 pereent of the e1adding is predieted to have oxidized. The steam generation
from the interaetion of the debris with water in the vesse1 head leads to fur-
ther oxidation and heating of the eore, with eo11apse of the entire eore into
the vesse1 head predieted at 147.8 minutes. The above progression of events is
generally representative of the other eases eonsidered. The total extent of
e1adding oxidation ea1eu1ated for the referenee ease (Gase 1) is 57 pereent; of
this about 2 pereent is predieted to take p1aee within the debris in the bot tom
head.
Gase 2 is simi1ar to Gase 1, above, exeept that the e1adding oxidation in
me1ted nodes is not permitted; this is equiva1ent to assuming eomp1ete b10ekage
of the eore region upon node me1ting and no new surfaee for e1adding oxidation.
The resu1ts for Gase 2, i11ustrated in Figure 2, show somewhat lower reaetion
than the preeeding ease, but the redueed reaetion in the me1ted nodes de1ays the
onset of eore slumping and eo11apse and provides more time for reaction in the
still solid nodes. Thus, the assumption of ehanne1 b10ekage upon me1ting does
not lead to as signifieant reduetion in total oxidation as may be expeeted. In
this, as in the previous ease, 2 pereent of the total reaetion is predieted to
take p1aee in the vesse1 bottom head.
Gases 3 and 4 assume that the meta1 and oxide phases are separate in the
bottom head, thus making the unreaeted Zirea10y more aeeessible for oxidation.
The resu1ts are i11ustrated in Figures 3 and 4. In eomparing Figures 2 and 3
and Figures 1 and 4, the substantia1 inerease in the total e1adding oxidation is
assoeiated with the predieted reaetion of 21 pereent in the vesse1 head in both
eases.
Gomparison of the resu1ts for Gases 2 and 5 i11ustrates the effeet of par-
tie1e size for homogeneous debris partie1es on the extent of reaetion. Figure 5
i11ustrates the extent of reaetion for the sma11 partie1e ease; the differenees
between Figures 2 and 5 are notieeab1e but not dramatie.
Gomparison of Gases 6 and 7 i11ustrates the effeet of homogeneous ver$us
separated phases in the debris for a low assumed 1iquidus temperature. Gase 6
is noteworthy as being the one with the lowest extent of reaetion of those eon-
sidered. This low predieted reaetion is 1arge1y due to the eomblned effeets
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TABLE 111. RESULTS FOR IN-VESSEL HYDROGEN GENERATION
Fraction Clad Reacted
Conditions* Before Slump During Slump In Vessel Head Total
1) A, D, F, H, J 0.33 0.22 0.02 0.57
2) A, E, F, H, J 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.44
3) A, E, F, I, J 0.40 0.01 0.21 0.62
4) A, n, F, I, J 0.33 0.21 0.21 0.75
5) A, E, G, H, J 0.40 0.01 0.09 0.50
6) B, ·E, F, H, J 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.26
7) B, E, F, I, J 0.24 0.00 0.17 0.40
8) A, E, F, H, K 0.41 0.00 0.02 0.43
9) C, E, F, H, K 0.65 0.00 0.02 0.67
10) A, n, F, H, K 0.63 0.01 0.01 0.65
11) C, n, F, H, J 0.44 0.15 0.01 0.60
12) A, E, F, H, L 0.13 0.30 0.01 0.44
* Key to Gonditions:
A - Gore melting temperature of 2550 K.
B - Gare melting temperature of 2090 K.
G - Gore melting temperature of 3150 K.
n - Zirconium-steam reaction allowed to continue in molten nodes.
E - No zirconium-steam reaction in molten nodes.
F - Particle size in vessel head of 12.7 mm.
G - Particle size in vessel head of 1. 27 mm.
H - Homogeneous distribution of metal and oxide phases within particles in
vessel head.
I - Metallic zirconium on the outside of particles in vessel bottom head.
J - Meltdown Model A with regionwise slumping.
K- Meltdown Model A with coherent slumping.
L - Meltdown Model G.
of a low melting temperature and the assumption of complete channel blockage on
melting, with the other variables being less important.
Contrast of the results for Gases 2 and 8 illustrates the effect on the
predictions of changing from the gradual to the coherent core slumping model,
with no reaction in the molten nodes for both cases. The difference is minimal
under these assumptions. Contrast of the results for Gases land 10 illustrates
that the difference between the gradual and coherent slumping model can be appre-
ciable if oxidation is allowed to continue in the molten nodes.
Gomparison of the results for Gases 2 and 6 illustrates the effect of the
effective fue~ liquification temperature in combination with the gradual slump-
ing assumption; Gases 8 and 9 give another illustration of the effect of melting
973
SURRY TMLBl
-- FCR Fraction Clad Reacted

























0.0 00.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 100.0 1.20.0
TIME - (MINUTE)
140.0 160.0 160.0
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FIGURE 2. EXTENT OF CLADDING OXIDATION AND GORE MELTING FOR CASE 2
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FIGURE 4. EXTENT OF GLADDING OXIDATION AND CORE MELTING FOR GASE 4
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FIGURE 5. EXTENT OF CLADDING OXIDATION AND CORE MELTING FOR CASE 5
TMLB29






























FIGURE 6. EXTENT OF CLADDING OXIDATION AND CORE MELTING FOR CASE 9
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temperature in combination with the coherent slumping model. The differences in
both cases are appreciable. Comparison of the results for Cases 1 and 11 which
incorporate the gradual slumping model and allow cladding oxidation in melted
nodes, on the other hand, indicates that the results are not very sensitive to
the assumed melting point. The assumption of continued reaction in the melted
nodes dominates the results in these cases.
Figure 6 illustrates the extent of reaction for Case 9; where the assump-
tions of a high melting point, shutoff of the metal~water reaction due to channel
blockage on melting, and coherent slumping lead to relatively long times to core
collapse, thus permitting significant extent of reaction even for low steam flow
rates. Radiation from the core to the water in the bottom head provides steam
for the reaction in this case.
The results for Cases 2 and 12 contrast the gradual slumping assumptions in
MARCH meltdown Model A with the nodewise slumping inherent in meltdown Model C.
While the overall extent of reaction is essentially identical for the two cases,
it is interesting to note that for Model A most of the reaction takes place
prior to slumping, while for Model C most of the reaction is predicted to occur
during the slumping process. In both cases, the extent of reaction in the bot-
tarn head was found to be minimal, consistent with the results for a number of
other cases.
The highest extent of cladding oxidation was found for Case 4, where a sig-
nificant portion of the reaction was predicted to take place in the vessel bot-
tom head. It may be noted that comparable levels of oxidation have been seen in
specific accident analyses even without appreciable oxidation in the bottom head.
[3] Very extensive cladding oxidation is typically found for scenarios that in-
volve repeated core overheating and quenching, such as may take place if the
accumulators discharge onto a partially melted core.
CONCLUSIONS
The extent of predicted in-vessel hydrogen generation has been found to be
relatively insensitive to a wide variety of modeling assumptions regarding the
behavior of the fuel following the onset of deformation and movement. While the
results do vary with modeling assumptions, in essentially all cases considered
the predicted extent of cladding reaction was higher than 40 percent, with a
maximum of 75 percent. The lowest~extent of reaction (26 percent) occurred for
the combination of the lowest effective core melting temperature together with
the assumption of complete steam flow blockage throughout a region upon node
melting.
The use of the gradual slumping model- typically leads to the prediction of
enhanced cladding reaction due to the steam generated by the quenching of the
initial slumped portions of the core; this steam is predicted to react vigorous-
ly in flowing past the yet uncollapsed regions of the core.
The assumption of complete flow blockage in a core region upon node melting
leads to the prediction of lower overall reaction, but, with the exception noted
above, not dramatically different from assuming that oxidation continues in the
melted nodes. The shutoff of the reaction in the melted nodes slows the melt
progression and allows more time for oxidation in the unmelted nodes.
The extent of oxidation during debris interactions in the bot tom head was
generally found to be quite limited (1 or 2 percent), with large reactions re-
quiring extremely small particle sizes and/or separation of the unreacted
Zircaloy from the oxides in the debris.
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POST ACCIDENT HYDROGEN PRODUCTION AND CONTROL
IN ONTARIO HYDRO CANDU REACTORS
c. Blahnik, W.J. Dick and D.W. McKean
Ontario Hydro, Toronto, Canada
ABSTRACT
The derivation of hydrogen source terms is described for severely
degraded cooling conditions in CANDU reactors. Parameters which
influence these source terms are examined and their effects
quantified. The implications for the design of hydrogen
mitigation systems in the multi-unit containment envelope are
discussed. The maximum pressures in containment are evaluated for
the distributed ignition system aided by forced mixing.
INTRODUCTION
The mUlti-unit CANDU stations owned and operated by Ontario Hydro have
several unique design features which influence the approach taken to
post-accident hydrogen control, viz:
o a "negative pressure containment" (NPC) system [1] consisting of four
reactor vaults connected to the vacuum building via a common
fuelling/pressure relief duct;
o a large containment volume;
o a relatively low containment design pressure;
o a long-term controlled and treated venting of the containment
atmosphere following a loss of coolant accident.
The large dilution volume (on the order of 10 5m3 ) and the prov1s10n
for containment venting are ~ighly effective for long-term hydrogen
management. Consequently, any source of hydrogen which requires a
considerable time to reach flammable concentrations (such as hydrolysis or
general corrosion) need not be considered in detail. On the other hand, any
rapid sources of hydrogen which could locally and temporarily accumulate to
flammable concentrations are important, bearing in mind the relatively low
pressure loads that can be tolerated by the containment structures (in
excess of 300 kPa(a)). Thus, the need for hydrogen mitigation depends
largely on the rate and quantity of hydrogen produced by the Zircaloy/steam
reaction during the high-temperature stage of a postulated accident (calIed
the "hydrogen source term" in this paper). Parameters which influence this
source term are examined, and their implications on the design of hydrogen
mitigation systems in Ontario Hydro CANDU reactors are discussed.
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HYDROGEN PRODUCTION
In Canadian licensing environment, plant-specific hydrogen source terms
are derived using conservative analysis. The production of hydrogen is
greatest under those severely degraded cooling conditions which present
small steam flows to the fuel, sufficient to maintain the exotherrnie
metal/water reaction but insufficient to cool the fuel. In CANDU reactors,
such eonditions are associated with postulated loss-of-eoolant aecidents
(LOCA) coineident with a failure of the Emergeney Coolant Injeetion System
(ECIS). The parallel, horizontal fuel ehannels beeome completely voided in
these aeeidents on a timeseale ranging from seeonds to hours. Subsequently,
the fuel is eooled by only a small flow of steam and hydrogen supplied from
the common headers arid by heat transfer to heavy-water moderator
(Figure 1). The fuel temperature will rise in order to aeeommodate
o
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Simplified Diagram of Heat Transport Loop
rejection of decay and ehemieal reaetion-heat to these two prineipal heat
sinks. Because of the distributed heat sink provided by the moderator, the
peak fuel temperatures remain weIl below the U02 melting temperature, and
the integrity of fuel channels is maintained for all postulated LOCA's [21.
Generally, much of the fuel in the core will remain at "moderate"
temperatures throughout the aeeident and only some fuel bundles in
high-power channels will aehieve highly elevated temperatures for long
per iods of time illustrated in Figure 2.
Realistic estimates of hydrogen production are partieularly difficult
for a CANDU eore arrangement sinee the fuel in eaeh channel experienees a
unique temperature excursion, governed by its decay power level, steam flow
rate and extent of mechanieal deformation. Steam flowrates may differ
widely throughout the core due to different hydraulic resistances and
elevations of parallel fuel ehannels. The eomposition of the steam/hydrogen
mixture at the channel inlet mayaiso vary depending on the flowrate and the
loeation of post-accident water supply. There is no large reservoir of
water in the eore, and without an external supply, the production of
hydrogen would be severely limited by the lack of oxidizing reagent.
Furthermore, a range of thermal/mechanical deformations of fuel and preSsure












Temperature Transient at Hottest Bundle Position
Channel Voiding Time 40 s, Constant Steam Flow @ 10 gis Thereafter
accidents as illustrated in Figure 3. These deformations tend not only to
increase the rate of heat removal to the moderator, but also to alter the
rate of metal/water reactions by reducing the supply of steam to the
interior subchannels of fuel bundles. Detailed modßlling of each individual




Geometry Distortions in a Fuel Channel
A computer code CHAN-lI [3] was developed to analyze the various
feedback effects on fuel temperatures in a CANDU fuel channel. It
calculates the temperature transients of·the fuel, pressure tube and
calandria tube at each bundle position along the fuel channel, as a function
of channel power and steam flow rate. The latter is user-specified or it is
derived from an iterative solution by equating the input header-to-header
pressure drop to the frictional losses across the fuel channel and feeders,
taking due account of the loss characteristics of the subchannel flow paths,
and the temperature dependent thermo-physical properties affecting the
frictional losses. The code employs a concentric ring model which accounts
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for internal heat generation, convection, conduction and radiation, and heat
generated by the cladding oxidation. Various types of deformations can be
modelied in the code, including pressure tube ballooning, sagging, fuel
sheath ballooning, and fuel bundle slumping. The changes in the steam flow
pattern through a deformed location is evaluated using the parallel-pipe
approach.
A core basis hydrogen sour ce term is readily derived from individual
channel response simulations for any given accident scenario. To avoid an
unmanageable number of accident scenario simulations, a conservative source
term can be derived for the purposes of licensing analysis, by arbitrarily
choosing channel conditions which maximize the extent as weil as the rate of
metal/water reaction. Such conditions involve minimum possible fuel and
pressure tube distortions combined with small flowrates of fresh steam on
the order of 10 gis per channel (or 0.3 to 0.5 gis per fuel pin). If it is
assumed that these conditions prevail indefinitely in all fuel channels of
the core, hydrogen production becomes strictly a function of channel decay
power during the degraded cooling period, which is determined by the time of
core voiding after reactor trip.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the core voiding time on these
conservative hydrogen production estimates in a large CANDU core (480 fuel
channels, 2800 MWth). If the coolant voids from the channels within a few
seconds after the break, little of the fuel's stored energy is removed
during the blowdown. The whole core undergoes rapid heatup at elevated
system pressures which results in considerable fuel and pressure tube
distortions (illustrated at the right side of Figure 3), establishing a
relatively efficient heat rejection path from the fuel to the moderator. At
later voiding times the fuel heatup is slower, commencing from a lower
stored energy level at lower system pressures. In the absence of internal
pressure, the pressure tubes may only achieve bot tom contact with their
calandria tubes (left side of Figure 3) resulting in a lower heat removal to
the moderator. Also, the fuel elements can experience only relatively minor
distortions by sagging between the spacer supports, because considerable
oxidation strengthening of the sheaths can occur due to the slow
heatup [4). Although the production rates are more gradual for these
"delayed heatup" scenarios, the amount of hydrogen generated can be larger
than in the "early heatup" scenarios. With further delays in core voiding,
the heat removal to the moderator does not change appreciably, but the fuel
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FIGURE 4
Hydrogen Production Transients for Degraded eooling Accidents
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decay power continues to decrease. Fewer fuel bundles in the core reach
highly elevated temperatures and the residence times at temperature become
shorter. consequently, the maximum amount of hydrogen produced in an
accident decreases with increasing time to core voiding.
The large and rapid source terms associated with short core voiding
times can be reduced sUbstantially by taking into account more realistic
deformation and steam flow patterns in the core. As an example, Figure 5
compares several hydrogen generation transients for a large break with the
core voiding time of 40 seconds. The highest curve corresponds to the
licensing estimate of 110 kg moles shown previously. 1t implies that about
30 percent of the fuel cladding and end plates in the core has been
oxidized, with the largest contribution coming from the high-power fuel
channels. Recall that this estimate considers only the minimum pressure
tube and fuel deformation (by sagging), in conjunction with an indefinite
supply of optimum steam flow. Following a rapid blowdown depressurization,
the core can experience slightly elevated system pressures for aperiod of
time (caused, for example, by post-accident operation of D20 feed pumps).
The sagging of pressure tubes would then be complemented by gradual radial
expansion into a full circumferential contact with the calandria tubes.
This "ballooning" phenomenon' alone reduces the amount of hydrogen produced
to about 75 kg moles. 1f, in addition, it is recognized that the steam will
not be distributed uniformly in the complex network of parallel fuel
channels, further reductions of the source term are obtained. For example,
for an accident scenario in which the steam is driven through the core by a
low header-to-header pressure differential of 5 kPa (producing about the
same total throughput as the above case), the amount of hydrogen produced
drops to 40 kg moles. 1f slumping of thin-walled, horizontal fuel bundles
is considered, with its attendant conductive heat transfer to the moderator
ani the reduction of steam access to the interior subchannels, the hydrogen
source term reduces to about 30 kg moles.
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FIGURE 5
EHeet of Mitigating Phenomena on Hydrogen Souree Terms
For the full range of degraded cooling scenarios, the emerging trend is
toward considerably lower core source term estimates as illustrated in
Figure 6. The largest releases tend to shift towards longer core voiding
times (smaller breaks) for which limited deformations may be realistic.
However, since the requirement is for conservative analysis, the application
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of this trend in licensing and design is still some time away. A number of
experimental programs are jointly being pursued by AECL and Ontario Hydro to
verify and improve our understanding of the full and channel
thermal-mechanical-chemical behaviour at very high temperatures and thus the
source term methodology. The fuel programs range from separate effect
experiments with fuel simulators in steam (reaching temperatures weIl in
excess of 2000°C) to steam tests with full-scale fuel bundles (reaching
temperatures of about 2000·C). Some of the results are being reported in
separate papers at this conference [4)[5). The fuel channel programs have
explored the full range of deformation modes over the past several
years [6][7] and a detailed analysis of the results is now in progress.
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FIGURE 6
Hydrogen Souree Term as a Funetion of Core Voiding Time
HYDROGEN MITIGATION
In the large containment envelope of CANDU multi-unit stations, even
the highest of the preceding source terms would yield a hydrogen
concentration below the flammability limit if a homogeneous mixing could be
assured throughout the containment volume. Within the individual vaults,
effective mixing is provided by large vault coolers with a volume turnaround
time of a few minutes. However, for rapid hydrogen release transients, the
source term dilution into the adjacent vaults may not be effective. During
a post-LOCA blowdown, the steam/air mixture is vented from the accident
reactor vault into the vacuum building to relieve the containment pressure.
After the end of blowdown, when the hydrogen can be generated in the voided
core, steam in the accident vault condenses resulting in areturn flow of
air back into the accident vault. This flow tends to impede the dispersion
of hydrogen into the adjacent reactor vaults. It may persist for about an
hour, coinciding with the duration of the large hydrogen source terms
described previously. Thus, high hydrogen concentrations in air could
temporarily be present in the accident reactor vault at the end of steam
condensation per iod.
984
To avoid an inadvertent ignition at these unfavourable mixture
compositions, Ontario Hydro has opted for a distributed ignition system in
each vault (Tayco glow plugs) to provide short-term mitigation. The basic
principle is to initiate the burn as soon as the hydrogen-steam-air mixture
is ignitable, thus minimizing its consequences. The ignitors are activated
early, before the flammable mixtur es could develop in the vault. Any
mixtures with high hydrogen content will thus be burned while there is still
a significant steam content. Lean mixtures will be removed in a number of
discrete burns as the hydrogen is produced.
Over the full range of degraded cooling accidents, a wide spectrum of
mixture compositions may develop in the accident vault, depending on the
actual timing and rate of hydrogen production relative to the timing and
rate of dispersion. The number of compositions that have to be analysed can
be reduced to manageable proportions by defining an "assured ignition
criterion" shown in Figure 7. This criterion identifies hydrogen-air-steam
proportions by which the ignition will have had occurred, regardless of the
previous transient composition. It was derived from tests in small and
medium-scale vessels [8,9] which show that three conditions must be met for
the assured ignition: the hydrogen _concentration must exceed 8 percent, the
steam concentration must be below 40 percent and the air concentration must
exceed 30 percent. superimposed is the flammability limit for
hydrogen-air-steam mixtures. Should ignition occur at the flammability
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FIGURE7
Assured Ignition Criterion for Hydrogen-Air-Steam Mixtures
The maximum challenge to containment structures can be quantified from
the parametric analysis of burns along the "assured ignition" lines. The
computer code VEN~ [10] is used, which calculates the pressure and
temperature transients in spherical or cylindrical volumes. The code
assumes a spherically-shaped flame front and employs empirically-based
correlations for flame velocity as a function of mixture composition and
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turbulence. pressure relief by venting of burnt or unburnt gases into
adjacent volumes is considered. Heat transfer to structures or the
dissociation of burnt gases are neglected for conservatism.
Estimates of the peak pressure within a reactor vault obtained by such
parametric analysis are shown in Figure 8 as a function of hydrogen
concentration at the instant of ignition. If the ignition is governed by
the availability of hydrogen, (Le., previous transient conditions are such
that the ignition occurs as soon as the hydrogen concentration reaches 8%),
the peak combustion pressures range from 90 to 140 kPa(a). The variability
of the peak pressure at the constant hydrogen concentration is due to
changes in adiabatic flame temperature and flame velocity over the range of
possible mixture compositions. If the ignition is governed by steam
condensation (i.e., ignition occurs as soon as steam concentration drops to
40%), relatively high hydrogen concentrations must be present. The peak
pressure rises rapidly to about 260 kPa(a) with the increasing hydrogen
content, reaching a broad plateau around the stochiometric composition.
Should the ignition become governed by the availability of air (implying a
hydrogen-rich atmosphere which ignites when the air concentration reaches
30 percent), the peak pressure could start rising again with the increasing
hydrogen concentration. However, the amounts of hydrogen needed to yield
such rich mixtures are weIl in excess of even the most pessimistic source
term described previously.
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FIGURE 8
Peak Pressures in Reactor Vault
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On the basis of preceding results, the largest challenge to the CANDU
containment structures comes from early and fast hydrogen production
transients which allow accumulation of relatively high hydrogen
concentrations in steam-rich mixtur es within a single reactor vault. This
challenge is estimated at 260 kPa(a) using conservative models; and it is
acceptable from the standpoint of containment integrity. An experimental
program of verification of the pressure transients associated with
combustion of such mixtur es has been mounted in order to provide more
realistic estimates of the challenge. Results to date indicate that the
"assured ignition criterion" in Figure 7 is conservative (i.e., ignition is
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closer to the flammability limits) and that the current modelling of
deflagration overestimates the pressure challenge. In parallel, an
alternate mitigation system is being investigated which has the potential of
further reducing the pressure challenges at a comparable cost. As
illustrated in Figure 9, the basic concept involves the removal of hydrogen
from the accident reactor vault atmosphere by c~rculating it through a
cooler/combuster unit. The cooler condenses the steam and the hydrogen is
then burned off in a standing flame within the combuster exhaust. The
hydrogen is thus continuously removed as it is produced, unimpaired by steam











o For a large CANDU core typical of Ontario Hydro's reactors, the
hydrogen source term is less than 110 kg moles for the most severely
degraded cooling accident. The duration of hydrogen release is. about
one hour from the time of core voiding.
o A number of phenomena come into play in degraded cooling accidents,
ranging from limited or excessive supply of steam into the core,
through non-uniform distribution of steam among parallel fuel channels,
to geometry distortions within the channels. These phenomena acting
alone or in combination can substantially reduce the source term.
o In the multi-unit Negative-Pressure-Containment systems, the timing of
hydrogen release is a major consideration in the design of mitigating
systems.
o A distributed ignition system aided by forced mlxlng limits the peak
pressure loads to less than 260 kPa(a). This provides adequate
protection for containment integrity.
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ABSTRACT
Two experiments are described in which unirradiated production CANDU fuel
bundles were heated in steam to temperatures exceeding 2000°C. The
pur pose of the experiments was to impt-ove the understanding of CANDU fuel
thermal-mechanical behaviour during accidents with severely degraded
cooling) in which gross slumping of horizontal fuel 18 anticipated. The
experimental apparatus and procedure is described~ incIuding unique
aspects such as the use of an oxy-hydrogen torch to provide highly
superheated steam~ and on-line video recording of the fuel as it
experiences severe temperature excursions and distortion~ as we1l as
details of the post-test fuel examination.
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INTRODUCTIOK
Accident analysis for CANDU reactors addresses the complete raIlge of pipe
break size and Ioeation in the primary heat transport piping system. In this
analysis) coincident failure of the Ernergerlcy Coolant Injection System to
operate on demand 1s also postulated, leading ta severely degraded eore eDoling
conditions for an indefinite per iod of time. Under these circumstances decay
heat 1s rejected through the pressure tubes and calandria tubes to the cool
moderator. This paper describes experiments carried out ta improve the
understanding of the thermal-mechanical behaviour of CANDU fuel bundles
subjected to severely degraded eDoling conditions.
The CANDU reaetor eore consists of about 400 fuel channels which contain
the high pressure coo1ant and the fuel. The fuel consists of 0.5 m 10ng bllnd1es
lying end-to-end within each 10 cm diameter pressure tube. The bundles are made
up of 37 U02/zircaloy clad fuel elements which are spaced from each other and
the pressure tube by end plates. spacers and bearing pads.
The individual fuel channel design allows geometrically representative,
integrated experiments to be performed with a simple and compact apparatus
employing a single fuel bundle.
TEST DESCRIPTION
A single unirradiated production CANDU fuel bundl~ was placed inside a
test section pressure tube and heated by highly superheated steam from a torch
fed with a stoichiometric ratio of hydrogen and oxygen • The torch provided up
to 9 gis of steam while producing 120 kW of power. The torch steam is mixed
with cooler plant steam (100°C) to allow control of total steam flow and
temperature. Instrumentation in the tests inc1udes steam flow measurement,
on-line hydrogen monitors, an emmissivity-insensitive optical pyrometer and
platinum-rhodium thermocoup1es for meas\lring fuel cladding temperatures, and
video cameras which record bundle deformation during eaeh test.
The external heating method in these tests might be expected to cause the
sheaths to be hotter than the fuel. This 1s not true for the reactor ease with
deeay power heating when the sheath is at a lower temperature (less than
1500°C). However. at higher temperatures (greater than 1600°C) external
sheath heating wou1d oeeur in reactor when the Zirealoy oxidiation reaetion
becomes the dominant heat source.
Two experiments were conducted, eaeh with test conditions representing an
extreme in the spectrum of degraded eooling aeeident scenarios. In the first
experiment, designated HTBS-001. the bundle was contained in a tight-fitting,
insulated shroud t to minimize distortion and radial heat lass. This geometry i5
an approximation of that within apressure tube whieh does not deforrn
significant1y during the accident. A sehematic of the apparatus is shown in
Figure 1. The eonditions in HTBS-002 were representative of accident scenarios
(1,2) in which the fuel and pressure tube heat up while the system pressure,
although rapidly decreasing. is still high enough to cause the hot pressure
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tube to strain in~o ful1 circumferential contact with its calandria tube. This
establishes an f;:ffective heat transfer path to the moderator, which ma.intains
the presslIre tube/calandria tube at low temperatures (about 20QoC) and allows
steam to bypass the bundle. In HTBS-002) the bundle was contained in a seetion
of Zr-2.5% Nb pressure tube, which had been strained radially 18 percent such
that il wO\11d fully conta~t the calandria tube. This provided greater clearance
for the bundle to deforrn under its own weight. Minor apparatus modifications
were made prior to the second test, to enablp. the upstream end plate to be
directly viewed by the optical pyrometer and video camera. The outside of the
pressure tube was cooled witll plant steam, however) its temperature was kept
relatively high, between 600'C and 1200'C, to ensure high fuel temperatures
wouJd be achieved. For this test the bundle temperature was stabilized between
800'C - 1200'C before being subjected to 9 gIs of steam from the torch at
1800'C - 2000'C. A schematic "f the apparlitus used for HTBS-002 is shown in
Figure 2.
OBSERVATIONS
Figures 3 and 4 show the post-test appearance of the bundle used in
HTBS-OOl after it had been carefully removed from the test section. Figures
and 6 compare views of the upstream end of the bundle be fore and after the
test. Cross-sections of the bundle nesr the upstream end and at the mid-plane
are shown in Figures 7 and 8. Typieal temperature and hydrogen evolution
transients are plotted in Figure 9. The maximum recorded temperature in
HTBS-OOl was 1700°C. However) there is indirect evidence which indicates that
the upstream portions of the bundle, where th~re was no temperatul;"e
instrumentation~ reached at least 2000°C.
The major observations from HTBS-OOl are as foliows:
(a) A clear flow path remained through the bundle. Many of the triangular flow
subchannels) particu1arly those surrounding the centre fuel pin) became
blocked;
(b) Oxidation cliused the bundle to become very brittle and fragile (the outer
two rings of fuel sheaths were oxidized over their ful1 original
thickness) while the inner element sheaths had partially reacted with
U0
2
during heatup and therefore the remliining oxide layer was thinner);
(c) Most of the up&tream end plate and some of the upstream end caps became
detached, exposing bare U0
2
pellets;
(d) Molten U/Zr eutectic formed in regions where the Zircaloy had not fully
oxidized during heatup but did not relocate during the test;
(e) Yellow and black deposits were observed on the oxidized cladding, with the
yellowish deposits appearing to emanate from the exposed U0
2
pellets
(analysis showed that U and Zr were the major constituents of the
deposits) with Zircaloy al10ying materials comprising the roinor
constituents);
(f) Additional deposits, primarily U0 2 and Zr, were found downstream of the
test bundle and on the condenser filter;
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(g) The olu ratio inereased from the initial value of 2.0 to a maximum of 2.2
in the upstream exposed pellets.
Tt was evident from the observed temperature transients and the post-test
appearance of the bundle that peak fuel temperatures significantly exceeded the
steam inlet temperature) due to heat generation from the Zircaloy-steam
reaction.
Temperatures and hydrogen evolution for HTBS-002 are shown in Figure 10.
The maximum recorded temperature was 2010°C. The pre-test and post-test
appearance of the upstream end of the bundle as weIl as bundle cross sections
is shown in Figures 11 to 14.
The observations from HTBS-002 are similar to those from HTBS-001, except
that only the inner rings of fuel elements of the upstream third of the bundle
reached temperatures above lS00°C) probably due to steam bypassing and heat
lasses through the pressure tube. Even so) there was slumping in the hotter
regions) with the auter elements sagging downward and outward to contact the
pressure tube.
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions drawn from the two high temperature bundle sag experiments
conducted to date are:
(a) The experimental technique captures the major phenomena expected in
severely degraded cooling accidents~ particularly the rapid temperature
excursions produced by the Zircaloy-steam reaetion.
(b) Under degraded eooling conditiöns in CANDU bundles, significant coolant
flow area will remain in the channel, either in the large square
subchannels or in the area above the bundle provided by expansion of the
pressure tube ancl/or slumping of the bundle. However, some subchannel
blockage~ particularly of triangular subchannels~ will occur if fuel
sheath ternperatures approach 2000°C.
(c) In accidents with temperature ramp rates and peak temperatures similar to
those of these experiments, there will be little formation of molten
matertal) and virtual1y no relocation of this molten material.
(d) Severe temperature exeursions in steam resu1t in a 10ss of fuel sheath
integrity~ and partial 10ss of end cap and end plate integrity due to
oxidation~ allowing the bundle to settle either during or after the
temperature excursion if it is not external1y restrained.
(e) Uranium and zirconturn particulates will be carried and deposited
downstream during degraded cooling conditions. In HTBS-OOl approximately
0.5% of the bund1e mass was carried downstrearn to the condenser.
These conclusions~ particularly those relating to geometry~ are important
to accident analysis of CANDU's (3~4) because they indicate the nature of the
steam flow patterns and heat transfer to be expected during degraded cooling.
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The results of these and future experiments will be fed back inta the analysis.
to ensure it conservatively accounts for the phenomena observed during these
simulated degraded cooling tests.
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FIGURE 3: HTBS-OOl POST-TEST APPEARANCE, PLAN VIEW
FIGURE 4: HTBS-OOl POST-TEST APPEARANCE, SIOE VIEW
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HTBS-OOl
FIGURE 5: PRE-TEST UPSTREAM VIEW FIGURE 6: POST-TEST UPSTREAM VIEW
FIGURE 7: POST-TEST UPSTREAM SECTION
(47 mm)
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FIG .10 TEHPERATURE AND HYDROGEN PRODUCTION
HISTORIES ( HTBS-OO 2 ).
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HTBS-002
FIGURE 11: PRE-TEST UPSTREAM VIEW FIGURE 12: POST-TEST UPSTREAM VIEW
FIGURE 13: POST-TEST SECTION UPSTREAM
END (47 mm)
FIGURE 14: POST-TEST SECTION
MID-PLANE (250 mm)
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ABSTRACT
An ana1ytica1 model was deve10ped to study suspension sett1ing of
mixtures having t~ particle species of unequal densities and of
different sizes. The model predictions of the settling mode l'ere
in good agreement with the resu1ts of sett1ing experiments. The
model predictions of the composition of nuc1ear debris beds of UO z
and zircaloy partic1es shol'ed that these beds may have a single
1ayer of mixed particles or may have two layers: a mixed layer
at the bottom and top layer composed of either zirca10y particles
or UO z partic1es.
INTRODUCTION
Determining the composition of debris beds that may form during a
severe core damage accident in a nuc1ear reactor is important for post-
accident heat removal. If a severe core damage accident in a Light Water
Reactor (LWR) were to occur, the fue1 rods may disintegrate and the UO z fue1
and zirca10y c1adding fragments could settle through a column of water
coolant and form debris beds on availab1e horizontal surfaces in the core.
These beds could be severa1 meters thick and ~u1d consist of a spectrum of
particle sizes (a few microns to severa1 millimeters) and shapes. Debris
beds could also form in a Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) core
fo11owing a hypothetical core meltdown accident. The molten fuel and stee1
cladding cou1d fragment upon mixing with sodium coolant and form debris
beds. The decay heat removal from such beds is important because inadequate
cooling .could cause a section of the bed to reach a temperature high enough
to me1t the partic1es and to thermally attack the supporting structures of
low melting point stain1ess steel. In general, the coolability of core
debris beds strongly depends on the morphology and size of partic1es, as
l'e1l as on the composition of the beds [1-4].
The objectives of this ~rk l'ere to: (a) develop an analytica1 sett1ing
model for suspension settling of mixtures of t~ partic1e species of unequal
densities and of different sizes; and (b) apply the model to the settling of
mixtures of UO z and zirca10y particles through water. The composition of
the UOZ-Zr particle beds was predicted as a function of the initial partic1e
concentration, and as a function of the vo1ume ratio and the size ratio of
zirca10y to UO z particles in the water before sett1ing.
1000
SETTLING MODEL
Recently, Lockett and Bassoon [5] have shown that the slip velocity for





(1)V = Vo (1- L:i i i=l





and Pc L: bt (aiPi) (3)i=l
Equation (1) is based on Richardson and Zaki's correlation for the effective
settling velocity of spherical particles [6] from a homogeneous suspension.
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) accounts for the
effect on the settling of particles of the increased drag due to the prox-
imity of other particles in the suspension. The value of the index, n, was
given as [7]:
n = 4.65 + 19.5(D/Dt ) Re < 0.2
n = 4.36 + 17.6(D /D ) Re-0 •03 0.2 < Re < 1p t
n = 4.45 Re-O•1 1 < Re < 500
n = 2.39 500 < Re < 7000 (4)
Equation (1) is also applicable to nonspherical particles although the
index, n, has a greater value [6,8]. For fine particles (4 to 7 wn in
diameter), the index, n, is equal to 10.5 [7] and for millimeter-sized
particles and creeping flow (Re< 0.1), the index, n, varies in value from
5.4 for cubics to 5.8 for angular particles [8].
In experimenting with the sedimentation of a binary mixt ure of spheres
of different materials but of the same free-falling velocity, Richardson and
Meikle [7] observed that the composition of the sediment strongly depends on
the initial concentration of the particles in the suspension. (See Figure
1a.) When the concentration of the particles was less than 8 percent by
volume, the sediment had two distinct layers: (1) a bottom 1ayer of mixed
partic1es and (2) an upper 1ayer of light partic1es on1y (mode 1). AB the
concentration of partic1es increased above 8 percent, three distinct 1ayers
were identified in the sediment: (1) only dense partic1es at the bottom,
(2) a mixture of both partic1es in the middle, and (3) light particles a10ne
at the top (mode 2). At concentrations above 15 percent, complete segrega-
tion between the two partic1e species was achieved (mode 3). These settling
modes were confirmed 1ater by Smith and Phillips [9] who experimented with
suspensions of two species of particles of different sizes and unequal
densities.
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Lockett and Bassoon have recently studied the settling of two particle
species of different sizes and the same density in a diluted suspension
(mode 1). This paper extends Lockett and Bassoon's [5] work to the settling
of two particle species of different sizes and unequal densities. Unlike
Lockett and Bassoon's model [5] which is limited only to mode 1, the present
model can predict any of the three settling modes (that is, mode 1, mode 2,
and mode 3).
Model Development
Consider a homogeneous suspension of N distinct particle species where
settling of particles and dis placement of host fluid occur only in the
vertical direction. In the settling column, just after settling commences,
the number of the settling zones depends on the settling mode of the
sediment: N zones for mode 1 and N+1 zones for both mode 2 and mode 3. (See
Figures 1 and 2.) The composition in the Nth zone in all settling modes is
the same as the initial suspension. However, the composition of the zone
N+1 of mode 2 differs from that of mode 3. In the zone immediately below
the clear zone, (N=l) only light (slower) particles will be present. The
interface between any two subsequent zones moves with the velocity of the
dense (or the fastest) particle species in the zone immediately below the
interface.
The slip velocity of a particle speeies, i, in zone k (where zones are
numbered from zone k = 1 immediately below the elear zone and i = 1 is the
light (or slowest) particle speeies) ean be given as [5]
(
k )n.-2
Vik = Vo i 1 - L: aik ~ ,
i=l
and in terms of the particle and fluid fluxes in zone k as
k










For a settling column that is closed at its base, the conservation of mass
in zone k gives
o (9)
Substituting equations (6) and (9) into equation (5) and summing the results
over all particle species in zone k gives:
(10)




Equation (10) ean be used to obtain the f1uxes of the partie1e speeies
in eaeh of the sett1ing zones; there are k equations for zone k where k <
N. In mode 1, the number of zones equa1s the number of partie1e speeies in
the system. However, in modes 2 and 3, there is an additional zone (N+1)
immediate1y above the sediment. In this zone there are N and N - 1
equations for partie1e f1uxes in mode 2 and in mode 3, respeetive1y. (See
Figure 2.)
Sinee ~ik = Vikaik' equation (10) ean be rewritten in terms of the
sett1ing velocity of the partie1e speeies i in zone k as
(13)
The eontinuity equation of speeies i aeross the boundary between
zones k and k - 1 gives
(14)
where Vkk is the velocity of the interface. For examp1e, VII and V22 are
the veloeities of the boundary between the e1ear zone and the first zone
and between the first and seeond zones, respeetive1y.
For the sett1ing of two partie1e speeies of unequal sizes and densi-
ties, equations (5) through (14) were used to obtain expressions for the
partie1e f1uxes and for the ve10eities of the boundaries between sett1ing
zones. For simp1ieity, it was assumed that the volume eoneentration of eaeh
partie1e speeies in a given settling zone is uniform throughout the zone.
However, in reality, partiele eoneentrations ean vary with height. The
settling eolumn eonsists of two zones for settling mode 1, and of three
zones in modes 2 and 3. (See Figure 2.)
Zone 1 (k = 1) in All Three Settling Modes--Beeause there is only partic1e 1
in zone 1, equation (7) was redueed to:
V01 vO l (1 - an) (15)
equation (5) v01 (1
n1
(16)to Vll - an)
and equation (14) in zone 1 to VII
(V12 - V22 )a12 + V22 (17)a ll
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Eliminating VII between equation (16) and (17) yields
o . (18)
Equation (18) was used to determine the volume fraetion, all' in zone 1.
Then VII was found by substituting the volume fraetion, all' in either
equation (16) or (17). Expressions for the veloeities V12 and V22 of parti-
eie 1 and partiele 2 in zone 2, respeetively, are derived in the following
seetion. The flux of speeies 1 in zone 1 ean be given from equation (10)
as:
(19)
Zone 2 (k = 2) in All Three Settling Modes--In this zone the two partiele
speeies are both present and the volume fluxes for the light (partiele 1)
and dense (partiele 2) speeies are given, respeetively, as:
(20)
and ~22 (21)
The veloeities of partieles 1 and of partiele 2 in zone 2 are




Zone 3 (k = 3) in Settling Mode 3--In this zone only dense partieles are
present beeause they settle mueh faster than light partieles. The volume
flux of partiele speeies 2 (dense partieles) was given as:
(24)
and the settling veloeity
(25)




Zone 3 (k = 3) in Settling Mode 2--In mode 2, the dense partieles settle
faster than light partieles. However, the veloeity differential is smaller
than in mode 3. Thus, eomplete separation of the two partiele speeies does
not oeeur in zone 3 immediately above the sediment. In this zone the light
partieles are displaeed by the dense partieles so that the net fluid flow is
zero [9].
h3 + ~23 = 0 • (27 )
To solve for ~13 and ~23' an additional equation for ~13 was developed
below. The settling veloeities of light and dense partieles, V13 and V23 in




+ b + e (28)V13 a13
a3)
~23 Uz -2+0.4
+ b - e (29)V23
= - = Vo (1 - a3)
a23 3
where a3 = (a13 + a23)' The quantity 0.4 was added to the exponent (ni -2)
in equation (5) at the suggestion of Mirza and Riehardson [10]. They found
that using the exponent 1.6 instead of 2 produeed 'good agreement with exper-
imental results at high partiele eoneentration. Also, the eoeffieients b
and e were introdueed to aeeount for the exeess drag on the settling of
partieles due to the high partiele eoneentration in this zone. A limiting
ease in zone 3, mode 2 is that the volume flux of light partieles beeomes
equal to zero when the density of the mixture beeomes equal to the density
of the light partieles (that is, a13 » a23):
~13 = 0 , when Pe = Pl
In this ease, eoneentration of partiele 1 in this zone 3 is
Pl - EPf - (1 - E)P2
Pl - P2
Substituting equatons (30) and (31) into equations (28) and (29) gives:






The veloeity of V2+3 of the boundary between zone 2 and zone 3 in mode
2 ean be given as:
(34)
The rising veloeities of the different layers in that sediment ean be
given as follows:
(a) Mixed partiele sediment in settling modes 1 and 2
where a2
(35)
(b) Light partiele sediment in settling modes 1 and 2
( e) Light partiele sediment in settling mode 3
~l3
uPl al3




COMPARISON OF MODEL WITH EXPERIMENTS
The governing equations (15), (17), (18-27), (31), and (33) were solved
simultaneously to ealeulate the volume fraetion and the fluxes of the two
partiele speeies in the different settling zones. The rising veloeity of
the sediment and the settling veloeities of the partiele species were
ealeulated through use of equations (35-38). These veloeities were then used
to ealeulate the heights of the settling zones as well as the thieknesses of
the partiele layers in the sediment as funetions of time. Ultimately, the
eomposition of the sediment and the mode of settling were determined. The
settling mode was determined as follows:
(a) If the settling veloeity of light partieles (partieles 1) in zone 2
(V12 ) was negative, but greater in magnitude than the rising veloeity of
the dense partieles (UP2)' then mode 3 will result. In this ease, the light
particles will be moving upward faster than the sediment of dense partieles
is rising; so no light partieles ean be trapped in the sediment until all
the dense partieles have settled.
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(b) If the rising velocity of the sediment of dense particles in mode 2
was approximately'zero, and the rising velocity of the mixed 'zone (UP1+2)
was not 'zero, then mode 1 will occur.
(c) If both UP2 and UP1+2 (in mode 2) are not 'zero, then the settling
mode 2 will occur.
The rising velocity of each particle layer in the sediment was taken to
be constant throughout the sedimentation process. For simplicity, the
porosity of the different particle layers in the sediment was assumed uni-
form and equal to 0.4. Practically, the porosity will vary with the srze
and the morphology of the particles [2], as Wlll as with the composition of
the particle layer. Ho wever , when the porosity was taken as 0.3 instead of
0.4, there was no change in the predicted settling mode or the relative
height of the particle layers in the sediment, but rather in the total
height of the sediment.
In tables I through IV, the model predictions of the settling mode were
compared with the experimental results of Smith and Philips [9]. As shown
in table I, ~len the particle si:ze ratio WlS 0.98, there was excellent
agreement between the model predictions and the experiments in all cases.
In table 11, where the particle srze ratio was 1.08, the correct settling
mode waspredicted in 19 out of 22 experiments. However, Wlen the partic1e
srze ratio was 2.60 and 4.31, the agreement between the model and the
experiments occurred only in 12 out of 20 experiments (table 111), and two
out of four experiments (table IV), respectively. Smith and Philips did not
report the total height and thicknesses of different layers of the sedi-
ment. The va1ues 1isted in tables I through IV were ca1culated using two
methods. In the first method, the height of sediment l~S determined by
adding up the thicknesses of particle layers ca1culated by the model; and in
the second method, the height was determined by assuming a uniform porosity
0.40 in the sediment.
In summary, the settling model predictions of the sediment composition
were in excellent agreement with experimental results when the particle srze
ratio was < 1.08. When the srze ratio 6f the two particle species was 2.41
and 4.31, the agrement between the model and the experimental results
occurred on1y in about 50 percent of the cases. Such disagreement could
have been caused by an error in identifying the settling mode experimen-
tally. Additionally, increasing the srze ratio of the particle species in
the suspension could have resu1ted in a mixed flow condition in the settling
column, a creep f10w from small particles, and a transition or turbulent
flow from large particles. These mixed flow con4itions cou1d be partially
responsible for the disagreement betWeen the present settling model,
developed mainly for creep flow, and some of the experiments that used
particle species with a large srze ratio.
APPLICATION TO POST-ACCIDENT HEAT REMOVAL
The settling model was applied to the settling from a suspension of UOZ
and 'zircaloy partic1es. The height of the settling lIRter column was taken
as 2.5 meters, and srzes of UOZ and 'zirca10y partic1es varied from 10 to
104 Jlm. The following assumpt!ons Wlre made: (1) UO Z and 'zircaloy
particles Wlre in a homogeneous suspension in lIRter initially at 300°C
before settling; (2) creep flow prevailed during particle settling, (3)
porosity of sediment was uniform and equal to 0.40; (4) the support struc-
ture on which the particle bed formed was impermeable; and (5) lateral
mixing of the particle species was negligible.
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Figures 3 through 5 present the predicted composition of core debris
bed as a function of the stze ratio and of the volume ratio of 'zircaloy to
U02 particles. As shown in Figure 3, the sediment of the core debris gener-
ally had tw) distinct layers: a layer of mixed U02 and 'zircaloy particles
at the bottom; and a top layer of either 'zircaloy or U02 particles, except
when the particle stze ratio (Dzr/Du02) was equal to a critical value. (See
Figure 6.) As shown in Figure 6, the'critical particle stze ratio increased
as the total volumetrie concentration of the particles and/or the volume
ratio of 'zircaloy to U02 particles in the suspension (Vzr/VU02) increased.
At the critical particle stze ratio, the effective settling velocity of the
'zircaloy particle ~s equal to that of U0 2 particles. This produced a sedi-
ment that only had a single layer of mixed U02 and 'zircaloy particles. When
the particle syze ratio was smaller than the critical value (for example,
DZr « DUO~' U02 particles settled faster than 'zircaloy particles. This
dissimilarity in particle syzes produced a top layer of 'zircaloy alone. (See
Figure 4.) The thickness of this layer, Wiich was smaller than the total
height of the debris bed, decreased as (Dzr/Du02) increased or as (Vzr/Du02)
decreased. On the other hand, when the particle stze ratio was higher than
the critical ratio (for example, D
U02
« DZr )' U02 particles settled more
slowly than 'zircaloy particles, thus producing a top layer of only U0 2 par-
ticles. (See Figure 5.) Unlike the top layer of 'zircaloy particles, the top
U02 particle layer increased in thickness as (DZr /DU02
) increased or as
(Vzr/VU02) decreased.
SU~n1aRY AND CONCLUSIONS
This research developed a model for the settling from suspension of two
particle species of different srzes and unequal densities, including sediment
buildup. The thickness and the composition of various layers of sediment
(that is, the settling mode) can be predicted. The model predictions of the
modes of settling (modes 1, 2, or 3) were in excellent agreement with exper-
imental results Wien the particle syze ratio was < 1.08; Wien the stze ratio
was 2.60 and 4.31, the agreement occurred in only about 50 percent of the
caaes.
The settling model was used to predict the composition of nuclear
debris beds of U02 and 'zircaloy particles, settling through water. Calcu1a-
tions showed that the sediment may have either a single layer of mixed
particles or may have two layers: a mixed layer at the bottom and a top
layer of 'zircaloy particles or U02 particles. The exact composition and the
relative thickness of these layers in the debris beds depend on the initial
concentration of U02 and 'zircaloy particles in the suspension as weIl as on
the volume ratio and the srze ratio of 'zircaloy to U02 particles. These
results may be applied to actual nuclear reactor accident conditions where
lateral mixing of particle species is limited and the height of the settling
water column is quite deep. The present model can also be used to predict
the composition of debris beds (mainly U02 and stainless steel particles)
forming in a liquid metal fast breeder reactor following a hypothetical core
meltdown accident. Future research shou1d include a study of the effects on
the dryout power limits of various compositions of debris beds. Such limits
could differ appreciably from limits previously detected in beds of single
type particles. Additionally, investigate the effects on the bed composition
of lateral mixing of particle species during settling.
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NOMENCLATURE
f parameter [equation (10)]
Re Reyno1ds number (p v D /~ )
f 0 P f
Up rising velocity of sediment (em/see)
V = effeetive sett1ing velocity of the boundary between zones or partiele
speeies (em/see)
Vo terminal velocity of a spheriea1 partiele (em/see)
Vo modified terminal velocity [equation (6)]
Y parameter [equation (7)]
Greek letters
vo1ume fraetion of a partie1e speeies in suspension
effeetive partie1e volume fraetion [equation (30)]
volume fraetion of the partie1es in the sediment
= dynamie viseosity (poise)
volumetrie partie1e f1ux (em/see)
density (g/em3)
density of suspension (g/em3) [equation (9)]
Subseripts
f = liquid in settling eo1umn
i ith'partie1e speeies
k sett1ing zone or number of partie1e speeies
ik partie1e speeies i in sett1ing zone k
s = solid sphere
1 slower or light partie1e speeies
2 faster or dense partie1e speeies
1+2 mixed partieles
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Table I
Comparison of the Settling Model with Suspension Settling
Experiments (particle size ratio = 0.98)
Settl1n9 colurm: fluid'" glycerol j height '" 76 cmj inner dIameter" 6 .97 cm
Pf = 1.1405 9/em' Pp, = 1.4093 9/em' 0p, = 0.0577 em
Pp, = 1.1877 9/em' IJf = 0.0875 poise 0P, = 0.059 em
(VOP/VO
L)* = 5.95
Size r,tto = o.as
o ume
--
Total Fractton C,leulated llel9ht of L,yers (em) C' leu1a led IIe 19h t Sett11n9 HodeConcentra tfon of Sediment (em)
of P,rtieles 'of Part1cles Dense Mixed li9ht tPredleted Observed1 to 2 P,rlieles P,rtieles Part1cles Hethod 1. Hethod 2
0.250 0 10.06 2.71 12.77 1 1
0.10 0.500 0 7.37 5.40 12.77 12.77 1 1
0.750 0 4.70 8.07 12.77 1 1 -
0.250 0 20.11 5.44 25.55 1 1
0.20 0.500 0 14.72 10.82 25. &1 25.55 1 1
0.750 0 9.33 16.22 25.55 1 1
0.250 0 30.46 7.86 )8.32 1 1
0.30 0.500 0 22.42 15.90 38.32 38.32 1 1
0.750 0 14.27 24.05 38.32 1 1
0.250 0 41.85 9.24 51.09 1 1
0.40 0.500 0 31.46 19.63 51.09 51.09 I 1
0.750 0 20.49 30.60 51.09 I 1
*The ratio of free fall1ng ve1ocl1;y of dense p,rtlele to th,t of li9ht partieie .
.;, Predicted by the model.
~tAssun1in9 a homogeneous porosity of 0.405 in the sediment.
Table II
Comparison of the Settling Model with Suspension Settling
Experiments (particle size ratio = 1.08)
Settl tn9 eolum: flutd = 9lyeerol; lIet9ht • 76 eml
Pf • 1.255 9/em' Pp, = 2.96 9/em'
Pp, • 1.4093 9/em' Ur • 0.0 polse
tnner dIameter = 6.97 em
o • 0.059 em
P.
0p, • 0.0517 em
(Vo°/YOl)* = 9.50
Slze r.tlo = 1.00
Tot.l Volume C.leulated IIelght or l.yers (ern) C.leul. ted lIe fgh t
Conccntr,ation fr.etfan of Sediment (em) Settllng 1I0de
or p..tleles or p.rtlelos OCllse Illxed light Predle ted OlJscrvad1 to 2 P.rtleles P.rtle1es Partleles ~d I llethodL'
-0:10---- 0.500 0.37 ----r.55 -ii:iiS- 2.71-12.17 ----r- --2--
0:li3-- ----o..fg- IDI~ ,9.16--- --2-- -2--0.16 0.667 0.31 7.09 11. 70
--1U~
19.16 2 2
0.25 0.69 Iß.9J~ ----r- '--2--
0.20 0.60 0.63 13.12 11.09 25.51 26.55 2 2




0.25 0.400 0.61 19.20 11.90 JI.93 2 2
0.000 O.JO 0.25 23.30 31.93 ----~ 20.!6r- 0.00 Jr,w-
lrg~
30.31- - -
O.JO 0.JJ3 0.02 25.61 JO.JI JO.JI 2 2
0.03J 0.30 0.91' 20.99 30.31 2 2
---0.161 0.90 J7.29 ~4;r~71 2 J
0.J5 0.429 0.92 26.25 17.53 44.10 44.11 2 2
0.03J 0.45 10.64 JJ.62 44.71 2 2
0.260 \,00 ~ lO:6i -5f:ij9 ----r- --2--
0.40 0.500 1.0J 21.J5 22.71 51.09 51.09 2 2
0.760 0.7J 16.13 34.23 51.09 --- 2 2
0.45 0.222 -.-:m- 4T.J9~ -WO 57.40 --2-- --3--
O~~ 1.09 29.26 21.12 57.47 2 2
0.60 0.200 0.09 ~:~~ 4U~
6J.Ol 63.07
--2-- --3--
0.000 0.61 63.07 2 2
The ratio of free-falllng ve octty of dense p,rtle e to that 0 lIght p.rttele.
-ttPredi eted by mode 1.
Assumfng a homogeneous porosity of 0.405 in the sediment.
1012
Table Irr
Comparison of the Settling Model with Suspension Settling
Experiments (particle size ratio = 2.60)
Settllng Celum: fluid = vlyeerol; helght = 76 em; Inner diameier = 6.97 em
Pf = 1.255 g/em' Pp, = 2.96 g/em' 0Pl = 0.059 em
Pp, = 1,4093 v/em' flf = 8.0 poise 0p, • 0.0227 em
(VOO/VO
L)* = 1.6~
Size ratlo = 2.60
Tolal .volume Caleulated lIeight of Layers (em) Caleula led lIelgh I Seltling.HedeConcentratton Fraetten of Sed Imen t (em)of Partieles Dense Hlxed LIghtof Parlfcles 1 to 2 Partic1es Parlle1es Partleles Helh~.<W2 I'elhed 2' Predtc ted
Observed
O. 0 0.500 8.24 .24 3,29 ~77 12.77 2 2
0.15 0.333 12.7ß 0 6.38 !9~ 19.16 3 20.667 7.$ 2.25 9.35 19.16 2 2
0.20
0,250 19.16 0 6.38 25.s;r- 25.55 3 20.750 6.73 4.40 H.~l 25.&1 2 2
0.200 25.55 0 6.30 31.93 3 --3--
0.25 0.400 19.16 0 12.77 31.93 31.93 3 2
0.800 6.48 5,75 19.70 31.93 2 2
------o.T67 31.93 0 6.39 38.32 3 3
0,30 0.333 25.55 0 12. .77 30.32 38.32 3 2
0.033 6.64 6.51 25.17 38.32 2 2
~:m
38.31 0 ~ ~4. 71 3 3
0.35 25.&1 0 19.16 44.70 44.71 3 2
0.057 7.14 6.76 30.00 44.70 2 2
0.250
~U~
0 12.77 5! .09 3 3
0.40 0.500 0 25;&1 51.09 51.09 3 2
0.750 12.77 0 38.32 51.09 3 2
0,45 O. 5 • 0 0 6.30 57 .~O 57 .~O 3
-'-3--
0.222 44.72 0 12.76 57.-18 . 3 3
0.50 0.000 2.77 0 5 .09 63.86 . 63.0] 3 ~-
*The ratlo of free·falltng veloclty of dense partle)e to that ef l1ghl partfcle.
1Predl eted 'by Ihe mode 1.
2Assumtng 5 homogeneous porostty of 0.405 in the sediment.
Table IV
Comparison of the Settling Model with Suspension Settling
Experiments (particle size ratio = 4.31)
Settling eolum: fluid' glyeeroll helght· 76 em; inner diameter = 6.97 em
Pf' 1.154 g/em' Pp, .' 2.96 g/em' Dp1 • 0.0415 em




Total oume Caleulated Hetght or Layers (em) Caleulated lIetghtfraetten Settl1n flode
Coneentratton of Parttc1es Dense Hlxed LIght or Sedlmen t (em)or Partieles 1 to 2 Partleles Partle1es Partle1es Helhod 1 Helhod 2 Predle ted
Observed
0.20 0.500 20.74 1.24 3.57 25.55 25.55 2 2
0.30 0.167 31.93 0 6.39 38.32 38.32 3 2
0.286 31.93 0 l2.7ß 44.71 3 2
0.35 44.71
0.714 21. 76 11.18 11.77 44.71 2 2
*The ratto of free-falling veloct~ of dense partlc1e to that of l1ght parttele.
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MIXTURE OF ZIRCAlOY
ANO U0 2 PARTIClES
VOLUME RATIO OF ZIRCALOY TO U0 2 PARTIClES
Vt., IVU02
o 2: 1
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DIAMETER RATIO OF ZIRCAlOY TO U0 2 PARTIClES (Oz,/Ou0 2)
Figure 3. Th~ composition of debris beds as a function of size
ratio and volume ratio of zircaloy to UOz particles.
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VOLUME RATIO OF ZIRCALOY TO U0:2 PARTICLES
Figure 4. The thickness of debris beds as a function of the
total particle concentration at a volume ratio of
zircaloy to UOz particles for (DZ/D/
uOz
) less



























0.25 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.0
VOLUME RATIO OF ZIRCALOY TO U02 PARTICLES
Figure 5. The debris bed thickness as a function of the total
particle concentration at a volume ratio of zircaloy
particle to UOz particles for (O.Z /OUO ) greater




































VOLUME RATIO OF ZIRCALOY TO U0 2 PARTICLES
Figure 6. CrHical size ratio of zircaloy to UOz particles
as a function of volume ratio of zircaloy to UOz
particles and particleconcentration.
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL REACTION OF ZIRCALOY TUBING
WITH OXYGEN AND UO Z AND ITS MODELING
P. HofmannI) , H.J. Neitzel Z)
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe




Federal Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
Under severe fuel damage conditions a combined external and interna1
oxidation of the fuel rod cladding occurs due to areaction with
steam on the outside surface and the UOZ fuel on the inside surface.
These reactions result in the formation of oxygen-stabilized a-Zr(O)
phases, ZrOz and a (U,Zr) alloy. The reaction kinetics have been
studied with both isothermal and transient temperature experiments
above 8000 C. The tests were performed using short LWR fuel rod sec-
tions in an (Ar + Z5 Vol.% 0Z) environment. The numerical model
PECLOX has been developed which solves the Fick and Stefan equations.
It predicts the formation, growth, and disappearance of the various
interaction layers and the corresponding oxygen profiles as functions
of temperature and time.
INTRODUCTION
In hypothetical light water reactor (LRW) accidents, nuclear fuel rods may
be subjected to very high temperatures for periods sufficient to cause severe
fuel damage (SFD). A wide variety of scenarios can be postulated in which SFD
may occur at an essentially unchanged high coolant pressure or at low pressure
conditions.
since Zircaloy-4 (Zry) is thermodynamically unstable with respect to HZO
and UOZ the ~ladding can react chemically with the oxygen of the steam and the
fuel. A quantitative description of the combined HZO/Zry and UOz/Zry chemical
interaction as a function of temperature and time is needed to predict LWR
fuel rod behavior in SFD accidents. For this reason extensive out-of-pile
UOZ/Zry reaction experiments have been performed. The results under inert gas
conditions are published in /I,Z/, and the results with an oxidizing environ-
ment are described in this paper.
The present work describes the results of out-of-pile annealing experi-
ments with LWR fuel rod sections conducted from 800 to 17000 C in an oxidizing
atmosphere (Ar + Z5 Vol.% OZ) under isothermal and transient temperature con-
ditions, with an external overpressure of about 40 bar and annealing times of
I to 150 min. In addition, a numerical computer model has been developed which
is able to predict the extent of the chemical interactions.
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The modeling of the combined internal and external cladding interactions
resulted in the numerical model PECLOX (pellet cladding oxidation). PECLOX
solves the Fick and Stefan equations. It-Predicts the for;ation, growth, and
disappearance of the various interaction layers and the corresponding oxygen
profiles as a function of temperature and time. The external oxidation of Zry
cladding due to the interaction with the steam has been extensively studied and
described in models. However, the u02/Zry interaction has not yet been satis-
factorily described in models, especially for transient temperature conditions
and also not for combined internal and external cladding oxidation.
The first attempt to model the complex U02/Zry chemical interaction was
made by Cronenberg and El-Genk /3/.They derived an oxygen diffusion model
which solves a two-media problem with a moving boundary in Zry due to the
alpha-beta phase change. In this analysis substantial simplifications were made
since not all experimentally observed interaction layers were considered.
Olander /4/ developed a sophisticated model that accounts for the formation
and growth of all three interaction layers between the U02 and the Zry~ The
kinetics of the process are governed by diffusion of oxygen, uranium and
zirconium. However, the application of the theoretical model is limited
since the necessary kinetic and thermodynamic data are not all available.
Denis and Garcia /5/ developed an analytical model which solves the oxygen
diffusion problem in all the phases which form due to U02/Zry interaction,
without taking into account uranium and zirconium diffusion. The main goal
of this model was to determine the temperature-dependent oxygen diffusion
coefficients in the various U02/Zry interaction layers and the oxygen con-
centrations at the interfaces; these data are used in the PECLOX calculations.
All the models /3,4,5/ attempt only to simulate the kinetics of the
system during the first stages of the process when all the interface move-
ments obey parabolic rate laws (infinite systems). The model PECLOX has
been developed to calculate the external and internal cladding oxidation
for constant and transient temperature conditions up to complete Zry oxi-
dation.
EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND CONDUCT
The out-of-pile U02/Zry reaction experiments were performed in an ,(Ar +
25 Vol.% 02) gas mixture with short cladding tube specimens filled with stoi-
chiometric high-density U02 pellets in the high temperature/high pressure
autoclave apparatus MONA /1,2/. The specimens were 100 mm long with an out-
side diameter of 10.75 mm and a wall thickness of 0.72 mm. The chemical compo-
sition of the fuel and cladding are given in /1,2/. The specimen is contained
in a high pressure vessel and inductively heated, with the cladding as the
susceptor. The experiment conduct is described in detail in /1,2/.
EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Due to oxygen uptake by the Zry cladding from reaction with gaseous oxygen
on the outside and from reaction with U02 on the inside, oxygen-stabilized
a-Zr(O) phases, Zr02 and a (U,Zr) alloy formed. The sequence of the various
phases at all temperatures is from the inside:
* the (U,Zr) alloy within the a-Zr(O)a layer is mainly concentrated at the
grain boundaries
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Figure I shows the sequence of the external and internaI interaction
layers. The a-Zr(O) layers which form at the inside and the a-Zr(O) layer
which form at the outside grow into the cladding at roughly the same rates.
Moreover, due to the elevated oxygen potential (oxygen partial pressure) of
the gas mixture or steam compared to stoichiometric UOZ' a ZrOz layer also
forms on the external cladding surface. Results obtained at 1020 and 13000 C
are presented in figure 2, with the thickness of the reaction zones plotted
versus It. With increasing time the ß-phase of the cladding disappears due to
oxygen uptake and transformation into a-Zr(O). The growth of the various
layers as functions of temperature and time and the increase in fuel rod
diameter due to the formation of Zr02 are evident. The time required to com-
pletely convert the ß-Zry region in the center of the cladding to a-Zr(O)
is strongly temperature dependent. After the disappearance of the ß-phase,
the oxidized cladding tube is completely embrittled, and no longer mechani-
cally stable. Minor forces acting during cooldown or subsequent handling
cause the fuel rod sections to break apart. Since embrittlement of the clad-
ding occurs as a result of the formation of a-Zr(O) the interna I oxidation
contributes to approximately the same extent as the external oxidation. For
this reason embrittlement of the cladding occurs about four times faster than
by one-sided oxidation alone.
The U02/Zry interaction can only continue until oxygen saturation is
reached in all the a-Zr(O) phases. The UOZ/Zry interaction can not proceed be-
yond oxygen saturation of the a-Zr(O) due to insufficient oxygen potential
of the stoichiometric fuel, therefore, Zr02 will not torm on the cladding
inside surface. However, the high oxygen potential of the outside environ-
ment (oxygen, steam) results in the formation of a Zr02 layer on the cladding
outside surface. IVhen oxygen saturation in the combined a-Zr(O) layer is
reached, the initially formed metallic (U,Zr) layer is converted to a (U,Zr)02
mixed oxide solid solution. The final stable reaction products of the com-
bined cladding interactions are Zr02 and (U,Zr)OZ'
A comparison of the total reaction zone growth rate equation for the
U02/Zry, 0z/Zry, and HZO/Zry reaction are shown in figure 3. Note that the
total u02/Zry growth rate curve overlaps the steam/Zry region (results of
six investigations) above about 1100oC. That is, the u02/Zry reaction occurs
as rapidly as the steam/Zry reaction above about II00oC. The total growth
rate curve for the 02/Zry gas mixture lies partly within the steam/Zry re-
gion. For this reason, the (Ar + 25 Vol.% 02) gas mixture can be used to
simulate a steam environment.
MODELING RESULTS
The numerical model PECLOX is based on the fact that the chemical pro-
cesses for the internal and external oxidation of the cladding are controlled
by the oxygen diffusion in the pellet and in the cladding. Therefore the pri-
mary objective of the model is to calculate the temperature- and time-depen-
dent oxygen concentration profiles in the various reaction layers as weIl as
the movement of the interfaces between the individual reaction layers.
PECLOX solves Fick's two laws for the diffusion process in the different
layers and the Stefan equation for the interface movement (figure 4). Because
the diffusion process of the internaioxidation is effectiveup to the center
of the pellet a cylindrical coordinate system was chosen. The model also takes
into account the swelling/shrinking effects of the fuel rod due to density
changes at the interfaces. Furthermore, PECLOX has an option for a limited
oxygen flux on the outer cladding boundary, for example due to steam star-
vation in the coolant channel. The temperature transient and radial tempera-
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ture profile has to be given as input from an experiment or another computer
model. Because the temperature is not constant with time and space in a SFD
accident and because of the finite geometry of the fuel rod, the differen-
tial equations must be solved numerically. Because of its simplicity, the ex-
plicit integration method was chosen. Astability criterion for the integra-
tion time step must therefore be fullfilled. To decrease the computer time
a mesh size profile for each phase is applied, i.e. small radial steps close
to the interfaces and larger radial steps in the middle of the phase.
As pointed out in reference /4/, in the case of the internal interaction
the growth of the (U,Zr) phase cannot be calculated by oxygen diffusion. In
agreement with experimental results /I,Z/, in the PECLOX model it is assumed
that the inner boundary of the (U,Zr) phase stays at the same location and
that its thickness is about 15% of the [~-Zr(O)a + (U,Zr)]-phase thickness.
This causes oxygen flux differences at the boundaries of the (U,Zr) phase to
be determined by the assumed interface movement. At all other interfaces their
movement is a result of the Fick and Stefanequations. Since the (U,Zr) phase
is very thin compared to the other phases, it is of minor importance that the
metal diffusion (U and Zr; similar to /4/) required for the growth of the (U,Zr)
phase is not considered in the PECLOX model. For the [~-Zr(O)a + (U,Zr)] phase
with channels of the (U,Zr) alloy at the ~-Zr(O)a grain boundaries an effective
oxygen diffusion coefficient was taken from reference /5/.
First calculations were performed by the PECLOX model to calculate the
one sided pellet/cladding interaction and the combined inner and outer chemi-
cal attacks of the cladding. Figure 5 is a three dimensional plot of the
radial oxygen concentration profile versus time for the one sided chemical
pellet/cladding interaction at 15000 C under inert gas condition. Each curve
is an oxygen concentration profile for a given time; the time step from
curve to curve is Z.5 minutes. One can see the evolution of the different
reaction phases e.g. the disappearance of the (ß-Zry) phase and the flux of
oxygen from the pellet into the cladding region generating the ~-Zr(O) phases.
Figure 6 shows a comparison of calculated interface movements with experi-
mental data. Due to the density change, especially at the interface between
the (U,Zr) alloy and a-Zr(O)b phase, the rod diameter shrinks with time.
Figures 7a, 7b and 8 show the calculated oxygen concentration profiles
and interface movements for the combined inner and outer cladding tube inter-
action at 1I00oC under oxidizing conditions. Figure 7 shows, beside the
oxygen concentration profiles, the radial location of the interfaces and the
phase thicknesses at different reaction times. Figure 8 is a graph of the
phase boundaries movement versus time in a square root scale. The compari-
son with experimental data shows good agreement with the model only at small
reaction times. An explanation could be that a radial and time dependent tem-
perature profile existed in the fuel rod during the experiment, and that the
measured temperature refers to the outer cladding surface. In the experiment
the rod was heated by inductive coupling with the metal region of· the cladding,
and no thermal insulation of the rod existed. Therefore a large temperature
difference is developed with time over the growing ZrOz-phase with a lower tem-
perature at the outer ZrOZ surface. However, when a time-dependent temperature
difference in the ZrOZ layer is assumed (0 K at 0 seconds linearly increasing
up to 100 K at 4000 seconds, and then held constant at .100 K thereafter), the
resulting agreement between experiment and model calculations is better ex-
cept for the thickness of the [a-Zr(O)a + (U,Zr)] layer.
Figure 9 is a fictitious example of a calculated combined inner and outer
cladding oxidation with increasing temperature up to very high temperatures.
For this calculation the unavoidable temperature escalation, which takes place
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due to the exothermic steam/Zry reaction after a temperature of about 15000 C
has been exceeded, was not considered. One can see the final total oxidation
of the cladding to Zr02 and the strong non parabolic interface movements.
Future work will be directed toward a systematic model verification using
various experimental data sets, the model implementation into the LWR code
system SSYST and the application to SFD conditions. Furthermore a model impro-
vement is planned with respect to steam starvation and hydrogen blanketing
conditions on the external cladding tube surface.
SU}ll1ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
- The external steam/Zircaloy or oxygen/Zircaloy and internal u02/Zircaloy
chemical interactions in LWR fuel rods under SFD conditions result in the
formation of following reaction layers at all temperatures examined.
[U02+u]+[a-Zr(0)a + (U,Zr)]+(U,Zr)alloy +ß-Zry +a-Zr(0)+Zr02
- The growth of the reaction layers initially obeys a parabolic rate law;
The diffusion of oxygen into the cladding is the rate-determining step.
After some time, the growth rate of the various phases increases due to
the finite cladding wall thickness.
- The u02/Zircaloy reaction occurs as rapidly as the steam/Zircaloy and (Ar +
25 Vol.% 02)/Zircaloy reaction. The (Ar + 25 Vol.% 02) gas mixture can be
used to simulate the steam environment.
- Oxygen uptake by the Zircaloy causes the cladding to become embrittled. Due
to the ,combined external and internal cladding oxidation the embrittlement
of Zircaloy tubing occurs about four times faster than oxidation from either
surface alone.
- since the oxygen potential (partial pressure) of the steam or the (Ar +
25 Vol.% 02) gas mixture is higher than that of the UO the final stable
reaction product is Zr02' The initially metallic (u,ZrY alloy will be con-
ver ted into a (U,Zr)02 mixed oxide phase.
- On the basis of oxygen diffusion with moving interfaces, the numerical com-
puter model PECLOX can calculate the chemical processes of the external steam
(oxygen)/Zircaloy and internal U02/Zircaloy interaction.
- PECLOX is able to calculate the concentration profiles in the various inter-
action layers as weil as the movement of the interfaces as function of tem-
perature and time up to the total oxidation of the cladding. Time-dependent
temperature profiles can be taken into account for the model calculations.
- First calculations show a reasonable agreement with experimental data with
respect to reaction layer thicknesses and cladding diameter changes.
- Further improvements on the material properties (oxygen diffusion coeffi-
cients in the various interaction layers oxygen concentrations at the
interfaces and densities of the interaction layers) are needed to get a
better agreement between calculation and experiment.
1020
ACKNOHLEDGEHENT
He would like to thank Prof. Dr. I,. Dienst, Dr. D.L. Hagrman, and
Dr. R.R. Hobbins for their critical and thorough review of the manuscript.
He also gratefully acknowledge the helpful discussions with Dr. E.A. Garcia,
Hr. S. Halang, Dr. R. Heyder, and Dr. M. Reimann in developing the PECLOX
model, and the assistance of Mr. G. Gausmann in performing ,and evaluating the
experiments, and of Mr. H. Metzger in performing the metallographie investi-
gations. The work ,.,as sponsored by the "Proj ekt Nukleare Sicherheit" at the
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK) and was performed within the coopera-
tion agreement between the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomico (CNEA) and
the KfK in the field of "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy".
LITERATURE
/1/ P. Hofmann, D.K. Kerwin-Peck; U02/Zry Chemieal Interactions and Reaction
Kinetics from 1000 to 17000 C under Isothermal Conditions. KfK 3552 (1983)
/2/ P. Hofmann, D.K. Kerwin-Peck; U02/Zry Chemical Interactions under 1so-
thermal and Transient Temperature Conditions. J. of Nucl. Mat. 124 (1984)
80-119
/3/ A.H. Cronenberg, ~I.S. El-Genk; An Assessment of Oxygen Diffusion during
U02-Zircaloy Interaction. J. of Nucl. Mat. 78 (1978) 390-407
/4/ D.R. Olander; The U02/Zry-Chemical 1nteractions. J. of Nucl. Mat. 115
(1983) 271-285
/5/ A. Denis, E.A. Garcia; A Model to Describe the Interaction between U02










Figure 1: Sequence of the external oxygen/Zircaloy-4and internal U02/Zircaloy-4
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Figure 2: Oxygen/Zircaloy-4 and UO?/Zircaloy-4 reaction zone thicknesses versus
time at I0200 C (left figüre) and 13000 C.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the growth rate equations for the steam/Zircaloy-4,
U02/Zircaloy-4, and oxygen/Zircaloy-4 reactions.
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Figure 4: Theoretical basis of PECLOX model: Fick and Stefan equations.
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Figure 5: Oxygen concentration profile. of a UOZ/Zir-
caloy-4 diffusion couple versus radial 10-
cation and time at 15000 C under inert gas
conditions.
Figure 6: Thickness of the reaction zones versus time
(interface movements) of a UOZ/Zircaloy-4
diffusion couple at 15000 C under inert gas
conditions.
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Figure 7: Oxygen concentration profile versus radial location of a u02/Zirca~
loy-4 diffusion couple at Iloooe under oxidizing conditions (Ar +


















Figure 8: Thickness of the reaction zones versus time (interface movements) of
a U02/Zircaloy-4 diffusion couple at 1I00oe under oxidizing conditions















































Figure 9: Thickness of the reaction zones versus time (interface movements)
of a UOZ/Zircaloy-4 diffusion couple under fictitious transient
temperature conditions (0.4 K/s) in an oxidizing atmosphere (in
reality an uncontrolled temperature escalation will take place
at about 15000C).
1026
SIMULATION OF THE INTERACTION BET\~EN URANIUM DIOXIDE AND ZIRCALOY
A. Denis and E.A. Garcia
Centro Atomico Constituyentes, Comision'Nacional de Energ!a Atomica
Avda. deI Libertador 8250, 1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina
ABSTRACT
The code solves the oxygen diffusion equations of the five phases
formed during the U02/Zircaloy interaction, using an implicit
finite difference method with parabolic interpolation at the in-
terfaces. Uranium and Zirconium mass conservation are considered.
The .code gives a good simulation of the experimental results for
isothermal conditions.
BACKGROUND
The calculation code is based on a previously developed model (I). The
hypothesis are:
- oxygen diffusion controls the rate of phase growth
- infinite system
- interface movements obey parabolic rate laws
- density changes are not considered
- Uranium and Zirconium balance at the interfaces are not considered
THE INFINITE SYSTEM ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
The model results (fig. I) in the determination of:
- oxygen diffusion coefficients in the five phases
- oxygen concentration at phase boundaries
- oxygen concentration profile
THE INFINITE SYSTEM, NU}ffiRICAL SOLUTION, HITO CODE
The code simulates the U02/Zircaloy interaction as a high temperature
~xidation (HITO) of Zircaloy in contact with solid U02' The-code results in
the determination of:
oxygen concentration in the five phases as a function of time
- disappearance of certain phases.
INSTABILITY OF THE INTERFACE (U,Zr)/a-Zr(O)
The model (I) solution corresponds to metastable equilibrium of s3
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The numerical solution becomes instable: S3 accelerates forward or backwards
and phase a-Zr(O)a or (U,Zr) respectively, disappears.
It may be shown by virtual displacements that the instability has physical
nature, fig. 2.
The interface accelerates in the same sense as the virtual displacement.




j +oo ( )-00 Cu x,t dx = 0
to keep the system consistent with the oxygen mass balance at S3' the concen-
tration C6 is allowed to change.with time. With these assumptions the code
gives a good simulation of the experimental results (2) for isothermal condi-
tions, .fig. 3. The errors introduced by the code are relatively small (lower
than 0.9%), fig. 4.
FINITE SYSTEM, ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
Experiments performed in an inert environment (2) show that the cladding
radius decreases as the reaction progr~sses. Zirconium mass conservation must
be considered:
d +00
dt j CZr (x,t) dx = 0
and a convective term must be consequently included in the diffusion equation.
A new analytical solution is found.
FINITE SYSTEM, NUMERICAL SOLUTION
The numerical solution for the finite system is achieved by employing the
HITO code together with the analytical solution just described. This numerical
solution is similar in every respects to that in fig. I with the only differences
that: Zirconium rigid displacement and a new moving interface (Zry/Argon), with
zero oxygen flux through it, are considered. Interface positions as functions
of time are shown in figs. 5-10 for two coordinate systems:
a) fixed to the initial position of s2, and
b) distances measured from SI; this enables the comparison of numerical
with experimental results reported in (2).
The oxygen concentration profiles at 13000 C for different times are shown in
figs. 11-12.
CONCLUSIONS
The simplified model (I) and the HITO code seem to give a good description
of the experimental results. However, the results for 15000 c are less satisfac-
tory than for 13000 C oi 1100oC. The reason is that the input data have certain
error due to a large dispersion of the experimental.data (2). For example at
15000 C the phase (U,Zr) tend to disappear in the experimental Arrhenius plot,
but this is not true in the kinetic plots for this temperature.
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Future work
- the HITO code will be extended to seven phases in order to consider
external oxidation.
- the HITO code will be tested during temperature transients.
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FIG. 4 INFINITE SYSTEM,
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FIG. 7 HITO CODE FINITE SYSTEM.
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FIG. 9 HITO CODE FINITE SYSTEM.
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FIG. 10 HITO CODE FINITE SYSTEM.
INTERFACE POSITIONS ORDINATES ORIGIN 51
1034
===================================CNEA==========~
FIG. 11 HITO CODE FINITE SYSTEM.
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FIG. 12 HITO CODE FINITE SYSTEM.
OXYGEN CONCENTRATION PROFILE,
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High Temperature Phase Relations in the U-Zr-O System
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Introduction
The first investigations ofthe phase stability relations in the ternary
U-Zr-O systemwere performed by Saller and coworkers /1/, who proposed
three tentative isothermal sections at temperatures up to ~II00oC. Further
investigations were performed by Politis /2/ to determine the melt and
phase equilibria at higher temperatures. The results obtained relate to the
isothermal sections at 1000, 1500 and ZOOOoC and the quasibinary section
between UO Z and oxygen-saturated a-Zr, which was designated Zr(O). As
shown by these experiments, the most important features of the ternary
system up to 15000 C are the existence of a large central three-phase-
region (UOZ+a-Zr(O)+y-U/ß-Zr or melt) and a quasibinary join between UOZ
and a-Zr(O). With regard to the UOZ-Zr interaction these results explain
the observed ternary corrosion reactiop by which uranium oxide is re-
duced partially to metallic uranium as long as zirconium is not saturated
with oxygen. However, the occurrence of a sandwiched (U,Zr) alloy between
two a-Zr(O) layers which had been observed in the UOZ/Zircaloy inter-
action tests /3/ could not be explained in terms of the ternary system
without assuming complicated diffusion paths. The necessity to resume the
investigations in this ternary system resulted from the current in-
vestigations being performed in the area of severe fuel damage (SFD).
In particular, to interpret the results of uOZ/Zry chemical interac-
tion tests, it was necessary to extend the equilibria examinations
between 1500 and ZOOOoC. Thepurpose of the renewed tests is, first,
to clarify the contradictions between the ternary iso thermal sections
and the temperature-concentration diagram of the quasibinary join
a-Zr(O)-UO
Z
in the earlier work /Z/, as well as the determination of
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the liquidus curves in isothermal steps between 1500 and 2000oC. If
possible, investigations concerning the occurrence of the (U,Zr) alloy
layer between two a-Zr(O) layers should also be performed in order to
examine whether this configuration can be thermodynamically explained,
for example by the existence of a miscibility gap in the ternary a-Zr(O)
region, as it has been supposed /4/.
Experimental methods
The specimens Were fabricated from homogeneous powder mixtures of U0 2. o '
Zr02. o and Zr. Tungsten, thoria and zirconia were used as crucible
materials. Isothermal annealing experiments, high temperature differen-
tial thermal analyses (DTA) and optical measurements of the melting
temperatures were performed in argon atmosphere. The agreement between
the results from the DTA and pyrometer measurements of the melting
temperatures lies within the measurement uncertainty. Identification




The quasibinary join Zr(0)-U0
2
Oxygen-stabilized a-Zr exhibits a wide homogeneous region with a tem-
perature-dependent oxygen saturation concentration (at the eutectic tem-
perature, the maximum oxygen solubility is ~34 at %, at 1500oC: ~31 at %
/5,6/). Therefore, on the Zr-rich side of the Zr(0)-U0
2
diagram, the
oxygen concentration should be chosen low enough to get a quasibinary
system. For the revised diagram (Fig. 1), the oxygen-concentration in
a-Zr(O) was fixed at 30 at % (in /2/: 34 at %). In the earlier work /2/
there was a noticeable inconsistency between the diagram of this subsystem
and the ternary isothermal sections, concerning the liquidus curve of the
two-phase region (U,Zr)02_x+L at the Zr-rich side. In the ternary iso-
thermal section at 20000 C this curve cuts the join U0
2
-Zr(0) at ~26 at %


















C lies at ~8 mol %U02 (~ 15 at % Uo.3300.67)' From the results
of this work, the temperature of the eutectic (18400C in /2/) is about
60
0
C higher than the earlier result. It has been measured by differential
thermal analysis of a specimen containing 15 mol % U0
2
(Fig. 2), as weIl
as by optical observation with a pyrometer. The new eutectic temperature
of ~19000C agrees with the a-Zr(0)-Zr0
2
eutectic temperature of the
binary system Zr-O, measured by Domagala /7/ and Gebhardt /5/, whereas
...
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Fig. 2: Differential thermal analysis of a specimen containing (in
mol %) 85 Zr(0)-15U02, showing the eutectic temperature byan endothermic peak at ~ 19000C
Ackermann /6/ measured a significantly higher value for the Zr-O eutectic




not lie at 5 mol % U0
2
as determined earlier /2/, but at ~15 mol % U0
2
.
This was determined from mierostruetural examinations of the melt
speeimens eontaining 10, 15 and 20 mol % U02 (Fig. 3).
a) b) e)
Fig. 3: Mierostuetures of melt speeimens eontaining (in mol %)
a) 90 Zr(O)-IO U02, b) 85 Zr(0)-15 U02, e) 80 Zr(0)-20 U02'
From>19000 C quenehed. Unetehed, magnifieation 100 x:
a) a-Zr(O)+euteetie, b) euteetie, e) U02+euteetie
Due to these ehanges, the liquidus line of the two-phase field
(u,Zr)02_x+L on the Zr-rieh side is shifted,to higher U02 eontents.
The results show that the maximum amount of U02 whieh ean be dissolved
at 20000 C is ~16 mal %. This value agrees with the phase field distribu-
tion in the isothermal seetion U-Zr-O at 20000 C signifieantly better
than the earlier value of ~8 mol %. The shape of the liquidus eurve with
inereasing U0
2
eontent was not determined. It was assumed that at 2400
0
C,
the liquidus line again joins the eurve determined in the earlier work.
The two-phase liquid region and the eorresponding monoteetie tem-
perature (24000 C) were also not eheeked.
On the U0
2
-rieh side, the results of this work indieated a higher
solubility of Zr(O) in U02. Thus, the (U,Zr)02_x one-phase field was
extended towards lower U02 eontents.
For a eomparison with the ternary U-Zr-O seetions whieh are given in
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at %, the concentrations ofthe quasibinary diagram had to be converted
from mol % to at %. For a more convenient direct camparison, the quasi-
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Fig. 4: Temperature-concentration diagram of the quasibinary Zr(o)-uo
Zsystem in at %, for direct camparisan with the ternary sec-
tions
Ternary isothermal U-Zr-O sections
The results· of the experimental investigations of the ternary isothermal
sections at 1600 and 18000 C are given in Fig. 5 and 6. There is not much
difference between these two sections and that at 1500oC. With increasing
Fig. 5: Isothermal section of the
ternary U-Zr-O system at
16000 C
Fig. 6: Isothermal section of the
ternary U-Zr-O system at
18000 C
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temperature, the field of the U-Zr melt extends towards Zr and thus the
concentration of the liquid phase in the central three-phase field changes












has been assumed resulting in a large two-phase field (U,Zr)OZ_x+
a-Zr(O) instead of a three-phase field at ISOOoC. The ternary region
near the a-Zr(O) field has been checked for the existence of a supposed
miscibility gap, but no evidence for this supposition was found.
On the basis of literature data and some own experiments, the isothermal
sections at 1905 and 19S0oC are represented as tentative diagrams (Figs.7
and 8). The binary eutectic between a-Zr(O) and ZrOz is assumed to occur
at 1900oC, according to /S,7/ (though a higher value (Z06SoC) has been
reported by /6/), and to extend into the ternary region, where the
eutectic temperature of the join a-Zr(O)-UO Z has been measured at
19000 C in the present work. With the higher value of the binary eutectic
temperature, the own results could have been explained only by the
assumption of a ternary eutectic.
Fig.7: Tentative isothermal sec-
tion of the ternary
U-Zr-O system at 1905oC
Fig.8: Tentative isothermal sec-
tion of the ternary °
U-Zr-O system at 19S0 C
These sections between 1900 and ZOOOoC are characterized by two liquid
fields, one metallic (LI)' and the second one with considerable amounts
of oxygen (L
Z
)' With increasing temperature, the two melt fields extend
on the Zr-side and combine above the melting temperatures of the solid
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phases in between, ß-Zr and a-Zr(O). Differing values have been re-
ported also for these temperatures (/5,7/ and /6/). For the construc-
tion of the tentative ternary sections in this work, preference has
been given to the lower values of /5,7/ because they fit better with
own results.
Ternary temperature-concentration diagrams
Considering the phase relations of the corrosion couple U0
2
-Zr, it is
perhaps advantageous to show not only the diagram of the quasibinary
system a-Zr(0)-U0
2
, but also additional temperature-concentration
diagrams representing the phase relations at different oxygen potentials.
Therefore, on the basis of the results obtained so far, the diagrams of
the ternary joins Zr-U02 and zro.sOo.s-U02 are shown in the Figs. 9 and
10. For a direct comparison with the isothermal ternary section, the
concentrations are specified in at %. since the phase equilibria above
the eutectic temperatures are not sufficiently cleared, the upper tem-
perature limits are 1900 and 20000 C, respectively.
1900 ". \
\~~ "" a~Zr(O)+IU,ZrI02 1(-i.-
1800 ,\" •• p'\
- \ \
&' \ '\ .l \ \ \ IU,Zr)Oz_x
























Fig. 10: Tentative temperature-concentration diagram of the ternary
join Zro.50o.5-U02 in at %
Conclusions
The inconsistencies of the earlier results regarding the quasibinary
a-Zr(0)-u0
2
diagram and the U-Zr-O isothermal section at 20000 C were
eliminated. New results were obtained in the temperature range between
1500 and 2000oC. Regarding the layer configuration of the u0
2
/Zr
interaction couple, no evidence was found for a thermodynamical explana-
tion in terms of the ternary U-Zr-O phase diagram.
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ABSTRACT
The dissolution of U0 2 by molten Zircaloy-4 cladding. and
structural changes to the UOZ matrix, have been investigated using
internally heated fuel rod simulators. The simulators were heated
in an inert atmosphere at a fixed temperature ramp rate. and held
at cladding surface temperatures (1800°C to ZZOO°C) above the
melting point of the cladding (17bO°C) for one second to ten
minutes.
The experiments show that a complex microstructure is formed
between the UOZ pellets and the moHen Zircaloy-4' cladding. The
molten cladding contains varying proportions of uranium and oxygen
that come from the dissolution of the UO Z pellets by the molten
Zircaloy-4. There is no penetration of Zircaloy-4 into the solid
UOZ' even along grain boundaries.
Measurements of dissolved uranium in the cladding. by
scanning Auger microscopy and chemical analysis, show that only
small amounts of UO Z (less than 3.~ vol.lo) are dissolved by the
molten cladding.
INTRODUCTION
In postulated reactor accidents. involving a loss of coolant. reactor
shutown and impaired cooling. the initial temperature rise in the fuel is
due to decay heat. As the temperature rises. and given the availability of
steam. additional heat is generated on the Zircaloy-4 cladding surface by
the exothermic Zircaloy-4/steam reaction. The nuclear fuel rods may reach
temperatures high enough to promote reactions between the cladding and the
uranium dioxide (UO Z) fuel pellets. At temperatures above the melting point
of the Zircaloy-4 cladding. it has been observed that solid UOZ can be
partially dissolved by the molten cladding. and that structural changes
occur in the fuel pellets. Any dissolution of the UOZ by molten Zircaloy-4.
or any structural changes occurring in the pellet. may result in an
increased fission-product release from the UOZ pellet. In addition. the
uptake of oxygen from the UO Z causes the cladding to become embrittled.
The single-effect experiments to be described were done to ob a tain
comprehensive understanding of UOZ dissolution by molten Zircaloy-4
cladding under well-defined boundary conditions of temperature. time and
atmosphere. The experimental program was undertaken
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to study the extent of the interaction between solid U0 2 and
molten Zircaloy-4,
to determine the amount of 002 dissolved by molten Zircaloy-4,
to determine the resultant reaction products, and
to study, indirectly, the wettability of solid U02 by malten
Zircaloy-4.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experiments were done using the test apparatus shown in Figure 1.
The fuel rod simulator consisted of an interJal tungsten heater surrounded
by annular high-densi~y (10.55 to 10.65 rlg/m ) stoichiometric U0 2 pellets in
a standard CANDU-PHWR Zircaloy-4 fuel cladding. The dimensions of the
simulator were as foliows: tungsten heater, 6.0U : g'82 mm; U02pellet, 6.1U
± 0.03 mm ID, 14.27 ± 0.01 mm 00; and fuel cladding, 14.40 mm nominal 10,
15.24 mm nominalOD. The simulator was positioned horizontally in a quartz
containment tube so that the melting behaviour could be viewed and
recorded.
During a typical test, power was fed from a lUO kV.A power/temperature
controller to the tungsten heater (melting point 3410°C) via water-cooled
copper electrodes. Temperatures were measured at one location on the top
central portion of the simulator by three or four emissivity-insensitive
dua'l-wavelength pyrometers, which operate in the range 75Uoc to 3500 oC.
Since we wanted to simulate, at least in part, the behaviour of a failed
fuel rod, no pressure differential was applied across the cladding wall.
The differential expansion of U02 and Zircaloy-4 on heating to high tempera-
ture was used to genera te the contact pressure.
In these "HELT" tests, the 250-mm long, horizontal simulator was
heated, in a purified inert gas atmosphere, at 10 to 20°C/s to 1600°C, and
then at lOc/s to the required test temperature. The simulators were held at
constant temperatures in excess of the melting point (1760 ± 10°C [1]) of
the as-received cladding for times between one second and ten minutes. The
majority of the "~IELT" tests were carried out on simulators having
as-received cladding and no CANLUB [2] coating. Three tests were carried
out on simulators having a CANLUB coating between the cladding and the U02
pellets. To complete the isothermal hold, the power to the simulator was
turned off and it was allowed to cool. Several tests were carried out at
other heating rates, 10°C/s and 35°C/s, above 1600°C.
After each experiment, the simulators were encapsulated in epoxy,
sectioned, polished and examined metallographically, and by Scanning Elec-
tron Microscopy (SEM) and Scanning Auger Microscopy (SAM), to identify the
reaction products.
The cladding was chemically analyzed for uranium content.
* CANada Qeuterium Qranium - Pressurized ~eavy ~ater !eactor
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RESULTS
For the tests carried out at a heating rate of lOc/s above l600°C, the
molten cladding wetted the UOZ pellets around their complete circumference.
In no case did the molten cladding flow off and drip to the catch tray
located below the test assembly. Figure Z shows a typical cross-section of
a fuel rod simulator after being heated at a surface temperature of ZZOO°C
for ten minutes. A large amount of UO Z (melting point Z865°C) has melted
around the heater. The remaining UO Z near the cladding has not melted, but
considerable interaction has occurred between the uoz and the molten clad-
ding. This interaction resulted in an increase in volume of the cladding.
When the cladding melted between l760°C and 1970°C (depending on
heating rate and oxygen content), a vapour was given off that deposited on
the cooler quartz tube. Spectrographic analysis of the deposit showed that
it consisted of tin, chromium and iron, all alloying elements of
Zircaloy-4.
For simulators heated in an inert atmosphere at faster rates, e.g.
35°c/s above l600oC, it was found that the molten cladding no longer
completely wetted the UO Z pellets. At this heating rate, the top of the UO Z
pellet was not covered with molten cladding, i.e. some cladding flowed to
the bottom of the horizontal simulators. In this case, less oxygen was
dissolved in the molten cladding, and hence there was less wetting of the
UOZ [3].
Complex microstructures were formed between the solid uo Z and the clad-
ding. Even though no pressure differential was applied to the cladding
wall, the thermal expansion of the two components was sufficient to cause
good contact at temperatures in excess of l600°C. When the temperature on
the surface of a section of the simulator did not exceed the melting point
of the cladding, the microstructure shown in Figure 3 was obtained. This
microstructure consists of UOZ ' an oxygen-saturated a-Zr(O) phase next to
the UOZ/Zircaloy-4 interface, a (U,Zr)-alloy phase, and thenaan oxygen-
saturated a-zr(O)b phase. Depending on the uranium content of the
(U,Zr)-alloy, the melting temperature of this phase could be as low as
ll3ZoC. This (U,Zr)-alloy was also distributed along the grain boundaries
of the a-Zr(O)a phase. Thus, the structure of the cladding just below its
melting point consisted of a low-temperature (U,Zr)-alloy situated between
two a-Zr(O) layers.
If the melting temperature of the as-received cladding is exceeded, it
is possible that only a portion of the cladding melts. Shown in Figure 4 is
a typical microstructure. Since Zircaloy-4 picks up oxygen from the UO Z'
the melting point near the UO Z/Zircaloy-4 interface can be raised to as high
as 1970°C. The outer section of the cladding, which has not picked up
oxygen from the UO Z' melts at temperatures above l760°C.
Raising the temperature to ZOOo°C melted all of the cladding and a
homogenized dendritic structure, shown in Figure 5, was obtained. The
scalloped structure of the UO z indicates that it was dissolved by the molten
cladding. The microstructure thus consisted of the original Zircaloy-4 plus
varying amounts of uranium and oxygen arising from the dissolution of the
UO z by the molten cladding. An important point to note is that the solid
UOZ does not contain any zirconium.
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The amount of uranium dissolved in the cladding was determined by SAM
and chemical analysis. The results (see Table I) show that less than
4Z wt.t. uranium dissolved in the molten cladding. The presence of the
CANLUB coating between the cladding and the ua Z had no measurable effect.
DISCUSSION
For the experiments conducted with no differential pressure on the
cladding wall, partial UOZ/cladding contact occurred only due to their
differential expansion. The fuel/cladding gap closed at about l600·C and
thus some UüZ/Zircaloy-4 interaction (see Figures 3 and 4) occurred even
without an external pressure. Consequently, the cladding melted over a
range of temperature, 1760·C to 1970·C.
When there is good contact between the UüZ and solid cladding, previous
W'ork [4-6] has shown that the sequence, at room temperature, of the
individual layers from UOZ to Zircaloy-4 can be represented as:
{UO Z+ U} .....{ o:-Zr(O)a } ..... {(U,Zr)-alloy}..... {o:-(Zr(O)b} .....{ Zr-4}
+ (U, Zr )-alloy
In the solid-state reaction, the (U,Zr)-alloy phase, found between the
two oxygen-saturated a-Zr(O) layers, has a very low solubility for oxygen
[7] and has a relatively low melting point, i.e. 1500 - 113Z·C, for alloys
) 50 wt.% uranium, which decreases with increasing uranium content. This
alloy will thus' be liquid before the Zircaloy-4 melts. On cooling, the
(U,Zr)-alloy consists of regions, as shown in Figure 3, of high zirconium
with low uranium, and low zirconium with high uranium.
Hith increasing temperature, asolid o:-Zr(O) layer and a (U, Zr )-alloy
phase form at the UOZ/Zircaloy-4 interface, as seen in Figure 4. The
melting point of the oxygen-saturated o:-Zr(O) is about 1970·C. With, how-
ever, a slight increase in temperature, the solid o:-Zr(O) layer melts, and a
homogeneous (Zr,U,O)-phase is formed, as shown in Figure 5. The transforma-
tion of the (Zr,U,O)-phase during cool-down appears to be oxygen-dependent
[8]. Hith a lower oxygen content in solution, two metallic phases exist in
the refrozen melts, i.e. a (U,Zr)-alloy phase of high but varying uranium
content, and oxygen stabilized a-Zr(O). With high oxygen content in
solution, the molten phase forms two metallic and one ceramic phase: (a) an
oxygen-stabilized o:-Zr(O)phase containing varying amounts of uranium, (b) a
metallic uranium-rich (U,Zr)-alloy, and (c) a ceramic (U,Zr)OZ phase with
low but varying zirconium content. According to the equilibrium phase
diagram, one metallic phase, a-Zr(O), is in equilibrium with two ceramic
phases, UO Z and zrO Z' and no (U,Zr)-alloy should be present. For the non-
equilibrium conditions existing in this work, a single (U,Zr)OZ phase of
varying uranium and zirconium concentration, rather than the separate UO Z
and ZrOZ constituents, is present at ambient temperature.
The interaction between UO Z and molten cladding also effects the over-
all UOZ microstructure. The molten homogeneous (Zr,U,O)-phase interacts
with solid VOZ to pick up more uranium and oxygen. The UOZ is consequently
reduced to UOz_x' i.e. depleted of oxygen. When the oxygen content of the
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UO z_x is furt her depleted of oxygen, the UOZ_x/U solvus boundary of the U-O
phase diagram is reached. At this point, liquid uranium forms in the UOZ_x'
On cooling to room temperature, the UO Z- x plus liquid uranium form stoichio-
metric UO Z and a-U. Figure 6 is a typical post-test micrograph, showing the
stoichiometric UOZ with the a-U preferentially formed along the UO Z grain
boundaries, and in the UOzgrains.
The major focus of this work was to determine the volume percent of UUZ
that could be di~solved by the molten cladding. Of particular concern was
the data of Hofmann et. al [I, 5J which suggested that 9.Z vol.!. UOZ could
react with the cladding.
In determining the vol.1. UO Z dissolved by the molten cladding, it is
important to note that the amount of uranium (or UOZ) dissolved by the clad-
ding is a function of cladding volume relative to the UO Z volume. Larger
cladding volumes will dissolve more UO Z' Shown in Figure 7 is a plot of the
UO Z pellet volume decrease as a function of the UO Z content in the cladding,
for three typical cladding and UO Z dimensions. It can be seen that fuel
rods having less cladding volume, such as those in the Picke ring and Bruce
CANDU reactors, can dissolve less UO Z than fuel rods having larger cladding
volumes.
Using the data from Table I and a plot of UU z pellet volume decrease as
a function of the uranium content in the cladding, the vol.% UO Z dissolved
during the HELT tests was calculated. The results are shown in Table 11.
It can be seen that, for CANDU fuel, less than about 3.5 vol.% UO Z is
dissolved by the molten cladding. For other fuel rod dimensions, however,
the vol.% UO Z dissolved by the molten cladding would be different.
CUNCLUSIONS
In this work, UO Z dissolution by molten Zircaloy-4 cladding, and struc-
tural changes in the UOZ matrix, have been studied by holding fuel rod
simulators for one second to ten minutes in an inert atmosphere at
temperatures above the melting point of the cladding.
A complex microstructure is formed between the UO Z pellets and the
cladding. Depending on the temperature, areaction is possible between the
UO Z and solid cladding, resulting in the formation of an oxygen-stabilized
a-Zr(O)-phase with a melting temperature of about 1970°C, or a horoogeneous
(Zr,U,O)-alloy phase. There is no penetration of Zircaloy into the solid
UO Z' even along grain boundaries.
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TABLE I











































VOLUME PERCENT OF UO, DISSOLVED BY MOLTEN CLAD
MELT Sy Scanning Auger
No. Mlcroscopy Sy Chemlcal Analysis
8 0.9 0.7 0.95 ±O.2
9 0.9 0.2 0.85 ±O.2
10 0.6 0.4 0.7 ±O.1
11 0.4 0.1 0.5 ±O.1
12 0.8 0.5 1.8
13 0.8 0.5 0.6 ±O.15
14 2.0 1.0 1.5
15 1.0 0.2 1.2 0.2
16' 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.2
17' 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.1

















Figure 1: Schematic of the Test Assembly Used to Study U02 Dissolution by Molten
Zircaloy-4
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Figure 2: Transverse Cross-Seetion of Fuel Rod Simulator from Test MELT-11
(Surfaee Heated at 2000AC ror 10 min.). Shown are (a) Tungsten
Heater, (h) Molten U02 , (e) U02 , and (d) Molten Zirealoy-4 Cladding
1052
Figure 3. Typieal Mierostruetures Obtained When The Simulator Did Not
Exeeed The Melting Point Of The As-Reeeived Cladding. Shown are
(a) UO Z + cr-U, (b) {cr-zr(O)a + (U,Zr)-alloy), (e) (U,Zr)-alloy,
and (d) cr-zr(O)b'
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Figure 4. Typieal Mierostruetures Obtained When The Cladding Reaeted With
The UOZ• Shown are (a) UO Z + a-U, (b) {a-zr(O) + (U,Zr)-alloy),
and (e) (Zr,U,O)-alloy phase.
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Figure 5. Dendritic Microstructure Obtained When All The Cladding Melted
And Reacted With The UOZ To Form A (Zr,U,O)-Alloy Phase.
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Figure 6. Typical Micrograph of UO Z With a-U Along Grain Boundaries, And In
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Figure 7. UO Z Pellet Volume Decrease As A Function of the UU Z Content In
The Cladding. The Cladding Outside Dimensions and Thicknesses,
in mm, Are Given.
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THERMAL HYDRAULIC SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA IN SMALL
FUEL ROD BUNDLES DURING SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
W. Eifler
CEC Joint Research Center
Ispra (Varese), Italy
ABSTRACT
Inpile or out-of-pile experiments for simulating severe accidents
are performed with test bundles consisting of a small number of rods.
Three-dimensional perturbations of the flow and temperature field in
such small rod bundles may complicate the analysis of such experi-
ments. A computer simulation of a typical inpile experiment, the PBF
scoping test, has been performed with the computer programme VELASCO.
The good agreement between computational and experimental results
leads to the conclusion that VELASCO may provide a useful contribut-
ion for the analysis of such experiments.
INTRODUCTION
Severe accidents similar to that which happened in the Three-Mile-Island
Nuclear Station 2 are characterized, when in an advanced stage of development,
by the following events.
The coolant inlet flow to the core may be very low or may even have
stopped. The power is at decay heat level. The pressure is still relatively
high. The coolant boils slowly down and core uncovery occurs. The steam flow
through the uncovered core region has not the capacity for transporting' the
generated heat out of the core. The uncovered core region heats up eventually
to extremely high temperatures. Additional heat is generated by the chemical
reacti~n between the zircaloy cladding and the steam, the heat up is
accel~rated. The heat up'spreads out radially to cooler core regions. However,
radial temperature gradients are relatively small.
For' the experimental simulation of such severe accident scenarios, only a
small part of the core can be considered. Fig. 1 shows the cross-section of a
typical inpile test train containing a 32 fuel rod bundle. For protecting the
reactor environment against the extremely high temperatures the'fuel rod bundle
is contained in a highly insulating shroud. However, no material has perfect
insulating characteristics, so that, still, a significant amount of heat is
transferred to the shroutl and conducted to a bypass cooling system. This
results in three-dimensional perturbations of the flow and temperature field.
An additional source of such perturbations may be the radial variation of the
fission power which is dependent on the characteristics of the reactor hosting
the experiment.
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In the frame of the CEC proj ect SUPER SARA (cancelled in 1983), VELASCO,
an existing steady-state computer programme LI J, has been further developed
into a tool for the analysis of three-dimensional transient steam flows in fuel
rod bundles. In this paper first the main features of VELASCO are described.
The following section deals wi th the treatment of heat transfer by thermal
radiation and convection, which are - together with the heat generation by the
zircaloy-steam reaction - the key phenomena during the heat up phase of severe
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THE COMPUTER PROGRAMME VELASCO
The actual 3DV version of VELASCO computes three-dimensional transient
steam flow in fuel rod bundles. The application of a single phase programme to
severe accident boildown situations is justified by the fact, that for~ypical
thermal hydraulic conditions the steam veloci ties near the water level are
qui te low (in the order of 10 ern/sec) and that droplet entrainment may be
neglected. The computations start downstream of the two-phase boundary,
assuming at the latter a uniform flow of dry vapour at saturation temperature.
The actual position of this boundary may either be determined by a steady-state
heat balance, or be specified as input, resulting either from separate
computations wi th available two-phase computer programmes C 2,3 J, or, in the
case of an experiment simulation, from the measurements.
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The main features of VELASCO are the following.
Modelling of the geometry
An example of the discretisation of a fuel rod bundle cross-section is
shown in Fig. 2. The bundle length is subdivided into a number ofaxial steps
the height of which may vary from step to step.
Mathematical features
For the three volume elements of a macro-element formed by the cross-sect-
ional area elements and by the axial step heigth, 7 fully implicit balance
equations are set up: three momentum balances, a mass balance and a heat
balance for the coolant region, and heat balances for the cladding and fuel
region respectively. The number of equations per macro-element may increase due
to further subdivisions of the cladding and fuel region. An iterative solution
procedure is applied, starting with an explicit estimate of the solution which
converges towards the implicit final results via a "trial and error" technique
controlled by the balance error. The computer time per iteration step and
macro-element is independent of the total number of elements. On an AMDAHL
470/V8 this time amounts to 1.7 msec for a "7 equation" macro-element. The
number of iterations per time step and the size of the time steps depend on the
characteristics of the specific case.
Thermal hydraulic characteristics
Special attention has been given to the modelling of the thermal radiat-
ion. More details are given in the next section. The momentum and heat
transport between surface elements and the coolant is described by using
suitable relationships for the friction factor and the heat transfer coeffi-
cient (for more details concerning the latter see next section). In the case of
a turbulent flow regime, momentum and heat transfer between adjacent coolant
elements include the contribution of turbulent diffusion. The heat transfer
through the cladding-fuel gap is treated in a simplified way using a constant
gap heat transfer coefficient. The heat generated by the chemical reaction
between steam and both the zircaloy fuel rod cladding and the zircaloy inner
liner of the shroud is computed using oxidation-rate-temperature correlations.
The thermal conductivi ty of the oxidising materials is continuously updated
depending on the oxide layer thickness. This is especially important for the
correct description of the peripheral conduction in the fuel rod claddings. The
heat transfer conditions at the outer radial boundary have to be specified as
input.
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THE TREATMENT OF SPECIAL HEAT TRANSFER PROBLEMS
Radiation heat transfer
Figure 3 shows a resul t of aseparate study on the influence of the rod
surface discretisation on the radial temperature distribution inside the rod
bundle. It is seen that i t is very important to use a rather detailed
discretisation scheme. In order to limit the resulting computer time to
acceptable values, surface-to-surface radiation and surface-to-steam radiation
are dealt with separately. The surface-to-surface radiation is computed
ignoring the presence of a radiation absorbing and emitting medium. The
surface-to-steam radiation is described by an apparent heat transfer coeffi-
cient. Details concerning this method may be found in ref. L 4 J. Fig. 4 shows
the apparent heat transfer coefficient as a function of the wall temperature.
It is observed that especially for high pressures the radiation heat transfer
to the steam may be quite important.
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Heat Transfer by mixed free and forced convection laminar flow
During the advaneed stages of severe accidents laminar
prevailing flow regime. Heat transfer by low veloeity laminar
much influenced by free eonvection [" 5 J. Figs 5 and 6 show
results of ref. C 5 J obtained for an annulus equivalent to
with a pitch-to-diameter ratio 1.33. CN and CN depend on
and on Ioeal thermal hydraulic conditions. They aare related
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where x and y are respeetively the axial eoordinate and the radial profile
o
length, and where PR, RE and NU are respeetively the loeal Prandtl-, Reynolds-
and Nusselt number'
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For typieal severe aecident eondi tions CN and CN may
be of the order 10 and 10 respeetively. Under those eondi tions the Nu~selt
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SIMULATION OF THE PBF SCOPING TEST WITH VELASCO
Boundary conditions and modelling assumptions
Information on the test train design is obtained from ref. r 6 J. This
report contains also information on pretest laboratory measurements of the
shroud conductivity. In view of the complex structure of the shroud a constant
value of 96 IV/rn2K has been assumed for the overall heat transfer coefficient
between the inner liner of the shroud and the bypass coolant. In ref. r7 J the
axial and radial fission power profiles are specified, which have been used for
precalculations of the PBF scoping tests; these data are used also for the
VELASCO computations. From this paper results also an indication on the bypass
and test train inlet water temperature (518 K). No other information being
available, this value is used as input. The bundle pressure during the
experiment is given in ref. r 10 J and amounts to 7,2 MPa. The time histories
of the fission power, of the inlet mass flow rate and of the water level are
taken from Fig. 3 of ref. L 8 J. The curves represented in this figure have
been smoothed, as shown in Fig. 7, retaining as important events the variations
of the power-time gradient and the rapid decrease of the inlet mass flow rate
after 196 minutes, accompanied by an accelerated falling of the water level.
The VELASCO computations start at 54 min. During the experiment the initial
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Fig.1: BUNDLE FISSION POWER,INLET MASS FLOW RATE, AND WATER LEVEL HISTORIES USED
AS INPUT FOR TUE VELASCO SIMULATION COMPUTATIONS OF TUE P8F SCOPING TEST.
The zircaloy-steam reaction is described with two different correlations,
depending on the temperature. For the lower temperature range « 1853 K) the
Cathcarth-Pawel r 11 J relation is used, for higher temperatures the Baker-Just
r 12 J relation is used. As inlet condition to the steam region radially
uniform mass flow at saturation conditions is ~ssumed. The axially developing
heat transfer is computed wi th a correlation obtained by aseparate study
L 5J, which has been illustrated in the previous section.
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Results
Figures 8 to 11 show a comparison of computational and experimental
results. The computed axial temperature profiles in Fig. 8 represent quite weIl
the measured values. The discrepancy between the analytical an<:! the experi-
mental steam temperature at the 0,5 m elevation cannot be explained and is
probably due to a measuring error. Fig. 9 shows the steam temperatures at the
outlet of the fuel rod bundle. The calculated temperature history follows wel1
the line representing the measurements. This allows the conclusion that the
overall heat balance is respected during the computer simulation. Agreement
between the computed and the experimental time history of the cladding and
shroud temperatures (Figs 10 and 11) is quite excel1ent, with the exception of
some systematic deviations. These deviations are explained as follows.
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Flg.l1: CENTRAL ROD CLADDINO TEMPERATURES AT THREE ELEVATIONS
The confrontation of the central rod cladding temperature and the shroud
inner liner temperature shows that - except for an initial time period - the
difference between them is systematically too high by about 20%. Probably a too
high value of the shroud conductivity has been assumed.
At times beyond 170 minutes the temperatures computed for the 0,7 m
elevation deviate more and more from the experimental temperatures. This may be
explained by a sudden increase of the shroud conductivity in the upper part of
the test train during the experiment. Such an increase could be due to a loss
of the inner liner integri ty allowing the infiltration of steam into the
fiberboard insulator.
The computed temperature gradients during the mass flow decrease in the
final phase of the transient are much lower than the experimental temperature
gradients. This is probably due to the fact that the simulated mass flow




The analysis of experiments simulating thermal hydraulic severe accident
phenomena is qui te complex because of the three-dimensional perturbations of
the flow- and temperature fields due to the reduced bundle size. The computer
programme VELASCO 3DV is a tool which may be used for the computation of such
three-dimensional effects. Its application for the simulation of the PBF
scoping test shows that the results obtained with VELASCO are quite realistic.
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POST-IRRADIATION EXAMINATION OF FUEL SUBJECTED TO
PRESSURISED HIGH TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS IN WAGR
A W P Newbigging, A I Russell and E Turner
UKAEA, Windscale
ABSTRACT
The prototype WINDSCALE ADVANCED GAS-COOLED REACTOR (WAGR) closed
down in 1981. In the 82 days following the formal shutdown a
collaborative series of safety related 'concluding experiments'
were performed which were jointly funded by the UKAEA, CEGB and
SSEB. This series included four pressurised high temperature
transients, in a loop of the reactor, which were intended to take
the fuel pin cladding close to melting.
Post-irradiation examination of the fuel after these four
transients has confirmed the success of the experiments and has
demonstrated that the present fuel design for COMMERCIAL AGRs
(CAGR) should be able to endure such transients and continue safe
operation thereafter.
INTRODUCTION
The loop chosen for these experiments provided a facility whereby the
fuel could be irradiated within the core but in a self-contained coolant
circuit with its own coolant control plant. Two setsof Burst Cartridge
Detection Gear 3BCDG) and a continuous on-line gamma spectrometer, monitoring
for Kr89 and Mn 6, sampled the loop coolant so that failures in fuel pins
could be detected immediately. The coolant pressure in the loop was 26 bars
compared to 20 and 40 bars in the cores of WAGR and CAGR respectively. The
coolant composition was C02 with 1% CO.
The aim of the experiments was to examine the behaviour of CAGR type
fuel under the high temperature transient conditions postulated to occur in
some limiting pressurised faults in a CAGR. Four experiments were conducted,
the first two with new specially instrumented fuel and the last two with
instrumented stringers previously irradiated in the core of WAGR (Table I).
TABLE I
Experiment summary
Experiment Type of Transient Calculated peak Time of
number fuel control clad temperature (OC) transient (mins)
1 ~W FLOW 1280 18
2 NEW POWER 1330 18
3 5 GWd/t(l) FLOW 1270 12
4 15 GWd/t FLOW 1280 20
(1) The irradiation va1ues quoted are stringer means. Peak temperature
element va1ue = (mean x 1.2).
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The engineering design, heat transfer and experimental control aspects
have been published previously [1][2], this paper summarises the results
obtained by post-irradiation examination of all four experiments.
EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
The fuel consisted of annular pellets of enriched uranium dioxide inside
0.38 mm thick 20% Cr, 25% Ni, Nb stabilised stainless steel cladding
initially filled with helium at 1 bar. Each fuel pin 1 m long and 1.52 cm
diameter contained 69 fuel pellets and every fifth pellet carried a V-shaped
groove, into which the cladding was pressurised, to inhibit pellet stacking
and the development of interpellet gaps. Nine such fuel pins arranged in a
single ring (7.2 cm PCD) comprised one fuel element and four elements made up
one fuel stringer. The fuel pins were fixed at the bot tom end into a
machined grid and were supported laterally at mid-span and top end by braces
fabricated from spot welded l8/8/Ti strip. The support system was carried by
a graphite centre tube and locked inside two half length inner and one full
length outer graphite sleeve. The fuel pin and support structure designs
were similar to those used in CAGR.
The original intention was' to take the cladding as close as possible to
the melting point (13700 C). Temperature control during the transients was
achieved by thermocouples buried in the wall of special fuel pins with thick
walls (1.8 mm). Allowances had to be made for local heat transfer
aberrations caused by carbon deposits on the pre-irradiated fuel pins,
thermal radiation shielding at brace positions and for the possibility that
fuel pins might bow to touch and then overheat at' the point of contact. In
the event fuel pinDowing did not occur and consequently the hottest
position, expected then to be below the upper brace of element 3, was
somewhat below the melting point.
The irradiation conditions at the peak of the transient and the
variation in temperature during the transient is illustrated in Fig 1 for the
first experiment.
POST-IRRADIATION EXAMINATION
The primary aim of the post-irradiation examination was to detexmine
whether a 'coolable geometry' had been maintained. Interest therefore
centred on the integrity of the graphite sleeves and grid/brace support
structures, the bowing of fuel pins to touch each other or graphite
components, and the physical integrity of the fuel pins which might have been
jeopardised by certain possible failure modes.
Immediate preliminary examinations were made of the first two
experiments with new fuel which established that 'coolable geometry' had been
maintained, and on the basis of this adecision was taken to proceed with the
final two experiments using pre-irradiated fuel. The results of examining
all four experiments can be summarised as follows:-
Graphite components. No physical defects were observed in graphite
sleeves or centre tubes that could be attributed to the transient
irradiation. Di'smantling procedures. are such that these components were
subjected to considerable stress. These procedures revealed no evidence of
weakness or friability of the graphite in any of the four experiments. The
graphite centre tubes in the top elements were expected to experience
temperatures approaching 1000oC. By comparing the first transient test
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centre tubes with similar specimens oxidised thermally in the laboratory, it
was confirmed that under-irradiation the surface corrosion was not worse than
thermally oxidising the graphite at 10000C for 20 mins.
Support structures. The inferior corrosion resistance of the l8/8/Ti
stabilised stainless steel used for grids and braces gave some cause for
concern; particularly the spot-welded braces in which the crevices between
adjoining strips represent ideal sites for oxide jacking. Thorough visual
inspection of all these components indicated no cause for concern.
Metallographic examination of the hottest brace from experiment No. 4
revealed no oxide jacking; good condition spot welds; some oxidation and
carburisation and the continued existence of a dense carbon deposit laid down
during the. 15 GWd/t irradiation in the core. Some evidence was obtained for
rubbing between fuel pins and braces at the pin support contact positions but
no doming of the braces had resulted indicating that the interactions were of
a minor nature.
Thermocouples. The new stringers built for the first two experiments
had Nicrosil/Nisil thermocouples at the peak temperature positions but the
pre-irradiated experiments 3 and 4 had to rely on the existing Chromel/Alumel
thermocouples. The durability of the latter gave cause for concern but they
performed satisfactorily and metallography showed that even after 15 GWd/t
they were in excellent condition at the hot junction.
Pellet/clad interactions. The 'weak cladding' concept employed in AGRs
means that the clad and fuel interact physically during power and temperature
cycles. These interactions which influence fuel pin dimensional changes and
bowing have been modelied [3][4] and so the relative contributions from
irradiation in the core and loop can be assessed. Fuel pin bowing
measurements were made which can be summarised as shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11
Summary of fuel pin bowing
Maximum pin bow (mm)
Experiment
Element 1 Element 2 Element 3 Element 4
1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5
2 - - 1.5 NO FUEL
3 2.0 3.8 3.8 7.6
4 2.5 3.0 3.0 10.2
The straightness tolerance of a fuel pin as-manufactured is 1.5 mm and
the pin/pin and pin/graphite clearances were 9.75 and 7.25 mm respectively.
The bowing of fuel pins in the peak temperature element 3 did not therefore
cause concern (Fig 2). The larger bows in the element 4 position of the two
pre-irradiated experiments 3 and 4 were due to collapse of the cladding into
interpellet gaps which developed by ratchetting. The computer model [3] and
measurements on other similar core stringers indicated that interpellet gap
development and clad collapse would have taken place during the core
irradiation for the higher burn-up stringer (experiment 4) whereas collapse
was considered unlikely for the lower irradiation (experiment 3). It is
possible that the majority of cladding collapse and bowing observed in the
latter stringer occurred during the transient. This is an important
deduction because it is suspected that a barely detectable fäilure occurred
in this stringer, during the transient, due to this mechanism.
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Interpellet gap development, end-cap inward doming, length changes,
local axial strain variations and associated clad wall thickness changes were
measured and found to be consiStent with the principles embodied in the
computer models [3]. For the pre-irradiated fuel it is concluded that the
bulk of the changes observed occurred during the core-irradiation and not
during the transients.
Fuel behaviour. By extracting and analysing the gas content of the fuel
pins in the pre-irradiated stringers it has been calculated that the fraction
of the stable Xenon genera ted which had been released into the voidage of the
standard fuel pins was as shown in Table 111.
TABLE 111
Fission gas release summary
Mean stringer Maximum release of stable Xe (%)
Experiment burn-up (GWd/t)
Element 1 Element 2 Element 3 Element 4
3 5 0.03 0.10 0.36 0.14
4 15 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.03
The levels of release in the peak elements (2 and 3) are only slightly
greater than expected from athermal processes and this is consistent with the
observation that fission gas bubbles were only present in the fuel, around
the bore of the pellets, at the peak rated ends of these elements. The model
used to predict fission gas release in AGR fuel [5] correctly predicted the
levels of release and indicated that no further significant release took
place during the transients; this is in agreement with the observations.
Cracking of the ceramic fuel pellets due to thermal gradient induced stresses
was normal. The transient had not caused any further cracks and the annular
fuel pellets remained mechanically stable.
Cladding behaviour. Grain growth by secondary recrystallisation was
observed in the cladding of all four experiments. By studying the
distribution it was concluded that the hottest point was at the top brace
position of element 3 as expected and that obvious cross-pin temperature
gradients existed during the transients. Grain growth in the pre-irradiated
cladding was inhibited presumably by the presence of helium bubbles and
precipitates formed during the in-core irradiation (Fig 3). Where grain
growth did take place in the pre-irradiated cladding it was restricted, by a
critical strain annealing mechanism, to areas of cladding which had been
strained in tension by the ratchetting process. Regions over pellet ends
subjected to axial compressive creep were less susceptible to grain growth.
The levels ofaxial strain observed in the higher irradiation (experiment 4)
were the highest recorded on WAGR fuel with thinning strains of up to 20%
over pellet centres; well above the levels required for a critical strain
anneal mechanism to operate.
The depth of oxidation of the cladding at the peak temperature position
was as shown in Table IV.
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TABLE IV
Clad oxidation at hotspot position
Fuel Temperature Oxide depth (um) at hotspot
Experiment type peak (OC)
Uniform Local
1 NEW 1280 4 10
2 NEW 1330 30 15
3 5 GWd/t 1270 4 10
4 15 GWd/t 1280 5 20
The levels of oxidation of the new cladding in experiments 1 and 2 are
as expected by comparison with laboratory simulations. The oxidation of the
pre-irradiated cladding is no worse than predicted from the in-core
irradiation. The existence of a healing layer of Cr rich oxide has inhibited
further oxidation in these transients. Evidence for spalling of oxide after
the transient was obtained which confirms that this was the probable cause of
the rise in Mn56 signal at the on-line spectrometer. The maximum local
pitting oxidation in experiment 4 occurred during the transient at a site
from which the uniform oxide layer had spalled.
There was no evidence for thinning strains over radial fuel cracks
indicating that pellet/clad interaction (PCI) had not occurred during the
transient rise in temperature.
The possibility that the pre-irradiated cladding might be carburised,
due to either the C02/CO coolant or the carbon deposits on the surface,
gave cause for concern since this would lower the melting point. There was
no sign of incipient melting and nuclear microprobe analyses of samples of
cladding from the hottest elements of experiment 4 (15 GWd/t) proved that the
cladding had not carburised.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been demonstrated that irradiated fuel of the CAGR design can
undergo short term pressurised transients to can temperatures between
l2700 C and l3300 C without:-
(a) losing coolable geometry;
(b) showing physical or chemical degradation of the graphite components;
(c) physical distortion of grid and brace support structures due either
to interaction with bowed pins or by oxide jacking;
(d) significant fission gas release, fuel relocation or structural
changes;
(e) clad melting or serious loss of section by oxidation.
The present design of fuel pin for Commercial AGRs has more
anti-stacking grooves than those used for these loop transient experiments in
WAGR. The model [3) predicts that in such pins, operating at a coolant
pressure of 40 bar, the axial gaps between fuel pellets will not exceed the
critical size for cladding collapse. It can be concluded that such CAGR fuel
could endure similar transients and continue to operate safely thereafter.
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF REACTOR-MATERIAL EXPERIMENTS
ON EX-VESSEL CORIUM QUENCH AND DISPERSAL




E1ectric Power Research Institute
Pa10 Alto, Ca1ifomia 94303
ABSTRACT
The resu1ts of reactor-materia1 experiments and re1ated analysis
are described in which mo1ten corium is injected into a mock-up of
the reactor cavity region of a PWR. The experiments address ex-
vesse1 interactions such as steam generation (for those cases in
which water is present), water and corium dispersa1 from the cav-
ity, hydrogen generation, direct atmosphere heating by dispersed
corium, and debris characterization. Test resu1ts indicate effi-
ciencies of steam generation by corium quench ranging up to 65%.
Corium sweepout of up to 62% of the injected material was found for
those conditions in which steam generation f10wrate was augmented
by vesse1 b10wdown. The dispersed corium caused very 1itt1e direct
heating of the atmosphere for the configuration emp10ying a trap at
the exit of the cavity-to-containment pathway. Corium sweepout
phenomena were mode1ed for high-pressure b10wdown conditions, and
the resu1ts app1ied to the fu11-size reactor system predict essen-
tia11y comp1ete sweepout of corium from the reactor cavity.
INTRODUCTION
A program of reactor-materia1 experiments and re1ated analysis is under
way at Argonne National Laboratory, under sponsorship of the E1ectric Power
Research Institute (EPRI), examining the thermal and hydrodynamic interactions
invo1ving mo1ten core materials (corium) and water in the reactor cavity re-
gion of the reactor containment bui1ding (RCB). The experiments and analysis
are performed to aid understanding of events taking p1ace ex-vesse1 for those
postu1ated accident sequences which inc1ude core me1tdown, fai1ure of the re-
actor pressure vesse1 (RPV) 10wer head, and drainage (or ejection) of the cor-
ium into the reactor cavity.
The purpose of the present paper is to describe resu1ts of experiments
and re1ated analysis fo110wing the initial scoping tests [1]. These tests
have examined corium entry into water under conditions simu1ating both 10w
initial RPV pressure (large break) and high RPV pressure (small break, 10ss of
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heat sink). The former cases are characterized by relatively slow corium
drainage through the vessel breach by gravity head and the retention of most
of the debris in the form of a bed in the cavity. The latter cases are char-
acterized by corium being largely levitated and swept out from the cavity by
the high pressure and high velocity flow of the blowdown gas, augmented in
some cases by steam generated from corium-water thermal interaction. The case
of corium entering a dry cavity followed by water injection atop the corium
melt layer has been described previously and is not considered here [1]. De-
tails of the experiment apparatus, technique, and instrumentation are pre-
sented in Ref. 1. The test apparatus is illustrated in Fig. 1.
HIGH RPV PRESSURE CASES
The conditions for the high-pressure dispersal tests are listed in Table
I. Tests 1, 4, and 5 were all performed with a sufficient mass of water ini-
. tially present in the cavity mock-up to completely quench the injected cor-
ium. In test #6, the cavity was dry, and the only water present. in the system
was in the bottom of the expansion vessel (EV). The tests performed with wa-
ter in the cavity consistently showed that as the corium began to enter the
water, the water underwent a vigorous levitation process, driven by the abrupt
steam generation. Displaced water filled the pipeway and was first ejected as
a slug and continued to be ejected in a dispersed droplet flow regime. Corium
was also swept out of the cavity by the high velocity gas and steam efflux
through the pipeway. The mass of corium swept out of the cavity ranged from
20 to 62% of the mass of corium injected into the cavity. Actually, the mass
swept out was even greater since the corium masses which were observed in the
motion pictures to fall back into the pipeway from the trap were not readily
measurable and were not included as swept-out material. (In CWTI-4, for exam-
pIe, it was estimated that 34% rather than 20% was actually swept out includ-
ing that which fell back into the pipeway.) Of the corium which was swept
out, most consisted of crust-like accumulation within and immediately sur-
rounding the trap. Debris in particulate form was recovered from the bottom
of the EV and from atop the baffle plate. The particulate ranged in median
size from 100 ~m (airborne material dispersed far from the pipeway) to ~ 1000
~m (particulate near the pipeway). In tests 1 and 4, the debris remaining in
the cavity consisted of a single, slab-like mass solidified on the base. The
corium contained both large-scale voids plus distributed small-scale porosity
in the oxide phase. The top surface was glazed over, seemingly imporous, and
very irregular in contour. The cross section revealed that the metallic con-
stituent had segregated into a pancake-shaped ingot totally imbedded within
the oxide. At the bottom, immediately atop the lavite base, was a thin, dense
oxide crust; above this was the imporous metal ingot, and atop this was the
thick, porous oxide layer.
In tests 5 and 6, the X-ray motion pictures showed that the corium chan-
neled through the levitated water (test #5), impinging directly upon the base,
whereupon the corium splashed upward off the base and was itself levitated
(dispersed droplet flow regime) by the high-velocity gas and steam velocity in
the cavity. The levitated corium left thick crusts frozen on all the inside
surface area of the cavity vessel. In test #5, there was less thpn 10% of the
injected corium remaining on the cavity base; 21% remained on the base in test
#6.
Figure 2 shows pressure traces from the cavity region for tests 5 and
6. In test #5 with water present in the cavity, a nonequilibrium pressure
buildup is evident during the time of water and corium expulsion from the cav-
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ity. Table 11 summarizes selected results from the tests. The time to reach
peak pressure is short in these high-pressure dispersal tests, ranging from
0.5 to 3.8 s at 90% of peak. The efficiency of steam production, the actual
measured steam pressure (corrected for hydrogen and inert gas partial pres-
sures) as apercent of that calculated based upon all corium enthalpy going
into steam generation, ranged from 10% (dry cavity case) to 65%. The remain-
der of the energy went primarily into heatup of the structure, and a small
fraction went into heatup of the atmosphere. Although luminescent corium par-
ticulate was dispersed into the containment atmosphere in all tests, as ob-
served in the motion pictures, the direct energy transfer to the containment
atmosphere was very small. In tests 1 and 5, the containment atmosphere actu-
ally cooled during the interaction due to the vigorous dispersal of water from
the cavity. In test #6, in which the cavity was dry, the containment heatup
attributable to the 1.2 kg of dispersed corium amounted to a temperature rise
of 53 C, only ~ 6% of the 842 C heatup calculated for temperature equilibra-
tion between the dispersed corium and the containment atmosphere.
LOW RPV PRESSURE CASES
Conditions for the four low pressure tests performed to date are listed
in Table I. Tests CWTI-7 and -8 utilized the scaled apparatus to investigate
the entry of corium into the cavity mock-up by gravity drainage only. In test
CWTI-7, the injector throat diameter was 5.08 cm (2") which scales to ~ 4.5 ft
dia opening size in the Zion RPV lower heat (14.4 ft I.D.). In test CWTI-8,
the injector throat diameter was 1.27 cm (0.5") which scales to ~ 1.1 ft dia
opening size in the RPV lower head. This latter size is representative of the
breach for failure of a welded instrument guide tube penetration when the
ablation-induced enlargement is included.
In test 7 the first corium fell as discrete particles or droplets fol-
lowed by a brief stage of filament-type flow. Subsequently, the corium drain-
age was very dense and occupied essentially the full nozzle diameter. The X-
ray motion picture showed that the water appeared to levitate uniformly upward
starting upon initial corium entry. The eritire water pool was levitated by
500 ms and showed net motion toward the exit pipeway between 500 and 675 ms,
driven by the rapid steam efflux. There was no more water visible in the cav-
ity by 770 ms. Hence, a large fraction of the injected corium entered the
cavity while there was either very little water present or while it was in a
highly fluidized state. In general, the molten corium appeared to collect
upon the base with little indication of splashing in this test. There was
little indication of crust formation on the walls compared to the previous
high-pressure tests.
The pressure data showed an abrupt pressure rise of 0.027 MPa (3.9 psi)
in the IV with a risetime of 30 ms at the start of corium injection. Steam
generation from the initial corium-water contact created apressure imbalance
between the IV and EV which peaked at 0.033 MPa (4.9 psi) at 480 ms. This
nonequilibrium pressure difference was caused by the presence of water and
corium masses in the pipeway. The pressure imbalance vanished at ~ 525 ms,
and thereafter the IV and EV pressures tracked one another. Overall, the sys-
tem pressure increased from 0.100 to 0.145 MPa during the time scale of the
corium injection, and thereafter increased at a more gradual rate as the
debris bed was cooled until peaking at 0.203 MPa at 15 s. The appearance of a
pressure maximum at 15 s was attributable to complete dryout occurring in the
cavity at about that time rather than the corium layer being fully quenched.
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Of the total mass of debris retrieved following the test, 195 g (6.6%)
had undergone sweepout into the EV. The median particle size of the dispersed
particulate was ~ 1200 ~m which is considerably larger than the debris col-
lected in high-pressure tests. The debris remaining in the IV was in the form
of a large ingot of oxide and metallic constituents of corium. This material
had not been quenched into solid particulate du ring the fall to the base, but
apparently had collected on the base in the molten state and had gradually
solidified and cooled as a porous slab. The layer ranged from 0.75 to 1.9 cm
in thick~ess, with an average thickness of 1.27 cm. The average density was
5.1 g/cm. There were numerous globular metallic inclusions which varied in
size from 10's ~~ to the order of 1 cm. The large metal globules had a den-
sity of 6.2 g/cm •
Gas sampIes were extracted from the EV at ~ 2-3 min after the test and
were analyzed for H2 content. The results indicated that 5.2 ± 1.1 g of H2
was produced during the test. This amounts to 23% of the maximum calculated
hydrogen generation based upon oxidation of all the Fe present in the injected
corium to Fe203 • The hydrogen partial pressure WaS 0.006 ~Wa. Additional
test results based upon analysis of data are summarized in Table 11.
Test CWTI-8 with the reduced nozzle diameter was very similar to test 7.
The leading edge of the corium column caused a crater and splash wave to form
in the water followed by levitation and dispersal of water from the pool.
Most of the corium remained unquenched during its fall to the base. It was
eventually quenched as a thick, crust-like layer on the base. There was neg-
ligible sweepout of corium debris by the steam for this prolonged corium entry
condition. The material on the base was a large, porous ingot with an exceed-
ingly irregular upper surface similar to CWTI-7. There was a marked separa-
tion of the metal and oxide phases. There was an irregular-shaped oval ring
of metallic material whose density measured 8.0 g/cm3 • The porous
3
0xide ma-
terial averaged ~ 1 cm in thickness and had a density of 3.97 g/cm. The gas
sampIes extracted from the EV indicated that 5.6 ± 1.5 g of hydrogen were pro-
duced during this test. This amounts to 76% of the maximum calculated hydro-
gen generation based upon oxidation of all Fe present in the injected corium
to Fe203 • Other test results are summarized in Table 11.
Tests CWTI-9 and -10 were performed to examine modeling concepts of cor-
ium breakup, mixing, and quench in water. In order to achieve substantial
quench during the fall through water, the pool depth was increased to ~ 35 cm
which is ~ 12 jet diameters. (The Corradini mixing model [2] predicts com-
plete breakup and mixing in ~ 4 diameters depth of water.) The two tests pa-
rameterized on the temperature of the water. In test CWTI-9, the water was
initially heated to close to saturation temperature. A total of 2.18 kg of
molten corium drained into the pool over a time span of ~ 0.9 s. Test data
indicated that the steam generated by corium-water thermal interaction as the
corium first entered the water caused an abrupt pressurization in the cavity
(Fig. 3) which was followed by a prolonged dispersal of water and some corium
from the IV into the EV. The X-ray motion picture showed an abrupt boilup of
the water pool into a fluidized state at that time. The corium sweepout, at-
tributable to the high steam efflux velocity, amounted to 318 g, 13.3% of the
injected corium. The debris rema1ning at the bottom of the IV could not be
characterized as a particle bed; instead, it was a highly porous ingot sug-
gesting that the major portion of the corium was not quenched to below its
solidus while falling to the base, in contrast to model predictions.
Test CWTI-10 was similar to the previous test except that the water was
highly subcooled at 25C. Theoutcome of this test was vastly different in the
sense that no net steam generation was measured due to rapid condensation by
the subcooled wate, and structure (Fig. 3), there was no appreciable water
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levitation, there was no sweepout of corium, and the debris bed had the char-
acteristics of a loose aggregate rather than a solidified ingot. Although re-
sults of the deep pool tests have not yet been fully analyzed, selected
results are summarized in Table 11.
MODELING AND ANALYSIS
To provide an interpretation of sweepout in the pressure-driven experi-
ments and to bridge the gap between the small-scale tests and the reactor sys-
tem, development of an integrated computer model [31 to calculate the time
dependent sweepout of corium from the cavity/tunnel region and related phenom-
ena has been undertaken. The model considers the pressure-driven flow of cor-
ium, water, steam, and gas in terms of a constant slip (i.e., velocity) ratio
between the steam/gas phase and each of the corium and water phases, freezing
out of corium as crusts upon structural surfaces, and levitation of corium and
water by the impinged and deflected vessel blowdown gas jet. The model was
applied to the CWTI experiments using the TV, IV, and EV pressures actually
recorded during the tests to drive the calculation of corium and water sweep-
out. Model predictions are compared with the experiment results in Table iII.
In CWTI-5 and CWTI-6, the corium injections were carried out at high ini-
tial TV pressures. The model predicts that as a result of interaction with
the high velocity follow-on gas jet, the corium and water are broken down into
liquid droplets which are levitated by the impinged and deflected gas stream
to form a dispersed droplet flow regime. The calculation predicts that the
corium retention reflects the freezing of levitated corium droplets as crust
until all remaining,droplets have been swept out of the IV. For CWTI-6 (dry
cavity), the predicted sweepout fraction (29%) is in excellent agreement with
the observed extent of sweepout (30% based upon the retrieved masses). The
calculated sweepout fraction for CWTI-5 (wet cavity) of 44% is somewhat less
than the experimental sweepout of 57%. The lower observed retention may prin-
cipally reflect the quenching effects of water within the IV which were not
modeled in the calculation. Specifically, corium droplets which have begun to
freeze as a result of heat transfer to levitated water droplets would not be
expected to adhere as weIl to solid surfaces thereby limiting subsequent crust
growth.
In CWTI-1 and CWTI-4, the injections were performed at low initial TV
pressure. The velocity of the injected gas flow is predicted to be insuffi-
cient to sustain the levitation of corium as droplets within the IV. Accord-
ingly, the corium forms a layer resting upon the IV base and the lower portion
of the horizontal pipeway such that freezing induced retention takes place on
these·surfaces. The calculation predicts that most of the retained mass is
due to the decay of the IV driving pressure before the greater portion of the
molten corium can be dispersed from the IV and pipeway.
The sweepout model was applied to the prediction of corium sweepout by
the blowdown steam jet from a full-size reactor cavity of Zion dimensions
[31. Initial conditions at meltthrough were taken representative of the TMLB'
sequence: primary system pressure = 17 MPa, cavity/containment pressure =
0.4 MPa (0.3 MPa steam plus 0.1 MPa air), water absent from cavity, corium
mass ejected from vessel = 86500 kg. When molten corium contacts concrete,
gas evolution and concrete melting are expected to commence immediately such
that the melted concrete and corium crust would be expected to be swept
away. However, to indicate the effects of scale upon crust growth induced
retention, the present calculations model freezing upon the cavity and tunnel
concrete walls as weIl as the RPV lower head. Table IV shows the effects of
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varying the breach flow area upon the percentage of ejected corium swept out
of the cavity and tunnel. Because the sweepout time is significantly shorter
than the vessel blowdown time, the corium predicted to be retained within the
cavity and tunnel is that which can be frozen as crust before all remaining
molten corium droplets have been swept out (as in the CWTI-5 and CWTI-6
tests). If crust formation were not modeled, the calculated dispersals would
be 100% of the corium entering the cavity. However, even with freezing upon
structure, a high sweepout of 90% or greater is predicted. The calculations
show that the relatively low sweepout fractions obtained in the CWTI experi-
ments are principally the result of the greater surface-to-volume ratio of the
small-scale tests favoring solidification upon structure as weIl as the use of
a steel rather than concrete-lined cavity mock-up.
For those experiments in which corium was gravity dropped into pools of
water within the IV and pipeway (CWTI-7 and CWTI-8), analysis has focused upon
steam and hydrogen generation. Most of the corium was found in the form of a
coherent solidified layer on the IV base and the lower portion of the pipeway
suggesting that with the exception of the small fraction of corium which was
swept out, the injected corium mostly fell through the water pool and accumu-
lated as a molten layer upon the IV base. Calculations were carried out
modeling the steam and hydrogen production resulting from the quenching of a
planar corium layer by film boiling heat transfer to an overlying water pool
and thermal conduction into the underlying stainless steel base using the
layer quenching computer code developed for analysis of the CWTI-2 experiment
[4]. The calculation assumes that a corium mass corresponding to that re-
trieved from the lower portion of the IV and pipeway is suddenly formed upon
the IV base beneath a water mass of 1.0 kg, representative of that portion of
the initial water inventory not swept out of the IV. Based upon the analysis
of CWTI-2, the corium upper surface was assumed to possess surface irregular-
ities which effectively enhance the interfacial area for film boiling heat
transfer by a factor of 3.5.
For CWTI-7 and CWTI-8, Figs. 4 and 5 compare the predicted total system
pressure with the measured pressure over the inferred cavity dryout time.
Good agreement is obtained between the calculated and observed total pressures
at dryout. For CWTI-8, the system pressurization rate throughout the dryout
interval also agrees with the measurement suggesting that the effects of addi-
tional steam generation associated with corium-water intermixing as the corium
penetrates the water and forms a layer are minimal in this experiment. In
contrast, for CWTI-7, the pressurization rate during the first 2 s of time
following the inception of steam formation is underpredicted by a factor of
greater than two. The disagreement here may indicate that either corium-water
intermixing effects are a significant source of early steam formation in the
test, or the effective enhancement in interfacial area due to surface irregu-
larities is greater than that characteristic of CWTI-8 or CWTI-2. The pre-
dicted total hydrogen production of 3.6 and 2.0 g for CWTI-7 and CWTI-8,
respectively, is somewhat less than the measured H2 generation (5.2 ± 1.1 and
5.6 ± 1.5 g). Both the calculated and experimental H2 masses are signifi-
cantly less than those corresponding to complete oxidation of the iron and
chromium present within the corium (42 and 26 g for CWTI-7 and CWTI-8, respec-
tively).
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the high pressure tests have demonstrated the importance
of modeling dispersed flow for both the water and corium under high-pressure
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blowdown conditions. The magnitude of corium dispersal into other parts of
the system has been found to be significant, and related analysis has shown
that the percentage of sweepout may be considerably greater at full-scale [3].
The test results suggest that the dispersed corium causes relatively little
direct heating of the containment atmosphere for the configuration employing a
trap at the exit of the pipeway. With water present in the cavity, the con-
tainment atmosphere heatup effect was essentially nonexistant. The results of
the gravity drain tests suggest that the coherent corium jet can effectively
channel its way through water without extensive breakup and mixing over great-
er depths than suggested by current modeling. The steam generation rates can
be effective in terms of levitating and dispersing water from the cavity, but
without augmentation by vessel blowdown, most of the corium remains as a bed
at the bottom of the cavity.
Based upon modeling of hydrodynamic dispersal and freezing phenomena, the
relatively small corium sweepout attained in tne high-pressure dispersal tests
(20-62%) is principally the result of the greater surface-to-volume ratio of
the small-scale experiments favoring solidification of stable crusts upon the
steel surfaces of the interaction vessel; sweepout in the reactor system is
predicted to exceed 90% of the corium mass ente ring the cavity during the
blowdown.
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rABLE I. INITIAL COSDlTIOSS fOR (ORIl'H/WATER ll\TERACTIOU TESTS
1. Test Apparatus CWTI-l ~ CHI-5 C...·TI-6 ~ CWTI-B CWTI-9 CWTI-IO
A. Water depth, cm (h/D
t
1) 5.4(0.5) W.8( 1.0) 10.8(1.0) 0.0 4.42(0.41) 3.5(0.37) 31.0 35.6
B. Watet temperature. C 99 95 93 95 92 94 25
C. Expansion veS8el g1l8
12~2
Ar Ar Ar Ar Ar Ar Ar
D. Gas temperature. C 126 146 135 147 130 141 25
E. Gas preasure, HPa 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
H. Corium Injector
A. Injector throat dia, c. 5.08 1.27 1.27 1.27 5.08 1.27 2.54 2.54
B. Hass of reactanta loaded, kR: 4.03 4.07 '.17 4.13 4.06 4.16 4.07 4.11
C. Hass of corium injected I kR: 1.94 4,06 3.94 3.7S 2.95 1.75 2.18 1.31
D. Injection pressure. HPa 0.49 0.36 5.0 4.7 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.18
E. Corium injection time. 8 0.070 0.50 0.30 0.15 0.7 1.5 0.9 N 0.8
F. Injector blowdovn tillle, 8 0.35 1.5 1.2 0.7
lRatto of initial water depth snd plpeway diameter.
tABU 11. SUMMARY 01 RESULTS FOR HIGH-PRESSl]pr CORllllof lN fFrrH'N TP,~T."
~ .9!!!:i 1~!1:1 ~ .9!!l.:l. C\lTI-8 CWTI-9 CWTI-I0
A. Mass of corIum injected, kg 1.94 4.06 3.94 3.7S 2.95 I. 75 2.18 1.31
B. Corium s ....eepout I I 35 20 62 J2 6.6 0.9 13.3 0
c. IV peak pressure riae I HPa 0.25 0.13 0.81 0,18 0.103 0.100 0,150 0.002
D. EV peak pressure rise, HPa 0.12 0.13 0.38 0.13 0.103 0.100 O. i50 0.002
E. Time to reac.h 90% of EV
peak pressure I S 1.0 3.8 0.9 0.5 6.7 28.5 35
F. Effic.ienc.y of steam
produc.tion I I 65 14 44 10 42 67 55 0.0
G. Hax. steam/gas veloc.ity
through pipeway, m/s 380 84 580 225 02 49 151 3.3
H. Hax. mea8ured tempo riet'!
in EV I C -10 15 -2 53
I. Eff!ciency of containment
atmosphere heatup, % 0.0 3.6 6.2
TABLE UI. COMPARISON OF PREDICTED AND OBSERVED SWEEPOUT IN GAS PRESSURE-DRIVEN CWTI EXPERIMENTS
Test Initial Initial Injected Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Injection Water Corium Compietion Compietion Corium Corium
Pressure, lJepth, Hass, of f::weepout, of Sweepaut t Sweepout 2 Sweepoul t
MPa ho/Dpipe I kg B B % %
GWTI-I 0.49 0.5 1.94 0.32 0.32 32 30
GWTI-4 0.36 1.0 4.06 '" 1.8 1.8 35 34
CWTI-5 5.0 1.0 3.94 0.7 0.53 57 44
CWrI-6 4.7 0.0 3.75 0.6 0.71 30 29
~Ratio of initial water depth end pipeway diameter •
. Based upan retrieved masses.
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Figure 2. Interaction Vessel (IV) Pressure Data from
CWTI-5 and 6.
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Figure 5. Simulation of CWTI-8: Comparison of Predicted and Measured System
Pressure versus Time.
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AREFINED MODEL FOR THE COOLABILITY OF CORE DEßRIS WITH FLOH ENTRY
FROM THE BOTTOM
T. Schulenberg*, U. MUller
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Institut fUr Reaktorbauelemente
Postfach 3640, 7500 Karlsruhe 1
Federal Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
A refined model for two-phase flow in particle beds is presented.
Compared to earlier models the improved model takes into account
the effect of interfacial drag forces between liquid and vapor,
\~hich are important in coarse debris beds. The model is based on
the momentum equations for separated flow, which are closed by
empirical relations for the wall shear stress and the interfacial
drag. Hhen the new model is applied to LWR severe accident scena-
rios an increased dryout heat flux is pedicted for debris beds
with flow entry from the bot tom driven by a moderate downcorner
head.
I NTRODUCTI ON
In the context of a hypothetical severe accident in a light water reactor
also debris beds of a coarse particle size are discussed. If the bed is located
on a permeable support structure, eoolant ean enter from the bot tom of the bed.
Then a conveetive flol< eirculating through a surrounding downcorner can enhanee
the coolahility, whieh was first demonstrated by Hofmann /1/ and Stevens and
Trenherth /2/. It ean also be derived from pressure drop measurements of Naik
and Dhir /3/ and Tung et al, /4/. In order to prediet the limit of coolability
of such debris, a two-phase flow model has been applied whieh neglects pressure
differenees between both phases as weIl as channeling effects /1/. However,
sinee interfaeial drag forees between liquid and vapor may enhance the coolabi-
lity, this effeet has been taken into aeeount in the model of the present work.
The important role of interfacial drag forees was pointed out earlier by
Tutu et al, /5/. As a first step for a new model they extended the se para ted
flo\~ model of Lipinski /6/ by including an interfacial drag term, whieh they de-
rived from bubbly or ehurn turhulent flow in pipeL However, large discrepancies
with respeet to their experimental results limited the usefulness of this model.
The present work is aimed at refining this model with respeet to the particular
properties 6f debris beds.
* Present adress: Dornier System GmbH, Postfach 1360, 7990 Friedriehshafen, FRG
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FUNDAMENTAL EQUATIONS
Following Tutu et al. /5/ the balance of momentum for the liquid (index f)









Pgg + v + v Ivgl +~ = 0, (2)8z KKg g nn g g 1-5
where vf and v denote the superficial velocities of the liquid and the gas
respectively. Ks a good approximation for coarse debris beds the pressure Pf
in the liquid phase may be assumed to be equal to the pressure p in the gas
phase. K and " are the permeability and the passability, respect'vely, for
single-phase flow of either component in a saturated porous medium. For uni-
form spherical particles they are related to the particle diameter d and the
porosity e according to Ergun /7/ as
d 2 E;3 (3)K 150 (1-E;) 2
d E;3 (4)
n = 1.75 1-E;
The relative permeabilities Kf and K, are functions of the effective satu-
ration sand the shape of the particles. fiese have been measured in a different
context by ßrooks and Corey /8/ for various sands. For beds consisting of uni-




Relations for the relative passabilities "f and "g have been proposed by
Lipinski /6/ and have recently been corrected by Lipinski /9/ on the basis of a
theoretical work of Reed /10/. In Dur investigation the functional dependence of
the relative passabilities on the saturation has been determined by measure-
ments.
To model the interfacial drag force Ffg the following considerations
mad~: The force Ffg can only be a function of the following four relevant
tit1es:
- the buoyancy force
are
quan-
the viscous forces in the




phase with respect to the relative veloci-
Vf--;-) ,
- the inertia in the liquid phase with respect to the relative velocity
2
Pf v vf" (~---;-)
- the capillary force
alK.
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Viscous forces and inertia of the gas phase are small compared to the
forces discussed above and they are therefore negleeted. Sinee indieations for
an interfaeial drag have only been observed in beds of eoarse partieles /3/
inertia forces, which are dominant in beds of eoarse partieles, are assumed to
be responsible for the momentum transfer between both phases. Capillary forces
will separate the flow and thus reduee the momentum transfer. The viseosity of
the liquid may inerease the momentum transfer in the ease of bubbly flol', whieh
is expected to oeeur at high saturations. At lower saturations viseous forees
may stabilize aseparated flow and thus reduee the momentum transfer. It is
expeeted that at moderately high saturations both effeets due to viseosity eom-
pensate. If only the dominant parameters are taken into aeeount, the interfacial
drag force Ffg , scaled with the buoyaney force, ean be modeled such that it
depends only on the ratio of inertia to eapillary forces, and on the effeetive
saturation. The laUer effeet is expressed by a funetion W(s) which has to be
determined. We obtain
(7)
In agreement with Tutu et al. /5/, Ffg is proportional to the square of the
relative velocity, but the dependenee on eapillary forees is stronger in the
model proposed by uso
EMPIRICAL CLOSURE EQUATIONS
In order to determine the empirieal funetians Tlf(s), Tl g(s) and W(s), the
pressure drop was measured of a vertieal two-phase flow of air and water or air
and an aqueous solution of 48 % ethanol through a bed of nearly spherieal glass
beads. The test seetion is sketehed in figure 1. The saturation was determined
by the amount of liquid displaced. Liquid and gas mass flow rates were measured
separately before the two fluids were supplied through a porous plate at the
bot tom of the bed. The properties of the beds are listed in table 1. The permea-
bility and the passability were measured with a single-phase flow using liquid
only. The effeetive partiele diameter mentioned eorresponds to the measured
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Fig. Sketch of the test section.
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Fig. 2 Dependence of the interfacial drag on the effective saturation.
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The empirieal funetion Wes) was determioed by evaluatiog the experiments at
a zero liquid flow rate with eqs. (1) and (7). Results are shown in figure 2.
Vertieal bars denote the experimental error bounds. For moderately large effee-
tive saturations of about 0.6 the same funetion W eould be reprodueed for diffe-
rent liquids and partiele sizes. These facts support the assumptions made in eq.
(7). For higher saturations the inereased viseosity of 48 % ethanol results in
higher values for W, whereas at values below 0.5 an opposite behavior ean be
notieed. This result is in aeeordanee with the eonsideratioDs above eoneerning
the influenee of viseosity. For all liquids and partiele sizes Wes) ean be
fitted as
m
Wes) = Wo s (1-s),
where \{o = 350 aod m = 7 ean be taken as mean values.
(8)
If the relative permeabilities are deseribed by equations (5) and (6), and
if the funetion W is fitted as in equation (8), the relative passabilities ~g
and ~f ean be determined from equations (1) and (2). Results are shown in figu-
res 3 and 4, respeetively. The experimental data ean be approximated as
if s < 0.68
if s > 0.68.
These relative passabilities are smaller than those whieh were first assumed
by Lipinski /6/, but they agree better with his i~proved model /9/.
APPLI CATION TO LI GHT WATER REACTOR SCENARIOS
If the debris bed, generated during a hypothetieal eore melt-down aeeident,
has a permeable base the amount of fluid penetration tbrough the bottom into the
bed and the maximum heat flux through the top, the so-ealled dryout heat flux,
are funetions of the driving downcorner head surrounding the bed. If this dOWD~
corner level is similar to the bed height the dryout heat flux will be signifi-
eantly inereased eompared to the dryout heat flux of a d'ebris bed on an imper-
meable, adiabatie plate. In figure 5 this increase of the dryout heat flux is
eal~ulated as a fUDetion of the dOl1neomer height Hd , I,hieh has been sealed with
the bed height Hb• Applying our new model the inerease is predieted to be higher
than that ealeulated by Lipinski /t/, even if his new model /9/ is applied. This
differenee is due to the lack of interfaeial drag forees in the models of
Lipinski. Ou~ new model is supported by an experiment of Hofmann /1/, also
plotted in figure 5. This experimental result even exeeeds our predieted results.
SUHHARY
The separated flow model proposed by Lipinski /6/ has been extended. By
measuring the pressure drop and the saturation in an unheated partiele bed empi-
rieal eorrelations for the relative passabilities were obtained. Their values
are generally smaller than those predietedby the eorrelation of Lipinski /6/,
but they agree better with his reeent assumptions /9/. In addition a simple
relation for the interfaeial drag has been developed. The relation expresses the
dominant influenee due to liquid inertia and eapillary forces. If the model is
applied to light water reaetor severe aeeident scenarios, an inereased dryout
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RECENT FILM BOILING CALCULATIONS:
IMPLICATION ON FUEL-COOLANT INTERACTIONS
B.J. Kim and M.L. Corradini
University of Wiseonsin-Madison
Madison, WI 53706, USA
ABSTRACT
A transient film boiling model was developed to study the film
boiling dynamies that would oeeur when a molten spherical fuel
droplet is immersed in a coolant. The foeus of this study was to
investigate the effeets of noneondensible gas, eoolant temperature,
and ambient pressure on film boiling during the initial growth
phase. These parameters were found to have the greatest influenee
on the triggering of the small seale fuel-coolant interaetions. The
results indieate that the film generally stabilizes with more
noneondensible gas present and higher eoolant temperatures. Our
ealculations indieate that small ambient pressurizations eause
violent fluetutaion of the film pressure while higher ambient
pressures suppress these oseillations. These results are in good
agreement with Nelson's experimental data for a single fuel droplet
in water.
INTRODUCTION
For an energetie FCI to oeeur, film boiling between the fuel and eoolant
is aprerequisite for a eoarse fuel-eoolant mixture to develop. Only when
there is an insulating vapor film is there enough time to mix the hot and cold
eomponents without premature rapid heat transfer taking plaee. Only a few
analytieal studies have been done to simulate transient vapor film boiling
around a hot sphere [1,2]. However, ealeulations were done up to only 1 ms,
whieh was too short to deseribe even the initial growth behavior of film;
usually it takes longer for the vapor film to grow and enter a quasi-steady
state. The purpose of this study is to develop adynamie model of film growth
whieh ean give the initial conditions for the film eollapse phase whieh
triggers the FCI; this is usually initiated by an external pressure pulse in
the small seale single droplet experiments [3,4].
FORllULATION OF THE MODEL
Our model is of a spherieal fuel droplet immersed in a large volume of
coolant, Figure 1, whieh is the charaeteristie of small seale single droplet
experiments. Our basic assumptions are:
1. The fuel-eoolant system is spherieally symmetrie; it implies that the
variation of the film thiekness is small eompared to droplet radius
and is observed in the small seale FCI experiments [3,4].
2. All the vapor produeed is retained in the film; no vapor generated was
detached from the filln during the initial film boiling in the
experiments.
3. The pressure in the film is spatially uniform; the film around the
droplet is very thin and the time elapsing as apressure disturbanee
is transmitted aeross the film is mueh less than the time involved in
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appreciable change in the average film pressure.
4. The vapor and other gases, if any, in the film are considered to be
perfect gases; the critical point of the coolant is avoided during the
film growth.
5. A small gaseous film initially exists at the surface of the sphere;
the initial gaseous film is comprised of both the gas generated at the
surface of the drop due to chemical reaction and the gas swept into
the coolant as the droplet falls freely through the surrounding gas.
In the model, only the gas swept into the coolant is considered.
6. Coolant and fuel liquid are considered to be incompressible; the
velocity of the film-coolant interface is far less than the speed of
sound.
7. The thermophysical properties are considered to be constant except the
latent heat of the coolant and density of air; since the film
undergoes severe oscillations during growth, the latent heat of






The dynamic film boiling process was mode lIed by writing a momentum
equation for film dynamics and an energy equation for each region of the system
(fuel, coolant vapor, and liquid) and linking each region by the appropriate
boundary conditions. The integral approach was used in each region for the
energy equations where the differential equation was integrated over the region
and a temperature profile was assumed.
The momentum equation for film growth is modelIed by a general Rayleigh




The evaporation or condensation rate is obtained from a simple kinetic





where accommodation coefficient was assumed to be 0.04 in this
application; separate studies indicate that the effects of accommodation
coefficient are negligible.
The velocity of the vapor-liquid interface is then given by
(3)




Since the temperature wave may not have penetrated to the center of drop let
during the time of interest, the droplet is treated as a semi-infinite mass and
integrated from r=R-Ah to r=R.
(5 )
A quadratic temperature profile satisfying the boundary conditions within the
thermally active region is assumed as
2
Thi + (Tho - Thi ) (1 - ~~r)
(6)
where boundary conditions satisfied are




(R, t) Tho (t)
(7.2)
aTh(r,t)
I r 0 (7.3)ar = R-Ah(t)
When this temperature profile is substituted into Equation (5), the result is
A 2 dT
ho1 (---h.) 1
+ 30 'R ' " dt (8)
The energy equation for the coolant is similar to Equation (4) except that
a radial convective term is included to account for the movement of the vapor
film and the subsequent movement of the liquid.
(9)
where the last term in the right hand side is the fraction of radiation
energy deposited in the thermally active region of coolant. The radiation
energy from the fuel was considered as volumetric energy generation within and
without the thermal boundary layer. Constant K is given as a function of the
surface temperature of droplet and the thickness of thermal boundary layer in
the coolant. Again a parabolic temperature profile is assumed in the liquid
thermal boundary layer. Boundary conditions are
T (Rö,t) Tco (t) (10.1)c
T (Rö
+ AC' t) Tci (t)
(10.2)
c






Temperature profile in the thermally active region of coolant becomes
(11 )
By substituting this temperture profile into Equation (9) and integrating over
the thermal boundary layer, it becomes
K RZ 4
Cl c + .!.. U + E_(J_T-,h:;:.o~ _
AC Z "ZR Z (T - T .)o pc cpc co c~
A A A Z dTc [.!. +.!. (~) + .!..- (~) ] co
Z(T - T
ci
) 3 6 Ro 30 Ro ~co
1 1 A 1 AC Z dRo- [2 + 3" (~) + TZ (R) ] dt (1Z)Ro 0
Using a lumped parameter energy equation for the vapor film, the energy
conservation equation is given as
Q _ P dV
v f dtdd [H u + H u ]t v v g g










) - ~(T - T )Qv -0- 41T Ro o v co (14)
h (Tv'Pv> C (T v - Tco ) + hfg + C (T - Tci ) (15)v pv pc co
Uv and hv are the specific internal energy and specific enthalpy of vapor. As
long as lumped energy equation is used, temperature profile assumed for the
vapor film does not affect the general film behavior very much.
Another relation between the rate of change of Tho and Ah is obtained from





The heat transfer rate in the coolant was determined by choosing the
higher transfer rate between conduction and convection. Forced convective heat
transfer coefficient is calculated from the correlation for the flow past a
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solid sphere [7] and is given by,
Nu 2.0 + 0.6 Re 1/ 2 Pr 1/ 3












Zk c(T - T ) - + - (T - T )




For a forced convection-dominating heat transfer, the rate of change of Ac is
neglected and the conduction heat transfer coefficient in the coolant is
replaced by the forced convection heat transfer coefficient.
The pressure in the vapor film is determined from Dalton's law of partial
pressurej
(19)
where vapor is treated as an ideal gas and noncondensible gas is assumed
to behave isentropically. The initial noncondensible gas film thickness is
considered to be some fraction of the boundary layer thickness of the flow over
sphere before it enters the coolant pool and given as
s 'g C • D • (Re )-1/2D (20)
where the constant C is parametrized and varied from 0.01 to 0.1 in this
modeL
Equations 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 constitute a set of non-linear
first order differential equations in the eight time-dependent variables RS' U,
Tv ' Tco ' Tho ' Ah' Ac' and Mv, A simultaneous solution has been obtained by
using one step Runge-Kutta-Merson technique which is a modification of 4th
order Runge-Kutta integration [8].
Applications of the Model: Results and Discussions
The model developed has been applied to the growth of a vapor film around
a molten iron oxide droplet in waterj this fuel-coolant pair was used by Nelson
[3,4] in his single droplet FCI experiments. The basic initial conditions are
given in Table I. Initially the rapid vaporization results in apressure rise
in the film which accelerates the film-coolant interface outward. However, the
outward motion of the interface continues beyond the equilibrium position.
Thus the film pressure falls below the ambient pressure leading to deceleration
of the interface. The movement of the film-coolant interface is reversed and
the film starts to collapse. This cycle of growth and partial collapse repeats
with an increase in the film thickness and the amplitude of the film pressure
oscillations until it reaches its maximum values. Then the film oscillation
decreases, which appears to enter a stable state. Under certain sets of
initial conditions (i.e. fuel and coolant temperature, ambient pressure,
noncondensible gas film thickness) we observed that the film oscillations do
not die away but continue over long time at large amplitude. We have verified
that these prolonged oscillations are not numerically based. Therefore, we
believe they represent the case where the film is not inherently stable and
surface instabilities (e.g. Taylor instabilities) would cause fuel-coolant
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liquid contact, film collapse, and triggering of the FCI. This set of
conditions is of importance to us because they probably represent the
conditions where Nelson found the single fuel droplet tests to be easily
triggered. Therefore, we have parametrically investigated the set of initial
conditions which Nelson found to be important in affecting the triggering of
the FCI in the single droplet tests (i.e. gas entrained, coolant temperature,
and ambient pressure). We feel one can explain the change in triggerability
due to the film growth dynamics when these initial conditions are varied.
Effect of Intial Noncondensible Gas Film Thickness
The influence of the initial noncondensible gas on the film growth is
significant (Figure 2). The oscillations of film were diminished enormously
with an increase of the initial noncondensible gas film thickness due to the
retardation of initial heat transfer across the film and its damping effect on
pressure fluctuation. This result suggests that the occurrence of spontaneous
triggering of the single droplet FCI at a lower drop fall height can be
explained by a smaller amount of noncondensible gas; i.e. the lower drop fall
height reduces the entry Reynolds number and therefore amount of noncondensible
gas entrained in the film causing large film and pressure oscillations, film
collapse, and FCI triggering.
Effect of Coolant Temperature
Figure 3 shows that the decreasing water .subcooling stabilizes film
boiling, which is consistent with experimental data [9]. Damped oscillations
at lower subcooling is due to the continuous and higher evaporation rate which
tends to prevent the pressure in the film falling below the ambient pressure.
Thus lower water subcooling makes film collapse more difficult due to these
effects on forming a more stable and thicker film around the drop.
At constant water subcooling, the oscillations of the pressure in the film
have a smaller amplitude and damps more quickly with higher ambient pressure
(Figure 4). Higher ambient pressure suppresses the oscillation of the film and
higher water temperature induces easier vaporization leading to the more stable
film.
Effect of Ambient Pressure
The duration of film pressure fluctuation becomes shorter as ambient
pressure increases as illustrated in Figure 5. Also the time required to reach
its maximum film pressure during the film growth also decreases with ambient
pressure. The maximum film pressure increases sharply as the ambient pressure
increases from 0.1 MPa to 0.2 MPa and then remains almost unchanged as P~
increases up to 0.4 MPa. For the further increases in ambient pressure, the
peak film pressure genera ted decreases relatively slowly. In some aspects
these film behavior explains why small ambient pressurizations lead to the
easier initiation of FCI and shorter interaction time. These effects of
ambient pressure are related to the suppression of 'oscillation and easier
vaporization due to lower latent heat of water at higher ambient pressure
against the higher subcooling of water.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our conclusion on this study is that a simple model of film boiling
dynamics can qualitatiely predict the characteristics of small scale single
droplet FCI in terms of film growth and its thickness, film pressure
oscillation and its amplitude, and time scale, which are strong functions of
evaporation rate throughout the boiling process. The initial noncondensible
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gas film thickness and coolant temperature have consistent and predictable
effects on film growth by diminishing the oscillation of film pressure.
Ambient pressure affects film behavior depending upon the magnitude of
pressurization, and results in the most violent pressure oscillation at a
certain intermediate ambient pressure. However, the influence of any one
parameter on the film boiling can be suppressed or enhanced by varying another
parameter; they are closely interrelated to each other.
Once the initial conditions for the collapse phase are obtained, film
collapse behavior due to external pressure pulse can be examined. During this
phase, film pressure is considered to increase rapidly and closer liquid-liquid
contact due to the surface instabilities is very likely. Therefore we are
continuing to study film collapse behavior in connection with surface
instabilities.
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NOMENCLATURE
Cp : Specific heat
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QUENCH COOLING OF SUPERHEATED DEBRIS BEDS IN CONTAINMENT
DURING LWR CORE MELTDOWN ACCIDENTS
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ABSTRACT
Light water reactor core meltdown accident sequence studies suggest
that superheated debris beds may settle on the concrete floor beneath
the reactor vessel. A model for the heat transfer processes during
quench of superheated debris beds cooled by an overlying pool of
water has been presented in a prior paper. This paper discusses the
coolability of decay-heated debris beds from the standpoint of their
transient quench characteristics. It is shown that even though a de-
bris bed configuration may be coolable from the point of view of
steady-state decay heat removal, the quench behavior from an initial-
ly elevated temperature may lead to bed melting prior to quench of
the debris.
INTRODUCTION
Core meltdown accident sequence studies in light-water reactors suggest
that reactor vessel failure would occur as molten core material (corium) ther-
mally attacks the lower vessel dome. In many important sequences water would
be available in the region beneath the vessel. As indicated schematically in
Fig. 1, melt would be ejected from the reactor vessel upon failure and some de-
gree of corium-water mixing would occur, accompanied by rapid steam generation,
and possibly steam explosions. The melt would be partially quenched by the
water and would eventually settle to the concrete floor beneath the reactor
vessel ("quench" implies reduction of debris temperature to water saturation
temperature). Much uncertainty exists as to the state and configuration of the
melt at this point. The corium may be in the form of a partially quenched sol-
id debris bed or in the form of a molten pool, which is both attacking the con-
crete and transferring heat to the overlying coolant layer. The lack of con-
vincing evidence from large scale tests regarding the nature of the debris fol-
lowing arrival to the concrete floor necessitates consideration of the impact
of two scenarios on the accident progression: (i) the quench of solid debris
beds by overlying pools of water and their coolability , and (ii) the cooling
behavior of molten pools which attack the concrete and are cooled by overlying
pools of water. This paper considers the quench cooling of superheated debris
beds in containment during core melt accidents.
Debris bed quench heat transfer has in the past been computed using a
single lumped-parameter energy equation for the debris bed, together .with
steady-state debris bed heat removal formulations [1]. As a conseq\lence of
this assumption, the debris temperature would be predicted to decrease monoto-
nically with time if the bed were coolable based upon steady-state debris
coolability considerations [2]. Experimental results suggest that steady
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state heat removal eoneepts ean, indeed, be used to prediet the debris bed heat
removal rate under transient queneh eonditions [3,4]. The data, however, indi-
eate that the bed queneh is a eomplex, multi-dimensional proeess that eannot be
treated using a single-volume energy equation method of analysis. Models have
been developed [5,6] to eharaeterize the transi0nt debris bed queneh proeess.
Early results [5] suggested that remelting of the debris is possible under some
eireumstanees, dependent on bed parameters and initial eonditions. The objee-
tive of this paper is to diseuss the eoolability of superheated debris beds
under eonditions of transient queneh eooling. Coolability limits are diseussed
for deeay-heated debris beds.
BED QUENCH MODEL AND ITS BASIS
Figure 2 presents a eoneeptualized view of a superheated debris bed under
transient queneh eonditions. Experimental data [3-5] suggest that paeked beds
of superheated partieles (with no internal heating), whieh were eooled by water
supplied from overlying pools of water, were quenehed in a two-stage eooling
proeess. Water initially penetrated the beds during the initial downward fron-
tal progression. This proeess was irregular and left ehannels or poekets of
dry partieles. It was estimated [3] that approximately 30-40% of the initial
stored energy was transferred to the water during this time period. During the
initial frontal progression, the bed is eoneeptualized eonsisting of three re-
gions. The uppermost partially quenehed region '(as represented in Fig. 2) eon-
sists of wetted ehannels of partieles whieh are quenehed to the saturation tem-
perature and ehannels of unquenehed partieles elose to their initial tempera-
ture. A two-phase region follows below. The partieles in the wetted ehannels
in this region are not yet quenehed to the saturation temperature and the sur-
rounding fluid is eomposed of steam and water. The bottom-most region is eom-
pletely dry. No liquid has yet penetrated to the partieles in this region.
The speed of the downward-progressing eooling front is vd' A final upward-
progressing front, moving at speed vu , began its traverse subsequent to eom-
pletion of the downward proeess. During this final upward frontal progression,
the remaining stored energy was removed from the partieles and the bed was eom-
pletely quenehed and.filled with water. The experimental measurements further
show that the steam flow rate was nearly eonstant for the entire duration of
the queneh proeess, inelusive of both frontal progression periods [7]. This is
taken to imply that the rate of heat transfer from the bed to the water was
limited by proeesses eommon to both frontal periods. The steam flow rate data
indieate that the bed-to-water heat transfer rate is well-approximated using
the Lipinski [2] model for steady-state heat removal from debris beds. The
evidenee suggests, therefore, that the rate of quenehing of a superheated de-
bris bed is limited by the hydrodynamies of eountereurrent two-phase flow with-
in the bed.
The above observations were applied to development of a model eharaeteriz-
ing the queneh of a superheated debris bed of uniform-size partieles and uni-
form porosity with deeay heat generation Q"'. The analytieal model, presented
in an earlier paper [5], eonsiders that a deeay-heated, superheated debris bed
is eooled in the two-stage queneh front propagation proeess represented sehema-
tieally in Fig. 2. Coolant is assumed to initially penetrate the bed, leaving
dry regions of partieles whieh eontinue to heat under deeay heating. Upon ar-
rival of the downward front to the base of the bed, a final upward-direeted
front propagates up the bed, removing the remaining s tored energy. The bed
eooling rate is modeled using the Lipinski formulation [2], modified to aeeount
for transient liquid storage within the bed whieh takes plaee during the queneh
proeess. The queneh fronts are assumed to propagate at a rate limited by the
rate of liquid supply to the front. Partieles in the unquenehed region of the
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bed are assumed to increase in temperature due to the internal heat source.
Steam cooling of the debris and steam superheating are neglected.
The complete formulation of the model includes: (i) a coolant mass con-
servation equation, (ii) a pair of momentum equations, one for liquid and the
other for vapor, (iii) a quench front propagation equation and (iv) an energy
equation for the unquenched particles. The reader is referred to the Appendix
for details of the model.
CALCULATIONAL RESULTS
Calculationswere performed for the range of conditions shown in Table 1.
Figures 3 and 4, which are representative results, present the downward- and
upward-frontal positions as a function of time for uniform beds of 6-mm parti-
cles, of depth 0.5 and 1.0 m, respectively. It was assumed in these calcula-
tions that 40% of the bed cross-sectional area is quenched during the downward
propagation period. The remaining energy is removed during the upward frontal
propagation time. The effect of initial bed temperature is shown on each fig-
ure. The temperature rise of the unquenched debris is shown in Fig. 5 for each
initial temperature condition. It is noted that since the effect of steam
superheating is not considered, the temperature rise rate is simply proportion-
al to the decay-heating rate.






















Referring to Figs. 3 and 4, the quench process begins with the progression
of the downward front from the top of the bed, and is represented as the lines
with the negative slope. This front reaches the bottom of the bed, at which
time the upward-directed front begins its progression, refilling the bed during
the process. The quench process is complete when the front reaches the top of
the bed. During the entire quench process, the dry unquenched channels are as-
sumed to continue to heat, as represented by the heating curves of Fig. 5. If
the quench process is complete before the. bed melting temperature is reached,
then the bed is considered coolable. In comparing Figs. 3 and 5, for example,
one observes that beds of 6-mm particles with 0.5 m height are coolable at ini-
tial temperatures up to nearly 3000 K. On the other hand, a comparison of
Figs. 4 and 5 suggests that beds of 1-m height are quench coolable only if
their initial temperature is relatively low, i.e., in the range of 1000 K.
Figure 6 presents the steady-state debris bed heat flux, based on the Li-
pinski (2) model.as a function of particle size, along with the maximum coola-
ble bed height computed on the basis of the heat flux. These results indicate,
based upon steady-state heat removal from uniform debris beds, that beds of
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6-mm particles up to 1.5 m in height are coolable from the standpoint of decay
heat removal. It is thus clear, based upon the model assumptions characterized
above, that debris beds which are coolable based upon steady state, decay heat
removal calculations are not necessarily coolable from the standpoint of tran-
sient quench heat removal. Bed melting may occur prior to transition to the
decay heat removal mode of bed cooling.
Calculations similar to those described above were used to construct de-
bris bed quench coolability maps for the conditions and particle diameters rep-
resented in Table 1. As discussed above, a bed was j udged to be coolable if
the quench process was completed prior to fuel remelting in the unquenched vap-
or channels. The results of these calculations are shown in Figs. 7-10. The
range of bed initial conditions leading to a coolable final state are presented
for each of the particle diameters considered.
The results presented in Figs. 7-10 clearly demonstrate that debris
quenching imposes an additional constraint on establishment of conditions for
bed coolability.
SU~fi1ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A model for the heat transfer processes during quench of superheated
debris beds cooled by an overlying pool of water is used to discuss the coola-
bility of decay-heated beds from the standpoint of their transient quench char-
acteristics. The analytical model is based on observations made during experi-
mental simulations of the quench process using beds of spherical particles of
uniform diameter.
Debris bed quench coolability maps were constructed for beds of spherical
particles of 1- to 12-mm diameter, up to 1 m in height. Initial bed tempera-
tures in the range 1000 K-3000 K were considered. A bed was considered coola-
ble if the quench process was completed prior to fuel remelting in the un-
quenched vapor channels. The coolability maps so constructed were compared
with coolability considerations based on steady state, decay-heated particle
bed analysis. The Lipinski two-phase countercurrent hydrodynamics treatment
for the bed heat flux was used in the transient quench formulation (modified to
account for the transient liquid be~ refill mechanism) and also in the steady-
state coolability calculations.
The results demonstrate that debris bed quenching imposes an additional
constraint on establishment of conditions for bed coolability. Even though a
debris bed configuration may be coolable from the point of view of steady-state
decay heat removal, the quench behavior from an initially elevated temperature
may lead to bed melting prior to quench of the debris. The question of steady-
state, decay heat removal debris coolability is moot unless one can first dem-
onstrate that conditions are favorable for debris quench to the coolant satura-
tion temperature. These results point to the need for more detailed examina-
tion of debris bed initial conditions and of the physical mechanisms which lead
to bed formation.
The analysis presented here may be overly conservative in that it was pos-
tulated that particles in the dry, unquenched regions of the superheated parti-
cle bed continue to increase in temperature despite the presence of flowing
steam in these regions. The questions of heat transfer from the particles to
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Fig. 1 Accident Progression Following
Vessel Faliure
Fig. 2 Schematic of Superheated Debris
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Fig. 3 Quench Front Propagation for
0.5 m Height Bed
Fig. 4 Quench Front Propagation for






























Fig. 5 Particle Temperature Results















Fig. 6 Steady-State Coolability Map for
Beds of Spherical Particles
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Fig. 8 Quench Coolability Map:
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APPENDIX: FORMULATION OF BASIC EQUATIONS
The analysis presented below focuses on the calculation of the frontal
propagation speeds and on the particle temperatures.
It is assumed that the quench front is propagated at a speed limited by
the rate of liquid flow to the quench front, and that the thickness of the two-
phase front is negligible. The front is assumed located at z=z*(t), as shown










An energy balance across the quench front then yields
(1)
A mass balance on the liquid phase yields
(2)










where ßT = Tp - TSAT'
(4)
A similar set of equations can be written for the time period of the
upward-progressing front. During this time period, liquid supplied from the
pool is used to remove decay heat from the debris which is already quenched,






The energy equation for the unquenched particles is
QIII (6)
while for the quenched particles Tp = TSAT'
has been neglected.
The effect of steam cooling
The overall coolant conservation equations are
fdVd(P~- Pg)
(l-fd)vu( P~ - Pg)
down-front
up-front (7)
where u~o and ugo are the liquid and vapor velocities at the top of the
bed.
The above set of equations can be solved once ugo and u ~o are relat-
ed. This is accomplished by assuming, as discussed above, that the heat trans-
fer from the debris bed to water is limited by countercurrent two-phase flow
conditions near the top of the bed. The Lipinski model supplies the additional
required relationship between u~o and Ugo'
Equations (4)-(7), together with the formulations for the bed heat remov-








Current computer codes for the interaction of core debris with
concrete concentrate on the high temperature phase of the
interaction and are not designed for prediction of the long-term
behaviour when conduction into the concrete becomes important.
This paper describes models of various levels of complexity for
thermal penetration into concrete. A simple model of thermal
penetration is included in substantially improved version of the
INTER code; this is compared with an alternative version which uses
isotherm migration routines for conduction. A code, CONIMM, that
uses fully two-dimensional isotherm migration routines and includes
a simple model for water release is also described. If coupled with
a 'pool' model, CONIMM would have the capability of calculating the
lang-term thermal penetration.
1.INTRODUCTION
The most widely available code for modelling the interaction of core
debris with concrete is the INTER code originally written by Murfin·of Sandia
Laboratories [1] and subsequently incorporated into the MARCH code [2]. The
INTER code was written prior to much of the experimental work on core-concrete
interactions and so, as Murfin noted "The model presented is to some extent
based on conjecture ••• Because of the number of assumptions and estimates, it
should not be supposed that the model can "predict" such critical variables as
the time of containment melt-through. The model can best be utilized to det-
ermine the general effect of changing parameters ••• " [1]. The Sandia assess-
ment of the use of INTER in MARCH [3] supported this interpretation of the
code.
Rather than develap INTER in the light of more recent experimental
information, effort has ~enerally gone into the development of new codes such
as WECHSL[4] and CORCON LS]; both these latter codes allow more flexibility
in the pool shape than is available in INTER, contain more detailed chemistry,
. and use more physically based models for heat transfer in liquid layers. The
published versions of these newer codes concentrate on detailed modelling of
the high temperature phase of the interaction during which the debris itself
and the concrete decomposition products are molten. The use of such models is
limited because (i) core debris need not be molten at the start of the
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interaction, and (ii) solidification of constituents of the debris may occur
early in the interaction. Furthermore neither the published versions of
WECHSL or CORCON contain models for heat loss by conduction into the concrete
(i.e. heat loss in excess of that required to supply the sensible heat of
ablated concrete); whilst this is probably not significant during the high
temperature phase of the interaction it would determine (a) the initial gas
release if the concrete is heated by a dried-out debris bed and (b) the long-
term growth of the interaction region, as it provides a significant heat sink
over periods of days and months. The modelling of concrete ablation is dis-
cussed in detail in section 2.
As noted above the model formulations in INTER are generally less mechan-
istic than those of the later codes; however the original code does allow for
solidified layers of debris, and for thermal penetration into the concrete.
In section 2.2 a revised expression for the thermal penetration distance is
given. This, and other changes, have been incorporated into a revised version
of INTER, which includes the bulk of the original coding, to give an improved
fast-running code that is capable of modelling all phases of the core-concrete
interaction. This new version INTER is described in section 3.
The more detailed treatment of ablation and conduction into concrete
described in section 2.4 has not, as yet, been incorporated into any of the
current codes, but has been programmed as a separate code CONIMM, which is
described in section 4.
2.MODELLING OF CONCRETE ABLATION
2.1.Basic equations.
Experiments [6] indicate that the attack of debris on concrete is primar-
ily a thermal process: heat from the debris raises the concrete to a temper-
ature at which it becomes generally molten. Although concrete actually melts
over a range of temperatures, this process may be approximated by the
relationship:
pL~ = ~ + k(bT/b~)I~ = O+E; E+O (1)
where ~ is the normal velocity of the ablation front, and ~ is a local normal
co-ordinate into the concrete from its interface with the debris region, ~ is
the (position dependent) heat flux on the debris side of the interface; p, L
and kare the concrete density, latent heat of fusion and conductivity at the
melting point (Tm) respectively.
Within the concrete heat is transferred by (i) conduction, (ii) the move-
ments of steam and other gases produced by the decomposition of the concrete,
and (iii) the movement of free water under the influence of the pressures set
up by the gas flow. The Sandia code USINT[7] models these processes in one-
dimension, but does not include an ablation front. Simple scaling arguments
indicate that when a steady rate of ablation is assumed, the ratio of heat
transferred by the steam and gas flqw is only a fraction of that carried by
conduction; the expulsion of water depends strongly on the boundary condi-
tions and is expected to lead to only small effects for a large concrete
block. Thus for simplicity only conduction in the concrete is considered
below (the coefficient of conduction may be modified to take into account
other processes), i.e.
pc( bT/bt) ~.(k~T) (2 )
where c (the specific heat) and k may depend on temperature.
2.2.Simple approximations.
Consider a locally 1-D approximation to the melt-front; equation (1)
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applies with T ~ Tm at ~ ~ O. On transforming to the frame moving with the
front, equation (2) becomes
(3)
at large values of ~, T + Ta (the ambient concrete temperature). An
approximate solution for the temperature profile is
(4)
where 0 (the thermal penetration distance) is a function of time. The resi-
dual of equation (3) with the approximation (4) is constructed:
R(~) ~ pC(OT*/ot - UOT*/O~) - O(k(OT*/O~))/O~. (5)
The weighted residual method[e.g.s] may now be used to find an approximate
equation for 0; i.e.
1R( ~). w( cl o~ 0 (6)
o
where w(~} is the weighting function. There are two obvious choices for w(~}
- uniform weighting, and, for Galerkin's method: exp(-~/o}. A general form
covering these two cases is
exp( -n~/o) • (7)
For constant thermophysical properties, equations (4}-(7) imply
do (n+1) [~co - u] (s)([f
substituting (4) assuming *and into (1), T T implies
pLu W - k(Tm - Ta)/o. (9)
Thus equations (S) and (9) give a simple approximation that allows for
thermal penetration variation during concrete ablation. Note that (i) the
approximation is dependent on the user's choice of n, and (ii) it gives exact
answers in the case of ablation that occurs at a uniform rate.
2.3.Introduction to the isotherm migration method (IMM}-1D applications.
Once ablation has started the problem is characterized bya relatively
thin front over which the concrete temperature falls from its melting point to
close to ambient temperature; this front may move several metres as the
interaction proceeds, and eventually broaden. A suitable numerical method for
such problems is the isotherm migration method (IMM) in which the position of
isotherms are treated as the dependent variables [9] - this ensures that there
is always adequate meshing in the region of the front.
For one-dimensional problems it can be shown that equation (2) transforms
to
p4 (~) _ 0 (krN- 1 )ö'l' 1Jr7ö'1' ( 10)
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where r(T,t) is the 'radius' of the isotherm of temperature T at time t; N=l
for cartesian co-ordinates, 2 for cylindrical co-ordinates, and 3 for spher-
ical polar co-ordinates. The equation
PL(~)T=T =iI>+i5r~i5TI (11)m T=Tm
applies at the melting front. Turland [10] has shown that equations (10) and
(11) when discretized in conservation form give very good results for test
problems involving thermal fronts; note that (10) and (11) are valid when c
and kare functions of temperature.
2.4. The 2-D applicatton of the IMM.
In the previous section the radial co-ordinate r was treated as a
function of temperature and time; to perform calcu~ations for axisymmetric
melt-pools it is necessary to introduce a new spatial variable. It is conv-
enient to take an origin of co-ordinates and construct a set of radial lines
(determined by the angle variable e) - the equations are now expressed in the
form of measuring the radial position of the intercepts of the lines and the
isotherms (i.e. we have r = r(e,T,t». If e = 0 on the axis of symmetry then
equation (2) transforms to [10]
2
~.pc (l ( 3) (l (kr2Sine(1 _re)) (l ( )
J at r = - OT r
T
+ r 2 + OB ksine.re
(12 )
where r x denotes the partial derivative of r with respect to X. The condition
on the ablation front (equation (1)) becomes
(lr r~ 1/2 k r~
L(at)T=T = iI>( 1+ 2) + r( 1+ 2) IT=T (13)
m r T r m
Equations (12) and (13) may be discretized in a conservative form in the space
of the independent variables (e and T) (see section 4). The performance of
the method on a number of test problems is discussed in [11].
3.A REVISED VERSION OF INTER
3.1.Principal modifications.
The principal modifications that have been made to the INTER code, as
incorporated into MARCH1.0, are as follows:
(i) A detailed check of the heat and mass balances for each layer, and
between the upper layer and overlying water (if present) revealed a number of
coding errors. The most significant of these affected only those parts of the
sequence where metal overlay oxide, and led to conservative predictions. The
code has been corrected.
(ii) The original code.preferentially reacted CO2 with Fe, and Zr with
H20. For the first 1000 seconds it also reacted FeO with Zr, leading, in
effect, to preferential oxidation of Zr. The new code allows the FeO reaction
with Zr to proceed at all times thus ensuring that the effect of the modelling
is the preferential oxidation of Zr.
(iii) If debris has not been quenched earlier in the accident the new
code assumes that heat transfer to any overlying water is by film boiling -
the new model also allows for crust formation at the top of the debris.
(iv) The original code made undocumented changes to the user's input
values of heat transfer coefficient from debris layers to the concrete - the
new code only uses the input values.
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(v) The original code had uniform thermal boundary layers thicknesses in
the upward, downward and lateral directions for each layer - the new code
allows the user to specify enhanced upward and!or lateral heat transfer when
debris is molten.
(vi) Substantial improvements have been made to the models of concrete
ablation, thermal penetration and water release (see section 3.2).
(vii) The decomposition temperature of the concrete has been raised to
the concrete melting point from the decomposition temperature of calcium
hydroxide.
Modifications (iv) and (v) were made to improve the use of INTER as a
code for scoping studies - the user must make external judgements on these
important heat transfer quantities.
3.2. Thermal penetration model and water release.
The shape of the debris (including ablated
characterized by two dimensions - ~ the radius
section, which is a section of a sphere, and r c
cylindrical section (see Fig.1). The downwards,
, rc
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increase in r c are calculated
the following relations:
6 = O.72kpco---




and ü (ZAb + rcAc)!(Ab+Ac ) (17)
where a dot denotes differentiation with respect to time. .A denotes surface
area, and suffices band c refer to the base and cylindrical sections
respectively.
For a uniform rate of ablation these relationships do not conserve heat,
and also exhibit an undesirable coupling between the heat transfer downwards
and that sidewards through the use of the common penetration distance Ö.
The new code uses separate penetration distances Öb ' Ö~ and Ö~ for the
different directions (superseripts 0 and m denote the concrete in contact with
oxide and metal respectively). These penetration distances are updated using
equation(8)where u = ~, ~~ and ~~ (for pool geometry these latter quantities
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are still averaged). To maintain linear stability in the case of a uniform
rate of ablation it is found that the timestep must satisfy
Llt 26< "(ll'FTjU (18)
This criterion is used where 6 and u are current values.
The exponential temperature profile assumed here (equation 4) may be used
to calculate water release from the concrete. The current version of the code
assumes that free water is libera~ed at its boiling point Tw; thus the rate
of progression of the dry region s in the concrete is given by
s (19)
If the concrete is not ablating, Tm is replaced by the current concrete
interface temperature. other decomposition processes could be represented by
similar expressions.
Aversion of INTER has also been constructed that uses l-D isotherm
migration routines (see section 2.3) to evaluate separately the three thermal
penetration distances. Whilst all penetration distances are less than 0'02m
the approximation (8) is still used; on switching to the IMM an exponential
temperature profile is discretized. Six isotherms are used in all cases.
3.3.Example calculations.
Because of the unverified nature of some of the conjectures in the INTER
model, and the use of arbitrary values for some of the user supplied
parameters, the calculations reported in this section should not be regarded
as predictions, rather they are part of a wider range of parametric studies.
The calculations reported here illustrate the concrete ablation model.
The debris is assumed to consist of 45 tonnes of U02 with 11 tonnes of Zr
(of which 50% is oxidized at the start of the interaction) and 10 tonnes of
steel. The concrete is assumed to consist of a basaltic aggregate with
composition by weight: 3% caco
3
, 10% Ca(OH)2' 4% water, 55% silica and 28%
other oxides (treated as A1 203 ). It is assumed to decompose at 1600K. For
conservation of heat it is necessary to choose the concrete specific heat to
be consistent with values given in the INTER subroutine ENTH - for the ab?ve
data a value of 1390 J Kg- 1K- 1 is appropriate. The initial radius of the
debris pool is 3'5m, and it is assumed to have an almost flat bottom. The
interaction is assumed to start 3 hours after the beginning of an (unspec-
ified) accident sequence when the decay heat produced in the debris is 15MW
(30% in the metallic phase). The heat transfer .coefficient at the interface
between the debris and concrete is set to 500wm-2K- 1, and both lateral and
upward heat transfer in a molten layer are enhanced by a factor of three
compared with the original code. There is no overlying water.
Results have been calculated using the simple approximations for thermal
penetration with n = 0 and n = 1 (see equations (7) and (8», and using the
version of INTER that incorporates the IMM routines (n = 0 initially). Runs
were terminated at 40 hours, used about 4000 timesteps and took a few minutes
CPU on a medium-sized computer (PRIME-9950). A comparison of the three runs
is given in Table I; it is seen that there are no major differences. The IMM
run gives support for use of the simpler thermal penetration model.
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PROPERTY 20 mins 1 hour
n=O n=1 n=O n=1
Metal temperature K 1801 1801 1742 1748
OXide temperature K 2128 2162 1853 1857
Depth eroded M 0.121 0.113 0.386 0.380
Width eroded M 0.263 0.256 0.482 0.481
Mass concrete eroded te 16.2 15.1 52.2 51.5
Water released te 1.1 1.2 3.4 3.5
PROPERTY 5 hours 40 hours
n=O n=1 IMM n=O n=1 IMM
Metal temperature K 1619 1620 1618 1613 1613 1613
Oxide temperature K 1735 1738 1735 1706 1708 1703
Depth eroded m 0.548 0.561 0.546 1.050 1.093 1. 038
Width eroded m 0.739 0.750 0.751 1. 443 1. 479 1.480
Mass cone. eroded te 83.1 85.3 83.4 204 219 209
Water released te 6.0 6.4 5.9 16.2 18.7 16.0
öII1 m 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.137 0.142 0.138w
ÖO m 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.109 0.112 0.114w
Öb m 0.045 0.047 0.045 0.137 0.142 0.139
TABLE I: Dependence of major parameters in INTER runs on thermal penetration
models; n refers to exponent in equation 7 and IMM indicates isotherm
migration routines were used. For times less than 1 hr the penetration
distance is so small that the IMM routines were not used by the code (see
text). Note - the number of significant figures in this table are given solely
to allow an adequate comparison of the numerical methods - they do not
represent the accuracy of prediction with the code.
In the calculations the oxide melts after 2'5 minutes, and becomes the
lighter phase after 14 minutes; the zircaloy is totally oxidized after 54
minutes, but the iron is not completely oxidized at the end of the run. After
40 hours a total of 1.17 TJ of decay heat has been generated in the pool
(compared with 0'04 TJ from chemical reactions); 0'56 TJ has been transferred
to the concrete and 0'84 TJ radiated from the upper surface. Fig.2 shows the
pool growth as a function of time, whilst fig.3 shows the thermal penetration
distances.
4.THE 'CONIMM' CODE FOR CONCRETE ABLATION
4.1 Calculation of pool growth and thermal penetration.
The CONIMM code uses the 2-D version of the isotherm migration method
described in section 2'4. A uniform mesh in (T,8) (i.e.temperature, angle).
space is used for the discretization; this divides the (T,8) plane into cells
with a mesh point at the centre of each cell. There are additional mesh
points located at the melt-front (T=T
m
). A zero flux condition is used at the

































FIGS 2 and 3: Results of example calculations: Fig 2 - pool growth, Fig 3 -
thermal penetration distances.
successfully [11]. The explicit scheme is fully conservative for the quantity
ffpcr 3 .sin6.dT.d6, which is related to the heat content of the thermal front;
however there are constraints on the timestep which become severe when the
isotherms are closely spaced:
(20)
in all cells where Är is the radial distance between mesh points.
Implicit methods need not be subject to these constraints. Even for
constant thermal properties the transformeq equations (12 and 13) are non-
linear, so to construct an implicit scheme it is necessary to linearize. This
is achieved in CONIMM by using predicted values in the evaluation of the
coefficients of the highest derivatives, which enables the use of the
alternating direction implicit method [12]. Rather than iterate at each
timestep (which would be possible), the timestep is chosen to ensure that the
actual movement of the isotherms and the predicted movement do not differ by
significant amounts. This method destroys exact conservation, and so CONIMM
has been tested against the original explicit coding, Using a coarse mesh of
6 isotherms and 6 angles (which is known to give reasonable accuracy in the
explicit calculations), calculations were performed for the growth of a melt-
pool in a basaltic concrete. Heat input was typical of the decay heat from
the whole core of a 1-3GW(e) reactor, and the horizontal heat flux was assumed
to be twice that downwards (for other angles an interpolation function was
used). The calculations were started when the major radius of the pool was
2-48m (minor radius =depth 1-24m) at time 4000s, and were continued up to
2Xl0 7s (231 days). It was found that the predictions of the movement of the
melt-front and all the isotherms by the CONIMM implicit coding agreed with the
explicit coding to better than 1% (at 2X10 7s the predicted pool radius is
10-Sm, and the thermal front is typically 3m thick). Although CONIMM took
less than one-third the number of timesteps required for the explicit scheme,
it was only 20% faster because of the increased computation at each timestep;
savings would be more significant on a finer mesh. (The CONIMM run used S104
timesteps and took 327s cpu on a PRIME7S0 computer),
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4.2. calculation of total water release.
When concrete is heated, water is released at temperatures well below the
concrete's melting point. The release of water is a complex process; exper-
imental data show that it occurs over a broad temperature range rather than at
a set of well-defined temperatures [13]. Release processes may be modified by
the transport of steam through the concrete matrix.
Far CONIMM it is assumed that at any given temperature there is an equil-
ibrium saturation of free and bound water in the concrete. Assuming that this
equilibrium saturation is reached on a short time-scale, the calculation of
water release is essentially one of integration.
The calculation of water release from an interior cell (in (T,e) space)
is straightforward; the volume of the cell is calculated and it is all
assumed at the temperature of the central mesh-point. The same assumption
cannot be made for the exterior mesh cells as they have infinite volume; it
is necessary to consider a temperature profile in this region. The choice of
profile is arbitrary, but it should be consistent with the total heat content
(above ambient) in the cello The CONIMM model uses this constraint, and fits
the profile t? the location of the T = Ta + ~T isotherm, the position of which
iso estimated by quadratic interpolation through nodes with temperature Ta +
(2m + 1) ~T/2; m = 0, 1 and 2. A quadratic dependence of water release on
temperature is assumed within the exterior region; there is no release at
ambient temperature. The water loss associated with the linear term in this
dependency does not depend on the choice of temperature profile because the
integral involved is the same form as the integral for heat content. For
CONIMM the temperature profile is assumed to be a decaying exponential in the
radial direction (it has been found that a profile with an additional inverse
dependence on radius gives very similar results).
For test calculations the steady-state water release curve for basalti~
concrete of Kent [13] has been used. The test problem is identical to that in
section 4.1, except that for the water release calculations the number of
isotherms have ben varied (6, 7 and 10). For the interior regions spot values
of water release at the nodal temperatures are used, whilst for the exterior
region the (assumed) quadratic dependence of water release on temperture was
obtained by fitting the data of [13] at T = Ta' Ta + ~T/2 and Ta + ~T.
Results are given in Table II, which indicate that reasonable accuracy can be
Time 6 7 10
(sj isotherms isotherms isotherms
4000 2.46 2.47 2.47
105 27.3 27.5 27.6
10 6 87.4 89.2 89.5
2X10 7 878 911 930
TABLE II: Calculation of water release (in tonnes) from concrete for the test
problem described in the text. The calculations were performed to investigate
the numerical accuracy of the approach rather than to make predictions for a
particular accident sequence.
achieved. The additional coding for the water loss model adds a negligible
amount to the cost of running CONIMM; more sophisticated water loss models
would require significantly more computation.
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5.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.
Models for thermal penetration into the concrete have been developed. A
simple model using the weighted-residual method has been derived and incorp-
orated into the INTER code (the model in the original code was found to have
poor heat conservation properties). other substantial changes to INTER have
also been made to provide an improved fast-running parametric-type code that
is capable of modelling all phases of the core-concrete interaction. A
further version of INTER has been produced in which the thermal penetration
model has been replaced by finite difference calculations using one-
dimensional versions of the isotherm migration method (IMM). At times up to a
few days calculations with this version give support to the simpler model.
A code (CONIMM) for long-term thermal penetration which uses a 2-D
version of the IMM has been written and checked; this code incorporates a
simple model for water release from the concrete employing experimental data.
CONIMM uses a radial mesh, as does the CORCON code [5], which has a much more
detailed treatment of the debris pool; it may be feasible to couple these
codes to give.a mechanistic model for the long-term interaction of core debris
with concrete.
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONTAINMENT THREAT
FROM HIGH-TEMPERATURE CORE-DEBRIS CAVITY INTERACTIONS
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ABSTRACT
In the event of primary vessel failure during a severe accident, many
of the potential threats to containment building integrity are
traceable to the interactions between high-temperature core debris
and the concrete reactor cavity. The nature and current status of
understanding of the phenomena associated with core-concrete
interactions are reviewed. The atypical thermal and physical loads
that are imposed upon the containment structure by such phenomena are
delineated. Current analytical capability for predicting the
parameters that contribute to containment loading is reviewed.
Representative calculations made with the CORCON MOD2 and CONTAIN 1.0
codes are presented.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The principle societal risk identified with nuclear power generation is
the potential release of radioactive fission products to the environment.
There are two intrinsic characteristics of nuclear power reactors that dominate
the hazard that is identified with them. The first is the inventory of radio-
active fission products that accumulates in the fuel. Typically, after a few
months of operation, a large plant will contain approximately one ton of
fission products in its core. Human exposure to the intense radiation
emanating from this material is indisputably deleterious; most public concern
focuses on this characteristic. Public safety is thus identified with the
ability to confine the reactor core. Secondly, after a reactor is shut down,
the fission-product inventory continues to constitute an uncontrollable heat
source which can not be interrupted or modified. The heat must be dissipated
as the radioactive decay dies out; the thermal energy can not be confined nor
compressed. The ultimate safety of nuclear reactors thus requires a system
which prevents the escape of core material and, at the same time, provides a
pathway by which the thermal energy can be dissipated in some benign fashion.
The nature and magnitude of the radiological risk is perceived in vastly
different ways, depending upon the point of perspective of the individual.
Vendors of power generating equipment and utility companies are influenced by
the profit motive as well as their intrinsic obligation to provide reliable
electric service to the public. Their concept of safety relies heavily on
adherence to established engineering-design safety margins. Excessive over-
design is prohibitively costly. On the other hand, regulators such as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take a more skeptical view and ask the
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question " ... But if something does go wrong, what are the consequences to the
public? .. ". This pragmatic attitude stimulates the identification of
potential risks previously overlooked and aids in the establishment of research
priorites. Until the core-damage accident at Three-Mile Island in March 1979,
little attention was paid to accidents beyond the design basis. Since that
event, the NRC Office of Research has developed an extensive program, the
Severe Accident Research Program (SARP), to address accidents involving
core-damage and failure of the primary vessel. In the discussion that follows,
co re melt-down and vessel failure are assumed to have occurred.
For convenience in delineating the problem of severe accidents, one may
consider three well-defined physical barriers between the fission products and
the external environment: (1) the fuel cladding, (2) the primary vessel and
its associated components, and (3) the reactor co~tainment system. In this
review, it is assumed that the first two barriers have failed and that the core
has found its way into the reactor cavity below the primary vessel. In
particular, we wish to examine the phenomena which characterize the
interactions between high-temperature core debris and the structural concrete
of the reactor cavity. These phenomena will be discussed in terms of their
relevance to the development of abnormal thermal and physical loading of the
reactor containment system.
The primary force that drives the interaction between core debris and
concrete is the decay power of the fission-product inventory. The principle
phenomena of interest are, therefore, primarily governed by the thermal balance
between the decay-heat source and the heat sinks available during the course of
the accident. To provide a framework in which to discuss the interactions of
interest, we assume an arbitrary containment design and a set of initial
conditions which will ensure occurrence of the phenomena we wish to explore.
At approximately 3 hours after shutdown, the entire core, which has become
molten, falls through the bottom vessel head onto the concrete floor of the
reactor cavity; it is accompanied by a comparable mass of steel from the core-
support structures and the lower vessel head. It is also assumed that only
refractory fission products remain in the debris, approximately one third of
the initial inventory having left as gaseous or volatile species during the
meltdown. The initial decay-power level will' be approximately 25 MWt. We will
consider some of the early transient phenomena, but focus primarily on proper-
ties of long-term quasi-steady-state concrete attack.
2.0 HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
After vessel failure, thermal ablation of the concrete begins instantly
and within a few minutes reaches a quasi-steady-state condition and proceeds at
a rate primarily determined by the decay-heat power level. The assumptions on
which the hypothetical example of a molten-core accident is based are given in
Table 1.
2.1 Accident Initiation
The term "severe accident" implies total or partial co re melt-down
followed by penetration of the lower vessel head. In the determination of
ultimate containment loading, the accident-related events prior to vessel
failure will leave a trail of conditions that must be accounted for in the
analysis, e.g., ruptured pipes, disabled safety features, failed-open relief
valves, etc. In this discussion, no effort is made to delineate or focus on
this aspect of the problem; only the circumstances following release of molten
core materials into the reactor cavity are considered.
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Table I Assumptions Used in Hypothetical Accident Example
• Composition of Core Debris (entire co re of 3400 MWt PWR)
100 MT Uranium Oxide
10 MT Zircalloy Oxide
4.5 MT Stainless-Steel Oxide
• Cavity Description
10 MT Zircalloy Metal










Molten-core deposited in cavity 3 hours after shutdown
Debris temperature = 2500 K
Initial fission product decay power = 22 MWt
(excludes volatile fission product species lost at melt-down)
Initial cavity atmosphere pressure = 1.5 bar
Coolant
(a) dry cavity
(b) overlying water layer present
2.2 Influence of Containment Design
The consequences of a core melt-down accident depend heavily upon the
nature of vessel failure and the geometric configuration of the structure below
the reactor. Containment systems vary markedly in their architectural
features, not only with respect to reactor types (PWR or BWR) but also from
plant to plant. The shapes, as well as the free volumes of the three BWR
containment systems currently used, are quite different. Likewise, PWRs are
housed in a variety of large dry containments as well as smaller structures
supported by ice-condenser steam suppression.
The three generic types of BWR containments have a number of features in
common. The reactor primary vessel is housed in an enclosure (called the
"drywell") having a relatively small free volume. The drywell is connected by
a number of vent pipes or "downcomers" to an auxiliary volume partially filled
with water (the suppression pool). The vents exit below the pool surface so
that, in the event of primary system failure, the escaping steam is forced to
bubble through the pool where it is condensed. These suppression-pool systems
permit the use of smaller primary containment structures having lower design
pressures. In all cases, the BWR primary containment (drywell plus suppression
pool) is encl.osed in a much larger secondary reactor containment building; it,
however, is not intended to provide significant protection against external
radiological release. Some of the characteristics of typical Mark I - 111
containments are shown in Table 11.
A number of PWRs are housed in what is referred to as "large dry contain-
ment" systems. As the name implies, there is no engineered system to condense
steam in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Rather, the contain-
ment structure has a sufficiently large free volume and design pressure high
enough to sustain the insult of a severe LOCA. The "ice-condenser" plants are
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analogous to BWR containment systems in that escaping steam is forced to pass
through achamber fill ed with baskets of i ce where it i s condensed. The i ce
condenser functions like a BWR suppression pool which permits the use of a
smaller containment building. Some relevant specifications of typical PWR
containments are also shown in Table 11.
Table I! Typical Containment Design Specifications
(a) BWR Systems
Mark Drywell 0 Wetwell
Vol,m3 P (bars) T( C) Free Vol P T
I 4500 3.9 138 3370 3.9 138
I! 7050 3.8 171 3625 3.8 104
II! 7645 2.1 166 39,643 2.1 85
(b) PWR Systems
Type Vol. P
Large Dry (Zion) 80,200 3.2
Subatmosphere (Surry) 55,500 3.06
Ice-Condenser (Sequoyah) 37,000 0.75
Because of this diversity in building design, no effort is made to inter-
pret the impacts of core-concrete interactions upon any particular containment
system. Rather, a hypothetical sample case is presented which can be approxi-
mately identified with the reactor cavity configurations found in some of the
existing containment systems. In particular, the Mark 111 BWR containment
design has a closed cavity in the reactor pedestal directly below the primary
vessel. Upon bottom vessel-head failure, the molten corium would fall into
this cavity where concrete ablation would begin immediately. For most contain-
ment systems, other than the BWR Mark 111, the example used in this discussion
would be considered conservative.
3.0 CORE-DEBRIS CAVITY INTERACTIONS
The phase of the hypothetical accident assumed in this treatment begins
with penetration of the lower vessel head by molten core debris. The spectrum
of ensuing phenomena can be considered as either transient or quasi-
steady-state. Even before this separation can be made, a branch point is
encountered, i.e., whether or not the reactor vessel is at high pressure at the
time of failure. It has been demonstrated experimentally that the velocity
with which the melt is ejected has a significant impact on aerosol production,
debris dispersal, and containment heating. A second branch point is
encountered simultaneously, i .e., whether or not the reactor cavity is flooded
with water at the time of debris deposition. Clearly, within the four accident
scenarios suggested by these branch points, a continuum of potential situations
exists. Since it is not possible to consider more than a few representative
examples, most of the phenomena will be described briefly while a few will be
considered in greater detail. The corium-cavity phenomena expected to be of
significance, to the loading of containment are shown in Table 111.
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3.1 Transient Phenomena Accompanying Reactor Vessel Failure
3.1.1 Dispersal of Core Debris: Molten corium is known to be quite fluid so
that it can be expected to flow readily throughout the cavity. If the vessel
is at high pressure, one can expect the debris to be more widely distributed.
One possible effect of high-pressure dispersal is to render the debris more
coolable at later times. On the other hand, the increased contact between the
debris and concrete surface augments the initial gas release rates thus making
an early contribution to containment pressurization. Correspondingly,
extensive prompt dispersal of core debris increases the direct structural
attack from thermal radiation.
Table 111 Core-Debris Cavity Phenomena
Debris Expulsion From Reactor Vessel
; High-pressure debris dispersal
; Mechanical damage to structural components and ESFs
I Direct atmosphere heating (sensible plus chemical-reaction heat)
; Steam explosions
Quasi-Steady-State Phenomena
I Concrete ablation and disposition of heat
I Basemat penetration
I Generation of combustible and noncondensable gases
I Generation of aerosols and release of fission products
I Crust formation and freezing
3.1.2 Potential for Mechanical Damage: Significant inertial effects can be
expected to accompany the sudden release of many tons of dense liquid driven by
high vessel pressure. The kinetic energy of the molten mass has the capability
of doing direct physical damage to structural components below the reactor and
in particular to components of engineered safety features which might otherwise
be sufficiently remote as not to be threatened.
3.1.3 Direct Heating of the Containment: It has been shown in small experi-
ments that corium ejected under high pressure fragments into fine particulates
and aerosols. This has two effects: sensible heat is rapidly transferred to
the atmosphere, and in addition, elemental metals (zircalloy and steel) present
in the melt can rapidly oxidize while airborne. These reactions are highly
exothermic and rapidly elevate the temperature of the atmosphere. The threat
of failure by overpressurization is augmented since there is insufficient time
to transfer the heat to the available heat sinks.
3.1.4 Potential for Steam Explosions: If the reactor cavity is flooded when
the corium enters it, there is the possibility of rapid steam generation from
explosive thermal interactions with the water. The probability for and
possible magnitude of such interactions is still not adequately quantified and
continues to be the subject of intense research. These issues will not be
discussed here. It is only pointed out, that although an ex-vessel steam
explosion might not of itself constitute a significant threat to containment
overpressurization, in conjunction with other factors, it might become
significant. Conversely, such explosions could prove beneficial in that the
core debris might become more widely dispersed and fragmented, thus rendering
it more coolable.
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3.2 Core-Concrete Interactions: Quasi-Steady-State Phenomena
After the transient conditions that accompany vessel failure have
subsided, it is assumed that a relatively stable pool of co re debris is formed
in the cavity. The modelling and capability for analyzing these ljnger-term
processes is relatively advanced. The CORCON MOD2 computer code[l developed
at Sandia National Laborities under NRC sponsorship treats the thermal and
chemical interactions that accompany the attack on concrete by high-temperature
core debris. The representative data used to illustrate the phenomena
described below have been derived by CORCON MOD2 analysis of the hypothetical
conditions described in Table I.
3.2.1 Concrete Ablation and Disposition of Heat: Once a temperature profile
is established in the concrete, and the ablation temperature reached at the
surface, as much as one third of the heat absorbed by the concrete is
permanently dissipated by endothermic dissociation reactions. In terms of
decay-heat removal , concrete ablation is desirable because a signlficant
portion of the absorbed energy is permanently dissipated, thus reducing the
total heat available for other threatening thermal processes. Conversely, the
hot ablation products, gases, aerosols, etc., tend to augment the containment
threat.
3.2.2 Slag Dilution of the Debris Pool: Although a considerable fraction of
the concrete is decomposed into gaseous reaction products, large amounts are
refractory and mix, or dissolve into the core debris. The oxidic components
are miscible with the UOzfuel and as ablation continues, the specific power
density of the debris is reduced. This process thus slows down concrete
penetration and, at the same time, lowers the bulk temperature and renders the
debris more coolable.
3.2.3 Penetration of the Basemat: Basemat penetration is the most readily
identifiable consequence of attack on the cavity floor. Although release of
radioactivity to the ground water through this avenue is highly improbable in
most cases, for certain reactor designs a~d some plausible accident scenarios,
the possibility can not be definitely precluded. Axial basemat penetration in
the hypothetical case assumed for illustration, has been computed for a 24-hour
period with the CORCON MOD2 code. These results are shown in Table IV.
Table IV Corium Penetration of Concrete
Time (h) Limestone-sand (cm) BETA Crucible (cm)
Dry Wet Dry Wet
0.5 27.0 24.6 21. 9 19.4
1.0 40.0 34.6 45.6 42.2
2.0 57.4 45.7 72.6 71. 9
4.0 71.0 52.0 98.0 98.6
8.0 81.2 62.0 112.7 113.0
16.0 94.5 78.7 135.8 139.6
24.0 105.0 91. 4 153.1 162.2
The calculation was made for each of two types of concrete, typical limestone-
sand (commonly used throughout the U.S.) and for the material used in the KfK
BETA test facility. For each type of concrete, the calculation was carried out
under two additional assumptions - - with and without an overlying pool of
water.
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3.2.4 Release of Water Vapor: All concretes contain a 1arge amount of water
(approximate1y 60-80 Kg/t); some is chemica11y bound in the concrete, whi1e
some is entrained as free water in the interstices. At various temperatures
during thermal ablation, both types of water are 1iberated so that a 1arge
amount of water vapor accompanies the decomposition. The water vapor contri-
butes to the formation of agas 1ayer at the debris-concrete interface and thus
inf1uences the ablation rate. As the water vapor and other decomposition gases
1eave the surface of the concrete, they bubb1e upward through the mo1ten pool
which tends to mix and agitate the pool. This process has a significant inf1u-
ence on the heat-transfer characteristics of the system. If there are metallic
components in the mo1ten debris, some of the water vapor will reactor
chemica11y with them to form Hz and oxides of the metals. For the samp1e
problem, integrated water-vapor re1eased from the debris-poo1 surface is shown
in Tab1e V.
Tab1e V Water Vapor and Gas Re1eased from Concrete (CORCON MOD2 Ca1cu1ation)
Dry Cavity
Time Limestone-Sand (kg-mo1) BETA (kg-mol)
(h) CO CO z Hz HzO CO COz Hz HzO
0.5 162 34 87 19 8 3 90 14
1.° 216 65 116 36 9 10 157 50
2.0 228 101 155 56 47 16 233 80
4.0 341 161 182 90 62 24 305 116
8.0 379 249 199 142 70 34 347 164
16.0 430 332 221 192 84 44 411 214
24.0 468' 371 237 218 92 49 446 246
F100ded Cavity
0.5 148 21 80 953 2 1 71 389
1.0 188 39 102 2067 2 2 134 1265
2.0 232 62 125 4017 44 3 218 2794
4.0 256 88 138 7406 60 6 294 6073
8.0 293 144 158 8405 68 13 332 8391
16.0 357 269 190 8476 83 36 405 8503
24.0 390 338 204 8517 94 56 454 8610
3.2.5 Hydrogen Production (Meta1-Water Reactions): At the high temperatures
existing in the debris pool, the water vapor released from the concrete can
react with the metallic components (zirca110y and stee1) to produce hydrogen
and meta1 oxides. The Hz gas is re1eased from the poolsurface whi1e the
oxides will mix with the other oxidic components in the pool. These
meta1-water reactions are exothermic and contribute to the heat source in the
pool. The Hz gas can contribute to containment loading in either of two ways.
Hydrogen is noncondensable and can contribute to overpressurization of inerted
systems such as the BWR Mark I and Mark 11. .In systems that are not inerted,
combustion of the Hz can cause overpressurization as wel1 as thermal and/or
mechanical damage resulting from combustion. The integrated Hz generation
associated with the samp1e problem is shown in Table V.
3.2.6 Release of COz From Concrete Ablation: When subjected to high
temperature, the CaC03 limestone aggreQate dissociates into CaO and COz. The
refractory CaO dissolves into the oxidic component of the debris pool whi1e the
COz gas bubbles upw~rd. The gas which is not further reacted in the pool
escapes from the surface of the pool. Since the COz is noncondensable it
contributes to containment overpressurization.
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3.2.7 Generation of CO: Some of the COz released from the concrete can
further react in the pool to form CO, depending upon the availability of
elemental metals. Again, the metal oxides remain behind while the gas escapes
from the pool surface. In addition to being noncondensable, the CO is also
combustible and carries with it the same hazards that are associated with Hz.
3.2.8 Aerosol Generation: As gases from the concrete pass through the molten
debris pool and bubbles break at the surface, aerosols are produced as the
result of film rupture and the condensation of vapors contained within the
bubbles. These aerosols carry high-temperature particulate debris (some of
which contain radioactive fission products) into the cavity atmosphere.
3.2.9 Crust Formation and Freezing: As the debris cools, freezing begins;
crusts may form either at the top or bottom, or within the pool depending upon
its composition and circumstances. Crusts at the pool surface are more likely
to form if overlying water is present. The thickness of such crusts are
"se lf-adjusting" since increased thickness also increases thermal resistance
with consequent rise in pool temperature. Although models are included in the
CORCON MOD2 code which treat crust formation and freezing, there is little
experimental data available as yet for the validation of these models.
4.0 THREATS TO CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY RElATED TO MOlTEN-CORE
CAVITY INTERACTIONS
The importance of accident imposed loads depends on the particular
containment system involved. It is the purpose of this review to identify the
principal sources of such abnormal loads and not to quantify their effects.
Most of the discussion in Section 3 is focussed on the phenomena occurring
below or at the top surface of the debris pool. Except for potential basemat
penetration, most of the containment threats have their source identified with
the pool surface. These are briefly summarized.
4.1 Upper Cavity Phenomena
Heat leaves the surface of the pool in two modes: thermal radiation and
convection to the atmosphere. During early stages of the accident, the upward
thermal attack is dominated by radiation. Clearly, this is influenced by the
presence of overlying water, and also by the opacity of the atmosphere. Under
some conditions, it can be expected that dense aerosol clouds will be present.
The upward heat flux will rapidly elevate the temperature of the exposed
structural surfaces above the pool. Concrete spallation, thermal weakening,
and ablation may occur. This upward concrete attack can release additional
water vapor and other gases into the atmosphere. In some systems, direct
attack on the reactor pedestal itself may be possible.
4.2 Overpressurization by Noncondensable Gases
The data in Table V provide an illustration of the significance of
noncondensable gas production from concrete attack. It is assumed here that
the hydrogen has not been burned; this may be the case if the containment is
inerted, or if the steam concentration is high enough to inhibit combustion.
The most extreme case is used, i.e., limestone aggregate concrete in a dry
cavity. At the point 24 hours after vessel failure, a total of 1076 kmoles of
gas (Hz, CO, and COz) are produced. This corresponds to approximately
24,000 m3 of gas at STP. If this gas were introduced into a Mark I BWR primary
containment, it would contribute a partial pressure in excess of 3 bars. When
corrected for the expected higher temperature, this contribution alone would
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exceed the design pressure of the structure. Clearly, for the large dry PWR
systems, threat of overpressurization from this source becomes minimal.
4.3 Burning of Combustible Gases - H2 and CO
As noted in Section 3.2, metal-water reactions produce H2; and CO; both
gases are combustible. Gas burning in the atmosphere elevates the pressure and
can threaten engineered safety features.
4.4 Degradation of Engineered Safety Features
Direct lateral concrete attack by the pool could, depending on the
containment design, damage specific safety feature components, i.e. pumps, etc.
Aerosols in the atmosphere could clog fan coolers or cause thermal damage by
deposition of radioactive fission products.
4.5 Influence of Aerosols on Containment Loading
During the discharge of molten core materials from the reactor vessel, and
later, during debris-concrete interactions, copeous amounts of aerosols are
generated and become airborne. Those which carry fission products contribute
heat to the atmosphere as the active species decay. This bulk heat source adds
to that already present in the form of volatile and gaseous species that were
released during the meltdown. Calculations with the CONTAIN 1.0 code have
demonstrated that accurate predictions of containment loading must include the
interactions of these aerosols with the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the
atmosphere. Aerosols leaving the pool surface can have a strong influence on
the intensity of the ultimate radiological source term as it evolves during the
accident.
5.0 CURRENT ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY
5.1 Core-Concrete Interaction Analysis
The CORCON MOD2 code is a highly-mechanistic computer program that models
a stratified pool of molten, or partially molten, core debris in a concrete
reactor cavity. It calculates the rate of concrete attack, the change of
cavity shape as ablation proceeds, and the evolution of gases and radiant heat
from the pool surface. CORCON-MOD2 includes the behavior of slurries and
crusts within the pool as well as the influence of overlying water. A
corresponding code, WECHSL, is under development at KfK in Karlsruhe, FRG.
Both codes suffer some lack of credibility resulting from a dearth of
experimental data against which they can be validated. This latter deficiency
is actively being remedied by experimental programs, both in the U.S. and in
West Germany. CORCON has been used to compute the examples presented in this
report.
5.2 Analysis of Containment Loading
The CONTAIN 1.0 code[2] is a generic systems code which models an
arbitrary (independent of reactor type or structural design) reactor
containment system. Source terms (resulting from primary system failure) are
provided by other codes such as CORCON, WECHSL, VANESSA, MELPROG, etc. The
thermal-hydraulic behavior of a coupled network of compartments is treated as
an interactive integrated system. Structural response depends upon the
specific containment system being modelled and is not incorporated into the
CONTAIN code. Although specific CONTAIN 1.0 calculations have not been
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presented since quantification of loading is outside the scope of this report,
many of the conclusions concerning response to debris-cavity phenomena are
based on CONTAIN 1.0 results.
6.0 SUMMARY
From this brief overview of high-temperature molten-core cavity phenomena
a number of conclusions can be drawn. Further research is needed before
accurate mechanistic models can be developed for many of the phenomena.
Further experimentation is necessary to provide the data base needed for the
validation of such models. The mathematical treatment of such complex physical
and chemical processes demands an interactive integrated analysis. The
consequences of such severe accidents are dependent, not only on the initiating
events, but upon the specific design details of each plant. Whenever and
wherever appropriate, the influence of possible ope~ator action must be
factored into the analysis.
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TRANSIENT MOISTURE MIGRATION IN CONCRETE




Upton, New Y6rk 11973
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ABSTRACT
In the most severe hypothetical core heatup accidents in High
Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, the heatup of the concrete reactor
vessel can result in gas release from degrading concrete which can '
ultimately lead to containment building failure. This gas release
is largely affected by the moisture migration during concrete heat-
up. Moisture migration in concrete is also of interest in Light
Water Reactor core meltdown accidents. Therefore, the general prob-
lem of moisture migration in a heated concrete slab, has been
analyzed including the effect of water evaporating close to the
heated surface and recondensing in cooler regions. Results for
early phases of core heatup transients are being given. Their
implication on the accident progression is being discussed.
INTRODUCTION
During hypothetical Unrestricted Core Heatup Accidents (UCHA) in High
Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors (HTGR) the Liner Cooling System (LCS) assumes
a crucial role•. This system of water cooled pipes is designed to protect the
liner and the prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV). If the LCS fails
during UCHA scenarios and is not restored to service within about 2 days, the
PCRV concrete will heatup, and thermal barrier and liner failures will result
at about 40-70 hr [1,2]. The concrete decomposition gases (predominantly HzO
and COz), can ultimately cause containment building failure due to overpres-
surization. The amount and timing of this gas release strongly depend on the
migration of the physically and chemically bound water in the concrete during
the gradual but severe heatup.
Vapor migration in concrete slabs heated on one side is also of interest
in severe accidents for Light Water Reactors (LWR). While this paper concen-
trates on vapor migration in HTGR accident scenarios, the analysis and the
code VAPMIG are equally applicable to LWR accidents.
As the porous concrete is heated at its exposed surface, some of the
water is vaporized, causing apressure increase and a flow of gas and liquid
phases into cooler regions, where recondensation can occur. When concrete
temperatures exceed the local vapor saturation temperature, a "dry region" is
lpermanent address: JAERI, Japan.
(1)
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formed in which water exists in the vapor phase only. This dry region expands
with an "evaporation front" moving into the concrete. Beyond the front, in
the "wet region" water exists as liquid and as vapor, in equilibrium. A
further important' aspect is the presence of a non-condensible gas (generally
air). The problem is essentially one of a phase change front motion with a
thermally driven flow field, with significant feed back from the flow field to
the temperature field.
Moisture migration in porous media has been of interest in many applica-
tions, as for instance in drying processes[3] , or in building structures ex-
posed to fires[4]. This work extends a previous idealized model of the cur-
rent authors[5]. A more comprehensive listing of recent literature can be
found there. Of importance for the nuclear industry are primarily the analy-
tical work oE Dayan and Gluekler[6,7] as weIl as the permeability measurements
of McCormack et al. [8]. Dayan[7] solved the vapor migration problem without
presence of a non-condensable gas and for a permeable outer surface using
similarity solutions. Dur work[5] extended that work by including the effects
of a non-condensable gas, and considering the case of an impermeable outer
surface. The dis advantages of these idealized solutions is that they cannot
represent the actual process with time varying boundary conditions and
temperature dependent material properties. However, with their simplicity
they do provide valuable insight into the basic phenomena and permit rapid
parametric evaluations. Dayan and Gluekler[6] solved the vapor migration in
concrete subject to severe surface heating in a more general numerical analy-
sis without explicit tracking of a phase change front. While such solutions
are simpler to obtain, it has been generally recognized[9] that solutions
explicitly tracking the phase change front are harder to develop, but are
ultimately more accurate and more reliable.
The current work, therefore, represents a finite difference solution of
the full partial differential equations of mass and energy conservation with
Darcy's momentum equation, considering two separate regions, a "dry" region
and a "wet" region, separated by a moving phase change front. As pointed out
before[5,8] the motion of gas and liquid in concrete heated beyond lOO·C is
predominantly due to pressure gradients, and the vapor motion by molecular
diffusion is therefore being neglected.
THE MODEL
A semi-infinite (or finite) slab of concrete is being considered with
no-flux boundary conditions at the far end. The domain is divided into a dry
region, containing concrete and superheated vapor, and a wet region containing
concrete, water in liquid as weIl as in saturated vapor form, and air. The
absence of air from the dry region is a result of the gas Elow from the evapo-
ration front [5]. Local thermodynamic equilibrium is assumed.The thermal
boundary condition at the outer surface (z=O) is that of a prescribed time
varying source temperature, and outside heat transfer coefficient.
The resulting conservation equations for the dry region are
vapor mass
mixture energy
a E+.E..... huät az Pv v g .E.....k ~az D az (2)
where the dry region mixture internal energy is
E = (1-e:) (pc)S(8 - 8ref ) + mve v (3)
(4)
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The vapor f10w fo110ws from Darcy's 1aw as
K apT
u = - (-)
g 11 g ----az-
The current model uses sp1ine functions of high accuracy for the water
properties. In the dry region these are generally solved as
Pv = PT = p (pv,e) where p~ mv/€' but solutions for p = p (p,e) are also
provided.
The conservation equations for the wet region are
water mass
a a
-at m = - a; (PVUg+ PtU t) (5)w
air mass
a a
-at m = - a; Pau g (6)a
energy
a a L k ~-at E + a; [(pvh/ Paha ) u + Pthtu t] (7)g az w az
where the mixture interna1 energy is
E (1-€) (pc)S(e - eref )
+ me + mte t
+ m ev v a a
and of course
m = mv + mt •w









Equation (10) a110ws for the use of separate liquid and vapor permeabi1ities,
to simu1ate the effect of reduced liquid f10w which has been suggested by some
authors[4,6]. Furthermore, in particu1ar for 1arge liquid vo1ume fractions an
impairment of the gas f10w has been suggested. To simu1ate that effect the
factor ag was added in the gas f10w equation. Optiona11y this factor can be
set to 1.0 (no gas f10w reduction) or to ag = Sg = ag/go
The wet region state re1ationships for water are obtained from sp1ine
fits to the 1967 IFC formu1ation, except for the liquid density which was
assumed as constant (1000 kg/m3). Air was treated as an ideal gas. All
phases were assumed to be 10ca11y in thermodynamic equi1ibrium. The total
pressure is then the sum of the partial pressures PT = Pv + p~.
At the vaporization front, mass and energy must be conserved. Mass con-
servation of water for a vaporization front moving with velocity Ufr requires
(mv1-mw2 ) Ufr = [Pvug]l- [pvug+ PtUt]2 (11)
where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to front properties on the dry side and onthe
wet side respectively.
Energy conservation at the front requires
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where Ei and E2 follow from Equations 3 and 8 respectively. Note that the
ui in Equations 11 and 12 are superficial velocities while the front velo-
city Ufr is·an actual velocity.
The equations were solved in a completely conservative finite difference
formulation using aspace coordinate system moving with the front. Details
regarding this formulation and the experience obtained with it are being docu-
mented in a future report[I2].
RESULTS
For the application to PCRV heatup transients, two flow boundary condi-
tions at the heated surface are of interest. Up to the time of liner failure,
the heated surface is impermeable to flow, and the boundary condition is
u = ~ = O' Z = 0 (13)
3z '
Subsequent to liner failure, vapor can flow into the core cavity and the
core inside pressure will provide the pressure boundary condition
p = Pcore; Z = 0 (14)
At first, a general application of the model was considered, to facili-
tate camparisan with previous work [5]. Considering impermeable wall boundary
conditions, a step change in temperature to 250°C was imposed at the outer
surface of a semi-infinite slab, using the input data of Reference 5. Some
results are shown in Figure 1, indicating that the previous approximation,
assuming a constant front temperature for the case of a step change in wall
temperature, was weIl justified. Also the approximate front progression of
zfr ~ It was confirmed to be accurate within '1% over the time range from 60 s
to 4 hr. Frame b shows typical temperature, pressure and liquid fraction dis-
tributions. The temperatures and pressures are slightly lower here, which is
apparently due to the improved latent heat relationships. A1together, the
close agreement with the previous results confirms the validity of the simp1i-
fied model, and establishes confidence in this new and more general model.
The model was next applied to the ear1y phases of PCRV heatup under UCHA
conditions using as source typical thermal barrier core side temperatures for
the 2240 MW th design, ranging from 300°C to IOOO°C over the period of 0 to
80 hr [1,2]. The thermal barrier consisted of 67 mm of kaowool insu1ation.
Other data are given in Tab1e I. (The code does provide for temperature de-
pendent properties, and constant values were applied here on1y for simpli-
city). The concrete thermal properties are representative of PCRV con-
crete [10] while the permeabi1ities are based on the data of Reference 8.
Results for the PCRV heatup prior to liner failure are shown in
Figure 2. The core side thermal barrier temperature (source) is included in
Frame a. Two cases are are being considered: The best estimate permeabili-
ties of Tab1e 1 were used in the first case (BE PERM). In the other case,
fo11owing a frequent1y suggested assumption that the liquid phase is immobile
or moves at a much reduced rate [4,6], the liquid permeabi1ity was reduced by
two orders (LL PERM). In this second case the evaporation front will be
slowed down as all liquid must essentia11y be evaparated first to then move as
vapor into colder regions of the concrete, while in the first case a signifi-
cant part of the mass transfer into cooler regions is due to liquid f1ow.
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Figure 1. Temperature, pressure, and liquid fraction during transient heatup
with step change in surface temperature.
Table I
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Figure 2. Simulated PCRV heatup prior to liner failure for eases of best-
estimate eonerete permeabilities (BE PERM) and for ease of
redueed liquid mobility (LL PERM).
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Frame b shows the front progression, indicating that the dry region forms
at about 3 hrs, and is of substantial width in either case at the time of anti-
cipated liner failure of 60 to 80 hr. At that time the dry region temperatures
extend up to about 600°C which could result in further release of some of the
chemically bound water with further pressure increases and flow towards the wet
region. While this effect is modeled in the VAPMIG code, the current sampIe
application, considered the physically bound water only.
For typical concrete permeabilities (BE PER}l) the dry region pressures only
rise to about 2 bars with a front temperature of about 120°C (Frame c). (With
an impermeable outer surface the pressure is virtually constant across the dry
region). In the wet region adjacent to the front the pores are almost comple-
tely filled with liquid (Frame d).
In the extreme case of reduced liquid mobility (LL PERM) the dry region
pressures become quite significant and exceed 8 bars at 80 hr. The liner
anchoring to the PCRV is generally designed for fluid pressures on the PCRV side
of about 6 bars, at LCS temperature levels of 30 to 50°C. Whether the liner and
its anchors can accommodate above back pressures at 300 to 600°C is question-
able. Therefore, earlier thermal barrier failure due to excessive back pres-
sures could be possible, if this case is representative for PCRV concretes.
Further more detailed data on PCRV concrete permeabilities, and a sensitivity
study On the input data of this analysis would be required to confirm or reject
this potential earlier failure mechanism.
Of crucial effect on the accident progression is the water ingress from the
PCRV into the core cavity subsequent to liner failure. The simulations of
Figure 2 were therefore extended, assuming liner failure and a corresponding
flow boundary condition at z = O. Results are shown in Figure 3. There was
virtually no change in the evaporation front velocity at failure time and the
front progression into cooler regions continued. In the case of best estimate
permeabilities (BE PERM) front temperatures and pressures did not change visibly
and continued there slight upward trend. For the case of reduced liquid mobi-
lity (LL PERM) the liner failure essentially terminated the upward trend of
front temperature and pressure. The resulting mass flows of vapor into the core
cavity are shown in Frame b. For the best estimate case the actual ingress was
about 0.035 kg/m2hr while for the case of reduced liquid mobility it remains an
order higher at about 0.5 kg/m2 hr. The PCRV heatup rates used here are the
most severe ones, occurring at the center of the core side barrel only. Either
of the above mass flows is significantly lower than the previously assumed
value[2,11] of about constant ingress of 1 kg/m2hr averaged over the total core
cavity surface. Such reduced water ingress could significantly extend the CB
failure time beyond the current estimate of 10 days.
For the case of reduced liquid mobility with its significant dry region
pressure an earlier liner failure at 40 hr was considered. The resulting water
ingress is included in Frame b of Figure 3. It is about equal to that observed
at later liner failure, except that this ingress now arises earlier.
In summary, the formation of a dry region and removal of most of the mois-
ture beyond the evaporation front protects the core cavity from most of the
original water in the concrete. As this front is driven by the heatup of the
concrete, areversal would only be possible with concrete cooldown, which cannot
occur in this accident scenario. We assumed two different cases of concrete
permeability and obtained significantly different results. The case of reduced
liquid permeability can be considered as an upper limit for potential water in-
gress. Whether actual PCRV behavior could be close to this limit would have to
be determined by experimental efforts, since currently available permeability
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Figure 3. Simulated PCRV heatup subsequent to liner failure for cases of
best-estimate concrete permeabilities (BE PERM) and for case of
reduced liquid mobility (LL PERM).
data are not sufficiently detailed. Special efforts are made to obtain high
conductivities in PCRV concretes[10] requiring dense structures. Therefore,
it is possible that PCRV concrete behavior might tend towards the case of
reduced liquid mobility.
The exponential increase of concrete permeability with temperature [8],
will be included in future simulations. However, the strong increase of per-
meability with temperature is only expected to effect the outer parts of the
dry region which contain very little vapor. Thus, it is not expected that
these simulations will affect our current conclusions significantly.
CONCLUSION
A generalized model of vapor migration in porous concrete being heated at
one side has been presented. The model agrees well with previous results,
thus confirming some of the assumptions made in the previous work and estab-
lishing confidence in the new model.
Applying the model to PCRV heatup conditions it is found that consider-
able pressures may be generated in a large dry region close to the liner,
potentially leading to earlier liner and thermal barrier failure. However,
due to the significant width of the dry region of 40 to 80 cm, the previous
estimates of water ingress into the core appear to have been excessive. With
considerably reduced water ingress the time of containment building failure
could increase significantly beyond the current estimate of 10 days.
1146
Further work is suggested, to obtain improved PCRV concrete permeability
data and to consider such effects as the observed significant increcse in con-
crete permeability with temperature as well as the increase in containment
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INTERACTIONS AND FEEDBACK EFFECTS
IN SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
R. S. Denning
Batte11e's Co1umbus Laboratories
Co1umbus, Ohio 43201, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
In the Source Term Reassessment Study, the suite of computer
codes was opera ted in aserial fashion such that many feedback
mechanisms were approximated or ignored. The purpose of this paper
is to identify the most important feedback mechanisms and to discuss
their potential impacts on source term predictions.
INTRODUCTION
In order to predict the behavior of severe accident scenarios in light
water,reactors it is necessary to model comp1ex and interacting phenomena. In
state-of-the-art computer codes, such as those used in the Source Term
Reassessment Study for the analysis of severe accidents, approximations are
sometimes emp10yed in which feedback effects are either ignored or treated
simp1istica11y.
In the Uni ted States severe accident ana1yses are being performed by the
Nuc1ear Regu1atory Commission to deve10p a better understanding of the risk to
the pub1ic from severe accidents in existing nuc1ear p1ants, to determine the
adequacy of proposed future standard plant designs to protect against severe
accidents and to eva1uate improved methods for predicting the release of
radioactivity to the environment (source terms) in severe accidents. The
resu1ts of these ana1yses will be used by the NRC to make decisions that cou1d
lead to changes in regulations or regu1atory requirements. It is therefore
necessary to deve10p a quantitative understanding of the level of uncertainty
associated with unmode1ed or poor1y mode1ed feedback effects or to deve10p
improved models in which the feedback effects are inc1uded in the analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the important interactions and
feedback effects which are either ignored or treated simp1istica11y in state-
of-the-art methods of analysis.
BACKGROUND
Subsequent to the accident at the Three Mi1e Is1and Unit 2 Plant, the NRC
undertook the Severe Accident Research Program (SARP) /1/ to deve10p a better
understanding of severe accidents in light water reactors and the level of risk
posed by these accidents to the pub1ic. At the conc1usion of Phase I of SARP,
consideration will be given to the adequacy of existing plant, designs to
protect against severe accidents and to possib1e changes in regulations and
regu1atory requirements to account for an improved understanding of accident
source terms. !wo major studies integrate the resu1ts of Phase I research:
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(1) Source Term Reassessment Study (NUREG-0956) /2/--the basis for Source
Term Rulemaking which integrates the results of source term analyses
(BMI-2l04) /3/, the QUEST Study /4/ of source term uncertainties, and
two special study groups on containment loads and containment
performance.
(2) Severe Accident Risk Rebaselining/Risk Reduction Program (SARRP)
/l/--the basis for severe accident decision-making which employs a
methodology consistent with the BMI-2l04 analyses to evaluate the
public risk and the cost/benefit tradeoffs of modifications to the
design and operation of six reference plants.
The computer codes used in the BMI-2l04 analyses are identified in
Figure 1. In the BMI-2l04 Study these codes were applied in the serial fashion
indicated in the figure. Thus some potentially important feedback effects
between the fundamental processes were ignored or treated in an approximate
manner.
Whereas Phase I of SARP involved a broadly-based research program aimed at
developing a comprehensive understanding of severe accidents, Phase 11 of SARP
will be more closely focused on the resolution of specific issues. Many of the
most important issues that have been identified involve interactions and
feedback effects that are the subject of this paper. In addition, Phase 11 of
SARP will be directed at the completion and validation of a set of mechanistic
codes for severe accident analysis. It is anticipated that the mechanistic
codes will be grouped into code packages in which transfers are made between
codes as a function of time permitting feedback effects in the analysis.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships among the principal mechanistic codes
under development.
POTENTIAL INTERACTIONS AND FEEDBACK EFFECTS
In performing severe accident safety studi~s, such as those in the Source
Term Reassessment Study and the Severe Accident Risk Rebaselining/Risk
Reduction Program, it is necessary to analyze a number of fundamental processes
that are part of severe accident behavior. For the purpose of this paper we
consider the following fundamental processes:
Thermal behavior
Mass transport--aerosols and fission products







Interactive phenomena are those in which coupling occurs between different
processes. Table I identifies and shows a number of important interactive
phenomena that were treated superficially or ignored in the BMI-2l04 analyses.
Each of these interactive phenomena will be briefly described and its
potential importance to accident consequences discussed.
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FIGURE 1. BMI-2104 COMPUTER CODES
FIGURE 2. MECHANISTIC CODES UNDER DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 1. INTERACTIVE PHENOMENA IN SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Interacti ve Phenomena
Decay heat distribution

















































































Radiation heat transfer-aerosol interaction
Mass transport limitations to fission product
and aerosol release
Changes in chemi caI form of fi ss i on products
Fuel slumping-hydraulic interactions
Reevolution of deposited fission products
Aerosol resuspension
Coupl ing between contai nment thermal-hydraul ics
and aerosoI processes
Contai nment performance under contai nment
loads




















In the MARCH 2 code the loss of decay heat from the fuel associated with
fission product release, and the transport of this heat source is modeled but
not in a manner that is completely consistent with the fission product release
and transport analyses performed by CORSOR, TRAP-MELT, and NAUA. The
prediction of the partitioning of the heat source to the containment
atmosphere, to ice beds, to suppression pools, and to sumps can affect the
loads on containment, the timing of containment failure and the thermal-
hydraulic conditions in the containment atmosphere.
One of the key outstanding issues in source term analysis is the decay
heating of RCS surfaces by deposited radionuclides potentially resulting in the
reevolution of fission.products. Table 11 indicates the fractional decay heat
associated with each of the fission product groups at one hour after shutdown.
Since the BMI-2l04 analyses indicate that la~ge fractions of these
radionuclides would be deposited within the RCS for most core meltdown
sequences, it is evident that a great deal of heat (e.g., on the order of
10 MW) could be released to RCS surfaces.
TABLE 11. FRACTION OF DECAY HEAT ASSOCIATED WITH RADIONUCLIDE



















The MARCH 2 code models the flow through the RCS as one dimensional with
the flow rate driven by the leakage from the system during depressurization,
boiloff of water from the core and condensation of steam in the steam
generator. Recently, analyses have been performed that indicate recirculation
patterns may be established within the vessel /5/, particularly between the hot
core and colder upper plenum structures of a PWR. The effects of recirculating
flow could have a major impact on the timing and phenomenology of severe
accidents such ast increased time to meltdown, increased hydrogen production
from Zircaloy and steel oxidation, melting of steel structures, increased
release of fission products from the fuel, decreased retention of fission
products within the RCS, and even alternate modes of failure of the RCS due to
overheating. The magnitude of convective flow patterns in the RCS is a major
outstanding issue. Analyses are being performed with the TRAC code, a new two-
dimensional version of the ~IMAS code, and the COBRA code to determine the
magnitude of the effect. It appears likely that, in the future, severe
accident analysis codes will need to account for recirculation flow in-vessel.
Natural convection in the containment mayaiso be an important phenomenon.
Within a compartment, natural convection is typically accounted for as a
mechanism that enhances heat transfer between the surfaces and atmosphere.
Natural convection mayaiso be a component of the driving force for flow
between compartments in a multi-compartment analysis, however. A minor effort
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was undertaken in BMI-2104 to examine the effects of compartmentalization on
source term analyses. Comparisons with more mechanistic models such as
COBRA-NC are required to determine the adequacy of lumped parameter containment
models to characterize natural convection driven flow.
Radiation Heat Transfer-Aerosol Interaction
The effect of aerosols on radiation heat transfer is not accounted for in
the MARCH 2 code. Within the RCS, aerosols could act to inhibit heat transport
by radiation between regions of the core and between the core and neighboring
structures.
During concrete attack, significant heat loss is predicted to occur from
the upper surface of the melt to structural surface,s in the reactor cavity.
The presence of aerosols in the gas above the corium would result in reducing
the heat loss to the cavity walls and increasing the gas temperature in the
cavity.
Mass Transport Limitations to Fission Product
and Aerosol Release
The CORSOR code uses empirically-based release coefficients for fission
products and inert sources of aerosol material (e.g., control rods). These
coefficients cannot account for potentially limiting mechanisms within the
fuel, at the surface of the fuel, and in the gas. As discussed by Taig /6/,
the large masses of inert aerosol-forming material predicted to be vaporized by
the CORSOR code may be inconsistent with the equations of state of these
materials. A mechanistic fission product release model, VICTORIA, is being
written for the MELPROG code which can be used to evaluate the limits of
applicability of a simple empirical model like CORSOR. Since significant
credit is currently given to RCS retention of fission products in many
sequences analyzed in BMI-2104, a reduction in the aerosol source term (with
less sedimentation in the RCS) or a holdup of fission products in the fuel
until after vessel failure can have a significant impact on the predicted
release to the environment.
Changes in Chemical Form of Fission Products
In the BMI-2l04 analyses chemical forms of the fission products are
assumed which do not change during transport through the plant. A number of
processes are being studied in NRC-supported research that could change the
chemical forms of fission products and their subsequent transport behavior.
Emphasis has largely focused on the chemical forms of iodine. Some processes
under consideration are reactions of fission product species with borates from
control materials, oxidation in standing or propagating flames, reaction with
silver, radiation induced change, oxidation in high-temperature regions of the
containment such as a reactor cavity or BWR drywell, evolution from water pools
and reactions at containment surfaces to form organic iodides. As source terms
are reduced by taking greater credit for the capture of the primary species
released from the fuel and from the RCS, greater attention must be given to the




The selection of fuel slumping models in MARCH 2 has been shown to have a
major effect on the amount of hydrogen produced in-vessel, the flow-rate
through the RCS and the temperatures of RCS structures. Slumping of hot fuel
debris into the reactor lower plenum can produce steam that feeds steam-starved
regions of hot Zircaloy, enhancing oxidation. Slumping can, however, also lead
to flow blockage and the isolation of regions of hot fuel. Similarly runoff of
hot cladding can either enhance oxidation as fresh surface is exposed to steam
or reduce oxidation by cooling the Zircaloy cladding material. Although the
early stages of fuel degradation are being studied experimentally, the latter
stages involving major slumping and hydraulic interactions would involve a
scope of experiments beyond those currently planned. It will be necessary to
rely on advanced modeling efforts, such as MELPROG, to provide a basis for
determining the range of conditions that is possible.
Reevolution of Deposited Fission Products
The BMI-2l04 analyses have focused on the initial removal of the fission
product primary species released from the core and from the RCS. However, once
these primary species have been removed from the gas region of the RCS or
containment, consideration must be given to processes that could lead to
reevolution of fission products and make them again potentially available for
release. Within the RCS the principal issue involves the potential for the
release of volatile fission products as the result of decay heating of
structures. Consider a deposit of 80 percent of the volatile fission products
equally distributed on 45 MT (100,000 Ibm) of steel in a PWR upper plenum. At
one hour after shutdown the adiabatic heatup rate for this mass of material
would be 1710 K/hr (3,070 F/hr). Assuming gas phase equilibrium the maximum
quantities of CsI and CsOH that could be in vapor form in the upper plenum of a
PWR as a function of temperature are illustrated in Table 111. Thus if the
upper plenum temperatures reach the vicinity of 1089 K (1500 F) significant
revaporization of CsI and CsOH from surfaces could occur. Whether or not these
temperatures will be reached or not will depend on the heat loss from the RCS
and the extent of natural circulation. The delayed release of volatiles from
RCS surfaces could be particularly effective in increasing the environmental
source term, since the release could result in sma\l aerosols with slower
removal rates in the containment, perhaps being released near to or following
containment failure.
TABLE 111. HYPOTHETICAL MAXIMUM QUANTITIES OF SPECIES AIRBORNE
IN RCS UPPER PLENUM AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPERATURE
CsI CsOH
Mass Percent Mass Percent
Tempera ture Airborne Core Inventory Airborne Core Inventory
F K kg % kg %
1000 811 4.8x10-3 1.9xlO- 2 5.3xlO-2 4.0xlO- 2
1500 1089 1. 24 4.9 5.07 3.8
2000 1366 25.9 102 71.5 54
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As discussed earlier, the release of fission products to the containment
atmosphere from water pools and surfaces can be a particularly important
consideration in accident sequences in which the primary source of fission
product species is very effectively attenuated. In the BMI-2l04 study a
generic analysis of the long-term release of more volatile forms of iodine was
made that indicated a potential source of 10-4 to 10-3 release fraction for the
more volatile iodine forms.
Aerosol Resuspension
Aerosol resuspension is analogous to vapor reevolution. Within the RCS,
resuspension could occur in high pressure sequences at the time of core
slumping into the lower head of the vessel. The potential for resuspension of
aerosols ·is being studied experimentally at ORNL.
Within the containment, aerosols could be resuspended as the result of
blowdown forces at the time of containment failure or as the result of the
flashing of water pools in the containment following massive containment
failure. Analyses performed in the QUEST study indicated that containment hole
sizes would have to exceed the order of 10 m2 for either mechanism to become
significant. Recent studies by the Containment Performance Working Group /7/
of the NRC indicate that this type of massive failure of a containment is
unlikely.
Coupling Between Containment Thermal-Hydraulics
and Aerosol Processes
In the BMI-2104 analyses, thermal-hydraulic conditions in the containment
obtained from the MARCH 2 code were provided to the NAUA code to calculate such
effects as aerosol growth by condensation and diffusiophoretic deposition
resulting from steam condensation on surfaces. In actuality, the processes are
closely coupled and the magnitudes of these effects as analyzed in the BMI-2l04
studies must be considered representative rather than best-estimate. Further
analyses with the CONTAIN code and the results of DEMONA tests planned in the
FRG should help to resolve uncertainties in this area.
A major outstanding issue is the potential for the production of
aerosolized core material in high pressure meltdown accidents at the time of
vessel failure and the potential for direct heating of the containment
atmosphere by this dispersed core debris. This issue has been addressed by the
Containment Loads Working Group of the NRC /8/. Sensitivity studies performed
by group members indicated that heating of the containment atmosphere by heat
transfer alone from aerosolized core debris would probably not threaten the
integrity of a large dry PWR containment. Significant chemical reaction of
unoxidized zirconium, steel and uranium dioxide in the aerosol could however
result in pressures well in excess of the expected containment failure
pressure. Resolution of the issue will be obtained through an experimental and
model development effort at Sandia.
Containment Performance Under Containment Loads
In parallel with the BMI-2104 analyses, the NRC has been investigating the
likelihood and expected modes of containment failure in severe accidents. The
Containment Loads Working Group has been assessing the character and magnitudes
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of imposed loads and the Containment Performance Working Group has been
investigating 1ike1y modes of containment fai1ure 1eading to increased 1eakage.
The resu1ts of the BMI-2l04 ana1yses and the two working groups are to be
integrated in the report NUREG-0956. Pre1iminary ana1yses have been performed
with the BMI-2104 codes in order to eva1uate the effects on source terms of
enhanced 1eakage as opposed to massive fai1ure of the containment. The resu1ts
of these ana1yses indicate that the source term is sensitive to the hole size,
the timing of increased 1eakage versus the release of fission products to the
containment, and the rate of gas generation in the containment. In order to
inf1uence the therma1-hydrau1ic character of the accident or resu1t in
significant environmenta1 release the 1eakage must be orders of magnitude
higher than design 1eakage (e.g., 50 percent per day). Enhanced 1eakage with
increased pressure, rather than massive fai1ure at a thresho1d pressure, does
not necessari1y lead to reduced environmenta1 source terms of radionuc1ides for
all accident sequences. In those important sequences in which containment
fai1ure cou1d fo11ow c1ose1y after core me1tdown, however, enhanced 1eakage
rather than massive failure would provide additional time for deposition in the
containment and prevent the very large source terms calculated for these
sequences in WASH-1400.
Operator Actions to Control the Accident
With the BMI-2l04 code suite it is possible to make ~ priori assumptions
about how the operator will respond to an accident sequence and to adjust the
appropriate boundary conditions of the problem accordingly. Primarily
operators can by their actions directly affect reactor kinetics and reactor
hydrau1ics. Modeling the response of operators to their perception of plant
parameters is beyond our level of understanding of human behavior, however.
The behavior of the operator is a major source of uncertainty in the
analysis of severe accidents. The operator has the potential to turn minor
events into major accidents, as in the TMI-2 accident, or to take innovative
actions to minimize the consequences of an accident. Improving operator
performance is probably the most cost-effective means of risk reduction.
Operator performance is being investigated in the Severe Accident Sequence
Analysis program and in accident management studies in the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the methodology demonstrated in the BMI-2l04 analyses represents
a major improvement in the modeling of accident phenomena relative to WASH-
1400, a number of feedback effects are either treated approximately or
neglected in the analyses. Some of the feedback effects have the potential to
lead to major changes in predicted source terms. Of these the most important
appear to bel reevolution of radionuclides from RCS surfaces, recirculating
f10w patterns in the reactor coolant system, changes in fission product
chemical form, direct heating of the containment atmosphere by dispersed
aerosols, containment performance under containment loads, and operator
actions. Phase 11 of the NRC's Severe Accident Research Program is focusing on
the resolution of these key outstanding issues. Resolution of the issues will
be obtained in the form of improved computer models, reasonably validated
against experimental data, which are opera ted in parallel as necessary .to allow
for feedback between phenomena.
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ABSTRACT
For the design of a nuclear power plant it is very
important to know realistic values of the overpressure
build-up in a chemical explosion. To obtain a further
insightinto the complex pattern of events in this
field experimental investigations were carried out in
free and partially confined homogenous clouds with
hydrogen as a fuel. The results of the experiments in
an unconfined hemispherical configuration show a
distinct dependence of the flame velocity on the cloud
size which does not exceed, however, an upper limiting
value. To increase the turbulence effects in the ex-
periments under partially confined conditions a fan
was used. Depending on the fan speed the flame velo-
city was strongly influenced. In the case of the maxi-
mum fan capacity a transition from deflagration to
detonation was observed.
INTRODUCTION
Extensive studies and the accidents which occur despite in-
tensified primary explosion protection have shown that chemical
explosions cannot be entirely excluded. Accordingly, additional
protective measures must be taken, irrespective of the probability
of occurence of such an event. To estimate these measures further
information ab out the generation of chemical explosions and their
effects on buildings and plants must be compiled. Especially for
the design of a nuclear power plant it is of substantial interest
to know realistic values of the overpressure build-up produced
by chemical explosions.
Despite the fact that a lot of experiments carried out in
this field and most of the accidents have shown that in a more
or less free cloud a deflagration with rather low overpressures
is by far the most probable mode of combustion in an accidental
situation, a detonation with considerably higher overpressures
i s di scussed, too.
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Therefore, the most important question in this connection
is under which conditions the transition from a deflagration to
a detonation will occur in a free or partially confined gas
cloud near the plant.
EXPLOSIVE EVENTS IN A FUEL AIR MIXTURE
If an explosible fuel/air mixture is ignited, there will
always be, initially, a combustion wave whose rate of propagation
is given by the laminar burning velocity and the ratio of the
densities ahead of and behind the flame front. Now, as a result
of turbulence effects this velocity could increase as the distance
covered by the flame increases, which means that the velocity
would have to be expanded by a turbulence factor to get the actual
flame velocity.
The information of a shock wave as a precondition to the
change from a deflagration to a detonation is therefore deter-
mined by the nature of the process of flame acceleration which
is closely linked with the rate of energy release. Flame propa-
gation at normal flame velocities, well below the sound velocity
of the unburned gas mixture, will certainly not result in a deto-
nation. On the other hand, there must be a detonation if the
energy density, as a function of time, is high enough to initiate
a shock of sufficient intensity. This high power density neces-
sary to initiate a detonation is normally only available from
high explosives.
RESULTS OF FORMER EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
This statement is confirmed by many experiments wh1ch have
been carried out in our institute within the last ten years.
Quantities as low as 8 g, 30 9 and 80 9 of high explosive,
resp~ctively, were sufficient to initiate gas detonations in
stoichiometric ethylene/air, propylene/air and propane/air mix-
tures; it was not possible to initiate a detonation in methane/
air mixtures even with 2.500 9 of high explosive.
In areal cloud of propylene/air with its concentration
gradients 300 9 of high explosive did not suffice to initiate a
detonation compared with 30 9 in a stoichiometric mixture.
When igniting with flames, exploding wires or pyrotechnical
fuses no events resembl i ng a detonati on were o~served, in the
case of methane even in volumes up to 12,000 m with fan and
obstacle induced turbulence. The overpressures measured in the
interior of the reacting mixtures were less than 0,1 bar. Similar
results were obtained in plastic tube experiments up to a length
of 28 m which, when ignited deflagratively, no significant flame
acceleration could be found even with turbulence generating
obstacles.
In double balloon experiments, where two balloons were con-
nected with an opening of about 30 cm in diameter, the possibi-
lity was simulated that a detonation starts in a building or
facility and is then transmitted to a free spherical c~oud.
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In the second balloon which had not been ignited initially
this merely triggered a fast deflagration whose velocity decrea-
sed with increasing distance of the flame. When the detonation
was transmitted into a plastic tube filled with stoichiometri-
cally premixed ethylene/air mixture, it was propagated, however,
over the whole length; i .e. the propagation of a detonation
obviously depends on the geometry of the cloud, too.
In other experiments the effect of an isochoric explosion
transmitted into a. gas mixture in an outer space after failure
of a wall was investigated with failure pressures between 0.17
and 3.6 bars. Independent on the size of the outer cloud there
was no essential acceleration of the flame. The overpressures
generated by the flame were much lower than the values due to the
failure pressure up to a distance of 25 m. In summary it can be
said, indeed, that free gas clouds can be made to detonate only
by sufficiently strong detonative initiation, if at all.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, there still exists the
idea that especially in large clouds the acceleration of the
flame due to turbulence effects could become high enough to cause
a detonation.
RESULTS OF RECENT EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
To get a further insight into the flame acceleration mecha-
nisms within the PNP safety research program experimental inve-
stigations were carried out in free and partially confined clouds
the aim of which was to measure the flame velocity and the over-
press ure depending on the cloud size and the partial confinement.
The experiments und er partially confined conditions were exten-
ded to fan induced turbulences to increase the turbulence
effects. Because of the high laminar burning velocityand the
importance in the PNP-project hydrogen was used as a fuel. These
experiments were performed with Interatom as a contractor.
The free gas clouds were simulated by hemispherical balloons
consisting of thin polyethylene foil. The balloons were filled
with nearly stoichiomejric hydrogen/air mixtures with volumes
between 7.5 and 2100 m corresponding to balloon diameters
between 3.0 and 20.0 m. The gas mixtures were ignited by ex-
ploding wires in the center of the balloon. In this way a good
spherical symmetry of the pressure field and the flame propaga-
tion without any reflections of the pressure wave was obtained.
The overpressures were measured by piezoresistive gages installed
on the floor. The flame propagation was filmed by high speed
cameras. The maximum overpressures measured were between 22 mb ar
and 63 mbar corresponding to flame velocities between 39 and
84 m/s (Table I). These results show that there is a evident
dependence of these values on the cloud size due to flame in-
duces turbulence increasing with the volume of the fuel/air mix-
ture. The recalculated turbulence factors, i.e. the ratio of
turbulent and laminar burning velocity, indicate that there
exists a limiting value which is reached asymptocally so that
the flame front velocity cannot increase arbitrarily with in-
creasing flame path.
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This result which is in agreement with statements of
Strehlow and Wagner D,2l is logical insofar as the velocity
fluctuations u' cannot exceed the flow velocity
u = (E - 1) • St (1 )
were 5 is the turbulent burning velocity and E the expansion
ratio,t i . e . the ratio of the densities ahead of and behind the
flame front, respectively. So, several turbulent flame models
lead to a maximum turbulence factor between (E-1) and E.
Karlovitz [3J. correlates the flame induced turbulent velo-
city component with the difference in the kinetic energies of the
expansion and the normal velocity component. In connection with
'h;, "":::::':::,:h~ f':(i::;:':::;:~:]")i'd " 'h' ":::""
Abdel-Gayed et al. [4] show that the eddy diffusivity is
proportional to [1 - exp (-t/tLU, where t is the elapsed time for cloud
growth and TL a scaling parameter. The time t is linked with the
cloud radius r o and the burning velocity So' As the turbulence
factor is proportional to the square root of the diffusivity, it
can be described by the relation
f, " 1 + (E-l) . [1- "P (- :;~:J'~ s,)] 1/2 (3)
This very important result means that in a stoichiometric
hydrogen/ai r mi xture at room temperature wi th E~ 7 the maximum
flame front velocity of about 125 m/s will not be exceeded even
in very large clouds corresponding to a maximum overpressure
of about 130 mbar.
The checkup of these equations for other fuels but hydrogen
like methane and propane shows that there exists a general vali-
d i ty i f
or
1 + (E-1) . [1
f t = 1 + (E-1)' ~ - exp (- 0,038 ro)J 1/2
In Figure 1 Eq. (2a) and Eq. (3a) are compared






Very similar results were obtained under partially confined
conditions. The partial confinement consisted of two parallel
walls, 3 m high and 10 m long in a distance of 3 m closed at one
end. The ignition took place in the center of the closed side.
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The results .of these experiments which were carried out with
rich hydogen/air mixtures show that in absence of an additional
turbulence the flame velocity is not influenced by the confine-
ment and it is determined by the initial hemispherical propaga-
tion of the flame front (Table 11).
Only when the flame leaving the confinement a strong~r acce-
leration due to the jet-like expansion of the gas mixture ahead
of the flame front was observed. By this jet additional turbu-
lence effects were induced so that the flame front velocity
reached values in the unconfined space up to 200 m/s correspon-
dingto overpressures of more than 200 mbar.
In order to increase the turbulence effects accelerating the
flame in a more defined way a fan was located near the ignition
source at the closed end of the lane. The 3fan had a diameter of1.25 m and a maximum capacity of 24.000 m /h. It produced a
turbulent flow field in the lane which was maintained during the
combustion process.
Different experiments with 50, 75, 90 and 100 % of the full
fan capacity were carried out. While in all cases the flame front
velocity between the ignition sour ce and the fan was about the
same as in the experiments without additional turbulence it in-
creased strongly after the flame had passed the fan (Table 111).
'So, with lower fan capacities the flame velocities reached values
between 170 and 190 m/s which, in a certain distance from the fan
dropped' to a velocity of about 110 m/s. With the full capacity,
however, a flame front velocity of 222 m/s was measured. After a
flame path of about 3,5 m from the ignition point the flame was
still accelerated and the transition from deflagration to detona-
tion occured near the wall. As the flame velocity is well below
the sound velocity of the unburned mixture it is assumed that the
high flow velocity induced by the high flame velocity interacted
with the boundarylayer ne ar the wall producing still higher tur-
bulences which initiated the detonation. This was the first time
that such a transition was observed in a more or less free cloud
only confined by two parallel walls.
Figure 2 shows the flame contours and the path/time depen-
dence of the flame front which results in a detonation velocity
of about 2080 m/s. The overpressure measured was as high as
25 bars.
CONCLUSIONS
The flame front velocity in an unconfined premixed cloud
depends distinctly on the cloud size due to flame induced tur-
bulences.An upper limiting value is not exceeded, however.
In partially confined regions like a lane without additional
turbulences the flame velocity is determined by the initially
formed hemispherical flame front. Only at the end of the lane a
flame acceleration occurs because of the jet-like expansion. With
additional turbulences within the lane produced by a fan with a
sufficiently high fan capacity the transition from a deflagration
to a detonation occurs at least with hydrogen as a fuel.
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This transition, howeve~ is likely restricted to hydrogen,
because turbulence factors greater than 30 require very high tur-
bulent velocity fluctuations which can only be produced under
extreme conditions. In contrast to hydrogen most of the hydro-
carbons have much lower laminar burning velocities so that the











13th Loss Prevention Symp. (1980)
PTß-Mitteilungen 91 (1981)
Selected Combo Problems (1954)
First Special ist Meeting (Int.) of
the Combo Inst. (1981)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
rolm)
Figure 1 Turbulence factor f t as a function of thecloud radius r for a stoichiometric hydrogen/
























Figure 2 Top: Fl ame path/time di agram and typical pressure/
time curves at 3, 4, 6 and 8 m distance from
the ignition point






TABLE I: Results of the Balloon Tests
ro c Mo MF To TF
S 293 To E SF ft f t0 So
(m) (Vol%) (glmol) (glmol) (K) (K) (m/s) (m/s) (-) (m/s) (-) (-)
L53 30,1 20,8 24,1 283 2378 2,59 2,44 7,25
L53 28,6 2L2 24,5 279 2341 2,41 2,22 7,26 46 2,85
L53 29,2 2LO 24-4 282 2374 "- 2,48 2,32 7,25 46 2J 73
L53 29,1 2LO 24,4 282 2369 2,47 2,31 7,23 42 2,51 2,58
L53 29,1 2LO 24-4 282 2369 2-47 2,31 7,23 41 2,45
L53 29,5 20,9 24,3 281 2378 2,52 2,35 7,28 45 2,63
~
L53 29,2 2LO 24,4 281 2373 2-48 2,32 7,29 39 2,31 ~Cl'
lJ1
2,88 27,2 2L5 24,8 286 2273 2,23 2,14 6,89 43 2,92
2,88 29,4 20,9 24,3 279 2374 2,51 2,31 7,32 50,5 2,99 2,96
2,88 29,5 20,9 24,3 279 2376 2,52 2,32 7,32 54 (3,18)
korr, 2,96
5,00 3LO 20,5 23,9 281 2368 2,68 2,50 7,23 59 3,26 3-46
5,00 25,9 2L9 25,1 283 2195 2,06 L94 6-77 48 3,65
10,00 29-7 20,9 24,2 283 2378 2,54 2,39 7,26 83,6 (4,82) 4-48
korr. 4-48
JABLE 11: RESULTS OF THE LANE TESTS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL TURBULENCE
MO MF To TF
S 293 To E SF f t f tro c 0 So
(m) (Vol%) (g/mo 1) (g/mo 1) (K) (K) (m/s) (m/s) (-) (m/s) (-) (-)
L50 35 19,5 22,5 281 2318 3,11 2,90 7,15 49 2,36
L50 39,1 18,4 2LO 272 2209 3,40 3,00 7,11 54 2,53 2,39
L50 39,0 18,4 2LO 276 2213 3,40 3,07 7,02 49 2,27
TABLE 111: RESULTS OF THE LANE TESTS WITH FAN INDUCED TURBULENCE
S 293 S To E
.,





(m) (Vol%) (g/mo 1) (g/mo 1) (K) (K) (m/s) Cm/s) (-) 0\
L50 41 17,9 20,3 291 2178 3,46 3.42 6,60 12 000 172 7,62
L50 38 18,7 2L4 293 2260 3,35 3,35 6,74 18 000 176 7,79
L50 41 17,9 20,3 292 2179 3,46 3,44 6,58 18 000 179 7,91
L50 41 17,9 20,3 288 2175 3,46 3,36 6,66 21 600 190 8.49
L50 37 18,9 2L8 298 2290 3,28 3,38 6,66 21 600 186 8,26
L50 36 19,2 22,1 285 23,02 3,20 3,05 7,02 24 000 222 10,37
1167
DESCRIPTION OF VAPOR EXPLOSIONS BY THERMAL DETONATION AND
HYDRODYNAMIC FRAGMENTATION MODELING
M. BUrger, C. Carachalios, D.S. Kim and H. -Unger
Institut fUr Kernenergetik und Energiesysteme (IKE),
University of Stuttgart, Pfaffenwaldring 31, 7000 Stuttgart 80, FRG
H. Hohmann and H. Schins
Commission of the European Communities,
Joint Research center, Ispra Establishment, 21020 Ispra (Varese), Italy
ABSTRACT
A hydrodynamic fragmentation model has been developed which is ba-
sed on the stripping of the crests of waves produced by shear flow
instabilities at the surface of the melt drop. The comparison with
experimental investigations supports this model at least for Weber
numbers > 1000 with respect to the general features, the fragmen-
tation times and the drift and deformation behavior of the drops
of melt. Incorporating this model in a steady state thermal deto-
nation code, detonation cases for certain coriurn-H 20 prernixtures
are determined, which deliver input values for analysing the load
to structures in structural dynamics codes. The fragmentation mo-
del is also used in a transient thermal d~tonation code for deter-
mining the escalation behavior under given triggering conditions.
INTRODUCTION
Vapor explosions caused by the contact of molten core material with
coolant are an important issue within reactor safety analysis, because they
could produce an early threat to the containment within a core melt acci-
dent. Many analyses have therefore been performed already in order to eva-
luate thepossible load to structures due to vapor explosions as well as the
conditions of initiation of large scale explosions. However, the load calcu-
lations are usually based on experimentally obtained conversion ratios of
thermal to mechanical energy or on parametric models for the determination
of the rapid heat transfer and pressure buildup. In recent models, see for
instance /1/, the heat transfer from the fragments to the coolant is deter-
mined by means of an unsteady-state heat conduction model. Such approaches
however cannot always assure absolutely conservative estimates. In particu-
lar, the conduction model of heat release for instance does not account for
the turbulent flow effects inside a detonation wave. Although the choice of
a rather small fragment size as compared to experimental values of large
scale experiments may compensate for this, this procedure restricts the
capability for extrapolations.
More insight into the processes and a more reliable means for extrapo-
lations and use for reactor conditions can only be gained from a detailed
modeling according to the essential physical mechanism of large scale vapor
explosions, the thermal detonation mechanism /2/, /3/. A crucial point in
this modeling is the description of the fragmentation process, which deter-
mines the heat transfer. While after initiation of the interaction in a
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coarse premixture of melt and coolant thermally induced fragmentation must
dominate, hydrodynamic fragmentation processes should dominate after some
escalation of the pressure pulse. The latter processes are produced by the
relative velocity of melt drops and coolant inside the detonation wave. The
velocity equilibration taking place inside the wave, promoted by the frag-
mentation itself, gives however a strong restriction to the fragmentation
and thus to the rapid heat release to the coolant. A restriction of similar
efficacy is not evident from realistic considerations on the heat transfer
from the fragments, at present.
Thus, in order to obtain the restrictions to the violence of explosions
inherent in the interaction of the physical processes and in order to allow
an extrapolative use of the model, e.g. to reactor conditions, the above
processes have to be described within the thermal detonation modeling. The
best estimate as weIl as conservative character of the model has then to be
proved experimentally. First comparisons have already been performed /4/,
globally with thermal detonation experiments and - for analysing the main
part of the model - with hydrodynamic fragmentation experiments. A more
detailed analysis of the latter will be shown here. At first, a short des-
cription of the hydrodynamic fragmentation model will be given. Finally, the
model will be applied within a steady state and a transient thermal deto-
nation model to corium-water sampie cases.
MODELING OF DYNAMICS AND FRAGMENTATION
part of the modeling, which has been done in addition to earlier ther-
mal detonation models /2/, /3/ and which is described already in /4/, con-
ceives improvements of the dynamic description, which determines the veloci-
ty equilibration between the flow components (coolant, melt). Instead of
using empirical values for a mean drag coefficient of the drops of melt
(which have been derived from single drop experiments and can therefore not
be extrapolated to dispersions), a correlation is used which is related to
the actual states of the drops in the dispersion. It includes the dispersion
effects as weIl as the effect of drop deformation. For this, the deformation
process had to be modeled, which was done by assuming deformation to ellip-
soidal shapes. Thus, the description of the processes inside the detonation
wave includes the movement of the drops of melt, their deformation and their
mass loss due to fragmentation.
Detailed models on hydrodynamic fragmentation, caused by the relative
flow of melt and coolant inside a detonation wave, have also been described
in /4/. From these models, the wave stripping model seems to be the most
appropriate from a first comparison with the experiment. It delivers also
the strongest fragmentation. Therefore, only this model is considered here.
The model is based on the stripping of capillary waves produced on the drop
surface by the shear flow of the coolant. Traveling and growing waves are
considered On the ellipsoidal drops of actual state. stripping of fragments
due to the relative flow derives from stripping criteria. These define a
minimum wave (basic) amplitude for the occurence of stripping of the crests
of the waves as weIl as - by an energy consideration - the stripped mass and
the fragment size. since the basic amplitude is reestablished by stripping,
repeated stripping events at subsequent locations occur on the drop. These
are accumulated in the region of the drop equator. sumrning up the stripping
rates at the different locations gives finally the actual stripping rate on
the whole drop within a quasi-steady state approach.
Some modifications and extensions of the modeling described in /4/ have
been performed in the meantime. While in /4/ a fixed deformation state of
the drop has been assumed, argueing that the pronounced stripping at the
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equator of the drop counteracts the deformation process, it has now been
tried to model this effect. Within a rough approach, a cylindrical model of
the drop - used already in /4/ .for the Taylor instability model of breakup -
is used complementarily to the ellipsoidal model. The stripped mass calcula-
ted from the ellipsoidal model is - within the cylindrical model - assumed
to be only stripped at the cylindrical surface. The radius of the cylinder
is then reduced correspondingly. Since this radius has been chosen equal to
the semi-axis of the ellipsoid perpendicular to the flow, the reduction is
directly transformed to the ellipsoidal model. This effect is added to the
deformation qf the drop due to the surrounding flow.
In addition, some small modifications have been performed. E.g., strip-
ping is assumed to stop shortly behind the equator of the drop, whereas in
the earlier model /4/ stripping was also considered on the lee side of the
drop, using the irrotational flow solution without taking account of the
flow separation. This means a reduction of the fragmentation rate as compa-
red to /4/. An initial phase can be d~fined with respect to the motion of
the drops and the fragmentation process. During an initial phase of poten-
tial flow the drops are not accelerated. On the other hand, deformation
occurs due to the pressure distribution of the potential flow solution. A
characteristic scale for the duration of this initial phase is given by the
time the flow needs to pass the drop diameter. An initial phase of fragmen-
tation may be needed to establish at first a pattern of waves with suffi-
ciently high amplitudes on the drop. In a first approach a delay time
corresponding to the drift delay may be assumed.
TRANSIENT THERMAL DETONATION MODEL
The transient thermal detonation model, described already in /5/, has
been improved along the same lines as the steady state model. However, a
simplified method has been chosen for the description of the fragmentation
process. Instead of the fragmentation model a correlation for the actual
rate of stripped mass has been developed and fitted to the model by compa-
ring results obtained from the steady-state model with the respective formu-
lations. The calculations give a very good agreement of the correlation with
the modelover a wide range of conditions (mass ratios of melt to coolant,
initial mixture configurations, shock front pressures, Weber numbers, etc.).
The constant of proportionality must however be determined separately for
every material combination, but shows only small differences for the mate-
rials considered here. It must be mentioned, that - in contrast to other
transient thermal detonation models (see /5/) - the present model includes
the description of the relative motion of the drops of melt and the coolant
(also taking into account the drop deformation) and, based on this, the
coupling of hydrodynamic fragmentation to the actual flow situation. This is
also valid for the correlation derived here.
In addition to this description of hydrodynamic fragmentation athermal
fragmentation model according to Corradini /6/ was incorporated in the tran-
sient model. with the inclusion of this thermal fragmentation model a detai-
led analysis of the escalation process can in principle be performed, start-
ing with local vapor film collapse in some region of the coarse mixture,
e.g. near a solid wall. While in the beginning only thermal fragmentation
exists, the increase of the pressure pulse leads to an increase of hydrody-
namic fragmentation, which should finally dominate. Within the present mo-
deling the two fragmentation mechanisms can act separately or in a combined
way. Thus, their relative importance on the escalation and propagation
behavior of a thermal detonation wave and the development of a spontaneous
interaction to a full steady-state detonation wave with possibly changing
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fragmentation behavior can be examined.
other improvements of the transient thermal detonation model concern
the formulation of the triggering and boundary conditions. While in the
earlier modeling an inflow plane behind the wave was defined by a somewhat
artificial coupling of outside and inside conditions, a more physical des-
cription has now been performed, prescribing the physical conditions either
at a solid wall, at a source point for spherical propagation or at an open
end. In addition, the effect of arbitrary triggers can be superposed. Since
saturation of the coolant often occurs at a wall side due to the induced
flow, causing apressure release, vaporisation had also to be considered
within the model in order to analyse the further development of the detona-
tion wave. This has been done by assuming equilibrium conditions between the
coolant phases. Improvements have also been done with respect to the numeri-
cal formulation, especially of the shock fitting procedure. These improve-
ments of the transient model allow more reliable analyses of the escalation
process as well as of the transition to a steady-state detonation wave. By
inclusion of the deterministic fragmentation d~scription a deterministic
prediction of the energy release and the pressure buildup during a thermal
detonation is achieved.
RESULTS
Firstly, calculations have been performed for hydrodynamic fragmenta-
tion experiments with single drops of gallium in water streams in order to
examine the hydrodynamic fragmentation model as well as the dynamic descrip-
tion of the drift and deformation processes of the drops. Based on this
validation of the key parts in the thermal detonation model, sample Cases
which are relevant for reactor conditions have been analysed by use of the
steady-state as well as the transient detonation model.
Experimental Examination of the Hydrodynamic Fragmentation, Deformation
and Drift Models
A first comparison of the hydrodynamic fragmentation modeling with the
experimental results gained at the IKE has already been presented in /4/. At
least for Weber numbers greater than 1000 the experiments support the wave
stripping model by phenomenology as well as by the results for the fragmen-
tation times and the fragment sizes. Because of the modifications and exten-
sions of the model mentioned above and also of a more detailed analysis of
the experimental results /7/, the comparison is repeated now.
1. Fragmentation Times
A reexamination of the experimental results of /4/ has already been done in
/7/, introducing modified as well as additional criteria for the fragmenta-
tion time. These various criteria have been chosen because of the uncertain-
ties in determining the experimental fragmentation times due to the inherent
difficulties to distinguish between the drop and the fragments. On one hand,
the different criteria allow to determine fragmentation times for different,
roughly defined stages of the fragmentation process and, on the other hand,
to get a confirmation with respect to the trend of the data. As an important
result it can be seen. from Fig. 1, that no obvious tendency with the Weber
number can be detected for the dimensionless fragmentation times (defined as
usually, e.g. /4/) fram any of the different criteria (for We ~ 400). This
result is adequate to a stripping model of fragmentation. Increases for
We ~ 400 may indicate a different region of fragmentation, defined by strip-
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ping of eoherent skins with subsequent breakup instead of fully developed
wave stripping with direet stripping of fragments from the wave erests (see
also /4/, /7/).
In addition to the Criteria 1-3, which are the same as in /7/ (because
of a printing error in /7/ it must however be remarked that Criterion 2 eor-
responds to doubling of the projected area of the "drop"), a new Criterion 4
has been introduced, replacing that of /7/ which overestimates the fragmen-
tation time. This eriterion assumes complete fragmentation after the lateral
expansion of the shadow of the drop together with its stripped fragments has
stopped. It is based on the consideration that after a phase of dominanee of
the deformation processes of the drop the stretching of the eloud of frag-
ments in the direction of the flow should finally dominate. As can be seen
in Fig. 1, the results from this criterion lie between the results of Crite-
ria 2 and 3. Since the Criteria 2 to 4 are related to more final stages of
the fragmentation process, a constant dimensionless fragmentation time of
eomplete fragmentation in the range of 2.5 to 3.5 may be derived from the
experiments, at least for Weber numbers We ~ 400.
The results for different fragmentation grades (ratio of fragmented to
initial drop mass) with the modified wave stripping model are also ineluded
in Fig. 1. Above eertain limits of fragmentation, whieh oeeur espeeially for
higher fragmentation grades beeause of the veloeity equilibration, also
praetieally eonstant dimensionless fragmentation times for eertain fragmen-
tation grades are obtained. The limits of fragmentation are stronger than in
/4/, and the dimensionless fragmentation times for eertain fragmentation
grades are nearly doubled. This must already result approximately from stop-
ping the fragmentation just behind the equator of the drop. Sinee the frag-
mentation proeess may be assumed to be essentially eompleted for fragmenta-
tion grades between 0.75 and 0.9, a dimensionless time of 1.5 to 2 for eom-
plete fragmentation may be derived as eompared to the experimental values
between 2.5 and 3.5. Thus, the theory gives the experimental order of magni-
tude. The lower theoretieal results ean be explained by the severe idealiza-
tions of the modeling. They assure the eonservativity of the detonation
deseription with respeet to reaetor safety.
2. Fragment Sizes
Mean values of the fragment diameter are derived fram an evaluation of pho-
tographs of the experimentally obtained fragment distribution. For the gal-
lium-water experiments DS-12, DS-15 and DS-18 (see /7/) the following values
result respeetively: 250 ~m, 90 ~m, 40 ~m. The respeetive theoretieal va-
lues, determined by mass averaging, are: 106 ~m, 98 ~m, 50 ~m. Although the
agreement for DS-15 and DS-18 appears rather good, smaller theoretieal va-
lues were expeeted beeause of the idealizations of the modeling. However,
further breakup of the stripped toruslike erest of a wave ring is not eonsi-
dered here, whieh would lead to signifieantly smaller theoretieal fragment
sizes. The mueh larger fragment size obtained experimentally for DS-12 ean
be explained by the lower Weber number of 630, for which the wave stripping
may not yet be fully developed.
3. Deformation and Drift Processes
Fig. 2 shows results of the deformation behavior of the gallium drops from
some of the experiments together with the theoretical results. In the model
the pressure coefficient charaeterizing the pressure distribution around the
drop was set to 1 during the initial delay phase. A theoretical value of
2.25 corresponds to the initial potential flow around a spherieal drop.
During the development of boundary layer separation this value must however
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decrease to 0.7 in the region of developed flow. The value of 1 can there-
fore be understood as some average betwe6n the limiting values for potential
and developed flow. Until now only data for spherical shapes have been taken
due to a lack of data.
In the dimensionless representation by Fig. 2, the deformation behavior
of the different experimental cases with Weber numbers varying from 630 to
3520 is rather close. This is also valid for the theoretical results which
agree rather well with the experimental results until theoretically a maxi-
mum is reached. Experimentally the lateral extension continues to grow until
a maximum is reached much later (see fragmentation Criterion 4, Fig. 1).
However, while the theoretical results only concern the drop remnant, the
cloud of fragments enlarges the apparent "drop" in experiment. This lateral
enlargement can be explained by the effects of lateral flow of the fragments
as well as by deformation effects of the cloud of fragments. It is however
counteracted and finally stopped by the stretching of the cloud of fragments
in the flow direction, caused by the subsequent stripping of fragments and
the increase in fragment sizes.
The experimental results on the drift of the gallium drops can be seen
in Fig. 3. Again the experiments DS-12, -15, -18 in the regime of higher
Weber numbers (630 - 3520) are considered. They deliver nearly the same
drift behavior in the dimensionless representation. This effect is reprodu-
ced by the theory. However, the theoretical drift develops more rapidly,
which may be explained by the neglection of virtual mass effects, which are
due to the momentum transfer to the coolant and the fragments. The mass loss
history of the drop of DS-15 (fragmentation grade) is also included in
Fig. 3 for illustration.
Due to the coupled description of the fragmentation, deformation and
drift processes the present modeling allows detailed examinations of the ex-
periments and thus enables to identify the dominant processes as well as to
limit the regions of uncertain physical values, such as the pressure coeffi-
cient, for instance. Because these uncertain quantities are related to spe-
cific processes, they can in principle also be determined easily for rele-
vant ranges by separate, specific experiments. Thus, the detailed modeling
allows extrapolations with the detonation model. In contrast to this, the
global correlations and parameters used in the earlier detonation models
/2/, /3/, which were derived fram single drop experiments, do not allow
reliable extrapolations.
From the above comparisons it can be concluded that the present model
is consistent with the experimental results on the fragmentation, deforma-
tion and drift behavior of single drops. Also the theoretical fragment sizes
lie in the experimental range. conservativlty with respect to the use in
safety considerations is assured by the comparison on the fragmentation
times, which indicates, that the times - although lying in the experimental
range - are smaller than the experimental ones. Further analyses and compa-
risons should however be performed with other single drop experiments as
well as with respect to dispersion cases in order to learn more about the
capabilities of the models.
Thermal Detonation Calculations for Corium-water systems
After validation of key parts of the thermal detonation model, the applica~
tion of the model to reactor related conditions may be justified, although
some work has still to be done. Firstly, the stability considerations for
the steady state model are restricted until now to the occurence of satura-
tion at the Chapman-Jouguet plane. Secondly, nonhomogeneous heating of the
coolant is not considered. Both restrictions make the conservativity of the
results unsure and need therefore to be investigated in future. For this
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paper, calculations have been performed with the steady state as weIl as
with the transient detonation model, the latter without taking into account
an initial delay phase. In both cases the same data of the coarse premixture
have been chosen, which are given in Fig. 5.
1. Results from the Steady-state Model
The main result of the calculation shown in Fig. 4 is the strang restriction
of the fragmentation grade and thus of the transfered heat, which occurs due
to the counteraction of velocity equilibration. The results can be used for
determining the possible load to structures. The main effects result from
the expansion processes of the high pressurized region which is left behind
by the detonation wave at the end state of the wave. In order to calculate
the possible loads from such expansion processes, hydrodynamics codes such
as PISCES (see /1/) can be used, taking the results of the detonation model
as input values. Only some evaluations on the basis of the energy release
calculated from the detonation model could be made here, using results from
load calculations given in the literature.
For calculations with PISCES the heat flux into the water pool is nee~
ded. If a spherical propagation of the detonation wave is considered and the
result of the plane wave calculation of Fig. 4 is uSed approximately, a
coarse mixed region of volume 18.3 m3 is affected in 4 ms. With a fragmenta-
tion grade of 13 %, a heat transfer of 7.5'10 9 J into 8.9 t water during
this first rapid phase of vapor explosion results. On the other hand, a
sampIe calculation with PISCES and ANSYS given in /1/ shows that 10 10 J of
heat, released in 4 ms into 10 t water, do not lead to a break of the reac-
tor pressure vessel (RPV) of a nuclear reactor of Biblis type. Thus, the
detonation case calculated here should not mean a threat to the RPV. This
result must however be considered as preliminary, since it is only
calculated for one coarse mixture configuration. Also the effects mentioned
which question the conservativity of the model must be investigated further.
2. Results from the Transient Model
Calculations have been performed for an interaction starting at asolid
wall. Instead by a thermal fragmentation model the initial energy release in
a certain region ne ar the wall is here parametrized. After a certain time
only hydrodynamic fragmentation according to the wave stripping model is
considered further. However, at the present state of the develoment of the
transient model numerical problems still occured with the fragmentation
rates determined from the wave stripping model. Therefore, these fragmenta-
tion rates have been halved for the present calculations. Thus, these re-
sults cannot be taken directly for safety considerations, but give in any
case some insight in the escalation behavior and in the relation to the
steady state case. In order to analyse this relation, the steady state case
has been determined correspondingly with halved fragmentation rates.
The results show an escalation to a steady-state propagation, which can
be seen in Fig. 5. A saturation plane follows areaction zone and propagates
with the same velocity as the shock front. Behind, a region with coolant
vapor with nearly constant pressure is established, approximately equal to
the end press ure at the saturation plane. In the saturation plane also velo-
city equilibration occurs. Thus, the wave is compatible with the calculation
from the steady-state model. Also the characteristic quantities are practi-
cally the same. The shock front pressure of both models is about 25 MPa and
the end pressure 9 MPa. In both cases the fragmentation grades are approxi-
mately 12 % and the lengths of the w~ve are 9 cm. Fig. 6 shows the time
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development of the phase velocities and the fragmentation grade at a place
after the arrival of the shock front for both the transient and the steady
state model. Again the very good agreement can be demonstrated.
These results prove the consistency of the transient with the steady-
state detonation model. Furthermore the escalation process can be conside-
red. In the present case a length of approximately 5 times the wave length
is required. An escalation threshold results, depending on the initial ener-
gy input. only wi th an energy release of more than500 J per cm 2 cross-sec-
tion into a region of the length of 5 cm within a time of 100 ~s an escala-
tion occurs, whereas with a smaller input the wave finally decays (Fig. 7).
Further analyses are necessary for interpretation of these results.
CONCLUSIONS
.Detailed descriptions of the dynamics and of the fragmentation of the
drops of melt have been incorporated in a steady-state and a transient ther-
mal detonation model. These descriptions have been validated by means of
experiments with single gallium drops. Applications of the detonation models
for corium-water sample cases showed - besides an excellent consistency of
the models - strong restrictions to the heat release. However, the transient
model could only be used with a reduced fragmentation rate due to numerical
problems. Based on the result of the steady-state model with the full rate,
an evaluation on the threat to the RPV of a nuclear reactor was performed,
using results from literature on load calculations. The result indicates
that the RPV should withstand the explosion in this sample case. Further
calculations with other cases and an extended modeling are however necessary
to ass ure this conclusion. After solving the numerical problems with the
transient model, this will give another important tool for risk analyses,
delivering information on the escalation requirements and the effects of
'inhomogene i ties in the coarse premixture as well as allowing exam inations of
the steady-state model with respect to stability considerations.
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CORE-CONCRETE INTERACTION: STATUS OF BETA EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM
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ABSTRACT
The experimental BETA program is carried out at KfK with the
principal goal to verify the exisEing computer codes on core
concrete interaction. In BETA all the interaction processes dur-
ing core melt/concrete contact are being studied, starting with
very high melt temperatures of 2400 ·c and following all the
sequences until the melt is substantially frozen. The experiments
at different interaction temperatures were specified following
the requirements of the codes.
Tests in the early 84 show the reliable operation of the experi-
mental facility. The experimental program starts with high tempe-
rature investigations of melt concrete interaction. The newest
experimental results are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Core melt down accident research in the FRG concentrates on risk assessment
of nuclear power plants /1/. The dominant role of core concrete interaction on
the possible overpressurization of the containment has led to the development of
sophisticated computer codes such as KAVERN /2/, WECHSL /3/, and CORCON /4/.
These codes calculate the core-concrete interaction, the energy fluxes, the
generated gaseous and liquid products, crust formation, chemical reactions and
melt front propagation. Verification of the codes was limited up to now on
separate effect experiments or transient small scale experiments with reactor
typical materials.
As the final step for code development and code verification, the BETA
facility has been constructed as a large scale experiment. With closely connec-
ted experiments and pre- and post-test code calculations, the various processes
during melt/concrete interaction and their models in the computer codes are
studied in detail. At the end of the experimental BETA program, verified codes
will be available to describe melt/concrete interaction during a hypothetical
core melt down accident.
DESCRIPTION OF THE BETA-FACILITY
Following the needs of code verification, the BETA facility was constructed
as a large melt facility with sustained heating of the simulated core melt in a
concrete crucible (Fig. 1). All the interacting processes during melt/concrete
contact will be investigated, starting with very high melt temperatures of more
than 2000 ·C, and following all the sequences until the melt is substantially
frozen.
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The principle idea is to investigate the different regimes which occur in
the process of melt/concrete interaction with a sequence of experiments at
different temperature levels, which are studied in BETA under controlled quaB~
steady conditions. The melt is heated internally in the BETA facility by induc-
tion heating with very high input power to keep the temperature of the melt
constant, according to the need of a specific experiment. This approach haB the
advantage that the complex physical and chemical reactions can be elaborated in
more detail and that the time scale approaches the real accident situation.
Accordingly, heat flux and temperatures, melt fron penetration and most of the
other relevant processes are simulated in a 1:1 scale, which is essential for
the applicability of the experimental results to the real core melt down acci-
dent.
The main characteristics of the test facility are described in Ref. /5/.
The melt consists of up to 300 kg steel and up to 300 kg oxidic phase contained
in a concrete crucible of 38 cm inner diameter (Fig. 1). The concrete crucibl~
(1) with the melt is enclosed by the induction coil (2) in its central part. The
electric power supply feeding the coil, and its very large capacitor bank, is
not shown here. The hood and offgas pipe (3) collect all gaseous products
generated during melt/concrete interaction for physical and chemical analysis.
On top of the crucible are both the reaction tank (4) to prepare the thermite
genera ted melt, with an attached pouring spout, and a container (5) with dip-in
measurement systems for melt analysis.
The most important measurements during the experiments are power input to
the melt; temperatures, melt front position and moisture detectors in the cru-
ciblej temperatures of the melt; off-gas composition, and aerosol release.
FIRST EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The construction of the BETA facility was finished at the end of 1983.
Operation began in February 1984. Three experiments, VO.1 to VO.3, have been
conducted to test the equipment and measurement systems (Tab. 1). In experiment
VO.1, the thermite melt generation and pouring device were successfully tested.
The experiments VO.2 and VO.3 are the first sustained heating experiments and
are similar to the experiments in the test matrix. They proved that the power
input by induction heating is in accordance with the planned data and that
continuous heating of a 300 kg steel melt with a maximum net input power of 1700
kW is achieved. Off-gas system and measurement systems were operated safely.
Test Initial melt in crucible Heating Remarks
VO.1 300 kg steel no equipment tests,
VO.2 300 kg steel 400 kW VO.2 and VO.3 similar to
VO.3 300 kg steel, 150 kg A1
2
0
3 1700 kW test matrix experiments
V1.1 20 kg steel pulsed failure of pouring control




pulsed influence of Lorentz-
forces excluded
V1.3 300 kg steel, 150 kg Alt3 1000 kW
+ Si 2
Tab. 1: BETA experiment until August 1984.
The experimental series V1, which follows the equipment tests,is investigat-
ing the high temperature interaction of the liquid melt with the concrete. It
should be mentioned that the experiments, up to now, use siliceous concrete
crucibles only.
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Some of the cross sections of BETA crucibles, which were cut after the
test, are reproduced in Figs. 2a-b. The crucibles of the soustained heating
experiments with 400 and 1000 kW power input, respectively, show a considerable
difference in melt front propagation when compared to previous transient tests.
Downward propagation is clearly dominant when the temperature of the melt is
kept high over longer periods of time, while the sideward penetration is rather
limited. This effect was observed also in experiment VO.3 with the very high
power input of 1.7 MW, indicating that this behavior is valid for a wide tempe-
rature range of the melt. In earlier transient tests, melt front propagation is
only some 5 cm in both the downward and sideward directions.
The influence of magnetic Lorentz-forces, resulting from induction heating,
on melt front propagation was investigated experimentally and theoretically when
the BETA facility was planned. This influence was found to be neglegible, com-
pared with that of the gas agitation of the melt. However, becauseof the
unexpected melt front shape, an additional experiment V1.2 was carried out in
BETA to validate the experimental melt front results. With pulsed heating, at
maximum input power, the melt was repeatedly heated in the crucible to high
·temperatures and then allowed to interact with the crucible with zero induction
field. After aseries of ten power cycles comparison of the melt shape with VO.2
shows no significant difference, and it was concluded that radial and axial
penetration are not affected by the heating method.
A second inportant effect has been observed in the sustained heating expe-
riments, which becomes most clearly visible in V1.3. This experiment, with a
rather high sustained heating power of 1000 kW, began with oxidic and metallic
melt in the crucible, with the metallic phase initially at the bottom. With the
high gas release from the concrete the steel is entrained into the oxidic phase
in fine droplets. After 5 to 6 minutes of interaction, an almost complete
disperion of the metal into the oxide is observed, and no continuous steel phase
exists which may be heated by the induction field. Therefore, the heating power
drops to a low value, ending this high temperature experiment. The dispersion
process is mainly influenced by the superficial gas velocity and the viscosity
and density of the metal and the oxide. Therefore, it is strongly dependent on
the temperature of the melt, and the inverse process of segregation must be
considered when the liquid melt is at lower temperatures, with reduced gas flow
rates, for longer times.
As discussed above, the heating power which is coupled to the melt in BETA
contains important information of the constitution of the melt and is given in
Figs. 3a-b. In experiment VO.2 nearly constant heating was achieved over some 40
minutes, with the exception of three power peeks between 1700 and 2100 sec,
which were applied to test the equipment, and a short power failure at 600 sec.
The experiment started with no oxidic phase. A closer inspection of the power
curve shows a slight increase of the power over the first 600 sec. Probably, the
metal undergoes.a coarse mixing with molten silica and gas, resulting in a
distribution of metal with a higher effective cylindrical surface more amenable
to induction heating. As the oxidic melt mass grows, fine metallic particles
produced by the entraining gas flow may be kept in the oxide, unable to be
heated inductively because of their small sizes. Therefore, a slow decrease of
input power results.
Power input during V1.3 (Fig. 3b), with a much higher gas release and the
oxidic phase present from the beginning of the experiment, suggests a much
faster transition to the fine distribution of the metal with a drastic reduction
in power input. A similar behavior is observed in experiment VO.3.
Melt front propagation in the BETA experiments was evaluated from the
failure time of thermocouples in the crucibles (Figs. 4a-b). It is seen that the
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downward melt front propagation rate is nearly constant with time, indicating a
quasi-steady experimental condition, and reaches from .18 mm/s for the 400 kW
power input to 1.0 mm/s for the 1.7 MW power input in VO.3. The downward propa-
gation velocity is approximately proportional to the power input, but is up to a
factor of Z higher than has been observed in earlieZtransient experiments. Thecorresponding maximum heat flux density i8 4.4 MW/m • However, as seen from Fig.
4, the sideward penetration is limited to only a few centimeters. After some
minutes of interaction, the radius of the cavity remains almost constant.
The gas and aerosol release are discussed below for the pulsed heating
experiment V1.Z. The aerosol measurements by extinction of a laser beam, are
given in Fig. 5, which shows aseries of aerosol peaks over a low base level.
The initial peak of serosols is observed with the first contact between the melt
and the concrete, and is probably due to the fabrication of the crucible, which
is cast in a greased mold for easier separation of concrete and mold. The other
large peaks are due to the insertion of paper shrouded thermocouple lances into
the melt, producing a significant amount of smoke by pyrolysis. Smaller peaks
are from ceramic shielded thermocouple lances. It can be stated that the amount
of aerosols producjd directly from melt/concrete interaction is very low, in the
range of some mg/m • This is confirmed by the visual observation with TV- and
film cameras. Furthermore, temperature variations due to the power peaks in this
experiment have no significant effect on aerosol release.
On-line measurements of gas concentration during this experiment are given
in Fig. 6 in relative units of the mass spectrometer. The constant argon cover
gas flow gives a time dependent concentration signal because of the varying
contribution of the gas release from the concrete in response to the changing
temperature of the melt. The most important gases are HZ' HZO, and CO, while the
amount of CO
Z
is very small (lowest curve in Fig. 6). Tfie release rates of HZ'
CO
Z
and CO follow the power peaks in the melt, and the gas increase is due to
the higher melt front propagation at increased melt temperatures. Some of the
peaks are due to the insertion of paper shrouded thermocouples, producing gases
as weIl as aerosols. It is interesting to note that the release of water vapor
is independent of power variation. Therefore, it is concluded that the detected
vapor is released from the upper sidewalls of the crucible which are covered
with splashed oxidic melt, while the water vapor bubbling through the liquid
metal is completely reduced to hydrogen. Most of the CO
Z
is reduced to CO by the
steel. Due to the use of siliceous concrete, the most important gas is hydrogen.
Future experiments with constant power input will allow more detailed gas analy-
sis.
CONCLUSIONS
From the BETA experiments carried out so far, following preliminary conclu-
sions may be drawn:
- Downward propagation of the metallic melt dominates for the high temperature
melt/concrete interaction. Present modelling of heat transfer in the computer
codes, based on earlier transient experiments, must be improved.
- Dispersion of the metallic into the oxidic phases is observed in the experi-
ments with high gas release. The long-time st;bility of th~ dispersed mate-
rials and the possible influence on freezing processes needs further investi-
gation.
- The gas released from the melt surface is mainly hydrogen for the siliceous type
of concrete.
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- The aeroso3 release from melt/concrete interaction is observed to be very low(some mg/m ).
Further analysis of these phenomena is carried out in the ongoing BETA
experiments in close cooperation with code verification, presently concentrating
on the high temperature interaction. The subsequent experiments involving crust
formation and solidification processes will complete code verification at the
end of 1985.
Considering the implications of the preliminary BETA results with respect
to the reactor situation, the following consequences may be derived: A faster
downward propagation of the melt may occur while the melt is liquid. However,
because of the higher heat transfer rates from the liquid melt, freezing proces-
ses in the melt will start earlier limiting the fast downward propagation. The
reduced radial propagation of the melt may lead, for the German PWR, to a
retarded sump water ingression, with the consequence of a later overpressuriza-
tion of the containment. However, the containment atmosphere may be loaded by a
relatively higher hydrogen content.
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Fig. 2 Cross sections of BETA crucibles after test
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LARGE-SCALE MELT/MATERIAL INTERACTION EXPERlMENTS*
T. Y. Chu, J. E. Brockmann
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
The paper describes the design and performance of the Large-Scale Melt
Facility (LMF) at Sandia National Laboratories. The facility is capable
of producing up to 500 kg of core melt with super heat up to 150 oK. The
results of the first experiment carried out in the facility involving the
interaction of 230 kg of a 70% UOZ-30% ZrOz melt and a magnesia crucible
are also presented.
INTRODUCTION
Core melt/material interaction experiments are currently being carried out
at SNLA to provide quantitative data for the validation of computer codes for
severe reactor accident assessment. For the data to accurately reflect the
thermal hydraulic phenomena involved the experiment must be carried out in
large-scale and the facility must be designed to be flexible enough to accommo-
date a variety of test conditions. The LMF at Sandia is designed to meet these
requirements. A description of the facility and a summary of some of the
developmental studies are presented .in the first part of the paper. More
detailed descriptions can be found in references [1,2).
The second part of the paper reports the results of a core melt/magnesia
interaction test. The purpose of the test is to assess the ability of magnesia
bricks in mitigating or moderating core melt attack. Of interests are thermal
and mechanical responses of the material as weIl as the amount of gas and aero-
sol generation.
LARGE SCALE MELT FACILITY (LMF)
Furnace and Test Chamber
The LMF consists of an induction furnace on a platform for melt preparation
and a test chamber below for the interaction test, Figure 1. The furnace is
approximately 1.5 m in diameter and 2.1 m high with a water cooled outer shell,
Figure' 2. The test chamber is 2.7 m in diameter and 2.4 m high, made of 1-cm-
thick mild steel, with external girdling beams. The test chamber is mounted on
tracks to allow both the furnace and the chamber to be serviced simultaneously.
The melt is prepared in the furnace and tapped into the test chamber for experi-
mentation.
*This work supported by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and performed at
Sandia Nat'l Labs. which is operated for the U.S. Dept. of Energy under Contract
Number DE-AC04-76DP00789.
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During operation the furnace is continuously purged with argon. The power
supplied to the induction coil is coupled to a graphite susceptor. The power
supply for the furnace operates at 1000 Hz with a maximum power of 280 kW. The
maximum power deposition into the susceptor was experimentally determined to be
154 kW. The susceptor has an outside diameter of 56 cm and is 76 cm high. The
melt crucible assembly is an upright cylinder with a hemispherical bot tom; the
overall height is 53.3 cm and the diameter is 34.2 cm. The crucible assembly
fits into a cavity inside the graphite susceptor, the cavity is closed off by
a graphite lid, Figure 2. An opening on the bottom of the susceptor allows the
melt to be tapped from the bottom by explosively driven projectiles. Two
methods are used. One is to use a self-forging fragment which is a slug of
metal formed and driven by explosives. Another way is by firing two special
slugs from a double barrel 12-gauge shotgun into the bottom of the melt
crucible. The self-forging fragment is found to be more effective. A 200-kg
melt can be released into the test chamber in less than one second.
The test chamber is designed to withstand an internal pressure of two
atmospheres. It has a spring loaded relief port to prevent overpressurization.
Two access doors allow the introduction of test objects up to 1.5 m in width and
2 m high. There are a number of ports on the side and top of the chamber to
provide television and motion picture coverage of the test. There are also
various instrumentation ports through the chamber wall for thermal, gas and
aerosol instrumentations. Experiments are remotely operated from a control
building about 100 m from the furnace platform. Up to 128 channels at 1.5 sec.
intervals are available for data acquisition; the system is currently being
upgraded to 200 channels at 0.5 sec. intervals.
MELT CHARGE AND CRUCIBLE ASSEMBLY
The charge material was a mixture of urania 70% by weight and the balance
zirconia (stabilized by 12% yttria). The raw materials were in powder form with
a typical packing density of about 30%. To increase the amount of charge in the
crucible and, more importantly, to improve the thermal properties of the melt
charge, the powders were hot pressed to approximately 80% of theoretical dens-
ity. A typical charge billet was a cylinder about 30 cm diameter and 10 cm high
weighing about 50 kg. Holes were drilled into the charge to accept temperature
instrumentation. The bot tom charge billet was machined to fit the spherical
contour of the crucible bottom. The melting range of the melt charge was deter-
mined in two independent sets of experiments at Sandia to be between 2798 K
(2525°C) and 2848 K (2575°C).
The melt crucible was actually an assembly of two vessels. This was
because of the compatibility requirements. The melt crucible had to be able to
withstand, concurrently, the diffusion of carbon from the susceptor on the out-
side and the possible attack of the melt from the inside. Material compatibil-
ity tests showed that none of the candidate materials, Ta, W, Ta-2 1/2W, and
Ta-10W, could meet both requirements. Carbon diffusion was lowest in Ta-10W,
about 1/3 that of other materials, but the tantalum in the Ta-10W alloy was
found to be soluble in U02' Tungsten was the only material compatible with
molten U02' Therefore, the crucible had to be a multi-walled structure with an
8-mm-thick Ta-10W vessel on the outside and a 1.6-mm-thick CVD (chemical vapor
deposition) tungsten liner inside. Additional barrier were provided by a 3 mm
of plasma-sprayed tungsten on the inside of the TA-10W vessel and a 2.5-mm-thick
tungsten-powder packing between the liner and the outer vessel. The powder
packing also helped to dis tribute the loading on the liner, Figure 3.
Similarly, a 5-mm layer of U02 powder was used between the me1t charge billets
and the tungsten liner to even out the loading resulting from the charge.
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Instrumentation
The susceptor and the melt charge were instrumented with 21 type C
(tungsten 5%-rhenium vs tungsten 26%-rhenium) thermocouples, 5 ultrasonic
thermometers and 2 pyrometers. Thermocouples in the charge were installed at
5.1-cm radius and 14.0-cm radius at depths from 7.5 cm to 4.1 cm into the
charge. Ultrasonic thermometers were installed at similar locations. The
susceptor temperature was also monitored by thermocouples and ultrasonic
thermometers, Figure 4. Of the two pyrometers, one monitors the susceptor
temperature and the other monitors the charge temperature. The tungsten
pyrometer well in the charge was placed along the central axis of the charge and
reached to within 7.4 cm of the bottom of the melt crucible.
Thermal Modelling of the Charge-Crucible-Susceptor Assembly
Concurrent with the development of the melting technology was the develop-
ment of a computer model of the charge-crucible-susceptor assembly to guide the
control of the experiment. The power from the induction coil is deposited in
the graphite susceptor, the energy is transferred through the crucible to heat
the melt charge. Because of the low thermal diffusivity of the melt billet and
the U02 powder surrounding it, the energy transfer between the crucible and the
charge is quite slow. The highest safe operating temperature of the crucible as
defined by the Ta-W-C phase diagram is 3100 K which is only approximately 250 K
above the melting range of the melt. When the rate of energy deposition into
the susceptor exceed the rate of energy transfer into the charge, the crucible
will fail by melting. In addition, components of the refractory crucible often
have residual stresss developed during manufacturing and are susceptible to
cracking due to thermal stress in the range of 300 K to 1300 K. It is, there-
fore, very important to be able to control the rate of heating of the susceptor
throughout the experiment.
A finite difference model of the charge-crucible-susceptor assembly was
developed [3]. The model was first used to evaluate different design alterna-
tives and later used to set the heating schedule for the experiments. The model
takes full account of conduction and radiation heat transfer. Melting of the
charge is modelled by an increase in specific heat of the charge and convection
in the melt is approximated by an increase in the thermal conductivity of the
molten charge. The amount of increase is estimated by standard natural convec-
tion correlations. The model is accurate to within 100 K as compared to experi-
ments [3] up to charge melting. Because convection in the melt is only approxi-
mated by conduction, the details of the melt front progression cannot be accur-
ately modelled. But reasonable estimates of total time for melting can be
obtained.
MOLTEN CORE/MgO INTERACTION EXPERIMENT
Physical Assembly of the Test
The magnesia crucible was made of Harklase MgO bricks. The bottom was made
of three layers of flats with a total thickness of 19.1 cm. The sidewall con-
sisted of two layers of arch bricks with a total thickness of 22.9 cm. The
resulting cavity was approximately circular with an average "diameter" of 36.2
cm and a depth of 66 cm. The bricks were.supported below by a 1.3 cm steel
plate. The entire brick assembly was contained inside of a 107x107-cm-square
steel box 95 cm high. The space between the bricks and the box was filled with
MgO powder. The bottom and the sidewall of the crucible were instrumented with
thermocouples at depths ranging from 0.32 cm to 15.2 cm below the surface.
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An 81.3-cm diameter shield was instrumented to measure the upward heat flux
from the melt in the MgO crucible. It was mounted on a boom and was designed to
be moved over the MgO crucible cavity after the tapping of the melt was com-
pleted. The shield was a sandwich structure; the top and bottom were made of
8-rnm steel plates with a middle layer of alumina felt insulation, The lower
plate was segmented with a 35.6-cm-diameter disk surrounded by a 19.7-cm-wide
middle ring and an 24.8-cm-wide outer ring. The center disk was plasma sprayed
with a layer of alumina. The segments were separated by 3 rnm of alumina insula-
tion. In addition, the shield was equipped with a number of heat flux gauges
for local measurements.
The test chamber was extensively instrumented for aerosol measurements.
Two main items of interest in aerosol measurements were the aerosol source term
and the size distribution. The aerosol source term was obtained by mass balance
measurements. The rate of change of' the total suspended aerosol mass in the
test chamber was the result of the balance between production, the source term,
and depletion due to venting and deposition. Filter samplers and an aerosol
photometer were used to measure aerosol concentration as a function of time from
which the total rate of change of aerosol mass was calculated. To insure that
the concentration measurements were representative, three fans were used for
mixing and moving three times the chamber volume per minute. Deposition was
measured by the use of deposition surfaces and deposition samplers. Cascade
impactors and cyclones were used to collect aerosols for size distribution
determination.
Results
Figure 5 shows th~ temperature history of the susceptor and the charge dur-
ing the heating and melting phase of the experiment. The susceptor temperature
was driven through aseries of ramps and plateaus according to a predetermined
heating schedule based on model calculations [3]. The plateaus were used for
cross-checking temperature instruments and also to allow the interior tempera-
ture to catch up to the susceptor temperature. The middle curve on Figure 5
corresponds to the temperature 2.2 cm from the crucible inner wall; it lagged
behind the susceptor by about one hour. The center of the charge showed a lag
of about three hours. Sixteen and a half hours into the test, the center pyrom-
eter showed a melting plateau at 2798 K (2525°C), it las ted for about one hour.
Eighteen hours into the test, the first attempt to tap was made. For this
experiment, a double barrel shotgun was used for tapping. Four attempts were
made before the crucible was successfully tapped at 19:56 hr. Approximately
4.25 minutes were required to drain all the melt from the furnace into the MgO
crucible. Because of the slow rate of melt release, the melt charge lost some
of its superheat in transit. Video tape made during the test indicated that the
charge was barely molten toward the end of the four minutes. Therefore, the
present result should correspond to a case between that of a hot solid attack
and a melt attack.
Shown in Figure 6a is the upper portion of the MgO crucible after the
test. Cracks and some shallow (3 mm) surface spallations are evident. The
cracks were found to be through the bricks,' Most of the cracks were on the
sidewall above the melt surface. In addition, diagonal cracks were observed at
the corner of sidewall bricks, Figure 6b, where they meet the flat bricks making
up the bottom of the crucible. This type of failure has been observed in previ-
ous smaller scale test using thermite generated melts. The crack pattern could
be attributed to the two dimensional heat transfer effects due to the presence
of the bottom bricks. A set of slits ranging from 0.3 rnm to 3 rnm wide and one
brick deep, 6.4 cm, were located in the bottom of the crucible to observe gap
penetration by the melt. Post-test examinations indicated that gaps as narrow
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as 0.6 mm were penetrated by melt through the full depth of 6.4 cm. The gaps
were not in all cases totally filled probably due to solidification as a result
of the low superheat of the melt. There was no melt in any of the cracks within
the brick. Despite the cracks and gap penetration there was no grass disloca-
tion of the brick pattern and the crucible structure was essentially intact.
Scanning electron microscope examinations were made of the melt brick inter-
face. The interface appeared to be sharply defined with no evidence of melting
(of the brick) or inter-diffusion of materials. In summary, there were no
significant rnacro or micro alterations of the brick due to the melt interaction.
Gas generation measurements showed that very little gas was generated.
There was no detectable amount of hydrogen due to the possible reaction of the
melt and water in the bricks. Visually the aerosol generation appeared to be
much less than that of melt/concrete interactions. The maximum aerosol concen-
tration was 2 g/m3 at about two minutes after tapping. The total aerosol gener-
ation was estimated to be 103 g and the source term was calculated to be less
than 1 gis. The aerosol size distribution was trimodal during the melt
release. After the melt release, the two large modes no langer existed and the
peak of the size distribution was then at 1 ~m, see Fig. 7. The larger modes
were probably caused by mechanical break-up of the melt during the melt release.
Typical temperature histories at different depths in the brick are shown in
Figure 8. The thermocouples were within a circle of radius 4.45 cm around the
center of the bottom of the crucible cavity. Thermocouple CR31 was installed in
a crack between two bricks. It showec a little faster response, compared to the
trend of the other thermocouples but there was no sharp increase in temperature
that might have indicated a direct contact with the melt. This was consistent
with the, post-test observation of partially-filled gaps. Heat fluxes into the
MgO bricks were obtained from in-depth temperature responses using inverse heat
conduction calculations [4]. Results for the crucible bottom (downward heat
flux) and the portion of the sidewall covered by the melt (sideward heat flux)
are shown in Figure 9. In both cases, during melt release the surface fluxes
were in the range of 20 w{cm2 • Twenty minutes later the downward heat flux
decreased to about 5 W/cm and the sideward heat flux decreased to about 3-4
W/cm2 • Heat fluxes into the sidewall above the melt also were in the range of
20 W/cm2 during melt release but reduced to a value of 1.5-2.5 W/cm2 20 minutes
later. Heat fluxes into the instrument shield were monitored by heat flux
gauges as weIl as by the temperature rise of the shield. Because the shield
could only be moved over the pool after the tapping was completed, this heat
flux data was not available until approximately five minutes after ta~ping. At
this time, the heat flux as measured 33 cm abave the pool was 36 W/cm ; the flux
decreased rather quickly to 3 W/cm2 in five minutes.
From the above calculations and measurements, the upward heat flux from the
melt can be obtained using radiation enclosure calculations. The result for the
duration from 5.25 minutes to 11.75 minutes after tapping (ar 1.0 to 7.5 minutes
after completion of tapping as plot ted) is shown in Figure 10. The net heat
lass from the melt surface varied from 82 W/cm2 to 13 W/cm2 • Twenty minutes
after tapping the upward heat flux reduced to 3 W/cm2 •
SUMMARY
It appears from the present study that MgO is more resistant to core melt
attack than concrete from thermal considerations as weIl as from gas and aerosol
production considerations. While MgO bricks suffered cracking due to thermal
stress, the overall integrity of structure was not seriously compromised.
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THE MELPROG MODEL FOR INTEGRATED MELT PROGRESSION ANALYSIS
J. E. Kelly, M. F. Young, J. L. Tomkins, P. J. Maudlin and W. J. Camp
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM 87185, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
The in-vessel modules of the integrated LWR melt QrQ[ression analysis
code, MELPROG, are described. These in-vessel modules are being
developed along with a reactor coolant system model and a containment
response model to provide a detailed, best-estimate analysis tool for
severe accident analysis in both BWR and PWR designs. The MELPROG
code, which is designed to treat melt progression from accident
inception up to and through melt ejection from the reactor vessel,
consists of eight explicitly coupled modules: Fluids, Pin-Behavior,
Structures, Debris Formation/Behavior, Radiation, Vapor Explosions,
Fission Product Release and Transport, and Material Ejection. The
first version of the code, which includes the first five modules, has
been completed and tested on a simulation of an SlD accident. The
results of that simulation are presented herein.
INTRODUCTION
Since the TMI-2 accident, renewed emphasis has been placed on improving
our understanding of severe accidents in light water reactors (LWRs). One
avenue of research has been to create detailed systems models for the response
of the reactor core and vessel, the reactor coolant system (RCS) and the
reactor containment. In this paper, we describe one such core/vessel response
code, MELPROG, which is being developed at Sandia and Los Alamos National
Laboratories as part of the USNRC and Foreign Partners' Severe Fuel Damage
program.
The MELPROG code has evolved from efforts in 2h3 MIMAS project l at Los
Alamos National Laboratory and the MELPROG project' at Sandia National
Laboratories. The MIMAS project developed a computer code, MIMAS, which treats
the thermal and hydrodynamic response of the reactor core region during a
severe LWR accident. MIMAS consisted of modules for fluid dynamics, rod
behavior, core-barrel and grid plate heating, and radiation heat transfer.
MIMAS was taken as the starting basis for qn extended melt progression
treatment in the MELPROG project. The goal of MELPROG is to be a best-estimate
model for meltdown sequences and, in ,particular, to predict the fission product
release and transport in a physically based manner. In order to do this, the
transient behavior of the reactor core and components must be calculated.
Consequently, the code must analyze all the various phenomena and the
associated coupling between the phenomena for severe accident sequences.
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MELPROG uses the fluid behavior, radiation, and rod behavior modules of
MIMAS with only minor modifications. A debris module has been added to allow
for detailed treatment of debris formation, dryout, melting, and relocation of
debris. A complete thermomechanical response and failure modul~ for structural
components has been developed and added to the code. A stand-alone model to
treat steam explosions, TEXAS4, has been developed for later inclusion in the
melt progression model. Work has begun on incorporating into the code a
thermochemical behavior of fission product model and a melt ejection model.
Finally, the code has been implicitly linked by the MIMAS projsct to the
TRAC-PFl RCS model developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory . The resulting
code is capable of analyzing the reactor core, vessel, and other components as
well as the reactor coolant system.
The initial version of the code has been exercised on an SID accident
sequence for a simplified model of a Westinghouse PWR. This sequence involves
a medium-size break in the cold leg with failure of the emergency core cooling
system. The sequence was run from accident inception through core uncovering,
clad oxidation, rod failure, debris bed formation, debris liquefaction, debris
slumping through the grid plate and core support plate, debris interaction with
the water in the lower plenum, debris quenching, dryout and remelt, and vessel
failure by melt-through. This accident poses particular difficulties for any
hydrodynamics treatment since coolant blowdown is via flashing and the
debris-coolant interactions are very violent. In addition, it allows thorough
exercise of all the other modules (and coupling between modules) in the initial
code version; namely, the rod behavior, radiation, structures, and debris
modules.
Both MIMAS and thT2o~plete in-vessel code, MELPROG, have been describedin recent publications ' , . Herein ~Ie present only a brief summary of each
module in the current code version in order to describe in detail the results
of the SID accident sequence.
DESCRIPTION OF MELPROG IN-VESSEL MODULES
The MELPROG code consists of modules which perform specific parts of the
overall calculation. The current code consists of five in-vessel modules.
These modules are explicitly coupled tagether to simplify the calculational
procedure. The modeling of the reactor vessel is pseudo-two-dimensional (R-Z)
in that the vessel is divided into axial nodes and radial rings which define
two-dimensional cells. This means that the radial and axial locations of the
various components and fuel rads can be modeled. However, in the current
version the hydrodynamic solution is strictly one-dimensional (i.e. axial
direction only).
The hydrodynamic equations are solved in the FLUIDS module. The current
version of MELPROG uses a one-dimensional, three-field, semi-implicit model.
The three fields are debris (i .e. solid and liquid fuel, clad, control rod,
and failed structural materials), liquid coolant, and vapor (i .e. steam,
hydrogen, fission product vapors, and aerosols). A four-field, two-dimensional
version is currently under6development for incorporation into MELPROG by LosAlamos National Laboratory . This improved model will allow for recirculation
effects and the separation of the debris field into liquid and solid
components. For each field, mass, energy, and momentum equations are solved in
order to calculate the volume fraction, temperature, and velocity of each
field. Auxiliary continuity equations are also solved in order to account for
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the hydrogen, fission product, and Zr mass9s. The numerical technique utilized
is the stability-enhancing two-step method •
A detailed rod behavior module, PINS, which was developed as part of the
MIMAS project, is used in MELPROG. This model uses a single representative rod
for each radial ring in the core. The rods are noded axially according to the
FLUIDS noding. Within anode a detailed model for radial heat transfer, 9
chemical reactions, and mechanical response utilizing the REBEKA~ and MATPRO
data bases is used to predict fuel and clad heat up and failure.
The thermomechanical analysis of structural components is calculated in
the STRUCTURES module. One and two-dimensional. heat transfer models have been
constructed in the MELPROG project for the majorgeneric structure types of a
Westinghouse PWR. These models include conduction heat transfer, plate-out of
materials on the structures, and melting or ablation of the structures. In
addition, brittle and ductile failure models have been developed for these
structures.
A simple debris bed formation model has been developed to allow bed
formation in any cell. Once a bed has been formed, the DEBRIS module takes
control of bed behavior from the FLUIDS module. The DEBRIS module utilizes a
much finer finite difference mesh than the FLUIDS module. This allows detailed
analysis of debris dryout, heat up, melting, relocation, and crusting, as well
as crust remelt, within the debris bed. This detailed analysis is also needed
to provide the heat transfer to supporting structures. Both decay heat and
chemical (oxidation) heating are included in the modeling.
Radiation heat transfer is calculated in the RADIATION module which was
developed as part of the MIMAS project and has been adapted and extended for
inclusion in MELPROG. The current model is based on a combination of the net
radiation enclosure method and a diffuse flux treatment between cells. Each
cell in the two-dimensional grid is treated as a net enclosure with internal
structures and contains an isotropic, homogeneous, absorbing/emitting medium.
The cell boundaries are treated as black-body absorbers and emitters. The flux
entering or leaving a cell is treated as diffuse. The structures within a cell
are treated as diffuse emitters/absorbers/reflectors. Within a given cell, the
treatment is three-dimensional (3-D view factors are used). Fluxes between
cells are strictly two-dimensional (R-Z geometry). The model treats radiation
between pins, gas, water, debris, and structures. Changing geometry during the
core degradation process is accounted for by dynamic view factors within each
cell.
TEST PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In order to test the first version of MELPROG, an SlD sequence in a
Westinghouse PWR was chosen as a calculational exercise. The intent of this
effort was two-fold. First, while the various modules had been tested
separately, the combined code and the coupling between modules had not been
fully tested. Hence, this problem served to identify and resolve
inconsistencies between modules. Second, the actual reactor vessel modeling
process and running of the problem required certain simplifications which have
identified specific areas which require improvement. It is important to note
that the current calculation, while complex in itself, contains numerous
modeling simplifications and, hence, the calculational results must be viewed
as a demonstration exercise and not a quantitative assessment of this accident
sequence.
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In performing this simulation, the link to TRAC-PFl was not utilized in
order to avoid unnecessary complications. Instead, the RCS was represented by
a set of upper-plenum pressure, liquid fraction, and temperatufo boundary
conditions obtained from a RELAP5 calculation of this accident . A simulated
flow coastdown was used for the lower boundary condition. These
simplifications have repercussions on the details of the calculated sequence,
since no active feedback to the RCS hydraulics from in-vessel processes is
included. However, the use of these boundary conditions presents no
limitations on the exercise of individual modules, nor on the overall code
itself. Since the exercise was in the nature of a code demonstration and
evaluation, these simple boundary conditions were felt to be sufficient.
The SlD sequence involves a high pressure blowdown through a 66 - 102 mm
diameter break with scram and pump trip. The upper plenum pressure behavior
can be characterized as a sharp drop to saturation pressure over about a
50 second time span followed by continuous steam generation and slow press ure
drop as water flashes out of the reactor. It was necessary to simulate voiding
of the upper plenum by linearly decreasing the liquid fraction at the upper
plenum boundary to zero in about 80 seconds. This rate of voiding was
arbitrarily chosen and will have some influence on the timing of events during
the accident sequence.
A schematic of the MELPROG nodalization model for this test problem is
illustrated in Figure 1. The problem was set up with four radial rings and
seven axial nodes (five in the core region and two in the lower plenum).
Structures modeled were the vessel wall and vessel bottom head, the core
barrel, the core support plate, support columns (not shown), and upper and
lower core grid plates. For simplicity, neither the upper plenum (replaced by
apressure boundary) nor the downcomer were explicitly modeled. Also,
instrument penetrations of the lower head were not treated in this calculation,
although these may be included at the option of the code user.
TEST PROBLEM RESULTS
The results of this test problem are summarized in this section. In order
to clarify the results, the details of the calculation have been divided
according to the module in which they were calculated. Table I highlights the
major events which occurred during the calculation in each of the in-vessel
modules (except for the radiation module). This summary gives a good
indication as to where and when various phenomena are being calculated. The
main events in each module are discussed below.
As discussed above, the FLUIDS module is concerned with predicting the
fluid dynamic behavior in the problem. In particular, it calculates the volume
fraction, temperature, and velocity of each field as a function of time and
space. Since the modeling is one-dimensional, only averaged quantities are
calculated. Nevertheless, these quantities give a good indication of the
accident sequence.
Of particular interest during this test sequence is the production and
transport of vapor. Figure 2 shows the vapor volume fraction distribution
during the accident sequence. (Note that the sum of the liquid, vapor, and
debris volume fractions is always equal to 1.0 and the point Z=O is at the
bottom of the vessel.) Flashing of water to steam is predicted to begin
relatively early in the sequence when the system pressure drops to the
saturation pressure. Core uncovering begins shortly after flashing and at
1200
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Figure 1: MELPROG Noda1izationa1 for SlD Test Calcu1ation
Table I: Summary of Irnportant Events
TIME FLUIDS PINS DEBRIS STRUCTURES
(s)
50 Flashing Begins
135 Care Uncovering Begins
400 Pin Ballooning Oceurs
560 Care 80% Uncovered Pin Oxidation Begins
800 Rods Embrittled
815 Contra! Rod Failure Begins
825 Trnax=1700 K pin Melting Begins Debris Bed Forms Trnax=800 K
900 Core 100% Uncovered 20% of Pins Failed Debris Melting Begins
1200 Trnax=2220 K 45% of Pins Failed Trnax=llOO K
1900 Trnax =2400 K 60% of Pins Failed Melting and Compaction Top P):ate Fails
2300 72% of Pins Failed Malten Pool Forms Core\Barrel Failure Begins
2700 Trnax =2480 K Tgrid plate=1460 K
3200 Trnax =2480 K 80% of Pins Failed Debris 70% Molten Tgrid Plate=1600 K
3375 Steam Spike Occurs Debris Quenches Grid Plate Fails
3380 Vessel Cornpletely Dry Bed Forms In Battom Thead=500 K
3400 Trnax=2285 K 92% of Pins Failed Debris Melting Begins
3700 Trnax=2500 K Thead =520 K
4430 Trnax=2450 K Thead =650 K
6400 Trnax =2720 K Debris 63% Molten Thead=1400 K









Figure 2, Vapor V01ume Fraotion Di,tribution









Figure 3, C1ad 'a11 Temperature Di,tributio
n
in Ring 1
During SID Test CalcUlation
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560 s the core is 80% uncovered and the maximum steam temperature is 1100 K.
The steam continues to heat andfuel pin oxidation begins shortly after this
point. The water in the vessel continues to vaporize due to the
depressurization and heat transfer and at 900 s the core is completely
uncovered. From this point until later in the accident, the vapor behavior is
benign as the water in the lower plenum slowly vaporizes. However, at 3375 s,
grid plate failure leads to a debris-coolant interaction resulting in rapid
vaporization and a steam spike. This event causes the code to run with an
extremely small time step, typical for hydrodynamic codes under conditions of
rapid phase change and shock generation. Following this event, with the debris
generating heat and no water supply, the water in the lower head boils rapidly
and is completely gone at 3380 s. After this point, the vapor is nearly
stagnant and changes in its volume occur only due to the movement of debris.
As discussed above, the PINS module is responsible for predicting the fuel
pin behavior. Specifically, in each core region ring, one representative fuel
pin is modeled and its temperature distribution as function of time is
calculated. When the representative pin in a given node is predicted to fail,
all the pins in that node fail and their associated mass and energy are
transferred into the debris field in FLUIDS.
In the test problem, the fuel pins begin to overheat as soon as core
uncovering is initiated. Figure 3 illustrates the clad surface temperature
distribution for the pin modeled in ring 1. (A value of 0 K for the
temperature indicates that there are no pins at that location.) This figure
shows the rapid heating of the pins as cooling is lost and as Zr oxidation
occurs. Ballooning of the pin in the top of the core occurs at 400 s.
Oxidation and subsequent rapid heating of the pin begin to occur at 560 s. The
rods become embrittled at 800 s. At this point, a quench would shatter the
pin. Melting of the zircalloy cladding begins at 815 sand the first pin
failure occurs at 825 s. Following this point, pin failure occurs in other
cells as the sequence continues. Pin failure can be seen by a sudden decrease
in temperature to zero. At 1900 s, 60% of the pins have failed. The model
continues to calculate the behavior of the remaining intact pin stubs until
complete failure occurs.
As discussed above, the DEBRIS module is responsible for predicting the
debris behavior after the debris is created. While FLUIDS calculates the
average mass, temperature, and velocity of the debris on a one-dimensional
basis, DEBRIS calculates detailed temperature and compositional distributions
in the debris on a two-dimensional basis. This information is important for
providing the correct heat flow to supporting structures such as the grid plate
and vessel bottom head.
In the current problem, the debris formed by pin failure is predicted to
move downward and freeze in the lower sections of the core. Hence, the debris
does not move through the grid plate until grid plate failure begins. The
debris accumulates on the grid plate and the first debris bed is formed at
825 s. At this point, the DEBRIS module begins to calculate. Gore uncovering
leads to bed dryout and the debris begins to overheat. Since there is steam
production below the bed, Zr oxidation occurs in the bed. By 900 s, debris
melting begins leading to some compaction of the bed. As pin failure
continues, the resulting debris is added to the bed and the radial extent of
the bed increases. The melting, relocation, and freezing of the debris in the
bed lead to blockages in the bottom of the bed which effectively insulate the
molten regions from the grid plate. At 2300 s, a molten pool is predicted to
exist in the bed.
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The downward heat flux from the bed to the grid ultimately results in grid
plate failure at 3375 s. The debris then interacts with the water in the lower
head to produce a steam spike and to fragment and quench some of the debris.
However, most of the debris remains hot and the remaining water quickly boils
away. By 3380 s, all of the debris is in the lower head where it continues to
heat. Melting and relocation are predicted to occur. By the time the vessel
bottom head fails, nearly 73% of the debris is molten.
The RADIATION module is responsible for predicting the radiative heat
transport in the vessel. As such, it calculates the radiative energy exchanged
between the various modules. Although major events can not be associated with
this module, radiation heat transfer significantly affects the heat flow
distribution and timing of events in the vessel. For example, the failure of
the outer ring of pins is delayed relative to the inner rings due to the energy
lost by these outer pins to the core barrel. Furthermore, the primary heat
transfer mechanism to the core barrel and top grid plate is radiation.
Radiation heat transfer also acts to coolthe top surface of the debris bed and
strongly impacts the heating of the steam. Another, important feature of this
module is its ability to modify the view factors as structures and pins fail.
The STRUCTURES module is responsible for calculating the thermomechanical
response of the structures in the problem. In ~ach structure modeled, a detail
heat transfer calculation is performed and, based on this, the mechanical
response of the structure is determined.
Since there is little or no heat source in any structure, the temperature
increase of a given structure is governed by the heat transfer from the vapor
to the structure and by radiation heat transfer. This leads to a lag in the
heating of the structures relative to the vapor and pins. As seen in Table I,
the maximum temperature of any structure is 1000 K at 1200 s. Initially, the
core barrel is the hottest structure. However, it is the top plate which
mechanically fails first at 1900 s. Following this, sections of the core
barrel begin to overheat and fail. The grid plate heat up is controlled by
heating from the debris bed on top of it and from cooling by steam flow from
below. Failure occurs at 3375 s due to melt through. At this point in the
sequence, the lower vessel head is still at the saturation temperature and,
hence, is relatively cold. Consequently, failure of the vessel by melting (and
problem termination) does not occur until 6900 s.
On a integral basis, at the time of vessel bottom head failure, 486 kg of
H2 had been evolved which represents oxidation of approximately 50% of thezlrcalloy in the core. Approximately 106000 kg of molten debris would have
been ejected which represents 73% of the core inventory. While these numbers
and the timing of specific events are certainly not a best-estimate due to the
simplifications involved, the results of this calculation demonstrate the
potential capabilities of MELPROG.
SUMMARY
The performance of the modules in MELPROG for this SlD test problem
calculation has demonstrated that the current code contains most of the
features necessary to calculate a meltdown progression. The code is able to
analyze in an integrated manner the important in-vessel phenomena anticipated
for this accident sequence with the exception of fission product chemistry,
which is currently being added. The code performed largely as designed for
this test problem. The timing of events as well as the interaction of the
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various modules seemed to be consistent. While the simplifications in the
modeling of the reactor core and vessel mean that this particular calculation
is not a best-estimate, it should be clear, that the major components for a
best-estimate calculation currently exist in the code.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work was supported by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
Foreign Partners' Severe Fuel Damage program and performed at Sandia National
Laboratories which is operated for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract
Number DE-AC04-76DP00789.
REFERENCES
1. P. J. Maudlin et al., "A Damage Assessment of TMI-2," LA-UR-83-737 (1983).
2. W. J. Camp and J. 8. Rivard, "Modeling of LWR Systems During Severe
Accidents: The MELPROG Perspective," SAND83-l205 (1983).
3. M. F. Young et al. ,"MELPROG Code Development and Methods," Proceedings,
International Meeting on LWR Severe Accident Evaluation, Vol. 1, p. 2.8-1,
Cambridge, MA (1983).
4. M. F. Young, "The TEXAS Code for Fuel-Coolant Interaction Analysis,"
Proceedings, LMFBR Safety Topical Meeting, Lyon, France, Vol. 3,
p. 567 (1982).
5. "TRAC-PFl An Advanced Best Estimate Code for PWR Analysis," Los Alamos
National Laboratories preprint (1982).
6. S. Dearing, private communication.
7. J. H. Mahaffy, "A Stabil ity Enhanci ng Two-Step Method for One-Dimens ional
Two-Phase Flow," LA-7951-MS (1980).
8. D. A. Powers and R. O. Meyer, NUREG-0630 (1980).
9. "MATPRO-Version 11 (Revision 1), A Handbook of Material Properties for Use
in the Analysis of LWR Fuel Rod Behavior," NUREG/CR-0947, TREE-1280,
Rev. 1 (1980).
10. S. M. Modro et al., Proceedings, International Meeting on Thermal Reactor
Safety, Chicago, 111., NUREG/CR-0027, Vol. 2, p. 839 (1982).
1206
RESULTS OF THE IN-PILE DEGRADED CORE COOLABILITY
EXPERIMENTS: DCC-1 AND DCC-2*
Kenneth R. Boldt, Paul A Kuenstler, Jr., and Theodore R. Schmidt
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 USA
ABSTRACT
The results of DCC-1 and DCC-2, the first Degraded Core Coolability
experiments in the USNRC's Severe Fuel Damage Program, are presented.
The experiments evaluated the coolability of a fission-heated U02
debris bed in a water bath with pressure variable from 1 to 170
atmospheres. The 0.5-meter deep bed consisted of small~sized
particulate with an average diameter of 0.4 mm for DCC-1 and
large-sized particulate with an average diameter of 1 .8'mm for DCC-2.
DCC-1 evaluated deep bed behavior in the laminar coolability regime
while DCC-2 examined coolability in the transition and turbulent flow
regimes. The main results presented are the dryout heat flux
dependence on pressure and the rate and method of quench of dry
debris.
INTRODUCTION
DCC-1 and DCC-2 are the first two experiments in the USNRC-sponsored Degraded
Core Coolability (DCC) Program being performed at Sandia National Laboratories.
The DCC program is part of the NRC's Severe Fuel Damage (SFD) program
established after the accident at TMI-2. The main objective of the DCC program
is to verify, with a limited number of in-pile experiments, the accuracy of
existing debris coolability models for predicting bed behavior in
previously-untested SFD parameter regimes. The primary test matrix consists of
three experiments of which the first two are reported here. Both experiments
evaluated the coolability of a deep U02 debris bed in a pressurized water bath
with pressure variable from 1 to 170 atmospheres. The beds were fission-heated
in the Annular Core Research Reactor to simulate the internal heat generation
from decay heat in an SFD accident. DCC-3, to be performed in mid-1985, will
be a similar experiment with the addition of bed stratification and liquid
injection to the bottom of the bed.
DCC-1 and DCC-2 differ primarily in their particle size distributions for the
debris bed. DCC-1 contained a broad small-particle distribution simulating the
expected debris from the interaction of molten fuel in a steam explosion.
DCC-2 had a narrow, large-particle distribution simulating the rubble that
would be expected from the quench of non-molten fuel. In addition to being
prototypic of different accident scenarios, the DCC particle distributions were
selected to span the range of coolability regimes. Figure 1 shows the
*This work was supported by the D.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and performed at Sandia National'Laboratories which is operated for
the U.S. Department of Energy under contract number DE-AC04-76DP00789.
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predicted dryout heat flux as a function of particle diameter and bed porosity
using the Lipinski zero-dimensional coolability model. 1
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Figure 1 DCC Coolability Regimes
The graph is subdivided into the three general coolability regimes -- laminar,
transition and turbulent. Mapping the DCC-1 and DCC-2 effective particle
diameters and porosities onto this graph illustrates that the experiments are
predominantly in the laminar and transition regimes, respectively. As pressure
is increased, the tendency is for each experiment to become more turbulent.
EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTIONS
The DCC-1 and DCC-2 experiment packages (Figure 2) are nearly identical in
design, assembly, and operation. 2 During operation, the experiment packages are
located in the dry central cavity of the ACRR, utilizing all of the axial
height of the reactor for irradiation of the debris bed. The bed has a
diameter of 0.10 m, a height of about 0.50 m, and is contained in a insulated
double-wall crUcible. The crucible provides a near adiabatic boundary
condition on the bed bottom and walls. The debris consists of coarse U02
particulate seeded with Gd203 to decrease thermal neutron sensitivity. Therelative differences in the particle size distributions for DCC-1 and DCC-2 are
shown in Figure 3. Predictions of dryout heat flux contained in this report
use the effective (Fair-Hatch weighted) particle diameters with a shape factor
correction (assumed a constant multiple of 0.78), The porosity achieved for the
dry-packed DCC-1 bed was 34.5% and for DCC-2 was 38.4%. The total fuel mass in
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Figure 2 DCC Experiment Package
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Figure 3 Particle Size Distributions for the DCC-l and DCC-2 Debris Beds
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As shown in Figure 2, the debris bed, crucible, and water bath are enclosed in
the primary containment vessel. To evaluate the dryout heat flux at very high
pressures (up to 170 atmospheres), the primary vessel was fabricated from
Inconel 625 and extensively tested to withstand all expected normal and
abnormal pressure environments. The primary containment vessel is a closed
system with pressure adjusted by raising and lowering the saturation tempera-
ture of the water bath. Subsequently, most all of the experimental dryout
points were ebtained fer a saturated pool with little or no subcooling. To
prevent fission product release in the event of any primary boundary failure, a
secondary containment vessel completely surrounds the primary vessel. A
concentrio-flow heat exchanger is attached to the secondary vessel. The
manifold on the top of the heat exchanger routes cold helium gas down the
outside of the secondary containment vessel and receives the return flow from
the outer annulus of the package.
The main diagnostic instrumentation for determining bed conditions are sheathed
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Figure 4 Thermocouple Locations for DCC Debris Beds
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The extensive array of thermocouples was used to interpret subcooled, boiling,
and dryout conditions in the bed. Pressure in the primary vessel was measured
using pressure transducers and verified by the saturation temperature.
The DCC auxiliary systems and their interconnection to the experiment package
are shown in Figure 5. The DCC debris bed is fission heated in the central
irradiation cavity of the ACRR. Cooling lines are connected to the mobile
helium cooling loop located outside of the reactor highbay. The flow from the
loop to the package can be diverted to a heat exchanger in 'the liquid nitrogen
tank to provide additional cooling capacity. Diagnostic instrumentation from
the package is monitored by an HP-9845/HP-1000 computer-based data acquisition
system. Aseparate HP-9845 computer-based data acquisition system is used to
monitor cooling loop parameters for diagnostic and control functions.
EXPERIMENT OPERATION
Due primarily to the difference in particle size distributions, the DCC-1 and
DCC-2 experiments exhibited considerably different dryout behavior. 3 ,4 A
listing of the main features and operating his tory for both experiments are
shown in Table I.




































In DCC-1, dryouts were obtained in two general forms: incipient and forced.
Incipient dryouts were achieved by taking small power steps from a boiling-bed
condition. Figure 6 shows the temperature and power history for a typical
incipient dry out in DCC-1. This particular dryout was performed at pressure of
0.62 MP with all of bed thermocouples indicating saturation temperature of
1600 c +1 0 C. As shown in the figure, the dryout was first detected after the
reactor power step to 19 kW. After observing the growth of the dry zone to a
few more thermocouple positions, the dryout was terminated by reducing reactor
power to 1 kW; quench behavior was observed. Following quench at one pressure,
the experiment saturation pressure was changed to the next desired value by
adjusting reactor heating and package cooling. In this manner the entire































Figure 6 Typical DCC-l Incipient Dryout Temperature and Power Histories
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A few of the dryouts in DCC-1 were foreed with rapid pressure drops or large
power steps. When system pressure was redueed at a rapid rate (~4%/min),
dryouts oeeurred even though the bed power was only a small fraetion (down to
10%) of the ineipient dryout value. Large power steps were performed from 1.2
to 40 times the dryout power. These steps were used to investigate the
loeation of initial dryout as a funetion of power in exeess of dryout and to
attempt to disrupt the bed. One of the large power steps was extended to a
maximum bed temperature of '850oC to observe queneh behavior (Figure 7). About
two-thirds of the bed was dried when the power was redueed to obtain near
steady-state eonditions. When the power was dropped to zero, the resulting
queneh was slow, and wetting oeeured at sueeessive thermoeouple levels without
fingering.
In DCC-2 a quite different dryout behavior was apparent as eompared to the
ineipient dryouts of DCC-1. The existenee of loeal dryouts was identified
early in the experiment operation. A loeal dryout is defined as a portion of
the bed drying and inereasing in temperature above saturation; however, the
temperature reaehes a steady-state value and the dry zone eeases to grow.
Figure 8 shows the temperature history of a typieal loeal dryout (DO#7) for
DCC-2. With sueeessively higher reaetor powers, the loeal dryout obtained
higher temperatures and grew in size, and a new steady-state eondition was
aehieved. The loeal dryouts in DCC-2 are predieted to be eaused by the
existenee of a low permeability zone in one side of the bed. The liquid flow
through the remainder of the bed supplies suffieient eoolant to maintain a
stable loeal dry zone.
Global dryouts are those extending aeross the bed, eutting off the flow of
eoolant to the bottom of the bed. In DCC-2 global dryouts were obtained at
about 1.5 times the loeal dryout power. Figure 8 shows a global dryout (DO#8)
aehieved for the same eonditions as local dryout #7. In DO#8 the reaetor power
is inereased until it beeomes apparent that the loeal dryout has extended
aeross the bed and is not approaehing a steady-state eondition.
WithAttempts to disrupt the low permeability zone were partially suecessful.
sudden large power steps to 3 W/g from a subeooled eondition in the bed,
suffieient vapor generation was indueed to rearrange the debris partieles.
resultant debris bed was more than 2 em taller and had a porosity inerease
38.4% to 41.0%. Loeal dryouts were not eliminatedj however, their initial
location in the bed was lowered. Global dryouts as a funetion of pressure





To date, the reduetion of the data from the DCC-1 and DCC-2 experiments has
foeused on the determination of the dryout heat flux as a funetion of pressure.
A primary input needed to determine the heat flux is the eoupling faetor
between the reaetor and the debris bed. Using adiabatie heatups performed
throughout the experiments, the loealized eoupling faetors were determined for
the wet and dry eonditions. Combining the measured eoupling faetors with
neutronies and saturation ealeulations, loeal power densities were integrated
to yield the total bed power at the point of dryou~. Further analysis is
expeeted to reduee the uneertainty assoeiated with this method of bed power
determination.
The dryout heat flux as a funetion of pressure for both experiments is shown in
Figure 9. The data pOints are eompared to predietions using the Lipinski
zero-dimensional eoolability model. Most of the dryout points shown in Figure
1213
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Figure 8 Temperature and Power Histories for DCC-2 Local and Global
Dryouts
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9 are uncertain by+15%, primarily due to the uncertainty in the coupling
factor. For DCC-1,-the experimental and predicted dryout heat flux at one bar
agree within experimental error; however, the pressure dependence of the data
was much less than predicted. A factor of 6 was predicted for the ratio of the
dryout heat flux at its maximum (- 80 bars) and at 1 bar; whereas, only a
factor of 2.5 was realized experimentally. For DCC-2 the agreement between
predictions and the global dryout experimental results is better. The low
pressure dryout data for DCC-2 could not be obtained due to pressurization of
the primary vessel by non-condensable gas generation. Local dryouts for DCC-2
were obtained over the entire pressure range of interest with only those
occurring after the bed disruption shown in the figure.
Quenches of extended dryouts in the two experiments were quite different in
manner and rate. For DCC-1 quenches were slow (~2 hours for 1000 K fuel) and
revealed a uniform quench front (i.e., no fingering was observed). The quench
rate in DCC-2 was fast (~10 minutes for 1000 K fuel) with rewet occurring













Figure 9 DCC-1 and DCC-2 Dryout Beat Flux Dependence on Pressure
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SUMMARY
The first two in-pile experiments in the DCC program were performed and provide
a data base for model verifieation in parameter ranges previously not
investigated. The experiments were operated for a total of over 200 hours with
121 observed ·dryouts. DCC-1, designed to test the laminar flow region of
dryout, displayed unexpeeted results. While the dryout fluxes at one
atmosphere are approximately those predieted by the Lipinski model, the
pressure dependenee of the dryout data is not predieted aeeurately. The queneh
behavior of DCC-1 displayed a uniform queneh front with queneh times extending
to hours. The DCC-2 dryout data eonforms in magnitude and pressure dependenee
with the Lipinski model. In addition to "global" dryouts, in whieh the dry
zone extends aeross the bed, "loeal" dryouts were observed. These are zones of
lower than average permeability whieh dry out and aehieve stable temperatures.
The queneh times in DCC-2 are only a few minutes long.
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ABSTRACT
A knowledge oE the behaviour of dry zones aEter dryout of parti-
eulate eore debris beds is of importanee beeause, iE remelting
oeeurs, attaek on supportlng struetures is possible. Furthermore
in the course of a reaetor aeeident, temporarily dry zones may be
envisaged, therefore rewetting behaviour is of lnterest. This
topies have been studied experimentally out-of-pile with indueti-
vely-heated, water-eooled partiele beds.
Studies of the loeation, size and temperature distribution of dry
zones allow to check predietions of dryout models and to identify
the main heat transfer proeess in dry zones. The rewetting beha-
viour of beds with small and large partieles have been investi-
gated and the rewetting velo city has been eorrelated with predie-
tion based on available dryout models.
INTRODUCTION
Analysing Light Water Reaetor degraded eore aeeident sequenees, the exi-
stenee of high temperature eore debris beds has to be eonsidered [1,2]. This
debris eould be formed within the reaetor vessel (in vessel) or in the reaetor
eavity (ex vessel) depending on the preeeeding aeeident history.
A knowledge of the behaviour after dryout, namely the dry front propagation
and the temperature profile within the dry zones is of importanee espeeially for
the in vessel ease, beeause, if remelting of the fuel oeeurs, attaek on and
failure of supporting struetures is possible. On the other side steam generated
as a eonsequenee of quenehing dry debris bed by feeding in emergeney eooling
water eould lead to pressure loadings on the primary system or on the contain-
ment building, whieh have to be quantified for reaetor safety evaluations.
In this work, the beds were eomposed of small, spherieal stainless steel
partieles and water was used as eoolant. Small partieles are eharaeterized by
eapillary pressure being eomparable to the hydrostatie pressure. Extended
dryout, espeeially the loeation, size and temperature distribution of the dry
zone and the variation of these parameters with time and power density (down to
rewetting) was studied with volume-heated beds. In addition, transient rewetting
was investigated starting with a dry bed of uniform temperature.





After reaehing dryout. the tempera-
tures in the dry zone inerease very
fast (Fig. 1). Hithin about 30 min
the dry zone aehieves its asymptotie
size, whieh was generally between
about 5 and 10 em from the bot tom.
After further 30 min the asymptotie
temperatures are established. Gene-
rally the maximum temperatures were
very high, therefore the power had to
be redueed to limit the temperatures
to a tolerable value (~ 500 ·C). Hith
few exeeptions the dry zone extended
radially over the whole bed, but the
thiekness at the eireumferenee varied
eonsiderably (Fig. 2). Even "hen the
dry zone extended radially over the
whole bed. stable eonditions (loea-
tion. size and temperature of the dry
zone; rat io of dmHlward to upward heat
flux) Were maintained over several
hours, inelieating that the mass trans-
port bet"een the bot tom and top wetted
zone is very smalI. The dryout zone
inereases with po"er beyond dryout
(Fig. 3), but there are only few data
available beeause of the temperature
limitation. The most surprising result
is that onee a dry zone has formed, it
is extremely stable against power re-
dueions (Fig. 3). Reelueing the power to
50 % of that for initial dryout did not
diminish the size of the dry zone anel
to aehieve rewetting, the power hael to
be redueed to 30 % of the initial
dryout power. IVhereas the size oE the
dry zones is independent of the power,






Bed 83/10/18-11/19, SS 316L. 200-500 ~
E=.395, H=20.0 em. water, bottom eooled
Bed his tory
Fig. 2
Bed 83/10/18-11119. 200-500 ~. E =.395.
water. bottom eooled. j. 9 H/em'
Stable dry zone
200
Behaviour after dryout was studied with volumetrieally heated beds of
stainless steel spheres (diameter 150-710. 200-500 and 200-315 ~. bed height 16-
20 em) using water as eoolant. The partieles were eontained in a double-wall,
eylindrieal glass vessel with a radial vaeuum gap to minimize heat los ses. The
bed power is removed by a eooled bot tom plate and a heat exehanger above the
bed. Several dryout runs were performed
400 B,d 10m, tU I ~l! I with eaeh bed. In eaeh run the power
("Cl zleml ~J1.~ ..J-~... • .., f' i d . b d
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r~~~~rtat fluxes :~. : ~~~~~dtd $~~1~1 detail previously [3].
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Irreversibility of dry zones
Stainless steel partieles, water,
bot tom eooled
Fig. 4
Bed 83/10/18-11/19, SS 316L, 200-S00~,
~=.39S, H=20.0 em, water, bottom eooled
Steady state temperature distribution
in dry zones
Tf eonduetion is the main heat transfer proeess in the dry ZOU!, the axial
temperatllre profile should be parabolie and the relation fiT/D' = q/8 Ab should
hold. fiT is the differenee between the maximum and the saturation temperature, II
is the thiekness of the dry zone, q the volumetrie power density and Ab is the
eonduetivity of the dry (vapor-filled) zone. The experimental profile is appro-
ximately parabolie, although some fluetuations exist, whieh are probably due to
different radial positions oE the thermoeouples. Using the relation abo!~ and
stationary experimental da ta of q, fiT and D (- 5 em) one gets Ab- 6x10 H/emK.
At dryout, about 30 % of the power is transfer red downward (Tab. 1). This
is eonsiderably more than is genera ted in the subeooled bot tom layer «1 em at
dryout), whieh eonfirms "doH'nward boiling" ~aused by eapillary fore es [3].
Adiabatie bot tom
After reaehing initial dryout at about 6.6 W/em' the power density was
inereased further to extend the dryout front before in the dry zone stable
temperatllre eonditions are established and temperatures above experimental limi-
tations (SOO'C) are reaehed. By this way a dry zone with a rather eonstant
thiekness of 9 em, t,hieh radia11y extended over the whole bed, eould be ob-
tained. Onee established a weIl defined dry zone the power was stepwise redueed
waiting at eaeh power level several hours for stahle eonditions. Similar to the
bottom eooled experiments the dry zone was very stable against power reduetions.
Rewetting and deereasing of the dry zone oeeurred only if the power was de-
ereased helow 40 % oE the initial dryout power. The values of the initial dryout





The heat conduetivity of the dry
zone determined from experiment~1 va-
lues of q, fiT and 0 is Ab" 8x10
W/emK, whieh is within the experimental
error in agreement with the value for
the bottom eooled experiment so
TRANSIENT REWETTING FROH TOP
The volume-heated experiments are
not weIl suited for detailed rewetting
studies beeause the initial conditions
are very eomplex (dry zones are rela-
tively small and complex in shape, lar-
ge temperature 'gradients in dry zone)o
Therefore transient rewetting has been
studied starting with dry beds of uni-
form temperature which are normally not
heated during rewettingo The main goal
was to study the shape of dry/wet in-
terface and to determine the rewetting
velocityo
Sehematic experimental set up
bed surface by atomizing the jet of









SUitable, initial eonditions are
achieved by heating up inductively dry
beds of stainless steel partieles (200-
500 ~ diameter) in air or in vaeuumo
Again, more than 20 thermocouples were
used to measure the bed temperatureo
The beds heated in vacuum were filled
with steam at atmospheric pressure be-
fore initiating rewettingo The results
of preliminary transient rewetting ex-
periments were the same if the bed was
initially filled with air or vaporo
Therefore in the final experiments the
beds were heated in airo Furthermore
after reaching a eertain temperature
the induetive heating was stopped and
hot air was blo\m from belO\~ through
the bed to equalize loeal uniformities
in the temperature (caused by inh01~oge­
neities in the power density probably
due to loeal variations in porosity and
particle size), resulting in a tempera-
ture whieh is uniform within 10 % over
the whole bedoThe gas flow is interup-
ted before rewetting is initiatedo Re-
wetting is started by pouring saturated
water from above on the heated erucible
above the bed (Figo 5)0 The heater va-
porizes part of the impinging water,
helps to sustain saturated eonditions
and also prevents disturbances of the
water poured into the vesselo Additional
to keep the liquid level constanto
Preliminary tests indicated that the shape of the dry/wet interface is very
sensitive to local inhomogeneities in porosity, particle size and temperatureo
1220
If the rewetting front is not uniform, the interpretation, espeeially the deter-
minationof the rewetting velocity, is diffieult. In order to equalize at least
the temperatures within the bed, the already mentioned additional heating with
hot air was used in the final series.
Few minutes after starting rewetting the saturated water pool reaehed his
final height of about 10 em above the top of the bed. The first 2 to 3 em of the
bed were rewetted in about one minute. This depth eorresponds to the region,
where later on vapor ehannel formation was observed. Proeeeding deeper the re-
wetting front velocity deereased to an asymptotie value. The shape of the re-
wetting front in this region was rather flat and did not show fingering (Fig.
6). This behaviour is in eontrast to experiments with bigger partieles where































Fig. 7 Red 84/8/14-31, SS 316L, 200-'500~, E =.395, H=20.0 em, water, To=200'
Time dependent temperature
In Fig. 7 the time dependent bed temperatures are plot ted. For a given
position within the bed the temperature deereases very slowly with time until
the rewetting front approaches. Then the temperature drops down tO,the satu-
ration point rather quiekly. This behaviour indieates that in the dry zone the
temperature front velocity is slower than the rewetting front velocity. Under
this eondition the involved rewetting heat flux j rew may be evaluated from the
rewetting front velocity urew by a simple eorrelation, whieh is a modifieation
of the Landau equation [5]:
meas
jrew
\~here urew is the rewetting front velocity, P the density, E the porosity of the
bed, e the speeifie heat, T the temperature, hv the heat of vaporization, As the
change of saturation; v, p, 0, s indieate vapor, partiele, initial and satura-
tion. Using this eorrelation we calculate from the measured rewetting front
velocities the rewetting heat fluxes at differe~t depths "rew of the rewetting
front in the bed. The results are plotted in the Fig. 8 together,with theoreti-
cal results.
As a spin off of the transient rewetting experiments it was found out that
iE the liquid is not spreaded homageneously aver the bed surEace the liquid will
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CALCULATION
penetrate on one side oE the bed rather
quickly whilst the produced vapor escape
through the non-wetted part of the bed.
This results in an about two times shorter
overall rewetting time.
The available dryout models and also DEBRIS
assume that bed behaviour is independent of
the previous bed history, Le. rewetting of
a dry zone is predicted to occur at the
same pOIver as initial dryout. As discussed
earlier this is not true for the beds inve-
stigated here.
The DEBRIS code [6] (version Oct. 82;
cosinus of contact an~le 0.8; Leverett
function J = 0/s-1)0. 75/15, s effective
saturation) was used to calculate the bed
behaviour up to and beyond dryout. General-
ly the experimental data for the upward and
do\mward heat fluxes (for bottom cooling),
the initial dryout heat flux and the loca-
tion and size of the dry zones are in rea-
sonable agreement with the predictions
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Fig. 8
Rewetting heat flux of a hot
debris bed in dependence of the
depth H of the rewetting front,
bed: sSr!130-500)1 ~ ,H = 20.0 cm










Capillary effects for dryout and
rewetting of particulate beds
A rewetting model based on DEBRIS and
the following two assumptions is proposed:
1. The differences in the heat fluxes for
dryout and rewetting are caused by dif-
ferent capillary pressures (Leverett
functions) for drainage and imbibition.
The dlfference in the"capillary pres-
sures can qualitatively be explained by
modeling the particle bed by a capilla-
ry with varying diameter. For drainage
the driving capillary pressure is de-
termined by the smallest, for imbibi-
tion by the largest diameter of the
capillary (Fig.9).
2. A bed with a dry zone behaves on power
reductions similarly as a stratified
bed (large variations of the saturation
at the layer boundaries).
According to these assumptions, rewetting is described with DEBRIS and by
replacing the normally used Leverett function for drainage J in the dry zone by
that for imbibition. The Leverett function for imbibition is approximated by
0.7J. In this model the saturation decreases steeply at the boundary between the
"wet" (J) and "dry" (0.7J) zone and rewetting is assumed when initial dryout of
this "layered" bed is reached. According to this model the rewetting heat flux
generally will depend on the location and size of the initial dry region.
For the volume heated experiments the volumetric power density q is the
independent parameter. For the transient rewetting experiments (q = 0), the
rewetting heat flux originates at the dry/wet interface. These experiments are
1222
therefore modeled assuming bot tom heating. To be consistent with volume heated
experiments the whole dry zone is modeled, but the thickness of the dry zone has
in this case no influence on the calculated rewetting heat flux. llecause DEßRIS
is a stationary code, the description oE the transient rewetting experiments
requires that the liquid mass transport to the wet/dry interface, which is ne-
cessary to generate the appropriate saturation in the initial dry zone, is taken
into account by an iterative procedure.




150-71011,.,- .363, H-20.5 cm
200-50011,"- .395, H-20.0 cm












adiabatic 200-50011, .,- .395, H-20.0 cm 5.8-6.6 2.5 7.4 3.8
*) DEBRIS. Version Oct. 1982; cos B - 0.8, Leverett J • (s-1_1)0.175/JS
Tab. 2: Conductivity Ab of dry zones.
Ab (W/cmK)











Kunii-Smith IIOJ Ab/\ = 1+(1-.,)(1-Ag/A.) + (1-e)(1-Ag/\)' n/w 3.2x10-3
(1-Ag/As)' sin'ß
w = 0.5 1n[A IA _ (A IA -1)cosßJ-(1-A IA )(cosß)




ß = 13.23 (1-d _ 5.36' n = 0.666
E: - 0.40; stainless steel (500 K) As - .171 W/cmK; steam (250'C) Ag- 3.81x10-4 W/cmK
Indices: s solid, g gas, b bed.
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C,leulated results for volumetrie heating using this rewetting model are
eompared in Fig. 3 and Tab. 1 with experiments. In agreement with the experi-
ments, the size of the dry zone is predieted to stay eonstant if the heat flux
is deereased below dryout and rewetting oeeurs at apower whieh is eonsiderably
lower than that for initial dryout. The transient rewetting experiments too are
reasonably well deseribed by the rewetting model. The predietion for both, the
absolute values and the dependenee of the rewetting heat flux on the position of
the \qet/dry interface, are in satisfaetory agreement with the experiments (Fig.8).
In Tab. 2 the heat eonduetivity of dry zones derived from the volumetrie
heating experiments is eompared with theoretieal predietious. The experimental
data are within the range of predieted values, indieating that eonduction is the
main heat transfer process within dry zones.
CONCLUSIONS
For beds where the capillary pressure is comparable with the hydrostatic
pressure, the rewetting heat flux is considerably smaller than the heat flux
causing initial dryout of a wet bed. In addition, once a dry zone has formed,
the size will not change if the power is varied between dryout and rewetting.
This rewetting behaviour can reasonably weIl be described by a model based on
the DEBRIS code and using the drainage and the imbibition Leverett function for
the wet and dry zone, respectively.
From comparisons of experimentaly derived and theoretically predicted heat
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IMPROVING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT RESPONSE TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS:
SUMMARY OF IDCOR RESULTS
M. H. Fontana, Director
National Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program (IDCOR)
A. R. Buhl, Vice President
Technology for Energy Corporation
Knoxville, Tennessee USA
ABSTRACT
The IDCOR program, funded by a nuclear industry consortium, devel-
oped a comprehensive, integrated position on the issues related to
potential severe accidents in nuclear power reactors. This effort
encompasses the following: how nuclear power plants proceed into
severe accident conditions and how this may be prevented; plant
behavior under severe accident conditions; effectiveness of con-
tainment systems in preventing fission product dispersal; length
of time that containments function acceptably; the consequences of
fission product release; operator actions to manage accidents; and
mitigation features having sufficient potential value to warrant
further consideration. The results of the IDCOR program show that
present-generation plants complying with present NRC regulation
are highly tolerant of severe accident conditions, constitute risks
lower than previously perceived, and require no major backfits.
INTRODUCTION
The Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking (IDCOR) Program developed a
comprehensive, integrated, well-documented, technically sound position on
the i.ssues related to potential severe accidents--i.e., accidents bGyond the
design basis--in nuclear power light water reactors. This program is an
effort funded by a consortium of over 60 nuclear utilities, NSSS suppliers,
and architect engineers, and is the basis for industry participation in the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) severe accident decision process.
IDCOR comprises a sequence of 52 analytical activities designed to
identify key issues, develop the understanding of controlling phenomena and
models to describe these issues, develop the necessary analytical methods,
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apply the models and methods to perform best-estimate analyses of the severe
accident behavior of a limited number of reference plants, and extend the
findings as generically as possible. 1he results of these activities are
reported in a Technical Summary Report which summaries nearly forty in-
depth reports which separately document the research, development, and eva-
luations performed by IDCOR on the major technical issues. An overview of
the program, as of 1983, was published in Reference 2.
POLICY
IDCOR was guided by an overall policy that called for the review and
use of existing information to the maximum extent possible, the enhancement
of technical understanding and communication between the industry and NRC
and among members of the industry, the use of best estimate rather than con-
servative analysis, and the use of an independent expert review process.
MAJOR ISSUES
Major issues that guided the IDCOR assessment were: how nuclear power
plants proceed into severe accident conditions and how this may be preven-
ted, plant behavior under severe accident conditions, effectiveness of con-
tainment systems in preventing fission product dispersal, length of time
that containments function acceptably, the consequences of fission product
release, operator actions to manage accidents, and mitigation features
having sufficient potential value to warrant further consideration.
TECHNICAL APPROACH
The technical approach of the IDCOR Program utilized a logical struc-
ture of 24 technical tasks, subdivided into 52 subtasks, which are described
in Reference 1. Specifically, the approach was to:
o Review in depth the existing base of information about severe
accident behavior in nuclear power plants
o Identify the important phenomena involved
o Adopt and develop appropriate mathematical models, correlations, and
assessment techniques
o Select a set of representative reference plant designs
o Identify the important accident sequences which can result in severe
conditions if allowed to proceed unchecked
o Realistically characterize plant behavior in the~e accident sequences
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e Identify and assess the opportunities for preventing these sequences,
terminating their progress, or mitigating them
o Estimate consequences and relate results to safety goals and
applicable deterministic criteria.
REFERENCE PLANT SELECTION
IDCOR analyzed the behavior of reference nuclear 'power plants under a
relatively small number of key accident sequences. Four reference plants
were chosen to represent the important characteristics of present-generation
plants in the Uni ted States. These reference plants were Peach Bottom
(General Electric BWR with Mark I pressure suppression containment), Grand
Gulf (General Electric BWR with Mark 111 pressure suppression containment),
Zion (Westinghouse PWR with a large dry containment system), and Sequoyah
(Westinghouse PWR with an ice condenser containment). Additional plants
were identified to represent those classes of plants different from the
reference plants. These were Susquehanna (GE BWR with Mark 11 pressure
suppression containment), Oconee (Babcock and Wilcox PWR), and Calvert
Cliffs (Combustion Engineering PWR). Although in-depth analyses of these
plants were not performed, analytical tools were developed for their analysis.
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE SELECTION
The IDCOR evaluations of existing PRAs showed that a relatively small
number of accident sequences dominated public risk. The large number of
remaining sequences have probabilities of occurrence and/or consequences
such that their contribution to the total risk is negligible.
For the dominant sequences, the factors that most strongly affect risk
are the probability of core damage, the capability of containment to perform
its function, and the fission products available for release to the environ-
ment.
The sequences chosen for detailed analysis of plant response are repre-
sentative of large classes of sequences with potential severe accident
conditions. They were drawn from core damage dominant and risk dominant
sequences as identified by prior PRAs. These sequences were chosen using
the criteria that they (1) be physically realizable; (2) have traceability
to reasonable initiating events; (3) be perceived as being important to
risk; and (4) be representative of large classes of sequences. The probabi-
lities of these sequences actually occurring are low. In general, the base-
line analyses were performed for sequences with little or no operator
intervention; in general, these are not the most probable cases, but tend to
yield results which represent upper bounds of consequences.
The IDCOR Program did not separately identify nor evaluate accident
sequences specific to large seismic events nor willful acts of sabotage.
IDCOR did evaluate initiating accident events similar to those that could be
1230
postulated to emanate from either seismic events or sabotage. The major way
that seismically or saboteur induced accidents could differ from IDCOR
results is to cause earlier failure of containment. However, IDCOR has exa-
mined the risks associated with containment bypass and impaired containment
sequences.
CORE DAMAGE PREVENTION
Extensive efforts have been devoted to core damage prevention since the
beginning of the nuclear industry, with increased efforts after the accident
at Three Mile Island (TMI). All probabilistic risk assessments done to date
indicate that core damage frequencies in modern nuclear power plants are
low. IDCOR assessments show that some additional benefits can be gained by
enhancing operator understanding and utilization of existing non-safety-
related systems for achievement of these functions. However, there appears
to be little benefit to be derived from major addition of equipment or from
major operational changes.
SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA
The important phenomena affecting ultimate consequences are those that
affect containment and provide the impetus for fission product dispersal.
Those factors which could cause early containment failure are particularly
important. Risk is greatly reduced if containment failure does not occur
until long times--measured in terms of time for operator intervention to
terminate the accident, for fission product attenuation, and for emergency
response measures--after the start of the accident, if at all.
The major historical concerns about phenomena potentially affecting
fission product release to the environment can be distilled into a few key
issues: (1) steam explosions potentially threatening to containment through
the action of pressure pulses, liquid slugs, or missiles; (2) containment
overpressure due to rapid steam generation; (3) containment overpressure due
to hydrogen generation and subsequent combustion; (4) bypass of containment
by such factors as open valves, failures of separation between interfacing
systems, and other sneak paths to the environment; (5) containment
overpressure due to noncondensable gas; (6) melt-through of the containment
basemat; (7) containment overtemperature and overpressure due to heat-up
caused by the loss of heat removal capabilityj (8) containment failure; and
(9) radionuclide release and transport.
IDCOR reviewed the existing information on these issues and assessed
existing analytical models and codes, and significantly improved the
understanding of these issues. New models were developed and incorporated
into an integrated code for accident analyses called the Modular Accident
Analysis Program (MAAP).
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IDCOR conclusions on the key phenomena issues that underly the plant
response analyses are:
1. The necessary conditions do not exist in LWRs to allow steam explo-
sions sufficiently energetic to cause containment failure.
2. Rapid steam generation from core debris quenching is less than the
capability of the primary system pressur~ relief values and of the
containment.
3. The conditions for hydrogen detonation do not exist; hydrogen burns
will not fail large containments and hydrogen control measure are
in place in smaller containments, such as pressure suppression and
ice condenser containments.
4. The probabilities of containment bypass, such as pre-existing
impaired containment or interfacing systems LOCA, are small;
nevertheless, these were analyzed.
5. Containment overpressure due to noncondensable gas generation is
slow and does not cause early containment failure.
6. Melt-through of the concrete basemat would not occur if water can
be supplied to the debris and appropriate power and heat sinks made
operative; if the debris is allowed to run dry, basemat penetration
would be slow and would always occur after the containment fails
from high press ure or high temperature.
7. Containment overpressure or overtemperature due to heatup caused by
loss of heat removal capability is very slow.
8. Containment failure, due either to overpressure or overtem-
perature, is likely to be a relatively small leak rather than a
large break; therefore, the base case for analysis is a hole size
in containment large enough to preclude further pressure buildup.
9. Radionuclide release and transport must take into consideration the
chemical forms of the important fission products (CsI, CsOH, and
Te02) which have lower volatilities than their constituent ele-
ments; the behavior of aerosols in the primary system and in con-
tainment, which tendsto be dominated by gravitational settling and
diffusiophoresis; and the potential for revaporization and reloca-
tion due to self heating of the fission products in poorly cooled
areas of the primary systems. These effects are incorporated into
the MAAP code which is used for the integrated plant analyses.
PLANT RESPONSE TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS
Amajor portion of IDCOR's resources was devoted to evaluation of the
inherent margin of safety provided by existing containment designs under
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severe accident conditions. Containment function is controlled by: (1)
water for cooling the fuel debris, (2) power for and survival of essential
equipment, (3) capability of removing heat from containment, and (4) con-
tainment integrity.
The IDCOR evaluations of plant response to severe accident conditions
were conducted using the newly developed integrated Modular Accident
Analysis Program (MAAP) for temperatures, pressures, material motions, and
fission product transport throughout the systems within containment. The
models in these codes are based upon a fundamental understanding of physical
processes and are supported by the available body of experimental evidence.
Final assessments of accident sequence probabilities and offsite con-
sequences are now underway and will be presented at the IDCOR/NRC technical
interaction meeting to be held in November, 1984.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (BWR Mark I)
The characteristics of BWR Mark I containment are shown in Figure 1.
The containment has four regions modeled in MAAP: the primary system, the





Fi gure 1. BWR Mark I Contai nment
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The key accident sequences for BWR Mark I systems considered are tran-
sient with failure of heat removal (TW), anticipated transient with failure
to scram (TC), station blackout (TQVW), and LOCA with failure of injection
(SIE). Each of these events pose potentially significant challenges to con-
tainment. However, many of the sequences provide ample opportunity to limit
the amount of core damage or to preserve containment integrity. In addi-
tion, important system features significantly reduce the radionuclide
release. Detailed descriptions of the thermal hydraulic and fission product
behavior, and results are given in References 1 and 3.
A summary of results for Peach Bottom are given in Table I, which pre-
sents the key ~equences and event times, a general description of system
failures and physical processes, and fission product release fractions.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (BWR Mark 111)
Characteristics of the BWR Mark 111 containment are shown in Figure 2. The
containment as modeled in MAAP has six regions: the primary system; the
pedestal cavity; the drywell; the wetwell, which contains the suppression










Figure 2. BWR Mark III Containment
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Tab1e 1
SUMMARY OF PEACH BOTTOM RESULTS
Resul ts
Core uncovery, hr
Start of fuel melting, hr
Vessel failure, hr
Containment failure modes b
Containment failure, time, hr
Time of fission product release, hr.
Duration of release, hr


























































aNumbers in parentheses are exponent~ of 10.
bSymbo1s:
Ö - overpressure due to steam generation
T - containment structural failure due to high temperature
c lf CRD flow or drywell sprays are reestablished after vessel
and before hour 65, these values are reduced to 0.03.
dAssurnes wetwell venting at 11b psia, according to procedures. Also, if
CRD (low or drywell sprays are reestablished before hour 30, these
values are reduced to 0.01.
elf power can be restored before hour 30, these values reduce to less
than 0.01.
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The key accident sequences analyzed for the Grand Gulf plant were tran-
sient with failure of heat removal (T23QW), anticipated transient with
failure to scram (T23C) LOCA with failure of injection (AE), and transient
with failure of injection (TIQUV). The response of the primary system and
containment is influenced by the separation of the drywell and containment
by the suppression pool, the pedestal and drywell configuration, and by the
presence of igniters. Detailed descriptions of the thermal-hydraulic and
fission product behavior and results are given in References 1 and 4.
Table 2 presents the key sequences and event times, a general descrip~
tion of system failures and physical processes, and fission product release
fractions.
Zion Nuclear Station (Large Dry PWR)
Characteristics of the Zion PWR large dry containment are shown in
Figure 3. The containment, as modeled in MAAP has four major regions: the
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Figure 3. PWR Large Dry Containment
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Tabl e 2
SUMMARY OF GRANO GULF RESULTS
Resul ts AE
Core uncovery, hr
Start of fuel melting, hr
Vesse1 fail ure, hr
Containment failure modes b
Containment failure, time, hr
Time of fission product release,
Ouration of release, hr






















































aNumber in parentheses is exponent of 10
bsymbols:
~ - overpressure due to non-condensible gas generation
<5 - overpressure due to steam generation
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The key accident sequences considered for the large dry PWR plant which
involve release to the environment are: station blackout (14-TE), station
blackout with reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal LOCA (2-SE), station blackout
with RCP seal LOCA and a pre-existing impaired containment (2-SE, impaired),
and an interfacing LOCA (16-VL). In the interfacing LOCA sequence, fission
product releases are to the auxiliary building, which significantly atte-
nuates release to the environment. Large and small LOCAs with failure of
recirculation do not fail containment because of action of the fan coolers
and spray system. Detailed description of the thermal-hydraulic and fission
product behavior, and results are given in References 1 and 5.
Table 3 presents the sequences and event times" a general description
of system failures and physical processes, and fission product release frac-
tions.
Seguoyah Nuclear Plant (PWR lce Condenser)
Characteristics of the PWR ice condenser containment are shown in
Figure 4. This containment, as modeled in MAAP, has five compartments: the
upper compartment, the lower compartment, the annular compartment, the ice
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Figure 4. PWR lce Condenser Containment
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Tabl e 3
SUMMARY OF ZION RESULTS
2-SE
Results 14-TE 2-SE (Impai red) 16-VL
Core uncovery, hr 2.3 2.2 2.2 20.0
Start of fuel melting, hr 3.1 3.0 3.0 ~23.0
Vessel failure, hr 4.0 3.8 3.8 26.0
Containment failure modesb ~ ~ ß
Containment failure, time, hr 32.0 32.0 0.0
Time of fission product release hr 32.0 32.0 4.0 24.0
Duration of release, hr 13.0 13.0 7.0 4.0
Fission product release fraction a
Xe-Kr 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
I-Br, Cs-Rb 2( -3) 2(-3) 1(-2) 8(-5)
Te-Sb 2(-5) 2(-5) 3( -4) 8( -5)
Ba-Sr <1( -5) <1(-5) 6(-4) 5( -5)
Ru <1( -5) <1 (-5) 6(-5) <1 (-5)
aNumbers in parentheses are exponents of 10.
bSymbols:
~ - overpressure due to non-condensible gas generation
ß - failure to isolate containment in the event of an accident
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The key accident sequences that could result in release to the environ-
ment are LOCA with failure of recirculation and sprays, with the drains bet-
ween the upper and lower compartment blocked (S2HF-drains blocked); the same
sequence with the drains open (S2HF-drain open); the same sequence with a
pre-existing impaired containment assumed to be a 0.6 m (2 ft) hole; a
station blackout (TIB3MLB13); and an interfacing system LOCA (V). In the
transient with loss of feedwater, large LOCA with failure of injection,
small LOCA with failure of recirculation, and small LOCA with failure of
injection, containment does not fail.
For only those key sequences which involve the release of fission pro-
ducts to the environment, Table 4 presents the sequences and event times, a
general description of system failures and physical processes, and fission
product release fractions.
Detailed description of thermal hydraulic and fission product behavior,
and results and given in References 1 and 6.
CONCLUS IONS
The major conclusions of IDCOR result from generic research and deve-
lopment of the under lyi ng phys i ca1 phenomena and operat i ona1 characteri st i cs
which influence plant behavior under severe accident conditions, and from
specific evaluations of plant response to these severe accident driving for-
ces for four reference plants covering the major characteristics of existing
pl ants.
Although a limited set'of specific areas of design dependency may
warrant further assessment for individual plants, the severe accident con-
ditions used to establish these conclusions are representative of the nature
and types of events which could, potentially challenge containment integrity;
the conclusions regarding the major phenomena of importance to containment
effectiveness are broadly applicable.
In summary, the IDCOR studies of the representative existing nuclear
power plants show that they have a substantial capability to accommodate
severe accidents. IDCOR calculated the fission product source terms for
many important accident sequences in both boiling water reactor and
pressurized water reactors, which are significantly below those predicted by
previous evaluations. The technical results support a reduction in the
current source terms used to license plants.
Because of the low probability of severe accidents in nuclear power
plants that are designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in accor-
dance with current regulations and because of the inherent capability of
such plants to control the consequences of a wide spectrum of such acci-
dents, we conclude that major design or operational changes are not
warranted for potential severe accident conditions.
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Tabl e 4
SUMMARY OF SEQUOYAH RESULTS
S2 HF S2 HF S2HF
(drains (drains) (impared
Results blocked) (open) contain- T1B3MLB 13 V
ment)
Core uncovery, hr 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.9 16.0
Start of fuel melting, hr 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.5 18.0
Vessel fail ure, hr 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.3 20.0
Ice depletion, hr 3.4 4.2 4.2 9.7
Containment failure modeb 1; I) ß I)
Containment failure, time, hr 23.7 10.0 0.0 27.5
Time of fission product
release hr 23.7 10.0 5.3 27.4 18.0
Duration of release, hr 6.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
Radionuclide release fraction a
Xe-Kr 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
I-Br, Cs-Rb 6(-4) 7(-4) 2( -2) 4(-3) 1(-4)
Te~Sb 2(-4) 2(-4) 4(-3) 2(-3) 1(-4)
Ba-Sr <1 (-5) <1(-5) 5(-4) <1 (-5) <1(-5)
Ru <1 (-5) <1(-5) 5(-4) <1 (-5) <1(-5)
aNumbers in parentheses are exponents of 10.
bSymbol s:
1; - overpressure due to non-condensible gas generation
I) - overpressure due to steam generation
ß - failure to isolate containment in the event of an accident
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ANALYSIS OF CONTAINMENT RESPONSE AFTER VESSEL FAILURE
WITH CORIU}! EJECTION INTO A REACTOR CAVITY
T. Ishigami, M. Nishi, H. Horii, K. Kobayashi,
K. Muramatsu and K. Soda
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
Tokai-mura, Naka-gun, Ibaraki-ken, JAPAN
ABSTRACT
An analysis of thermal hydraulic response in a PWR large dry containment
after apressure vessel failure with corium ejection into a reactor
cavity was performed with severe accident analysis codes, THALES-CV
developed at JAERI and MARCH1.O. The analysis covered important events
and phenomena for several hours duration after the pressure vessel
failure. Some differences between the calculated results with THALES-
CV and ~~CH1.O were found for the behavior of the corium temperature
and the concrete decomposition rate. These were caused by the differ-
ences of models in the two computer codes related to the configuration
and ihe property of corium. Important parameters which influenced the
thermal hydraulic response in the containment during the accident were
identified through the sensitivity analyses with THALES-CV and MARCH1.O.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a severe accident analysis has drawn a considerable
attention since the TMI-2 accident exhibited a fair amount of core destruction.
lt is weIL recognized that a nuclear reactor has a potential risk in itself and
that probability of having an accident leading to a .core melt still exists
unless an adequate prevention or mitigation procedure is taken. In order to
properly assess a reactor safety, a risk associated with a nuclear reactor must
be quantified. The WASH-1400 LI? was prepared for this purpose, and several
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Programs have been plannedand performed.
However the present status of quantification of such a risk is still in the
state of the art and a computer code to predict such a risk involves a lot of
uncertainties due to lack of information on physical phenomena in a severe
accident, and computer codes have not always been verified satisfactorily from
experiments. This leads us to an alternative method for verification of a
computer code, that is a comparison of calculated results among several
computer codes with different models to identify important parameters which
influence a risk of a severe accident.
This analysis focused on thermal hydraulic response in a PWR large dry
containment after vessel failure with corium ejection into a cavity, which
constituted apart of an international code comparison exercise organized by
OECD/CSNI. Hence this analysis covered important events and phenomena lasting
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several hours after apressure vessel failure. The analysis was performed
with severe accident analysis codes, THALES-CV developed at JAERI lf7 and
MARCH1.0 ~, including sensitivity analysis and comparison of calculated
results with these two codes.
CONPUTER CODES
Severe accident analysis codes, THALES-CV and MARCH1.0, were used for
the analysis. The THALES-CV code is one of the codes composing the THALES
(Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of Loss-of-Coolant, Emergency Core Cooling, and
Severe Core Damage)-code system~ under development at JAERI since 1981.
THALES evaluates an overall physica1 phenomenon and fission product behavior
during a severe accident of a nuclear reactor. THALES-CV is a computer code
for evaluating pressure and temperature response in a containment vessel dur-
ing severe accidents. A containment vessel is divided into several control
volumes, and the containment pressure and the temperatures of liquid region
and gas region in each control volume are evaluated. THALES-CV includes mass
and heat transfer models which are required for the analysis of wide-range
phenomena during severe accidents.
MARCH1.0 developed in U.S.A. is to evaluate an overall thermal hydraulic
behavior in a water-cooled reactor during a core meltdown accident and has
been used extensively in several institutions. For the present analysis,
however, two subroutines were added to the code, one being to accommodate the
initial thermal hydraulic conditions at vessel failure and the other being to
give a decay heat level at the constant value of 30 }lli as specified for the
code comparison exercise. Also the composition of steel was changed from the
composition used in NARCHl.O to the specified one.
Najor differences exist between the models in THALES-CV and }~CHl.O
regarding a configuration of corium dropped into water in the cavity at the
instance when water in the cavity is vaporized and also regarding a property
of corium. In THALES-CV, the configuration of corium is assumed to form a
layer for heat transfer calculation between corium and water, while spherical
shape is assumed in MARCH1.0. THALES-CV assumes corium to be one layer while
}~CH1.0 assumes corium to be separated into an oxide layer and a metallic
layer after corium-concrete interaction is initiated. Effect of the differ-
ences on the calculated results was investigated by comparing the THALES-CV
results with the }~CH1.0 results.
ASSUNPTIONS AND INPUT DATA
This analysis focused on thermal hydraulic response in a PWR large dry
containment after vessel failure with corium ejection into a cavity. In the
analysis, the containment was assumed to be adiabatic and its integrity
maintained during the accident. The total containment pressure at vessel
failure was 0.4 NPa at initial with partial pressure of air 0.1 NPa and partial
pressure of steam 0.3 NPa. Vessel and primary system pressure at vessel
failure was also 0.4 NPa (lo,~ pressure) at inital, and therefore the mass and
heat transfer from the primary system to the containment in a course of the
accident was neglected, The corium ejection from apressure vessel was assumed
to take pIace instantaneously and to fall into a reactor cavity without scat-
tering outside the cavity.
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Base case input data for THALES-CV and MARCH1.0 used for the present
analysis are given in Tab1e I. These data inc1ude cavity/containment geometry
and thermal hydrau1ic conditions at vesse1 fai1ure, mass and temperature of
corium at vesse1 fai1ure, type of concrete and decay heat level assumed to be
constant during the accident.










Total Pressure at Vesse1 Fai1ure





Hass of Zr (50% oxidation was assumed)
Total Corium Hass



















CaC0 3 :80w%, Ca(OH)2:15w%, Si0 2:1w%, H20:3w%, Al 2ü3: 1w%
Decay Heat Level 30 MV!
Note: * Values in parentheses indicate data for MARCH1.0.
THALES-CV ANALYSIS
(1) Calculated Results for Base Case
Thermal hydraulic response in a PWR containment after vessel failure until
300 minutes was calculated with the THALES-CV code. Figure 1 shows the
calculated pressure and temperature in a containment in the course of the
accident, and Figure 2 shows the ca1cu1ated corium temperature. In these
figures, the time 0 corresponds to the time when apressure vesse1 fai1ed and
corium was ejected. Physica1 processes ca1cu1ated with the THALES-CV code are
as fo11ows. When apressure vesse1 fai1ed at time 0, corium was ejected from
the pressure vesse1 into the reactor cavity and reacted with water in the
cavity. The containment pressure rapid1y increased with a violent steam gen-
eration. Corium temperature rapid1y dropped to 600 K in the cavity water unti1
all of the water in the cavity was vaporized. For that time decay heat in
corium was ba1anced with the heat transferred from corium to water. For about
ten minutes after the vaporization of water in the cavity was over in 33
minutes, pressure and temperature in the containment were kept to be almost
constant. This is because corium temperature is low (less than 1000 K), which
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results in the small heat transfer from corium to atmosphere. As the corium
temperature began to rise, pressure and temperature in the containment also
started to increase. The concrete decomposition was initiated at about 40
minutes after vessel failure. The calculated pressure and temperature in the
containment reached 1.4 MPa and 900 K respectively in 300 minutes when the
calculation was terminated.
(2) Sensitivity Analysis
In order to identify important parameters which would influence thermal
hydraulic response in the containment, sensitvity analysis with THALES-CV was
performed. The parameters selected for the sensitivity analysis are shown in
Table 11 together with the ranges of the parameters.
It was found in the sensitivity analysis that the deviation among the
calculated containment pressures was ± 30 % at the most for the parameters
selected for this analysis. The parameters resulting in a relatively large
deviation were heat transfer coefficient (H.T.C.) between corium and concrete,
and radiative heat transfer rate from corium to atmosphere. Figures 3 and 4
show the effect of H.T.C. between corium and concrete on the containment
pressure and total mass of concrete decomposition, respectively. When H.T.C.
between corium and concrete was large, the containment pressure was lower than
the base case, while the total mass of concrete deceomposition was about twice
as much as the base case. It is because the radiation heat transferred from
corium to atmosphere is reduced when the heat transferred from corium to
concrete was increased. The corium temperature was found to be much lower
than the base case when H.T.C. between corium and concrete was large.
The time interval for all water in the cavity to be vaporized varied
considerably with the change of an amount of water in the cavity, the corium
temperature at vessel failure, and H.T.C. between corium and water. It was
found in the present analysis that the change of an amount of water in the
cavity from 50 % to 300 % resulted in the time interval being varied from 5
minutes to 110 minutes.
The corium temperature and the total mass of concrete decomposition after
water in the cavity was vaporized showed similar behavior for the parameters
selected for this analysis. Therefore the corium temperature and the total
Table 11 Parameters Selected for the THALES-CV Sensitivity Analysis
Parameters
Mass of Corium (Kg)
Relative Amount of Metal in the Mass
of Corium
Corium Temperature at Vessel Failure (K)
Amount of Water in the Cavity (Kg)
Concrete Decomposition Temperature (K)
Concrete Decomposition Enthalpy (J/g)
H.T.C~* between Corium and Concrete (W/cm2K)
Radiative Heat Transfer Rate from
Corium to Atmosphere
H.T.C. between Corium and Water (W/cm2K)
Fraction of the Generated Gas Contributing





























Note : * The acronym SV stands for the standard value.
** The acronym H.T.C. stands for heat transfer coefficient.
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mass of concrete decomposition were almost determined by the time interval for
all water in the cavity to be vaporized.
MARCH1.0 ANALYSIS
(1) Calculated Results for Base Case
Thermal hydraulic response in a PWR containment during the accident was
calculated with the MARCH1.0 code. Figure 5 shows the calculated pressure and
temperature in the containment in a course of the accident. Figure 6 shows
the calculated temperatures of an oxide layer and a metallic layer of corium
which is, in MARCH1.0, assumed to be separated into the two layers after
corium-concrete interaction is initiated. When the vessel failed at time 0,
corium was ejected into the reactor cavity and reacted with water in the
cavity resulting in a violent steam and hydrogen generation and a rapid in-
crease of the containment pressure. The corium temperature dropped to 700 K
at the time when the water in the cavity was vaporized. All of the water in
the cavity was vaporized in 17 minutes after vessel failure. Then the corium
temperature began to rise and reached 1644 K in 67 minutes when a concrete
decomposition was initiated. In 117 minutes, the temperature of the oxide
layer of corium reached its melting point and gases generated by the concrete
decomposition started to flow through the oxide layer. In 192 minutes, a
metallic layer lo.cated in the upper layer of corium was overturned and moved
to the lower layer with the density of the metallic layer being smaller than
that of the oxide layer. Then the rate of concrete decomposition increased.
The calculated pressure and temperature in the containment reached 1.5 ~Wa and
1100 K respectively in 290 minutes when the calculation was terminated.
(2) Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis similar to the THALES-CV analysis was performed with
the MARCH1.0 code. The parameters selected for the sehsitivity analysis are
shown in Table 111 together with the ranges of the parameters.
As in the THALES-CV calculation, the deviation among the calculated
pressures and temperatures in the containment was ±30 % at the most for the
parameters selected for this study. The parameters resulting in a relatively
large deviation·were an amount of water in the cavity and a particle diameter
of corium. Figure 7 shows the effect of a particle diameter on the contain-
ment pressure. Some differences among the calculated results can be seen
concerning the increase of containment pressure at the time immediately after
vessel failure. The increase of pressure at the time immediately after vessel
Table 111 Parameters Selected for the MARCH1.0 Sensitivity Analysis
Parameters
Mass of Corium (Kg)
Relative Amount of Steel in the Mass
of Corium
Corium Temperature at Vessel Failure (K)
Amount of Water in the Cavity (Kg)
Radius of the Reactor Cavity (m)
H.T.C. between Corium and Concrete (W/cm 2K)
Particle Diameter of Corium (ern)



























failure is caused by the vaporization of water in the cavity resulted from
corium-water interaction. Since MARCH1.0 assumes corium dropped into water
in the cavity to take the form of spheres, the heat transfer area from corium
to water becomes larger .as the particle diameter is smaller. Thus the vapori-
zation time of water in the cavity becomes shorter and the pressure increase
becomes more rapid as the corium diameter is smaller, and vice versa.
The initiation time of corium-concrete interaction, namely the time when
corium was separated into an oxide layer and a metallic layer in the MARCH1.0
model, was extremely sensitive to an amount of water in the cavity, a particle
diameter of corium and the corium temperature at vessel failure. Figure 8
shows the effect of an amount of water in the cavity on corium temperature.
When an amount of water in the cavity was large, the corium temperature was
kept to be 460 K until the water in the cavity was vaporized, and then it
began to rise. When an amount of water in the cavity was small, the water in
the cavity was vaporized in a short time (less than one minute) and the corium
temperature was kept to be high. Thus the initiation time of corium-concrete
interaction varied from 0.6 minute to 180 minutes by changing the amount of
water in the cavity from 50 %to 300 %.
As in the THALES-CV calculation, the corium temperature and the total mass
of concrete decomposition after completion of water vaporization in the cavity
showed similar behavior for the parameters selected for this analysis.
COMPARISON OF MARCH1.0 AND THALES-CV RESULTS
The calculated results with THALES-CV and ~ßRCH1.0 was compared to
investigate the effect of different models used in these codes on the thermal
hydraulic response in the containment during the accident. Figure 9 shows the
camparisan of the calculated containment pressures with THALES-CV and
MARCH1.0. The two calculated results agree weIl even though the MARCH1.0
result shows a little higher pressure than the THALES-CV result. This was
caused by the difference in calculation of the system pressure. The system
pressure was determined in THALES-CV so as to keep total system volume con-
stant and the temperature was determined from mass and energy conservation,
while MARCH1.0 determined the atmosphere temperature first so as to give total
system enthalpy consisting of each enthalpy of air, steam, and water. Then
the system pressure is determined according to the given temperature based on
a thermal equilibrium model.
As for the corium temperature, the MARCH1.0 result was higher than the
THALES-CV result for 200 minutes after vessel failure as shown in Figure 10.
This is because heat transferred from corium to concrete estimated by THALES-
CV is larger than by MARCH1.0 since radiation heat transferred from corium to
concrete is considered in THALES-CV, not in MARCH1.0.
The MARCH result showed that the concrete decomposition rate increased
rapidly at the time when a metallic layer located in the upper layer of corium
was overturned and moved to the lower layer. On the other hand, the THALES-CV
result showed an almost constant decomposition rate because THALES-CV assumed
corium to be one layer.
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CONCLUSION
Thermal hydraulic response in a PWR large dry containment after vessel
failure with corium ejection into a reactor cavity was analyzed with the
THALES-CV and }ßRCH1.0 codes. The conclusion obtained from the analysis is
summarized as folIows.
(1) The sensitivity analysis with the THALES-CV code and the }ßRCH1.0 code
showed the deviation among the calculated containment pressures was 1 30 %for
the parameters selected in this analysis. The relatively important parameters
for pressure and temperature in the containment and event times were an amount
of water in the cavity, corium to concrete heat transfer coefficient, corium
to atmosphere radiation heat transfer rate, and a particle diameter of corium
(in the ~CH1.0 code).
(2) Comparing the calculated results of thermal hydraulic response in the
containment with THALES-CV and }ßRCH1.0, some differences were found for the
corium temperature and the concrete decomposition rate. These were caused by
the differences existing between the models in THALES-CV and ~CH1.0 related
to the configuration of corium dropped into water in the cavity for the time
when water in it is vaporized and the property of corium.
(3) It should be recognized that lack of experimental da ta results in large
uncertainty in the present analysis such as the parameters identified to be
important from the sensitivity analysis and the models related to the con-
figuration and the property of corium. Therefore experimental investigations
on physical phenomena associated with the parameters and the models are
strongly recommended.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the Swedish project RAMA (Reactor Accident Mitigation
Analysis) is to provide the methods and tools for assessing the containment
response and fission product release during a severe reactor accident. The
analysis of the containment response is perfbrmed with MAAP (the Modular
Accident Analysis Program) , which evaluates the postulated accident from the
initiating events to a permanently coolable state with or without containment
failure. This paper presents and discusses results for Ringhals 1 and
Oskarshamn 2. The calculations show that the time to containment failure for
these reactors is in the order of days for the two sequences total blackout and
large break LOCA followed by loss of core and containment cooling.
BACKGROUND
The RAMA (Reactor Accident Mitigation Analysis) project was established in
the wake of the decision by the Swedish government that decided measures if any
should be taken before 1989 at all Swedish nuclear power plants in order to
further reduce the likelihood of radioactive releases that could be caused by
severe accidents including core-meltdown. This applies especially to those re-
leases that could cause long lasting land contamination. The purpose of the
RAMA project is to provide methods and tools for the analysis of the source
term and the containment response during a severe accident. The work is accord-
ingly carried out in two working groups, one on the containment response and
one on the source term. The task of the containment group is to evaluate
temperature and pressure in the primary system and the containment during a
severe accident. All twelve Swedish reactors will be analysed. As a first part
of the work the thermal-hydraulic responses of the reactors Ringhals 1 and
Oskarshamn 2 have been studied. This paper presents some results from the
severe accident analysis of these reactors and the resulting impact on contain-
ment structures.
CONTAINMENTS LAYOUTS AND DATA
The containment configurations for Oskarshamn 2 (02) and Ringhals 1 (Rl)
are depicted in Fig. 1. As can be seen the containments are similar. Charac-
teristic features of these containments are the cylindrical condensation pool
which covers the whole containment basemat and the vertical drain pipe from the
compartment under the reactor pressure vessel to the suppression pool. The main
data for the reactors and their containments are given in Table 1.
1253
SEQUENCES ANALYSED
The following accident sequences have been analysed:
TB
AQUVW
Loss of AC power
Large LOCA, loss of all coolant injection
and containment cooling
When the AC power is lost in the loss of AC power sequence the reactor is
automatically shut down. Battery power vill be available for closing the con-
tainment isolation valves and later activate the automatie depressurization
system (ADS).
For the large LCCA case, a high temperature signal from drywell initiates
automatically shutdown of the reactor. The large LOCA is assumed to be a
guillotine break in one of the main coolant loops and outflow of hot water and
steam from both ends.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The analysis has been performed by using the MAAP (Modular Accident
Analysis program) computer program 111 in which major pysical processes during
an accident such as core heat up, clad oxidation, core melting, vessel melt-
through, debris configuration and coolability etc. are modelled. The code
evaluates the entire accident sequence from the initiating events to a perma-
nently coolable state with or without containment failure. The prog~am has been
developed for IDCOR by Fauske and Associates Inc. (FAI) in two major versions,
one for BWR's and one for PWR's. As a member of IDCOR, RAMA has gained access
to the MAAP codes. Because of the differences between different reactor systems
the original MAAP BWR code had to be modified for application to the ASEA-ATOM
reactors Oskarshamn 2 and Ringhals 1. The modifications of the code were per-
formed by FAI and concerned mainly the containment arrangement and the system
functions.
CONTAINMENT RESPONSE
Loss of AC power.
The results of the studies for this sequence are summarized in Table 2.
U02 accumu1ation in lower drywell and wetwell, drywell gas and suppression pool
temperature and drywell pressure are shown in Figs. 2 to 4.
During the first part of the accident, water in the reactor vessel is
boiled off by the decay heat. The steam produced is blown off to the suppres-
sion pool where it condenses. After about 30 min the top of the core is un-
covered. The uncovered part of the core is overheated and melting of the core
starts at about 2.5hours Due to reaction between zirconium and steam hydrogen
is produced. Vesse1 failure takes place at 3 to 4 hours, molten corium f10ws
out and falls down to the lower drywell floor. The melt heats up the concrete
floor and the concrete begins to melt. Also during this reaction some hydrogen
is produced. The main part of the melt makes its way down to the suppression
pool through the drainpipe in the floor. By melting through a steel door and
electrical penetrations the melt may also flow down into the pool through these
openings. Due to the considerable depth of the pool (6 m) the fal1ing melt
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fragments and the fragments solidifies. The debris ends up as a coolable layer
on the bottom of the suppression pool. Since the pool is uncooled the pool
temperature will increase due to latent and residual heat in the debris. After
some time the pool begins to boil. The steam partial pressure in the contain-
ment increases. After 40 hours the total containment pressure is about 0.7 MPa.
The containments of Ringhals 1 and Oskarshamn 2 is expected to remain essen-
tially leaktight up to about 1.0 MPa. If the containment is not cooled this
pressure will be reached after about 50 hours.
Large LOCA, loss of coolant injection and containment cooling.
This sequence has been analyzed for Oskarshamn 2 only. The results are
summarized in Table 2. UO accumulation in lower drywell and wetwell, drywell
gas and suppression pool temperature and drywell pressure are shown in Figs. 5
to 7.
The large LOCA break area assumed results in a fast emptying of the
reactor vessel. The core is completely uncovered within about 10 seconds.
Compared to the loss of AC power case the start of core melting and vessel
failure occurs about 1.5 hours earlier. The continuation of the accident is
then quite similar to the loss of AC power sequence. The highest calculated gas
temperature is somewhat higher, 260 0 C compared to 240
0
C. The total mass of
hydrogen is somewhat less, 40 kg compared to 50 kg.
COMPARISONS WITH EARLIER CALCULATIONS
The results from the MAAP calculations have been compared with results
from the FILTRA project, where the purpose was to design a filtered venting
system for the Barsebäck reactors, which are identical to Oskarshamn 2. In the
FILTRA analysis it was conservatively assumed that 50 % of the zircaloy in the
core was oxidized, which corresponds to a hydrogen'production of 750 kg. This
leads to a somewhat faster pressurization and earlier failure of the contain-
ment. Otherwise the comparison showed a reasonably satisfactory agreement.
CONCLUSIONS
As the main part of the core debris end up in a coolable state in the
suppression pool the risk for an early leakage from the containment caused by
the melt itself is small. The main threat to the integrity of the containment
is instead the combined influence on containment seals and penetrations from
increased inside gas temperature and pressure.
The containment atmosphere is heated by energy emitted from the stream of
molten corium, the frozen crust of core debris permanently resting on lower
drywell floor and gasborne radioactive substances. According to Table 2 and
Figs 3 and 6 the highest gas temperature is about 260oC.
The containment pressure increases as a result of steam partial pressure,
hydrogen production during chemieal reactions and increased containment gas
temperature. If the containment cooling is not restored the pressure rises
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Table 2. Event times and important results
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ABSTRACT
The paper assesses the reactor containment loading during a severe
accident sequence for a 900 MWe PWR unit. Calculations are per-
formed by using the JERICHO thermalhydraulics code concerning the
following cases: dry cavity, flooded cavity with corium not cooled
and flooded cavity with corium cooled.
INTRODUCTION
During the past several years, some work has been accomplished, in the
field of the nuclear reactor safety, concerning the evaluation of hypothe-
tical severe accidents on pressurized water reactors. These accidents invol-
ve core degradation and important fission product release from the fuel. The
radiological consequences of such accidents are mainly linked to the resi-
dence time of the fission product in the reactor containment building (RCB).
Indeed, fission product deposition, by settling on the floor and diffusion
on the walls of the RCB, will reduce the amount of radioactive material which
will be released to the environment if the containment fails.
Consequently, it is important to determine the mechanical behaviour of
the RCB during the accident and the thermal-hydraulic conditions (especially,
atmosphere moisture) in the RCB which influence the fission product behaviour.
The JERICHO computer code has been developed in order to provide the thermal-
hydraulics in the containment: gas pressure, gas and wall temperatures,
atmosphere moisture, atmosphere composition and leakage rate.
The objective of the present paper is to study the influence of the
state of the reactor cavity (dry or flooded) and of the corium coolability on
the thermal-hydraulics in the containment in the case of an accident sequence
involving core melting and subsequent containment basemat erosion.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE JERICHO CODE [1], [Z]
Since the objective of the JERICHO code is to analyse accidents evolu-
tion over several days, it was necessary to write a computer code with a
rather simple modelization and a sophisticated numerical treatment. The
containment volume is modelized in one compartment with two phases: gaseous
atmosphere and sump water. Both phases are assumed to be homogeneous, in
pressure equilibrium, but in thermal non-equilibrium. Containment atmosphere
can be composed of oxygen, nitrogen, steam, hydrogen, carbon dioxide and car-
bon monoxide. The main physical"phenomena are described below (also, see
Figure 1).
Mass and Energy Sources
The JERICHO code provides the thermal-hydraulic conditions in the
reactor containment building from the onset of the accident through the
stages of b10wdown, core heat-up, boiloff, core meltdown, pressure vessel
bottom head failure and interaction of the molten debris with the concrete
containment basemat. The energy and mass f10wrates of the different gaseous
species (HZO, HZ' CO Z and CO) entering the containment during the different
phases of the accident are eva1uated by various codes (described in [3]).
Besides, the fol10wing energy sources are taken into account :
- decay heat associated with fission products released into the containment.
This energy, initia11y re1eased in the gaseous phase, is rapid1y transferr-
ed into the sump water in order to simulate the fission product deposi-
tion (the deposition rate being ca1culated by the AEROSOLS/Bl Code [3]),
- energy radiated by the corium surface during the corium-concrete inter-
action phase. The radiation generated by the corium surface is to a 1arge
extent stopped by the reactor cavity walls: it leads to the heat-up and
the thermal degradation of the concrete, re1easing steam and carbon dioxide,
- energy re1eased from hydrogen and carbon monoxide burning.
Heat and Mass Transfer Between Atmosphere and Sump Water
At the surface of the sump water, convection occurs in thermal nOn-
equi1ibrium and condensation if the liquid temperature is lower than the
saturation temperature or evaporation in the opposite case. Steam condensa-
tion in the bulk gaseous phase and sump water boi1ing are also considered.
Heat and Mass Transfer Between Atmosphere and Structures
Heat and mass exchanges, between atmosphere and structures, occur by
convection and condensation if the structure temperature is 10wer than the
saturation temperature. In the JERICHO code, the condensation film is not
mode1ized as a distinct system; the condensed water is assumed to reach the
sump water instantaneous1y at the wall temperature.
Thermal Conduction in the Structures
Containment walls and interna1 structures are modelized as one-dimen-
siona1 slab geometry heat sink. Each structure consists of only one mate-
rial. In the case of concrete structures with a stee1 liner, aseparate
ca1culation is performed for the stee1 liner. The outside atmosphere and
the ground are treated as sinks at constant temperature.
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Containment Spray
In French 900 MWe PWR's, the containment spray system works either, in
direct phase, from the storage tank, in common with emergency core cooling
system, or, in its recirculation phase, from the sump water. In the second
case, the liquid passes through heat exchanger in order to evacuate the decay
heat in the long-term. The JERICHO code calculates the energy transferred to
the heat exchanger and the inlet temperature of the spray water.
Leakage and Venting
From the containment design pressure/venting of the RCB is designed
through a rough filtration device in order to reduce the radioactive release
to the environment. The gas is assumed to be expanded isoenthalpie ant the
flowrate is calculated from the SAINT-VENANT law. The containment leakages
(natural containment leakage and containment isolation failure) are also
modelized.
Hydrogen and Carbon Monoxide Combustion
The combustion of hydrogen and carbon monoxide becomes possible when
each of these components exceeds a given volumetrie concentration. More
accurately, the flammability limit is determined in the ternary diagram
(HZ+CO, HZO+COZ' air).
Hydrogen and carbon monoxide burning is modelized in two ways:
1) continuous burning as soon as the flammability limits are reached,
Z) storage and instantaneously burning (deflagration) at input specified time.
Numerical Treatment
The evolution of gas components and liquid water mass and internal ener-
gy, as weIl as structure surface temperature, is governed by a system of
first order non-linear differential equations. In order to modelize the
engineered safety feature performance and some physical phenomena (fission
product influence and leakage), some additional equations are considered.
This system is solved by an ADA}!S-PECE method. Gas and liquid temperatures,
as weIl as gas component partial pressures, are obtained by solving a system
of non-linear equations with a specific residues method.
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION
The accident sequence to be studied, on which the following study is
based, is a break loss-of-coolant accident (Z" diameter) with failure of both
the emergency core cooling system and the containment spray system (SZCD
sequence according to the Reactor Safety Study terminology [4]). Note that,
in tllls case, the containment building cooling is not operational. The
reactor to be considered is a 900 MWe PWR unit with a large dry containment
(Figure Z). The reactor building is a prestressed concrete containment with
an internal steel liner (steel thickness = 6 mm, air gap = 0.5 mm). We
present herein-after the successive stages of the accident and the corres-
ponding containment response. The timing of the main events occurring
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The primary circuit depressuriz8tion initiates the reactor scram and the
starting of the auxiliary steam generators feedwater supply system. }lliin
pu"ps are stopped because of the cavitation. The primary circuit blowdown
progresses and the core uncovery occurs at about 30 minutes. This stage has
been computed by using the RELAP 4 Mod 6 code [5]:
Core Hea~-Up and Meltdown
Thecore uncovery involves its heat-up, enhanced by the zircaloy
cladding oxidation by steam, which releases large amounts of energy and of
hydrogen. During this stage, the primary circuit depressurization continues
and the pressure falls below the ac umulators pressure threshold (4.2 MPa):
the accumulator water discharge temporary refloods the core. After this
water is vaporized, the core melting process resumes: the most volatile
fission products are released by the core. This stage comes to an end 'with
the core slumping in the vessel bottom head (at 195 minutes). Some water is
still present in the bottom head and its sudden contact withthe melting core
causes its rapid vaporization. The metallic components of the core are
supposed to be oxidized and hydrogen is again released in the containment
building. The computer code used here is aversion of the BOlL 2 code [6],
modified in order to calculate small break and transient accidents; moreover
the decay heat and fission product release models have been markedly improved.
According to a simplified evaluation, the bottom head rupture occurs after
about one hour. This long delay is due to the low primary pressure, which
does not lead to important mechanical stresses.
Concrete Basemat Ablation
The melting fuel and internal structures mixture (corium) falls down on
the concrete basemat in the reactor activity. The concrete basemat is pro-
gressively eroded by a thermal degradation process: concrete isdecomposed
and free wat~ , bound water and carbon dioxide are successively released.
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Water and carbon dioxide are partially reduced into hydrogen and carbon
monoxide when passing through the corium metallic layer. At the same time,
large amounts of energy are radiated by the very hot (temperature decreasing
from 4000°C to 1500 0 C) upper layer of the corium. The concrete ablation
kinetics, as weIl as the gas masses released into the containment atmosphere,
are highly dependent upon the composition of the concrete.
Main characteristics of a limes tone concrete are presented in Table I.
In the case of limes tone concrete, the ablation rate is estimated to be
30 cm/h during the first hour of interaction, 18 cm/h thereafter and 2 cm/h
after the solidification of the corium metallic layer in contact with the
concrete basemat. It is to be noted that considerable uncertainties still
exist in the knowledge of these phenomena and so we have simply adopted the
approximate values currently accepted. With this hypothesis, the basemat
rupture occurs at about 7 days (thickness of the concrete containment base-
mat: 4.2 m).
PRESENTATION OF THE JERICHO CALCULATIONS
After the vessel rupture, the corium forms a deep bed about 60-70 cm
high, according to the amount of core and structures involved, and progressi-
vely ablates the concrete basemat. During the long period of time (several
days) preceding the complete basemat pass-through, it is likely to set up or
recover means of providing cooled water on the corium surface. Hence the
problem of corium coolability is of primary importance as concerns the
management of severe accidents. Three key-questions are to be answered:
(a) what kind of interaction between the corium and water does occur,
(b) does it bring to a stable coolable configuration and (c) what are the
consequences on containment integrity ?
The molten corium and the water pool overlying it will probably be sepa-
rated by asolid crust and a vapor film, which limit the heat transfer to
rather low values. Yet crust dislocation by gas release and destabilization
of the vapor film, with direct water-corium interaction, are likely to occur.
These mechanisms could lead to a certain extent to corium fragmentation, but
it is difficult to imagine the formation of a coolable debris bed in this
way, according to the corium depth.
Nevertheless it is impossible up to now to answer the question of corium
coolability, and the present paper is aimed only at addressing the third
question, with arbitrary assumptions on coolability. It allows therefore to
bracket the containment response during this stage of the accident, assuming
the containment building cooling' is not available.
To this end, three calculations were performed: dry cavity, flooded
cavity with corium assumed being not coolable and flooded cavity with corium
assumed being coolable.
Case 1 (dry cavity)
The first calculation concerns the study of the S2CD sequence in which
the reactor cavity is dry. In this case, the concrete basemat is heated to
high temperatures before water vapor and gases are released from it. During
the first hours, a considerable amount of the available energy in the core
debris is therefore transferred to and stored in the concrete, leaving only a
fraction of the energy to be transferred to the containment building atmos-
phere as steam and non condensible gases (mainly, carbon dioxide).
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Case 2 (flooded cavity - corium not cooled)
The second calculation relates to the study of an accidental sequence
similar to the preceding, except that the reactor cavity is flooded (for
example, by recovery of the emergency core cooling system) after the begin-
ning of the corium-concrete interaction. Therefore, the radiation heat gene-
rated by the corium surface does not heat up the reactor cavity walls but
rather vaporizes the water poured into the reactor cavity.
Case 3 (flooded cavity - corium cooled)
For the third calculation, we assume that the cavity contains an unlimi-
ted amount of water to cool the debris to the extent that the core could not
reheat and interact with concrete. After the core is brought into thermal
equilibrium with the water (in 1 hour) and the rapid steam production and
rapid pressure rise have occured, the decay heat in the core materials conti-
nues to boil water (at the rate of 400 kg/minute).
For the previous three cases, the sources, in kg, released (after 4 days)
to the reactor containment building during the "corium-concrete interaction"
are given in the following table:
Steam released to the RCB
Hydrogen released to the RCB
Carbon dioxide released to the RCB














The main characteristics of the reactor containment building are pre-
sen ted in Table I and the different sources released into the containment
throughout the accident (dry cavity) in Table 11, among which the main sources
are the two-phase water flow during the primary circuit depressurization and
the carbon dioxide generated by the concrete basemat erosion.
RESULTS OBTAINED - DISCUSSION
Containment Atmosphere Pressure and Temperatures
The curves of pressure and average temperature of the gaseous and liquid
phases (Figures 3, 4 and 5) show two peaks corresponding to the primary cir-
cuit depressurization and to the bottom head water vaporization when the core
slumps. These pressure peaks reach respectively 0.20 and 0.28 MPa and so are
far lower than the containment building design pressure (0.5 MPa). For case 3,
the third peak (0.35 MPa) corresponds to the rapid steam production due to
the thermal equilibrium between core and water (see previous section).
The containment atmosphere pressure exceeds the design pressure: after
6 days for case 1, after 3 days for case 2 and after 1 day for case 3.
When the containment design pressure is reached, the containment atmos-
phere temperatures are equal to 117°C, 131°C and 138°C for cases 1, 2 and 3
respectively.
Note that:
the containment basemat is supposed to be penetrated by the corium after
7 days,
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the best-estimate assessments of the actual strength limits of reactor
containment with an internal steel liner had led to the conclusion that the
rupture occurs suddenly by fracture of prestressing cables at about 1.0 to
1.3 MPa leading to loss of containment integrity (7).
Therefore, the above-ground containment rupture occurs only for case 3,
after 3 days. For ease Z, the above-ground containment rupture and the base-
mat rupture occur at about the same time (after 6-7 days).
The pressure and temperature increase rates are:
1.8 kPa per hour and 0.Z9°c per hour for case l',
4.4 kPa per hour and 0.54°c per hour for,case Z,
for' ease
,
10.5 kPa per hour and 0.83°C per hour 3.
Containment Atmosphere Moisture
Figure 6 gives the containment atmosphere moisture versus time for case 1.
This curve shows that the containment atmosphere is not always saturated
during the first hours of the accident. Similar results have been obtained
for cases Z and 3.
Containment Atmosphere Composition
Figures 7, 8 and 9 give the atmosphere composition (OZ' NZ' HZO, HZ'
CO Z and CO) as funetions of time for cases 1, Z and 3. These curves show
clearly:
the importance of steam and carbon dioxide for case 1,
the importance of steam for cases Z and 3.
When the containment design pressure of 0.5 MPa is reached, the atmos-




















Concerning the hydrogen combustion:
For case 1, the hydrogen concentrations always exceed the flammability
limits: hydrogen volume fraction more than 4% and steam volume fraction
less than 60%.
For cases 2 and 3, the steam volume fractions are higher than 60% after 3.5
days and 0.5 days respectively.
Energy Balance
For cases 1, 2 and 3, the energy balances after 4 days are the following
(in % of energy injected into the reactor containment building):
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Energy located in the concrete walls 23 21 19
Energy located in the internal structures 58 42 46
Energy located in the atmosphere 6 9 12
Energy located in the sump water 6 13 19
Energy transferred to the environment 7 5 4
Note the importance of the energy located in the internal structures.
Concerning the decay heat, after 4 days, 5.334 ~ru is still located in
the corium (71.3%), 2.026 MW in the sump water (27.1%) and 0.118 MW in the
gas phase (1.6%).
CONCLUSION
The JERICHO code has been developed in order to study the thermodynamic
behavior inside the reactor containment building for the complete spectrum of
accident sequences likely to occur on a PWR.
Sensitivity analyses performed with the JERICHO code on the S2CD se-
quence (involving core melting and subsequent containment basemat erosion)
have shown the importance of the state of the reactor cavity (dry or flooded)
and of the corium coolability on the thermal-hydraulics in the containment.
For a dry cavity, the containment building failure'is due to the basemat
rupture, after 7 days. For a flooded cavity with corium not cooled, the
basemat rupture and the above-ground containment rupture occur at the same
time, after about 7 days. For a flooded cavity with corium cooled, the con-
tainment building failure is due to the steam overpressurization, at 3 days.
For this case, if the containment building cooling is recovered the above-
ground containment rupture will be prevented and the fission products will
not be released to the environment.
A substantial buildup of combustible gases resulting from the corium-
concrete interaction can be prevented if the core can be flooded with water.
The formation of a coolable debris bed remains to be demonstrated. Neverthe-
less, in the long-term, the rates for corium penetration and for combustible
gas production are expected to be lower compared with the dry cavity sequence,
even if the coolability is not demonstrated.
In the near future, we intend to check the adequacy of the input data
for the JERICHO code (in particular, mass and energy flowrates released into
the reactor containment building during the corium-concrete interaction) and
to validate the JERICHO code from analytical and integral experiments.
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TAßlE I _ MAIN CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT ßUILDING.
OF THE PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM AND OF THE CORE
TAßlE 11 _ MASSES RElEASED
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Core heat-up_BoilofLCore meltdown (trom 31 to 195 min)
Core slumping and vessel failure (trom 195 to 262 min )
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Steam released trom the break to the RCS 21.683
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Mass of aclive fission products *
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Corium-concrete interaction (trom 262 min to ..: days )
Steam released to the RCS
Hydrogen released to the RCS
Carben dioxide released to the RCS
Carbon monoxide released to the RCS
Sump water radio lysis (after": days )



















Fig.LDIAGRAM OF SYSTEMS AND PHYSICAL PHENOMENA
IN THE JERICHO CODE
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STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CANDU REACTOR'S VACUUM BUILDING
S.G. Krishnasamy and W.W. Koziak
Ontario Hydro
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M8Z 5s4
ABSTRACT
The vacuum building of the negative pressure containment system
is an important safety feature of the CANDU nuclear power plant.
During a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), when the pressure in the
reactor building reaches apreset value, the pressure relief valves
(PRVs), which provide apressure barrier between the reactor and
vacuum building, open to allow flow into the vacuum building; This
prevents the pressure in the reactor building from rising beyond the
design value. The change of pressure in the vacuum building, from
approximately 7 kPa to atmospheric, the high velocity at which the
released gases or vapour enter the building, and the action of the
dousing system, all apply considerable forces on the various
structural components of the vacuum building. The program described
in this paper, which is part of a comprehensive test plan coordinated
by the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, comprises measurement of the
pressure distribution in the main building, the wind velocity,
movement of vacuum duct support and the forces on various critical
components. An extensive analysis of the test data has been done to
determine the integrity of the vacuum building under an emergency
situation.
INTRODUCTION
The vacuum building of the negative pressure containment system is an
important safety feature of the CANDU nuclear power plant (Figure 1). During a
Loss-of-;Coolant Accident (LOCA), gases and vapours from the reactor building
would be safely transferred via pressure relief valves to the vacuum building.
The vacuum building consists of a main vacuum chamber, a water storage tank, an
upper vacuum chamber and a basement. The main vacuum chamber is the vessel
formed by the perimeter wall, and the roofand floor slabs. The upper vacuum
chamber, mounted centrally on the roof slab, contains sixteen suction pipes (or
riser pipes) which run into the water storage tank. A walkway, situated just
below the spray headers, provides access for maintenance. These parts of the
vacuum building are shown in Figure 2.
In case of a LOCA, when the pressure in the reactor building reaches a
preset value, the pressure relief valves (PRVs), which provide apressure
barrier between the reactor and vacuum buildings, open to allow flow into the
vacuum building. This prevents the pressure in the reactor building from
rising beyond the design value. During a LOCA the dousing system in the vacuum
building is also activated, forcing the watet' from the storage tank, through
the riser pipes, into the upper vacuum chamber. The water flowing through the
upper chamber is released into the main vacuum chamber via spray headerB. to
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INTERNAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE VACUUM BUILDING
WITH MEASUREMENT LOCATIONS
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The maximum change of pressure in the vacuum building, from approximately
7 kPa to atmospheric (approximately 100 kPa); the high velocity at which the
released gases or vapours enter the building; and the action of the dousing
system; all apply considerable forces on the various structural components of
the vacuum building.
OBJECTIVE
The test program on the Bruce NGS 'B' vacuum building, before it was
brought into service, was to confirm its structural integrity under a simulated
emergency situation. The testing program described in this paper, which is
part of a comprehensive test plan coordinated by the Atomic Energy of Canada
Ltd [1], comprises measurement of the pressure distribution in the main
building and the forces on various critical components.
TEST PROGRAM
In an emergency when the reactor building pressure increases by approxi-
mately 7 kPa, the sixteen self-actuating PRVs open and increase the main vacuum
chamber pressure. Apressure rise of approximately 27 kPa in the main vacuum
chamber activates the dousing system. For the blowthrough test program, a
specially designed pneumatic system was used to open the pressure relief valves
to the atmosphere instead of to the reactor building.
The test program was designed to measure, at locations indicated in
Figure 2, the following parameters:
i) Pressure distribution along a horizontal axis on the underside of the
roof slab, along a vertical axis on the inner face of the perimeter wall,
on the underside of the water tank slab and at two levels in the main
chamber.
ii) Strain and temperature on two riser pipes.
iii) Forces on the walkways and spray headers.
iv) Air velocity at three locations in the main vacuum chamber.
INSTRUMENTATION
Considering the hostile environment in which they had to function
effectively the various measuring instruments described below were made rugged
and compact, and in general had a high output signaL The supports for the
various instruments and the conduits for routing the signal cables were also
designed to withstand the forces generated during the blowthrough test. The
instrument profiles were such that they would cause minimum obstruction to the
air flow.
Static pressure distribution measurements were made at three locations
(Figure 2) using solid s tate absolute pressure t ransducers. The pressure
transducers were mounted on the roof, the water tank slabs, the perimeter wall
and beem surfaces.
Specially designed anemometers were used for measuring the wind speed at
three selected locations in the main vacuum chamber during the blow-through
test. The anemometer type chosen for this project measures the drag force on a
cylindrical rod, which then is converted into wind speed by proper calibration.
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The cantilever beam gauges were designed to deform permanently by forces
ind~ced by wind pressure during the blowthrough test. Permanent deformations
were then used to estimate the dynamic pressure on' walkways and spray headers.
A LVDT (Linear Variable Differential Transformer) was used to measure the
horizontal movement of one of the vacuum pipe supports.
Of the sixteen riser pipes, two were instrumented to measure strains in
the axial and circumferential directions at four locations.
All the measuring instruments, except the strain gauges, were continuously
monitored during the blowthrough test. The strain gauge signals were monitored
using a multiplexer at the rate of 10 readings per second. The conditioned
signals were stored in three tape recorders for further apalysis.
The pressure transducers, anemometers, signal conditioners and data
loggers were calibrated prior to the tests to minimize the instrument error.
In the case of pressure transducer, strain gauges and anemometer the estimated
maximum instrument error is ±1% and it is ±5% in the case of beam gauges.
BLOWTHROUGH TESTS SCHEDULE
The earlier tests in the series were scheduled to check instrument opera-
tion and calibration before the final "wet" blowthrough test. The following
are the different tests carried out under this program.
1) Sixteen valve blowthrough test without dousing under partial vacuum (at
60kPa initially) or miniblowthrough test - intended as a calibration test.
2) Single valve blowthrough test without dousing - to measure PRV performance
characteristics under prolonged choked flow conditions.
3) Sixteen valve blowthrough test without dousing or dry blowthrough test.
4) Sixteen valve blowthrough test with dousing or wet blowthrough test.
The blowthrough test without dousing was conducted because the pressure
transducers used were not designed to operate in wet conditions. The details
of the tests and other related information are given in Reference [2,3].
This paper deals primarily with the results of the dry and wet blowthrough
tests.
RESULTS
A total of 40 data signals were monitored during each of the dry and wet
blowthrough tests. Three magnetic tape recorders were used to store the data
and on each tape a time signal was included as a reference.
Time zero coincided with the activation of the PRV opening circuit.
The pressure data were digitized at a rate of 8 per second and the airflow data
at a rate of 200 per second. The type of signals, the recording mode, etc are
listed in Table I.
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TABLE I
DETAILS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MEASUREMENTS
Measurement Type of No of Transdueers Type of
No Category Loeation Transdueer and Spacing Monitoring
1 Pressure in Perimeter Absolute pressure 5 - spaeed verti- eontinuous
main vaeuum wall transdueer with eally at 3 m analog signal
ehamber surfaee specially intervals
designed mounting
Bottom of " 2-one elose to the "
the roof perimeter wall and
slab another near the
water tank wall
Bottom of " 3 "
water tank
slab




2 Air speed Three 2 dimensional I-at eaeh loeation "
in main loeations anemometers
vaeuum at two
building levels
3 Forees on Four loea- Speeially a set of 7 gauges self monitor-
struetural tions on designed at eaeh loeation ing deviees;




4 Movement A typieal Defleetion 1 eontinuous
of vaeuum support Transdueer analog signal
duet (LVDT)
5 Strain in Two riser Strain gauges 16-8 on eaeh of 2 digitized
riser pipes pipes riser pipes
- -- --
Pressure in the Main Vaeuum Building
Of the total 32 pressure measurements made at five different loeations
during the dry and wet blowthrough tests a typieal one is plot ted as a funetion
of time in Figure 3. In eaeh of these plots the pressure reading of one of the
transdueers on a beam, whieh was least affeeted by the jet flow, is ineluded as
a referenee. The pressure differenee relative to the referenee value was
ealeulated for eaeh loeation. A typieal plot of pressure differenee values on
the perimeter wall is shown in Figure 4. The maximum pressure differenees at
the roof slab, water tank slab and perimeter wall levels during dry and wet
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AIRFLOW MEASUREMENT IN TRE MAIN VACUUM BUILDING
Maximum Axial Time of Maximum Transverse Time of
Anemometer Wind Speed Occurrence Wind Speed Occurrence
Location (m/s) (seconds)* (m/s) (seconds)*
Location 1 85 1.1 130 0.8
(upwards) (north wes t)
Location 2 45 1.2 75 1.2
(upwards) (north east)
Location 3 40 1.6 60 1.9 & 3.1
( downwards) (south east)
*After the activation of the PRV opening circuit
Airflow in the Main Vacuum Building
The air flow measurements were done during both dry and wet blowthrough
tests. The wind speeds, both in the axial and transverse directions, for one
of the three locations are shown as a function of time in Figure 5 and 6. The
maximum axial velocities in the upward and downward directions were 85 m/s and
80 m/s"respectively. The maximum transverse velocity was about 130 m/s. The
maximum axial-upward velocity occurred about 1.1 s after the activation of the
PRV opening circuit while the maximum transverse velocity occurred after about
0.8 s. The velocity measurements at the three locations are shown in
Table Ir. Unexpectedly, the transverse speeds are consistently greater than
axial speeds.
Blowthrough Wind Loads on Walkways' and Spray Readers
The wind pressures on walkways and on spray headers were measured at four
selected locations on the radial catwalk for each of the dry and wet
blowthrough tests. The pressures on the beam gauges for both tests were
calculated from the permanent deflection of the mechanical gauges; The maximum
pressures on catwalk members and spray headers during wet and dry tests were
approximately 6.3 kPa and 4.1 kPa, respectively. It was observed that all the
beam gauges deflected downwards indicating a predominantly downward force.
Stresses on Riser Pipes
Both axial and circumferential strains were measured at four diametrically
opposite locations on each of the two riser pipes. The maximum axial and
circumferential stresses were about 20680 kPa' and 14480 kPa, respectively.
This is small compared to the yield strength of the material.
Movement of Vacuum Duct Support
The maximum horizontal movement of a typical support measured during the
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FIGURE 5
TYPICAL AXIAL AIRFLOW MEASUREMENT
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SOME IMPORTANT MEASUREMENTS DURING BLOWTRROUGR TESTS
Component Type of
and/or Type of Blowthrough
No Location Measurement Maximum Test
1 Roof SIab Bottom Pressure Differ. Pressure = 4 kPa Without dousing
= 4 kPa With dousing
2 Water Tank SIab Pressure Differ. Pressure = 1 kPa Without dousing
= 2.75 kPa With dousing
3 Perimeter Wall Pressure Differ. Pressure = 1.5 kPa Without dousing
= 1.5 kPa With dousing
4 Wind Measurement
Location 1 Air Speed 85 m/s Axial Up With dousing
130 ml s Transverse
Location 2 Air Speed 45 m/s Axial Up With dousing
75 m/s Transverse
Location 3 Air Speed 40 m/s Axial Down With dousing
60 m/s Transverse
5 Walkway and Pressure 6.3 kPa Without dousing
Spray Reader 4.1 kPa With dousing
6 Riser Pipes Stress 20680 kPa Axial With dousing





Measurements of pressure, air velocity and flow force were made during
blowthrough tests in the CANDU system's vacuum building in order to assess the
response of its structural components to postulated LOCA conditions.
The pressure variation, as a function of time at all the measurement
locations in the main vacuum building, was relatively smooth. The difference
between the various pressure readings at any one location were not considered
significant.
The air speed in the axial direction
transverse speed. The beam-column grid
responsible for the observed flow.
was less than the corresponding
in the building may have been
The measurements on the service platform and spray headers show that these
structures were subjected to relatively low pressures with resultant downward
forces exceeding the upwatd forces.
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Water f10w induced stresses in the riser pipes during the wet b10wthrough
test were not significant.
Measurements are summarized in Tab1e 111.
The resu1ts from these tests confirm that the design assumptions for the
vacuum bui1ding are reasonab1y conservative.
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ABSTRACT
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been supporting a
research program to study the impact of hydrogen combustion on nuclear
reactor safety. The objective of that program is to quantify the threat to
containment survival posed by the mechanical and thermal loads resulting
from hydrogen combustion. The program also addresses the potential sources
of hydrogen for postulated severe accidents, the evaluation of proposed
mitigation systems for reducing the threat from hydrogen. and the impact of
combustion on the survival and functioning of safety equipment. This paper
will be limited to discussing recent progress in understanding several forms of
hydrogen combustion including ordinary deflagrations, accelerated flames.
detonations, and diffusion flames.
DIFFUSION FLAMES
A diffusion flame may occur under various conditions during hypothetical reactor
accidents. Such flames may autoignite as hot steam:hydrogen mixtures leave the
primary system through a break or stuck-open valve. They might also be ignited
accidentally or deliberately elsewhere in containment. and flash back to a point near
the exiting mixture. Diffusion flame plumes might also form above the suppression pool
in a BWR. The primary threat from these flames is the high thermal load applied to
neighboring safety equipment and to containment penetl'ation seals, including
penetrations through the dryweIl wall. Recent research [I] has shown that such flames
can be very stable, even for steam mole fractions as high as 80%. Figure I. Current
research is addressing the applicability of small-scale systems to predicting large-scale
reactor situations. Models are being developed to predict the spatial and temporal heat
fluxes associated with these flames. Work sponsored by other organizations (e.g., EPRI,
HCOG) is being used to support this model development effort.
This work was supported by the Uni ted States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and performed at Sandia National Laboratories which is operated




Many experiments have been eondueted around the world to measure
hydrogen:air:steam flammability limits, pressure rises and flame speeds. Figure 2 [2]
illustrates the ternary flammability limits that have been measured for such mixtures.
The limits widen with inereasing temperature on the hydrogen-Iean side, but narrow
with inereasing initial temperature on the rieh side. Preeombustion gas motion has also
been shown to affeet these limits [3,4]. Figure 3 shows that the peak pressure resulting
from eombustion of lean hydrogen mixtures depends etrongly on the pre-burn gas
motion, vessel geometry and loeation of ignition source. For mixtures rieher than about
10% hydrogen, the dependenee on these parameters deereases signifieantly, and
hydrogen eoneentration beeomes the major determinant of peak pressure. For lean
mixtures, pre-burn gas motion tends to inerease flame speed and, eonsequently,
inereases the degree of eombustion eompleteness. This ean be seen by eomparing
experimentally measured flame speeds for the "fans off" (Figure 4) and "fans on"
(Figure 5) eases. The effeets of aerosols on eombustion is a eurrent research topie.
There is also some preliminary evidenee of ascale effeet in burning limits (seen in EPRI
tests at the Nevada Test Site) espeeially with respeet to the loeation of the ignition
source.
DETONATIONS
Signifieant progress has been made in determining the initial and bounciary
eonditions for the initiation and self-sustained propagation of a detonation wave. The
detonation eell width, whieh ean be measured experimentally, has been shown to be an
important fundamental length seale that eharaeterizes the ehemieal rate processes. A
knowledge of the eell width permits the detonation limits to be preseribed. The eritieal
energy for direet initiation of a detonation wave in a given mixture ean also be
estimated from the eell width and the equilibrium Chapman-Jouguet detonation states.
The eritieal tube diameter or the eritieal ehannel width for the eontinued propagation
of a eonfined detonation transmitting suddenly into an uneonfined region has also been
shown to be direetly proportional to the eell width. Thus, reeent research on
hydrogen-air detonations has been eentered around the measurement of this
fundamental eell width, not only for hydrogen-air mixtures, but for C02-H2-air as weil
as steam-H2-air mixtures. Figure 6 shows the detonation eell width as a funetion of
hydrogen eoneentration in air with and without the addition of earbon dioxide.
Attention is also devoted to the development of theories and empirieal eorrelations to
link the eell width data to the dynamie detonation parameters of praetieal interest (Le.,
detonation limits, initiation energies, eritieal tube diameters, transition to detonation,
ete.). Detonations have been observed at hydrogen eoneentrations as lean as 13.5% in
air, mueh less than the 18% limit that has been frequently reported in other referenees.
The initiation of detonations is as important as detonation propagation for some
reaetor safety situations. Prevailing seientifie opinion reeognizes two distinet methods
for initiating detonations: direet initiation (by explosives) and DDT (deflagration-
to-detonation transition) oeeurring in eonfined geometries. Reeent experiments in
Germany, Norway, <lnd the U.S. indieate that a third meehanism is possible, espeeially
at large scales. A sudden, spontaneous· transition to detonation ean oeeur when an
energetie souree of suffieient size is present. This souree eould be a hot flame Jet, or a
turbulent burning region (e.g., in the vicinity of a fan, or when the flame eneounters an
obstacle).
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ACCELERATED FLAMES (High-Speed Deflagrations)
Under appropriate initial and boundary conditions (e.g., strang ignition sourees,
geometrical confinement, the presence' of turbulence-inducing obstacles) HZ-air
deflagrations can accelerate rapidly to very high flame speeds and may even transit to
detonation. Secause of the dense distribution of equipment in same reactor regions,
high-speed deflagrations are of great practical significance. Research on high-speed
deflagrations has focused on establishment of the acceleration rate and the maximum
flame speed attainable under different boundary conditions and hydrogen
concentrations. Figure 7 shows the maximum steady state turbulent deflagration speed
as a function of HZ content. These flame speeds are obtained in circular tubes (5 and
15 cm in diameter) and with repeated (one diameter spacing) circular orifice plates of
blockage ratio SR =0.4 as turbulence-inducing obstacles. The flame speed increases
sharply at hydrogen concentrations just exceeding 13%: transition-ta-detonation results
near a concentration of 25% hydrogen. The corresponding overpressures associated
with these high-speed deflagrations are shown in Figure 8. Transverse venting has been
shown to be very effective in limiting flame accelerations in lean Hz-air mixtures. For
example, for 12.7% HZ. the deflagration accelerated rapidly to almost 200 m/sec in an
obstacle-filled rectangular channel. Figure 9. However, with only 8% venting on the
top ceiling of the channel, the flame acceleration has virtuaUy disappeared. Recent
large-scale experiments at Sandia have not demonstrated such a dramatic effect of
venting.
Current research is aimed at establishing scaling laws for flame acceleration and
transverse venting in large-scale field experiments at Sandia. The important problem
of formulating criteria for the transition from these high-speed deflagrations to
detonations is also receiving considerable attention.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Several compuLer codes have been developed to analyze the probability and
consequences of various forms of combustion. The HECTR code is used to predict the
transport. mixing and combustion of hydrogen during reactor accidents, for ordinary
deflagrations [5]. The Vortex Dynamics code is used to study flame acceleration under
certain conditions [6]. The CONCHAS-SPRAV code is also being used for studies of
flame acceleration and diffusion flames [7]. The CSQ code [8] calculates the spatial
end temporal dynamic pressures that can result from detonations in containment
geometries.
CONCLUSIONS
Figure 10 illustrates the various forms of combustion that depend on the rate of
burning. Much progress has been made in understanding the upper and lower extremes
of this region. Le., ordinary deflagrations and detonations. Work is proceeding to
complete our understanding of those phenomena. and improve our ability to predict the
intermediate regime of complex deflagrations and accelerated flames.
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Simi larity cons iderations are of utmost importance to back-up the interpretation
of experimental results obtained from downscaled experimental test rigs. The
availability of adequate computer codes which describe transient events was
considered to be sufficient once the codes have been assessed by those experi-
mental results. However all codes, in particular the "advanced codes" require
empirical correlations derived from downscaled basic experiments to amend the
necessary constitutive equations. Therefore the codes have to be analysed with
respect to possible sensitivities of the appliedequation system with respect to
linear dimensions and operational parameters. Phase separation and jet expansion
processes are in partlcular sus-pect to be described by empiricism which may be
dimension-dependent. Resulting inherent distortions of the simulation are ad-
dressed and proposals for posslble improvements are given.
Introduction
Similarity la ws and scaling criteria are very important for the interpretation of
experimental observations obtained from downscaled models. In the field of con-
tainment related research three facilities have been utilized to perform ex-
periments, the CVTR, the Battelle Frankfurt test facility and the HDR-test
facility. None of these facilities are geometrically similar replica of existing
PWR-containments nor are they similar amongst each other. The availability of a
computer code to describe the involved physical processes and the actually
existing geometric structures of a containment is essential to understand and
interprete experimental observations. On the other hand the validity of code
calculations is demonstrated by a comparison of calculated results with experi-
mental results obtained from the test rigs. The same code is then considered to
be adequate for the design of full size containments for light-water cooled
reactors.
Fig. 1 makes an attempt to illustrate the interrelations between analytical tools,
experimental facilities, the design of nuclear power plant systems and the
various engineering tasks. Within the lefthand circuit codes serve the experi-
mental activities and are verified by appropriate measurements, while within the
right-hand circuit the same codes are used to design full-size prototype equip-



























FIG.1 INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIOS ENGINEERING
TASKS AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS (CODES)
The most important physical phenomena to be predicted by codes to properly
design containment systems are
-subcompartment pressurisation in the vicinity of an assumed
rupture
-jet impingement forces caused by the rupture
-maximum containment pressure (design pressure)
-the long term temperature evolution within the containment.
These tasks require the availability of sophisticated thermo-hydraulic codes to
simulate the involved fluid-dynamic and heat exchange processes with the high
accuracy anticipated within national reactor safety rules and guidelines.
In general, fluiddynamic design analyses to define loads (overall pressure ,
subcompartment pressure differences and terriperatures) are nowadays performed
applying codes based on the volume-averaging lumped parameter concept
(COFLOW /1/, CONTEMPT /2/, DDIFF /3/, TRAP /4/, etc.) which offer a va-
riety of empirical options to cope with the heterogeneous reality of the
2phase-2component flows. Three containments systems have been available which
yielded extensive experimental data for code verification purposes :
-The decommissioned CVTR containment (heat transfer only) /7/
-The Battelle-Frankfurt Containment (BFC) Model /5/
- The decommissioned HDR reactor containment /6/.
All experiments to study the pressurisation process under design basis accident
conditions have been performed within the BFC and HDR facilities. The free vo-
lume of BFC is approx. 1/100, of HDR approx. 1/7 that of. a full size PWR con-
tainment. Valuable experimental evidence has been obtained from the BFC experi-
ments which is documented and assessed within numerous reports (e. g. /8 -101).
Confirmative experiments within HDR should serve to demonstrate the applica-
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bility of the BFC findings to another containment, different in construction and
free volume (factor 15 - 20).
General Scaling Aspects
The term "sca ling" is in general understood in a broad sense covering all dif-
ferences existing between areal full-size industrial plant (e.g. a nuclear power
plant system) and a corresponding experimental facility. An experimental facility
may differ in geometrie dimensions and shape, in arrangements and availability of
components, in the mode of operation (e.g. nuclear vs. electrical heating) 01'
even in the applied test fluid (e.g. Freon vs. water).
All these differences have the potential to distort an experimental observation
precluding its direct and immediate application for the design 01' operation of
full-size plants. An extrapolation procedure is necessary which requires good
understanding of the experiment and the involved processes to the largest pos-
sible extent.
The term distortion may be defined as a partial 01' total suppression of physical
processes (sometimes also called physical phenomena) observed by only changing
the size (geometrie dimensions) 01' the shape (arrangement of components) of the
test rigs, although the same experiment whith an identical goal is performed in
both facilities. Furthermore such distortions mayaiso be caused by differences
in the mode of operation of the test rigs considered 01' by the use of different
materials. In this connection it will be a central question to what degree the
analytical tools are able to simulate these distortions without a facility-dependent
tuning.
In the field of emergency core cooling and primary system blowdown an overview
about the present seal ing principles for nuclear reactor systems has been given
by Nahavandi 111/. Three types of possible seal ing principles have been derived
from a fundamental consideration of the conservation equations for mass, momen-
turn and energy for a homogeneous two-phase flow (3 equation system):
1. time-reducing scaling
2. time-preserving seal ing
3. idealized time-preserving modeling procedures.
The latter method requires the avallability of a mathematical descriptlon of the
physical process which can be applied to full size prototype facilities as weil as
to downscaled experimental test rigs in an equivalent unrestricted manner. In an
earlier study 1121 we came also to the general eonclusion that small scaled
reactor safety experiments can be best understood by the use of sophisticated
two-phase flow models. However, the accuracy of measurements, specifically
those of important boundary conditions has been identified to be a limiting factor
for the overall agreement between analysis and experiment. Heterogeneity of the
fluid, thermo-dynamic nonequilibrium and unsufficient treatment of flow resis-
tances for irregularly shaped flow paths have been supposed to be influencial on
the achievable accuracy of containment code predictions in terms of local pres-
sure differences and temperature fjelds. In so far it was not supprising that the
expected confirmation of conclusions drawn earlier from alarge number of ana-
Iyses for BFC experiments concerning achievable predictive aceuracies has not
been found for the first HDR containment experiments. A lack of geometrie simu-
larity between both experimental test rigs and the highly empirical concept to
cope with local flow phenomena may be reasons for this finding. In this context
it appears necessary to analyse the frequently used lumped parameter codes with
respect to their inherent dependence on dimensional effects. For the following
considerations it is assumed that a prototype containment is represented by an
experimental model designed in strictly geometrie similarity to the prototype.
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Dimensional Analysis of COFLOW
The lumped parameter code COFLOW is extensively used for the design of PWR
containment systems while the analyses of experimental results for many years
served the verification of this code. The code is described in detail within
references 11; 13/. It is based on continuity equations for vapor, water, air,
transportable water droplets withln the gas/vapor - phase and energy - as weil
as a momentum balance between adjacent nodes. The set of ordinary differential
equations can easily be transformed into a set of partial differential equations.
The vapor - balance may serve as an example for the following dimensional ana-
lysis of the basic COFLOW equations.
Vapor balance combined with the evaporation rate related to a sub-volume V
~(~ ~G..) + ~(CJ. ~w) =
at 0 y aX Dy
=_5: 2 ~Q_ ~ (_1) _~? ~~ f_')_I (G ~®)
D Y dt Sb D W Y dt \ 9w Y MB
Defining for each involved variable a dimensionless ratio
(1)
Varlablep~ototype __ (VPrototype
Variable* e.g. = V*)
VariableModell VModell
and replacing within equation (1) each variable by the product VPrototype
VModel V* yields the following equation
a~tx (q~p;~:~:) + ax?aXX(?D'~OX~,~~X W,wx) =
_ S"29x2~ d ( , )
- - 0 0 y'y x dt'dtX ?o' 5'ox -
(2)
Assuming that for al) v~riables the ratios "var lable*" remaln Independent from
space wlthin the described control volume and assuming In particular that it may
be justified to keep the time ratio t* = constant for the entire transient we are







Equations (3) and (1) will describe identical processes within the prototype and
the model if for a geometricaily similar experimental model the ratios of the
dimensionless groups K* 1 to K* 4 would become equal to 1.
Of particular interest for containment pressurisation processes may be the ba-
lance for water entrained within the gas phase. Oroplet deposition into the sump
water phase of a considered sub-volume is assumed to follow the empirical equa-
tion
FZ
Gsep = CWA • GWG + V2g H 9w· VWG • V
The transformed partial differential equation for the density of entrained water
within the gas phase finally will be
o a·
~h;(5lWG') + K,x aX' (5'WG' W') =
-" (I<)(~) - K,")2QH' 2wQ +
L '5 MB' 6 H'
~L ~?\G' ?\'~~(_') + K )( go' 9wG 'd (_'_.)
v)( '" 0' dt' 0' 7 1/ I dt 0 ,['2 Vw r W JO vW )'11
yielding additional dimenslonless parameter combinatlons. At the end we obtain a
set of 17 similarity groups Iisted within table 1. A more detailed analysis of ail
basic equations involved within the COFLOW-model can be found in /14/.
Additional similarity, requirements have been found originating from the acti-
vation of the optional model within COFLOW wh ich describes the dynamic com-
ponents of compartment internal pressure drop /13/. Work in this connex however
is still in progress. Hence, the foilowing discusslon is strictly limited to
fundamental questions of the lumped parameter code simulation in the vicinity of
the two-phase flow discharge •
Tabelle I
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Dimensionless Similarity Groups for the COFLOW-code
for Geometrically Similar Experimental Models.
The groups K1 to Kij result from the steam, water and air balances, groups K5to K7. from the droplet entrainment model, Ka to K14 from the energy balance
and K15 to K17 from the momentum equation.
One should take note that the groups Kz ' K3 , K6 and K1Z to K14 express someempirical committments with respect to l:he adopled discretisation scheme (no-
dalisation). In this context L represents the distance between node centers of
the momentum balance while V is Iinked to the subvolume of the node represen-
tative for the mass- and energy balances (superimposed mesh-scheme). H des-
cribes the height of a control volume to which the empirical droplet deposition
equation applies. These parameters (L,V and H) do not necessarily follow the
general geometrie hardw~?3 scaling between model and prototype expressed by
the linear ratio x* = 5 (geometrie similarity provided), ·they normally are
considered as optional to the code user.
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Discussion of the Dimensionless Groups
Containment experiments have been performed so far under a "time preserving
operating condition"
VPrototype Energy Additionprototype = S
VModel Energy AdditionModel
wh ich can be easily deduced from the first law of thermodynamics to yield for all
components under favourable circumstances
t* = P.* = D.* = h.* = 1
I J I I
as a good approximation. In this respect the free volume V of the entlre con-
tainment served as the important scal ing parameter. ---
An idealized geometrTc similar scaling prinE:.ipl~ is shown in fig. 2 for the
compartment where the local mass- and energy release into the containment may
~~~~~~ti~~a~btain equal relative energy addition requires 0 rupture to be scaled
,. ... i+ m
X=Y=Z=S
Fig. 2 Idealized Scaling Scheme for Compartmented Containments
to SI /2, if the properties of the pressurized water discharged into the con-
tainment are identical (as usually aimed for). With respect to the local pres-
surisation process we find as important local boundary condition W* = 1 at least
in the vicinity of the discharging two-phase jet.
For the formation of local pressure differences a similarity consideration has to
originate from this definable and reproducible boundary condition.
The column K,* within table I illustrates for wh ich similarity groups a value of
unity (1) mayl be expected. The question marks (?) indicate the implications of
the applied nodalisation concept. They may be disregarded if model and proto-
type would be nodalized with an identlcal scheme, otherwise the implications
should be discussed in more detail.
Of partlcular importance are the ratlos K3* to ~.6* which are derived from theapplied droplet entrainment model and the ratlos K~ * and K1/ whlch are repre-sentative for the momentum equatlon governed by Me density 9B of the massflow
and the flow resistance empirics. .
T,he flow density 'I B again is coupled to the droplet density ~ WG by the expres-
sIon
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S' B ='?WG +fL +9D
linking the above mentioned groups c10sely together. From the K.'" ratios In table
I the sensitivity of the code results with respect to the fo1rmation of local
pressure differences on the purely empirical corrective constants Cw and Ybecomes evident and some more fundamental treatment of the process ~Ithin the
code is highly recommended if model -or scaling- dependent errors are to be
limited. While the operating boundary condition W'" = , allows the simplifylng
conclusion that a similar velocity field may exis,t around the discharge-nozzle,
K] '" indicates a distortion with respect to the available linear dimensions when or
where ever a two-phase jet will hit a strl,Jcture. Thus, associated local thermal
and mechanical nonequllibrium processes may be distorted , although several more
recent fundamental studies concerning the behaviour of two-phase jets (e.g.
1'5, '6/) suppose a linear relationship between the diameter of the jet orifice and
the necessary distance for a jet to decay. its prnsure field to ambient con-
ditions. In so far downscaling of Drupture by 5 to a certain extent would
compensate the distortion expected from the K' '" conditions. However, a quan-
titative assessment of the jet expansion behaviour and the associated entrainment
of water during such experiments necessitates the development and/or application
of highly sophisticated advanced codes (e.g. COBRA-NC) at least to describe
the flow within the compartment of energy release. At the present stage of this
work only qualitative indications can be given for which areas of the COFLOW-
simulation (and other lumped-parameter code concepts) scaling-related distortions
may be expected.
Similarity conditions for flow fields further downstream from the compartment of
rupture are of course burdened by the uncertainty which exists for the compart-
ment ,of rupture itself. From an engineering point of view more detailed con-
siderations in th is respect would be of secondary importance unless correct
predictions of the component distribution (air, vapor, water) within the .entire
containment are of specific interest. This is certainly not the case for the short
term pressurisation per iod . Therefore K.*-ratios within table I should only be
considered as informative for the local pressurisation process in the vicinity of
the simulated rupture. Respecting this limitation the lack of geometric slmilarity
of the avallable containment experimental facilities mayaiso become a less
stringent additional problem not yet fully covered by nowadays simulation pro-
cedures.
Maximum total containment pressure will be reached towards the end of energy
release from the primary system. At this time internal flow velocities will decay
and the main similarity groups of interest will be Kg , and K" to K'4' K,lI shows
the weil known effect of an increase of heat losses to structures ot' down-
scaled experimental models. T~ih is caused by an increase of the ratio
surface/volume proportional to 5 . The other dimensionless groups may be of
some interest if thermal nonequilibrium between the 'phases had to be taken into
account (for the present study complete equilibrium was assumed).
For long term natural convection processes (e.g. the distribution of hydrogen
and/or fission products) K'4 may be again an important similarity group together
with K, , K'6 and K, . However additional studies deern necessary to more pre-
cisely ~efine the most important operating and boundary conditions common to
the experimental model and the prototype facility in this direction. Therefore no
further discussion of similarity requirements for this area seem appropriate
within the present paper.
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Conclusions
An attemrt has been made to analyse the basic equations of the lumped para-
meter: code COFLOW with respect to possible inherent distortions related to its
experimental verification on basis of downscaled test results. In specific the local
pressurisation process in the vicinity of the energy release point is suspect to
be largely influenced by the particular characteristics of the experimental set-up
entering into the primitive empiricism by which flow resistance and water en-
trainment are analytically simulated. In this context nodalisation concepts mayaiso
play an important role if different for the simulation of model and prototype. It
is expected that these effects may increase the uncertainty margins of code
predictions for the containment-related fluiddynamics weil above the 15-20%
assessed from the analyses of earlier BFC-tests /10/ for local dynamic pres-
surisation. The lack of geometrie similarity between model and prototype con-
tainments and the impossibility to predict or influence the shape of a fracture of
a recirculation line might aggrevate the problem. However, the application of
advanced containment codes like COBRA-NC for weil defined experimental con-
ditions of a rupture compartment seems inevitable and promising to allow quan-
tification of space-effects and influences associated to the heterogeneity of the
two component-twophase-fiow not amenable to lumped parameter simulation.
The development of maximum overall containment pressure is likely to be only
slightly distorted by scaling due to an increased heat exchange with structures
which may be conservatively neglected for design purpose code application. The
assessment of long term containment experiments may deserve further studies
concerning possible scaling related distortion if full understanding of experi-
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SCALING ASPECTS OF SUBCOMPARTMENT ANALYSIS
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ABSTRACT
Comparison of pressure differences measured during the
HDR and Battele Frankfurt containment tests have shown that
the traditional energy density/volume scaling approach is
inadequate. Additional factors are important such as absolute
compartment size, relative complexity of compartment geometry,
density and size of internal structures, average drop size
of suspended water and extent of departure from equilibrium
conditions. 'Relevant scaling methodology is reviewed and
its applicability to subcompartment scaling is assessed.
Several new dimensionless indexes characterizing compartment
geometry flow channel geometry and departure from equilibrium
conditions are defined.
INTRODUCTION
Several recent studies have demonstrated that the modeling
of short term pressure transients between zones of a containment
during a loss-of-coolant accident is inadequate [1,2]. This
is true for experiment to model [2,3], and even for model
to model [4] comparisons.
A successful calculation of pressure gradients within
a network of compartments subjected to a two-phase blowdown
fluid, requires the specification of flow resistances, evaluation
of local fluid densities, consideration of energy transfer
to structures and the determination of droplet to vapor relative
velocities. Until recently experimental data has been limited
and this basically two-phase flow problem has been analyzed
using simplified, usually homogenous computational models.
The broadening of the relevant data base by the addition
of the HDR containment test results [2,5] has demonstrated
the limitations of such models. The physical processes which
*Work performed under NRC Grant NRCG-04-B4-004
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determine the transfer of the air-steam-droplet mixture between
compartments are complex. It is doubtful that integral experiments
like the HDR test series can adequately resolve the various
issues raised. For a quantitative resolution, carefully
designed, separate effect tests are required. However, appropri-
ate separate effect tests can not be designed before the
scaling aspects of such facilities are fully understood.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PIPE AND COMPARTMENT HYDRAULICS
The design of scaled experimental facilities for thermal-
hydraulic tests is an established sub-discipline. An extensive
literature on various scaling aspects exist. Relevant recent
information can be found in references [6 to 8). Many of
the approaches developed in the listed references can be
adapted to scaling of subcompartment facilities. However,
this can not be done uncritically.
The focus of interest for most of the reactor safety
related thermal-hydraulic experiments to date have been the
primary and secondary coolant systems. In order to emphasize
this characteristic, the term "pipe hydraulics" is applied
to this broad subject. It is appreciated, that this is not
correct at all times. The reactor downcommer, head and the
steam generator dome are not realy 'pipes'. Nevertheless,
the prQmary and secondary systems flow geometries are dominated
by pipes.
The point to note is that for primary and secondary
system hydraulics this is, for the most part, applicable.
For flow in and between compartments it is not. In fact,
ideas and models developed for pipe flow and uncritically
transferred to flow between compartments can under circumstances
make understanding more difficult. It is thus imperative
to draw a clear distinction between flow problems encountered
in pipes on the one hand and compartments on the other.
The three main differences are:
(1) Pipe flow geometry is regular and weIl defined.
Compartment flow geometry is highly irregular. Compartments
are filled with structures, have blind corners and highly
irregular shapes. In a practical sense there are definite
limits beyond which compartment flow geometry can not be
defined.
(2) The flow profile in a pipe is- for the most part
regular. Parameters as average velocity, average density
average void fraction all have weIl defined and measurable
physical meanings. None of this is true for compartment
flow. In a compartment strong internal circulation flows
can be present. Velocities can vary from nearly zero in
blind corners to sonic velocities at the edge of an expanding
blowdown plume. Not only the magnitude but also the direction
of the fluid velocity is ill defined.
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(3) In the primary system and parts of the secondary
system the fluid is dense, either single phase liquid or
dominated by the liquid phase. Two-phase flow regimes are
then resonably weIl defined and relative vapor liquid velocities
can be described with universal empirical relationships. In
compartment flow the dominating fluid is vapor-air. The
liquid phase can make up half the mass and inertia but will
usually comprise less than 1% by volume. The relative liquid-vapor
velocity then can not be defined without additional knowledge
regarding droplet size and population distribution.
Additional differences cah be listed. Thus for example,
in pipe flow the cross sectional flow area, the frictional
and heat-transfer surfaces all have a fixed analytical interre-
lationship. This is not true for compartment flow. In fact,
for compartment flow it is an important to establish the
nature of the heat-transfer surface (i.e: concrete, thin
or thick metal) as the total available surface area [10].
Linear dimensions characterizing a compartment can be related
to the volume of the compartment, to the available surface
area, to the flow channels within it, the opening leading
out of it or to the diameter of structures. In scaling these
distinctions must be kept clearly in mind, and a length to
diameter relationship established for pipe hydraulics will
usually have little relevance when applied in an uncritical
manner to compartment flow.
SCALING APPROACHES
Scaling of experimental facilities for containment tests
is a new field and it is premature to propose a definitive
classification system. Nevertheless, in order to gain an
overview of the subject, an initial categorization is helpful.
The following categories are recognized in this survey:
1. Pipe hydraulics scaling. This is the classical
scaling approach used for designing primary and secondary
system scaled facilities. The distinction between pipe and
compartment hydrauli~s are described in the previous chapter.
2. Code based scaling. The general and special purpose
thermal-hydraulic codes employed in nuclear reactor system
safety analysis calculations presently represent more then
just indispensable computational tools. They are also a
compendium of information assembled by groups of interdiscipli-
nary specialists. As such they can become objects of investi-
gation in their own right. In arecent study Karwat [11]
has deduced subcompartment scaling laws based on the COFLOW
[12] code ..
3. Phenomenoglogical scaling. The two previous categories
represent integral scaling approaches. It is probable that
for separate effect tests such methods can provide only general
guidelines. Separate effects tests are designed to measure
specific parameters or the influence of certain physical




Reviews of pipe hydraulic scaling are presented in refs
8 and 9. The methodology developed has direct applicability.
Some of the derived results can also be utilized if the parameters
are interpreted appropriately.
The method is based on the definition of dimensionless
ratios for all relevant parameters. For example:
I t = LIA :p T:: I.?::L. e- fdf, (I)
'- I-p I 'Pp I
Assurne that the basic balance equations refer to the
scaled facility. That is, they are expressed in terms of
Lm, Pm, tm, etc. These variables are substituted by the
product obtained from the ratios given by 1. The equations
are then rearranged to yield the original relationships,
but in terms of prototype parameters. This creates a set
of dimensionless groups which define the basic scaling requirements.
For compartment hydraulics application it is preferable
to arrange the dimensionless groups of the momentum balance
in a different manner then quoted in the listed references.
dUn I) ? (J 0 "R 9 I )2PM~ + 1~"I"1I1-M = - ~M -) t'1 ff,J VfI1 - g pn
~ t M OX,.l1 7JX,H
After substitution of U~=U~Uf·t:ttpetc. we have:
t 't ) i'1
(-'-rl u f) p l.YP -I- (Pi! rj Pp Llp7J!Ai> =t 1- "P 'Ot p X /!(fip 2
= _(pt1llr - {r t-pt,tVfrPp Up -
X r /r; Xp
The 5 bracketed coefficeints of eq 3 can be reduced
to a set of 4 by appropriate division. In pipe thermal hydraulics
the fluid usually has a high density and inertial e~fe~ts
(term 1) are important. Eq 3 is then multiplied b~7Pt~setting
the coefficent of the first term to 1. The remainin~ coefficients
then express the relationship which must be preserved to
assure identical inertial effects. One requirement is that
in order to preserve identical model and prototype press~res,
both length and velocity must be conserved. This can be done
in a limited way for pipe thermal hydraulics and leads to
'long thin' scaling geometries exemplified by the semiscale
facility [13). For compartment scaling such an approach
is impractical. Since the fluids have a lower density inertial
effects are not as important. However, pressure is of primary
importance and the amount of its distortion~must be known.
It is preferable then to multiply eq 3 by(Ypt). This leads
to the following four dimensionless groups:
(pUL)p dU p + (~) 0 U ~i' - -4).ffi\T t P 'P COt.r p . ,P 'P /)Xp (JI Kr
_(?f~ u~) fP pP U?<- - (rJtL) PP
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Where the superscript is dropped and x is replaced by
its integral value. All of the dimensionless groups including
two sets arising from the momentum balance are shown in table
I. On the right hand side of the table the conditions are
listed which must be met if state functions are to be preserved
undistorted between the model and prototype. The linear
scaling factor is defined as: i fL) (- V,' ). ~ (51A. ::- L =- _fr/ '= -..!:J 'J
Lp Vi"
~ is thus a dimension characterizing the volume. Preservation
of time and state leads to the requirement (term 2) that
power input be scaled volumetrically;'·that isk,"A~ Note
that the average flow velocity in the model will be reduced
by a factor of A (term 1). Since fluid state is preserved,
temperatures and surface fluxes will also be identical.
As shown in term 4, this leads to the distortion of surface
energy transfer terms by I/~ .Note that for this scaling
scheme it is impossible to keep all events synchronous.
Interial effects will occur earlier by a factor of ;C'.
A final note. The presented methodology provides a
useful framework. However, in case of compartment thermo-
hydraulics it is riot to be taken too literaly. As noted
previously, the L/u, P parameters which for pipe hydraulics
have a weIl defined meaning are not weIl defined in compart-
ment flow and in fact are subject to multiple interpretations ..
PHENOMENOLOGICAL SCALING
The last scaling category is by its very nature the
least systematic. A whole range of physical phenomena such
as deentrainment and entrainment of drops, acceleration of
a two phase mixture contribute to an integral parameter like
the compartment pressure. Seperate effect tests will likely
focus upon the elucidation of such phenomena. They will
then have to concern themselves with specifically targeted
scaling problems.
In this section an initial survey of potential phenomeno-
logical scaling approaches is made. The list will probably
expand as additional phenomena are considered and also possibly,
it will be pared down as redundant and not very useful criteria
are dropped. At this point no attempt at ranking is made.
As for the previous section, scaling criteria are best
represented in terms of dimensionless groupings. Table 11
lists the dimensionless numbers as weIl as the scaling ratios
for isochronic, same fluid at same state scaling. They will
be surveyed by considering their origin and purpose.
/'leI ,4 F Cliiel /1,
I
The first group of 3 are taken from ref 2. The numbers
were defined for an analysis of Battele-Frankfurt and HDR
subcompartment pressure difference data. It was shown in
[2[ that in terms of traditional comparative indexes (i.e.
energy addition rate per compartment volume or per flow opening
FL
1306
areal the two sets of experiments were quite comparable.
,Matter of fact, the Battele-Frankfurt experimental parameter
range usually bracketed the corresponding range of the HDR
experiments. Nevertheless, the results of the two test series
did not overlap and formed two quite distinct groups of data.
It was then necessary to devise indexes which would quantify
the geometric differences of the two facilities. The three
indexes are:
The Normalized Compartment Complexity Index-NCI
Ps.,.
NCI = &V ~/$
defines the ratio of all structural surface areas (including
walls and interna1 equipmentl to the surface area of an empty
cube having the same volume as the compartment in question,
NCI is thus equal ,to one for an empty cube and grows as the
compartment geometry becomes more complex or as interna1
equipment is added.
The Total Flow Area Ratio - FT
L /lF,' /FT = ..; lo
V Z/ 3
wHere the numerator represents a summation over the junctions
of the compartment. FT is thus the ratio of the total flow
area to the cross sectional area of an equivalent volume
cube.
The Largest Flow Area Ratio - FL
,t)~ MAX
V2-/3
To maintain equivalency between model and prototye,
a scaling scheme which modifies compartment linear distances
by A ,should modify both structural diameter and flow
opening diameters Dr by A as weIl. However, other scaling
considerations conflict with this requirement. Thus in order
to assu~ equal flow opening vapor velocities DF has to be
scaled by a >y'l. factor.' For downscaled experiments this
would lead to a distortion of FT andft..by a factor of A..
This means that for the scaled facility the influence of
the opening on the flow field within the compartment would
be less. The potential intensity and complexity of interna1
flow fields would be reduced.
1dkSi '" .The Weber number lS a class1cal 1ndex represent1ng a
ratio of inertial and surface tension forces. Traditionally
it is used to correlate drop and bubble properties. In refs
[14] and [15[ the number has been redefined by equating the
linear dimension to the diameter of internal structures. Most
structures within a containment consist of pipes, reinforcing
bars, stairs railings and other elongated shapes which can
be reasonably weIl characterized by a typical diameter DSTand a length L proportional to the characteristic linear
length of a compartment. The structural We number then becomes
proportional to the inertial and surface tension force subjecting
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a liquid flow deposited on the structure. In the noted
references it is used to correlate effective deentrainment
rate within a compartment. If it is desired to maintain
this index unchanged structural diameters would have to be
scaled by a factor of A.">-' • .
In ref 8 this index is used to correlate entrainment
in pipes or vessels for which a small break occurs above
a liquid level. The linear dimension LpLis then the distance
from the center to the opening to the liquid surface. For
containment scaling the index is likely to be relevant only
in a negative sense. That is, under actual containment conditions
entrainment from liquid pooled at the floor of the containment
is likely to be negligible. That is f~~ will be quite small.
However, if care is not taken, for downscaled facilities
will be decreased sufficiently that F~Lincreases and entrainment
from this mechanism becomes important.
Di? and S,--
The next two dimensionless groups, called the Drag Co-
efficient and Slip ratio numbers are derived from the droplet
momentum balance equation. They determine whether the suspended
liquid will be accelerated to the same velocity during flow
between compartments.
For circular openings the spatial derivative of the
drop velocity can be approximated by:
dYto 0.75 Cl> pt] ( ~VF _ /)( Vlv~ - U 2) \ (t)
dp 76 P'I> S{ U'IJ 8 ~
Where the fluid is asumed to be incompressible. f is
a dimensionless distance along a radius vector.
Eq 6 can be used to establish the flow geometry and
drop size relationships which will assure identical drop
acceleration rates. Utilizing the techniques summarized
in refs 7 and 8, the dimensionless groups listed in table
11 are obtained. The D I<. number is thus seen to represent
a ratio of the opening diameter and the effective (drag
modified) droplet diameter. If droplet size could be controlled,
potentially this number could be kept unchanged for different
opening diameters. Unfortunately this is not feasible ..
The DR number then implies that drop acceleration rates can
not be reproduced for different opening sizes.
n1q ~ : Me r C1NIc1 T.('
The last group of numbers serve as indexes measuring
departure from equilibrium. They are defined by first evaluating
the time required to reach equilibrium at a constant approach
rate. For example, in case of mechanical equilibrium:
LI LA ~ t1 t UJ" ('(0 l.
eI (6~L rt",
Where for dispersed f low LIlA·:: (Ua. -(1)r») Note that
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both of these time constants assume that the rate of approach
to equilibrium remains constant. This is not the case, of
course. Both .6V1. and l!. T represent driving potentials
thus the actual rate decreases as equilibrium is approached.
The defined ~t values thus represent times which are
proportional to actual equilibration time intervals. The
dimensionless numbers shown in table 11 are obtained by dividing
eq I s 7 by a characteristic trans i t time: Li t -= ~
, 7fL. V1
The nonequilibrium indexes depend strongly on drop diameter.
This dependence is also reflected in the circumstance that
based on the relative drop-to-vapor flow conditions two mechanical
nonequilibrium indexes are required. Between laminar and
fully developed flow the drag coefficient changes not only
in magnitude, but assumes a different functional dependence.
All of the nonequilibrium indexes show a scale dependence.
Thus for facilities which preserve pressure differences the
maximum flow opening velocities must be equal for model and
prototype. This implies that departure from equilibrium
will increase as the facility becomes smaller. For 'Te and M~J
the distortion will be equal to 1\ , for (Y)~T it will be
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Table I
Pipe Hydraulies Sealing Methodology
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TESTING AND ANAL YSIS OF CONTAINMENT MODELS
Thomas E. Blejwas
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
To better understand the structural and leakage behavior of U.S.
containments during severe accidents, Sandia National Laboratories is testing
and analyzing scale models of containment structures. The quasi-static
pneumatic pressurization of models of steel containments of 1/32 scale has
been completed and testing of a 1/8 scale steel model is now beginning
(September 1984). By comparing tesults of analyses (conducted by Sandia and
others) with the experimental data, methods for analyzing the structural
behavior of containments are being qualified. Leakage data is being obtained
during tests of the larger models that have operable equipment hatches..The
leakage will be correlated with measured and predicted distortions of the
sealing surfaces.
INTRODUCTION
Sandia National Laboratories is conducting the Containment Safety Margins Program
for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The objective of the program is to qualify
methods for predicting the behavior of containment structures during severe (beyond
design basis) acci<;lents. The program is one of three programs at Sandia in the area of
containment integrity during severe accidents. Whereas. individual penetrations and seals
will be tested in the other programs, models of containment structures with a variety of
penetrations and other details are being tested in the Containment Safety Margins
Program. Four models of about 1/32 the size of hybrid steel containments have been
tested; testing of a 1/8 size steel model is beginning; and a 1/6 size concrete model has
been conceptually designed and is being acquired. The experimental da ta from the model
tests are being compared with analyses performed at Sandia and elsewhere; the
capabilities of the methods for predicting structural response are being evaluated. Data
for the leakage through equipment hatch representations on the larger model tests will be
correlated with measured and analytically predicted distortions of the sealing surfaces.
The data will be combined with results from the other programs on penetration behavior
during severe accident conditions. Also, the model tests and analyses will be used to
determine important boundary conditions for testing of full-size penetrations (e.g.
personnel locks) in one of the companion programs.
Descriptions of the first three tests with small steel containment models have been
previously reported [I, 2]. The results from the test and analysis of the fourth small
model (a shell with representations of major penetrations) were more recently presented
at a workshop [3]. Analyses and plans for testing the 1/8th size steel model and
conceptual plans for al/6th size reinforced concrete model were also presented [4. 5, 6].
In this paper the small steel model results will be reviewed and conclusions drawn;
updated analyses and recently completed preparations for testing the 1/8th size steel
model will be described; the conceptual design for the reinforced concrete model will be
reviewed; and progress on the concrete model project will be reported.
"Work supported by the U. S.Nuciear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research. and performed at Sandia National Laboratories which is operated
for the U. S. Department of Energy under Contract Number DE-AC04-76DP00789.
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SMALL STEEL MODELS
Review of Tests and Analyses
Four steel containment models about 1/32 the size of U. S. hybrid steel containments
(often used for PWR ice-condenser or BWR Mark 1II suppression systems) were tested
between December 1982 and December 1983. The configurations for the models are
shown in Figure I. The models were pressurized with nitrogen gas in a quasi-static
manner until a rupture or significant leakage occurred. The high temperatures of severe
accidents were not represented in the tests. I.e., testing was at near ambient temperature.
The first model, a clean shell configuration, was tested to check out the testing
hardware and software. Complete rupture occurred when pressure was being raised from
0.90 MPa (130 psig) to 0.93 MPa (135 psig). Howev~r, because of time constraints during
this check-out test, the model did not fully stabilize at the lower pressures; failure at a
lower pressure may have occurred if full stabilization were allowed. Maximum
circumferential membrane strains were about 20% at rupture. A second clean shell
configuration that was fully instrumented was tested. This model started leaking through
a crack near an improperly repaired weid at 0.76 MPa (110 psig). The maximum
circumferential strain at the onset of leakage was about 7%. Comparisons with analytical
predictions [I) show good agreement except that the pressure for gross membrane yielding
was over estimated by about 10 percent. (A resolution of the difference may not be
available until more testing is completed.) The welding and repair techniques used for the
model were not representative of procedures used in actual containments and no inference
of cracking and leaking of actual containments can be made from the test results.
A single ring-reinforced shell model was tested twice. During the first
pressurization, the model developed leaks at 0.83 MPa (120 psig) when the maximum
membrane strain was about 3%. Again, the leaks were due to improper weid repairs in the
very thin (1.2 mm) model material. The model was repaired and retested. However,
because the model material had yielded and was allowed to stand for about three weeks
between tests, the material properties were changed by strain aging . (Strain aging causes
an apparent raising of the yield plateau for some steels when they are yielded and allowed
to stand). During the second testing, significant reyielding of the model was not observed
until just before complete rupture at 0.97 MPa (140 psig). Comparisons of experimental
data and analytical predictions for the first pressurization [I, 3) show good correlation.
However, the analytical model did not include the relatively large amount of brazing
material used to attach the stiffeners, because the brazes had through thickness radial
cracks in numerous locations. If full or partial credit had been given to the braze
material, the pressure at which gross membrane yielding occurred would have been
slightly overpredicted. The analysis and experiment with the ring model both show a very










Figure 1. 1/32 Scale Steel Models
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The testing of a single model with penetrations completed the experiments with small
models. Until recently, the results of this test have received limited dissemination [3].
However, the results are being presented at a specialty conference [7] at the same time as
this meeting. The penetration model included simple representations of an equipment
hatch and two personnel airlocks. The penetrations were of fully welded construction,
that is, they were not operable. The shell was not thickened around the penetrations, I.e.,
the ASME area-replacement rule was not used. During initial stages of testing, the cover
on the equipment hatch that was concave inward buckled in a snap-through manner when
pressure in the model was raised from 0.28 MPa (40 psig) to 0.34 MPa (50 psig). In a finite
element analysis, buckling of the hatch cover was calculated to occur at 0.52 MPa (76
psig).
After the buckling of the cover plate, the model was depressurized and quickly
modified with the addition of a thick flat plate to the outside of the sleeve of the
equipment-hatch representation. The model was then slowly repressurized in steps to
0.83 MPa (120 psig). Shortly after the model was photographed (Figure 2) and about 1/2
hour after pressure was raised to 0.83 MPa, the model failed completely. The
circumferential membrane strain in areas away from penetrations was about 15 % at
rupture. Based upon the location of fragments and observations during rupture, failure of
the model initiated on the side of the model with two penetrations. One of the many
fracture surfaces passed between the two penetrations. Therefore, the failure of the
model may have initiated near the penetrations. However. the model was so highly
strained in free-field areas. that a small flaw or slightly thinner area mayaiso have been
the location of failure initiation.
A comparison of the experimental and calculated (pre-experiment) strains for a
location about three inches from the equipment hatch sleeve (three o'clock position) is
presented in Figure 3. The major and minor principal strains from two points in an
analysis are plotted with sets of principal major and minor strains from two strain gage
rosettes. The analytical results were obtained using the MARC finite element code with a
mesh representing a 45 degree segment of the model with the modified equipment hateh.
More details of the analysis will be available in references [3 and 7]. A second comparison
of experimental and analytical results for a location just below the six o'clock position of
the equipment hatch sleeve is presented in Figure 4. Strains from a single rosette and the
two closest integration points in the finite element model are shown. The two sets of
comparisons are representative of the range of differences between the experiment and
analysis. The onset of yielding was generally overpredicted for all locations, although
pressures corresponding to higher strains were both under and over estimated depending
upon the location. In areas of very high strain gradients, such as near penetrations, the
finite size of the strain gages (generally 0.32 to 0.64 cm) makes direct comparisons
unreliable.
Conclusions from Small Steel Model Experiments
The comparisons between experimental results and analytical predictions has been
generally good for the small model experiments. However, several areas require further
investigation. Explanations for the general overprediction of the pressure at which
yielding occurs are being investigated by Sandia. The testing of the l/8th size model will
provide additional da ta on yielding under multi-axial loading. Comparisons of analytical
predictions and experimental data in some areas, particularly those with high strain
gradients, are not always satisfactory. Resolution of differences will await the testing of
the large model. The large steel model will be heavily instrumented in selected areas of
high strain gradients and the larger model makes gage size less critical. Sandia has also
obtained analytical predictions from outside organizations using codes other than MARC.
Comparisons of all the analyses with the experimental data are planned.
Based upon the experiment with the ring reinforced model and related analyses, the
smearing of the effect of the stiffeners is a reasonable analytical procedure. Prior to the
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capabilities indicated that the rings would yield at pressures close to those for which the
cylinder wall yielded and that the rings and wall would move outward with increased
pressure in a smooth manner (with little noticeable bending). The qualitative behavior of
the model was as predicted. The behavior of ring stiffeners will be further studied on the
large steel model that has relatively thinner and wider stiffeners.
Penetrations do not necessarily cause early failures of containment shells. In the
testing of the model with penetrations, strains in the free field of the cylinder wall of
about 15% were reached before failure. By comparison, the first clean shell model
ruptured when maximum circumferential strains were only somewhat higher (20%). (Both
levels can be considered very high strains: the presence of a small flaw may lead to
rupture at such levels.) Although stress concentrations around penetrations are very high
during elastic response, a general smoothing of strains was observed both experimentally
and analytically as plastic flow occurs.
LARGE STEEL MODEL
Description of the Model
A large steel model, about 1/8th the size of typical U. S. hybrid steel containments,
was designed and fabricated for Sandia by Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. Dimensions and
features of the model are shown in Figure S. The shell of the upper structure (shown in
white in Figure 6) has a design pressure of 0.28 MPa (40 psig) and was fabricated from
ASl6 steel, a material that is used in many steel containments and for liners in concrete
containments. The bottom torospherical head serves as a test fixture and is not
representative of actual containments.
Instrumentation
The large steel model has been instrumented for measuring structural and leakage
behavior at pressures several times the design pressure. The structural instrumentation
includes over 700 high elongation strain gages (capable of measuring strains of up to 20%),
over 40 displacement transducers and nearly 40 thermocouples. Ten resistance
temperature detectors and a high accuracy pressure transducer will record the gas state
inside the model for leak rate estimates. An acoustic emission system will be used to
locate the sources of any leakage.
The distortion of penetrations are of particular interest because of the possible effect
upon leakage. Because preliminary analyses have indicated that leakage due to the
distortion of the sealing surfaces of the equipment hatch is probable, the hatches are
heavily instrumented. In Figure 7, the open hatch is shown with nurnerous strain gages on
the surrounding shell, the sleeve and the cover. The photo was taken before the cover was
closed and displacement transducers were mounted to measure relative motion of the
sealing surfaces. A single "0" ring was placed in a groove in the sealing surface prior to
closure.
Areas around other penetrations, such as the non-operable personnel lock
representation shown in Figure 8, have been heavily instrumented with strain gages.
Information on distortion of penetrations that are operable in actual containments will be
used to plan future tests of actual full size penetrations, which are to be conducted in a
companion program.
The area around a constrained pipe penetration has been instrumented with both
strain gages and displacement transducers. The displacement transducers, which are
mounted on a free standing interior structure that doesn't move during pressurization,
measure the total movement of a point on the shell. The constraint on the pipe
penetrations is intended to bound the restraint on pipes in ac tual containments. (Many
pipes through containment walls are limited in their outward movement by various types
of pipe supports and restraints).
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Figure 6. Large Steel Model with
Open Equipment Hatch
Figure 5. Large Steel Model
Figure 7. Equipment Hatch with
Installed Strain Gages
Figure 8. Strain Gages around
Personnel Lock Representation
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The steel model will be pressurized in slowly applied steps and data will be taken at
each step via a computer controlled data acquisition system. Photogrammetric da ta from
cameras located at three locations around the model will be used to determine global
displacements. In addition, a coordinate determination system, which uses da ta from
three theodolites in bunkers about 80 meters from the model, will be used to measure
displacements of specific targets placed on the outside of the model. One of the
theodolite bunkers is shown in the left side of Figure 9.
Test Plans and Expected Results
The model will be pressurized with nitrogen gas from a computer operated controller,
shown in Figure 9. Temperature in the model will be held at slightly above ambient. If
the model begins to leak, the pressure controller can maintain pressure while data is
recorded andcan increase pressure as commanded. Testing will be hai ted if the leakage
due to local tearing or distortions in sealing surfaces exceeds equipment capabilities (the
equivalent of at least 200 percent per day at 1.4 MPa or 200 psig). If the maximum
free-field membrane strains in the model are less than about six percent when severe
leakage occurs, the model may be modified to allow further pressurization. However,
present plans do not include pressurizing the model to agiobai rupture. An actual U. S.
steel containment is surrounded by a concrete shield wall that would alter the response to
pressure when the radial displacements of the shell are about five to six percent of the
cylindrical radius. The model will be pressurized to at least a comparable level, if
possible.
Preliminary analyses of the model [3, 7] indicate that the containment shell would
have aglobai pressure capability of about 1.7 MPa (250 psig). Local strains near the
thickened sections around penetrations are predicted to exceed the maximum strains
achieved in uniaxial test specimens (about 20%) at about 1.55 MPa (225 psig). Analyses of
the equipment hatch area of the model· have been recently updated because of
inaccuracies in those previously reported [3, 7]. The more recent analysis also includes a
more accurate representation of the shell stiffeners. The updated results are
qualitatively similar to the earlier ones. Specifically, at apressure level near those for
which the containment cylinder yields globally (about 1.3 MPa) the sleeve of the
equipment hatch begins to distort significantly, that is, the sleeve begins to become
noticeably oval in shape. In Figure 10 the change in diameter of the sleeve at the sealing
surface is plotted for both the meridional (3 to 9 o'clock) and vertical (6 to 12 o'clock)
positions. Above 1.3 MPa the diameter change qulckly approaches a magnitude on the
order of the width of the sealing surface (about 3 cm). If the diameter change does not
cause excessive leakage, the local strains (primarily due to bending) are predicted to
exceed the ultimate uniaxial strain of the material at 1.40 MPa (200 psig).
Testing of the model will begin in September 1984. In a manner representative of the
testing of actual U. S. containments, the model will first be pressurized to 0.32 MPa
(115% of design pressure). The pressure will then be reduced to the design pressure, 0.28
MPa (40 psig), and an integrated leak rate test (ILRT) will be performed. The model will
be tested and repaired until the leakage is less than 0.1 percent mass per day at design
pressure. After a successful ILRT, the model will be depressurized and data from all the
instrumentation will be thoroughly checked. If necessary, low pressure testing will be
repeated until the data acquisition system ·performs satisfactorily.
Testing at pressures slgnificantly above design pressure will be conducted in steps of
14 to 140 kPa (2 to 20 psi). Smaller steps will be taken as predicted global yielding is
approached and while the model responds plastically. As discussed previously, if leakage
occurs before sufficient structural response has been obtained, the model may be repaired
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REINFORCED CONCRETE MODEL
Following the testing of the large steel model. the model will be removed and a
model of a reinforced concrete (R/C) containment will be constructed at the same site.
The model will be approximately 1/6th the size of typical U. S. R/C containments. A
drawing of the planned model is shown in Figure 11.
The conceptual design of the R/C model has been completed and requests for
proposals from prospective contractors have been placed. By the time of this conference.
the proposals will have been received by Sandia and review will begin. After the contract
is awarded, aseries of small tests will be performed to ensure that a high quality model
can be constructed and that the behavior of certain key components, e.g.•
liner-stud-concrete anchorage. are representative of actual containments. Construction
of the model is expected to begin in 1985 and testing will occur in 1986. However. a
reliable schedule will not be available until input from contractors is received.
The concrete model will have the following features:
I. 1/6 scale
2. ft3 rebar as major reinforcement
3. 1.6 mm (1/16 inch) thick steelliner with stud attachments
4. Two operating equipment hatches with seals
5. Two personnel lock representations
6. Restrained pipe penetrations
7. other pipe penetrations
8. Thickened liner sections around penetrations
9. A "flat" basemat
10. A hemispherical dome
11. Diagonal seismic rebar that is scaled from actual containments
12. A design pressure of 0.32 MPa (46 psig)
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Details of reinforcement are specified to be typical of that in actual containments.
A possible reinforcing plan for the cylindrical wall and basemat of the model is shown in
Figure 12.
The equipment hatches in the model will receive particular attention. Two
equipment hatch penetrations and three covers are planned for the model. Apressure
unseating cover will be used on the exterior of one of the penetrations until leakage
becomes excessive. The cover will then be replaced by apressure seating cover on the
model interior.
LONG RANGE PLANS
The testing planned through the end of 1986 is for quasi-static pressurization of the
large steel and reinforced concrete containment models. Although a prestressed concrete
model is not presently planned. attempts will be made to extend the information learned
to this third type of containment. Tests of walls of panels that are similar to the wall of
the R/C mqdel will be tested in a like manner to panel tests (sponsored by the Electric
Power Research Institute) of full size wall panels from prestressed containments [8].
Comparisons of all results may provide additional insight into both reinforced and
prestressed concrete containment behavior.
Testing for the years beyond 1986 may include the seismic response of containments
and the response "to dynamic internal pressurization. Particular attention is being given to
tests that will represent the behavior of containments during accidents that are initiated
by an extreme seismic event.
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ABSTRAcr
Studies on the behaviour of reactor containments under off-design
conditions have been corrlucted in France on both 900 MV Pressurized
Water Reactors (PWR) with metallined contairnnents and 1300 MV Pres-
surized Water Reactors with dual concrete wall containments.
The results show that :
- 900 MW PWR contairnnents should keep their integrity until failure
sin:::e the risks of metal liner tearing are low,
- The behaviour of 1300 MV PWR contairnnents is governed by the
transverse carcking of the concrete which, due to the resulting
leakage rate, terrls to control internal pressure to a value less
than collapse pressure,
- Mechanical penetrations exhibit a mechanical strength which is well
above contairnnent collapse pressure .
:rnrroDUcrION
French 900 and 1300 MV PWR contairnnents are designed to withstarrl a design
basis accident (cornplete rupture of the largest pipe in the rnain prirnary
circuit). This load configuration is conditioned by t611p9rature and pressure
and pressure variations conservatively calculated to bound those potentially
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reached during the plausible accidents considered in plant design.
However, it was considered beneficial from the safety standPJint to examine
contairnnent behaviour under conditions in excess of design.
These studies, jointly conducted by the French Atomic Energy Comnission and
Electricite de Frame, were intentionally linlited to a gradual pressure and
tanperature rise above design basis accident conditions (0.03 MPa/hour for
pressure and 2°C/hour for temperature from 0.4 MPa and 140°C). They airn to
estinate mrrgins to loss of integrity or containment collapse and rrore generally
to define the scenario leading to collapse : concrete cracking, reinforcing
steel rupture zones, any tearing of the metal liner, leakage rate caused by
concrete cracking, strength of rnechanical or electrical penetrations •••
This docl.lllEnt surrrnarizes the I113.in results obtained for metal-lined 900 MV
PWR contairnnents and for 1300 MV PWR containments with dual concrete walls.
STUDY ProGRI\M
Studies focus on ~ I113.in areas
- containment behaviour,
- contairnnent mechanical penetration behaviour.
COntainment behaviour :
a) Mechanical behaviour
900 MW and 1300 MV PWR containments are considered as axisyrrrnetrical
structures, without defects or penetrations, and a complete thermal/mechanical
calculation is performed for both containments up to the collapse PJint, with
due allowance for concrete and rebar steel non-linear behavioural laws.
These calculations were preceded by a "test case" study : calculations by
four different computer codes conducted by different design offices relating to
a limited area of the containment and aiming to provide krx:Jwledge of the
accuracy to be expected from such non-linear calculations when applied to
prestressed concrete.
b) COncrete cracking and leakage rate
French 1300 MW PWR containments have dual concrete walls instead of metal
liners. When cracks spread across the concrete of the inner containment wall,
the wall starts to leak and its mechanical strength is dependent on this leak,
which tends to reduce internal pressure. Thorough analysis is I113.de of the
distribution and opening of 'cracks in a containnent wall (calculations + mockup)
and its associated leakage rate.
Penetration strength :
When the collapse mechanism of each containment üil known, an assessment




900 rM PWR containments
a) "Test case" study
This analysis, which relatOO to a limitOO containments area (barrel to base
ITI3.t junction zone) ITI3.de it possible to determine the state of the art for
concrete structure elastic/plastic calculations and to highlight the inade-
quacies of the concrete behavioural rrodels in order to specify result uncer-
tainties (four codes were usOO). These calculations, which includOO rrodelling
of all the containment load-hearing elEments (finite elEment rrodelling with
non-linear behavioural laws) showOO :
- good agreement on final collapse (between 1.15 and 1.3 MPa gage). The
latter is relatOO to the rupture of the barrel horizontal prestress cables and
the final mechanism is simple.
- however, there is wider scatter affecting the intennediate concrete
cracking mechanisms . The influence of the concrete behavioural rrodels is direct
and aceuracy is lower (for example transverse barrel cracks appear between 0.6
an 1K1 MPa gage).
b) Mechanical strength of 900 M'l PwR containments
After a critical examination of the above test calculations, a complete
study of this metal-linOO containment was corrluctOO and 100 to the following
conclusions :
- final collapse is due to rupture of the barrel horizontal prestress
cables and (alIrost simultaneously) of the dome pres:t;ress cables at an internal
pressure of about 1.2 MPa.
- metal liner deforITl3.tion is still rroderate just before collapse (less than
a few %). This suggests that the risks of liner tearing in the zones free of
discontinuities are low. Therefore, if no tear appears in the area of the
penetrations and if the liner exhibits no initial defects, these containments
w:mld remain leaktight right up to the errl. Intennediate concrete cracking
mechanismsare less :important and do not have a direct effect on collapse.
1300 M'l PWR containments :
a) Mechanical strength of 1300 rM PWR containments
A canplete calculation along the same lines for a containment of this
design showOO that behavioural was very different fran the 900 r.w containments.
This containment consists of a dual concrete wall without a metal liner and with
provision for leakage recovery in the space between the containment walls and
the filters.
- During the first hours after the Design Basis Accident, leaktightness is
providOO by a concrete layer (highly compressOO because of heat shock) on the
inner face of the inner containment wall.
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- However, transverse =ncrete cracks appear over a large area of the dome
at internal gage pressures of about 0.6 MPa and 0.75 MPa in the barrel zone free
of dis=ntinuities. This results in leakage through the crack lattice, which
terrls to offset the steam production in the containment due to the accident. A
straightforward rnechanical study is inadequate in this case and it is necessary
to analyse the possible distribution of the cracks, their opening and related
leakage, the recovery of this leakage in the inter-wall space or the possible
rise of =ntairment pressure••• Containment mechanical strength and the entire
accident scenario depend on leakage rate.
b) Concrete cracking and leakage rate
This study involves the detection of cracks and monitoring of their growth,
depth and opening with the rise in containment pressure.
• As regards cracking, calculations show that this is highly sensitive both
to the steel-to-concrete average bonding value and to the criterion for the
rupture of concrete subjected to tensHe loads.
• On a practical basis, if it is assumed that there is a regular array of
vertical cracks, the associated minimum leakage rate rapidly becomes very high
when these cracks open under the effect of internal pressure .
• Ta =nfirm the validity of this calculation, a 1/10 =ntainment local
mockup (barrel) showed that cracking was at first regular and that =llapse was
preceded by the oc=rence of several large cracks close to which all the
deformations are concentrated.
· Developnent of the calculational model is continuing based on closer
comparison with the test results acquired by the above mockup which is buHt
in a concrete representation of the PALUEL containment.
Penetration strength :
In reality, containments are not axisynrnetrical structures without defects
or penetrations. The aim of these studies is to find out whether the existence
of these discontinuities (equipnent hatch opening etc) does not =nstitute a
series of weak points which risk the prEnlature =llapile of the containment.
- Equipnent hatch opening : An initial buckling analysis shows that, if
this metal shell does not exhibit any initial defects, its strength is guaranteed
above 1. 2 MPa (900 M'i PWR =ntainment collapse pressure) without risk of
instabHity.
- Personnel hatch : A =mplete finite element calculation of this hatch with
geometrical and rnechanical non-linearities shows that at apressure of 1.2 MPa
part of the structure is plastified, but that =rresponding deformations are
slight and the hatch as a whole rEnlained perfectly stable. M:x:kups were also
buHt to ascertain the strength of the windows and inflatable seals and demons-
trated their good performance.
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CONCLUSION
PencUng final conclusions, it can be stated that the behaviour of the
9CO M'l PWR metal-lined containments is very different frcrn that of 13CO M'l PWR
containments with dual concrete walls and cannot be covered by the same type of
study. 900 M'l PWR containments exhibit purely mechanical behaviour in that they
probably rernain leaktight right up to the errl, whereas the behaviour of the
1300 M'l PWR containments is much II'Ore complex and is largely deperrlent on
con:::rete cracking arrl associated leakage.
A containment depressurization system is currently being studied in France,
which would cover both cases. The study will detennine the pressure above which
the system should enter into service in each p::>ssible scenario.
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ABSTRACT
The effect of fan-induced turbulence on the combustion of hydrogen-air
mixtures has been studied in a 2. 3-m diameter sphere over a hydrogen
concentration range of 4 to 4210 (by volume). Two fans were used to
produce the turbulence, 'Ohich was measured at various locations by
hot-'Oire anemometry.
For low hydrogen concentrations « 710), turbulence increases the rate
and extent of combustion; for large turbulence intensities the extent
of combustion approaches 10010, and combustion times are reduced by
factors of H to 10 from those observed under quiescent conditions. At
high hydrogen concentrations, the effect of turbulence on combustion
time is less pronounced than at 10'0 hydrogen concentrations. Flame-
gener4ted turbulence has a significant effect on the combustion rate.
1. INTRODUCTION
The possible combustion of hydrogen-air-steam mixtures is an important
concern in certain postulated loss-of-coolant accidents in nuclear reactors.
The factors influencing combustion in reactor containment buildings must be
kllown in order to predict hydrogen combustion behaviour when potential
sources of ignition are present.
One factor that significantly affects combustion in reactor containment
buildings is turbulence, such as that produced by fans or by the combustion
process itselL The factor that governs the rate of flame propagation or
the rate of combustion when turbulence is present is the turbulent burning
velocity. Whereas the laminar burning velocity is a fundamental physico-
chemical property of the combustible mixture, the turbulent burning velocity
depends strongly on the flow itself. However, a correlation exists in most
Cases between the turbulent and laminar burning velocities and the para-
meters governing the nature of the turbulence. The turbulent burning
velocity, St' may be expressed as:
f(u' ISu, 1, L)
where S is the laminar burning velocity, u' is the turbulent intensity, and
1 and LUrepresent the microscopic and integral scales of turbulence,
respectively. Numerous correlations of the above type have been proposed by
several researchers, and a detailed account of several of these is given in
Reference 1. Even though such correlations may be used to predict combus-
tion behaviour in large systems, experimental work is required to verify
their applicability.
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Although turbulent combustion has been studied extensively, the work to
date has dealt primarily with small systems. Results of some large-scale
methane-air combustion experiments in the presence of fan turbulence,
described in Reference 2, are not directly applicable to hydrogen-air
systems because of the special nature of hydrogen. Furthermore, the experi-
mental results were qualitative in that turbulent intensities were not
measured. The results were reported in terms of the peak pressure versus
fan speed or blade tip Reynolds number.
Since the laminar burning velocity of hydrogen-air mixtures increases
with hydrogen concentration, up to 42%, it may be expected that the effect
of turbulence on the burning velocity should diminish as the hydrogen
concentration is increased, because the ratio St/Su depends upon u'/Su' The
effect of turbulence is large for mixtures with SIMll burning velocities and
increases with the intensity of the turbulence. Recent work by Abdel- Gayed
and Bradley [3J shows that this is true for most fuel-air mixtures.
Recent investigations by the present authors [4J have shown that
combustion of hydrogen-air and hydrogen-steam-air mixtures is greatly
influenced by turbulence at low hydrogen concentrations. At low hydrogen
concentrations, turbulence increased the extent of combustion and the resul-
ting pressure rise, and increased the rate of combustion by a factor of five
to six. At high hydrogen concentrations, the rate of combustion increased
only marginally. However, these present observations were qualitative
because the fan turbulence was not characterized.
Experiments have therefore been done in a 2.3-m diameter sphere to
relate these effects to the amount of turbulence. This paper discusses the
results.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE TEST FACILITY AND INSTRUMENTATION
2.1 Test Facility
The Containment Test Facility (CTF) consists of three major components
that may be interconnected: a sphere, a cylindrical duct and a vertical
cylinder. The sphere alone was used for this series of experiments. It has
three large openings and several smaller ones. The smaller openings are
used for mounting instruments and probes. The sphere is insulated and
trace-heated with steam, and its temperature can be maintained constant as
desired Cup to about 13S0c). Two, fans driven by variable-speed air motors
are mounted diametrically opposite each other in the sphere, as shown in
Figure 1.
2.2 Instrumentation
Figure 1 also shows the CTF instrumentation. Transient pressures in
the sphere during combustion were measured by four piezoelectric trans-
ducers, with a rise-time of 2 ~, and a Ku1ite semiconductor transducer with
a similar rise-time. The Kulite transducer provided highly reliable
measurements over the entire range of pressures encountered. A Rosemount
pressure transmitter with a response time of 0.2 s was used for monitoring























Figure 1. Arrangement of Fans and Instru-
mentation in the Sphere
Figure 2. Location of the Uea-
surement Points in
the Sphere
the Rosemount transmitter \>las aceeptable for hydrogen concentrations between
51. and lvI., and the indicated pressure was close to that of the Kulite
transducer. A fine-\>Iire (0.075 lllIll diameter), Type S thermocouple was used
to measure the transient temperature of the gases elose to the wall of the
sphere.
Two of the piezoeleetrie transducers were reeess-mounted and eoated
with RTV-I08 for thermal protection. The other two piezoeleetric trans-
dueers were mounted flush with the inner wall of the vessel.
The signals from all the transducers were processed by an analog-to-
digital converter \>Iith a scan time of 1.5 ms. A two-channel transient
recorder that could record 4000 data points with a maximwn sampling rate of
2 llliz was also used to record transient pressures.
The gases in the sphere were analyzed, before and after combustion,
using agas chromatograph.
3. RESULTS AND 0ISCUSSION
3.1 Heasurement of Turbulence in the Sphere
Ideally, it is preferable to have homogenous and isotropie turbulence,
to facilitate comparison with theoretical predictions. This would permit
measurements at a single point during the experiment, and could be accompli-
shed by laser-Uoppler anemometry. However, homogeneous turbulence is diffi-
cult to achieve in a real situation, and turbulence parameters tend to vary
spatially. Since spatial measurement of turbulence was not possible during
combustion, it was decided to carry out detailed turbulence measurernents in
the sphere at certain fan speeds and then to carry out combustion experi-
ments later at these same fan speeds.
Since the flow field produced by the fans is strongly three-dimension-
al, a TSI (Thermo Systems Incorporated) 1294 three-dimensional hot-film
probe \>las used for the measurements. The probe was operated with three
TS1 1050 research anemometers. Each sensor was calibrated separately over a
range of velocities from 1 to 15 Ill/s with flows normal to the sensor.
1330
Figure 2 shows a schematic of the measurement grid used. The probe was
traversed manually by moving the arm on which the probe was mounted.
Detailed measurements were made in one quarter of the horizontal diametral
plane. The flow field produced by the fans was assumed to be symmetric
about the fan axis, although measurements indicated that true symmetry did
not exist. Velocities at corresponding points differed by as much as 30%,
especially at low velocity values.
Figures 3 to 5 show the root-mean-square velocity (u') plotted against
the distance from the fan axis, for three fan speeds. As can be seen, the
r.m.s. velocities decrease with fan speed. Except at low fan speeds, the
highest r.m.s. velocities 'are observed along the fan axis. It should be
noted that the measured r.m.s. velocities are high, as high as 50/, of the
time-averaged velocities in many cases. This is mainly due to the confine-
ment of the gas in the sphere. In large unconfined volumes, the situation
would be somewhat different. The flow entering the fan would be less likely
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Figure 3. Turbulent Intensity in
the Sphere with a Fan
Speed of 400 r/min
Figure 4. Turbulent Intensity in
the Sphere with a Fan
Speed of 800 r/min
to be influenced by the flow field at the fan exit.
however, circulatory flow is set up in the vi~inity
short-circuiting. The flow at the fan entry itself
which causes high turbulence at the fan exit.
In confined volumes,
of the fan and there is
is highly turbulent,
Even though no single characteristic turbulent velocity exists in the
sphere, due to the complicated flow patterns, it is useful to think of a
single r.m.s. velocity that is characteristic of the turbulence. It should
be noted that the r.m.s. velocity at any point is related to the average
kinetic energy for an entire speetrum of eddy sizes. A spaee averaging of




where Ei is the loeal kinetie energy assoeiated with eaeh point in spaee,
and n is the number of points. E' is used in the ealculation of a single
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A plot of the spaee-averaged r.m.s. velocity versus fan speed is shown
in Figure 6. For the range of speeds investigated, u' appears to be a
linear funetion of the rotational speed of the fan.
Another important quantity in determining the turbulent burnin6 velo-
city of a eombustible mixture is the seale of turbulenee, whieh depends upon
the r.m.s. velocity u' and the auto-eorrelation eoeffieient, p.
In a generally three-dih1ensional flow Held it is diffieult to eompute
the fluetuating velocity eomponents direetly and to find their auto-eorrela-
tion eoeffieients. Therefore, no attempt was made in these measurements to
resolve 'the eomponents direetly and obtain auto-eorrelation eoeffieients.
The effeetive velocity measured by eaeh sensor was eorrelated with itself.
Although this does not provide an accurate value for p, it is sufficient to
give a rough measure of the seale of turbulenee. Knowing the seale and
turbulent intensity permits ealeulation of the turbulent burning velocity,
via a suitable eorrelation [lJ.
3.2 Combustion Experi,nents
All the eombustion experiments deseribed were eondueted at 10UoC, and
near atmospherie pressure. The mixtures were ignited cent rally and the fans
were aetivated 1 to 2 min prior to ignition.
Figure 7 eompares pressure-time traees obtained with a low (510) hydro-
gen eoneentration, for three fan speeds. Hithout turbulenee, the extent of
eombustion is very small, less than 1010' of the hydrogen [4J. The correspon-
ding pressure rise is also small. iiowever, wi th the lowes t fan speed the
pressure rise is appreeiable, and nearly 6010 of the hydrogen is burned.
Furthermore, the eornbustion time is short, around 2 s, eompared with 6 s
under quieseent eondi tions. As the fan speed is inereased {rom 400 to
1050 r/min, the peak pressure increases from 60 kPa to lU5 kPa. The rate of
combustion also increases by a factor of 3 to 4. The fraction burned in-
ereases frOlO 60 to 10U1o as the fan speed is inereased. At high fan speeds;
the turbulent intensities are large alm the flame front is fragmented and
transported in the sphere in almost all directlons, before the effects of
buoyancy can be felt. This results in eoruplete combustion. For example, at
1050 r/min the highest turbulent intenslty measured is of the order of
1.6 rn/s, and with central ignltion we therefore expect the flame speed to be
of this magnitude. The expeeted eombustion time would be around U.7 s. The
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Figure 6. Average Turbulent Intensity
in the Sphere
Figure 7. Effect of Turbulence on
Combustion for 5% Hydro-
gen in Air
The present finding that turbu1ence has astrang effect for 10101-
burning-velocity mixtures agrees with that of Abdel-Gayed and Bradley [3).
The experiments clearly demonstrate that even low-level turbulence has a
strang effect on combustion. However, a 4% hydrogen-air mixture did not
ignite in the presence of turbulence.
The situation is somewhat different at high hydrogen concentrations.
At these concentrations, the ratio u I /Su ,is small and the influence of
turbulence is also smalI. Figure 8 shows the pressure transients observed
at a high (20;;) hydrogen concentration, for three fan speeds. The effect of
turbulence on the combustion time and the peak pressure is reduced signifi-
cantly.
The variation of the combustion peak pressure with hydrogen concentra-
tion for various fan speeds is shown in Figure 9. The peak pressures for
all fan speeds and hydrogen concentrations lie between the theoretical
adiabatic limit and the experimental quiescent limit. At 400 r/min, corre-
sponding to 10101 turbulent intensi ties in the sphere, peak pressures are
close to the quiescent combustion values for hydrogen concentrations greater
than 1010. Ihis is reasonable, because Ul/SU =1 and combustion is not
greatly influenced by turbulence at 10101 turbulence levels. Furthermore,
peak pressures at a fan speed of 1050 r/min are elose to the adiabatic
pressures, in general agreement with earlier combustion experiments in the
spllere [4J. Tlle only difference between combustion at 1050 r/min and under
quiescent conditions is the level of turbulence, which alters the rate of
combustion and the time to peak pressure. This indicates that the observed
pressure differences between quiescent and theoretical adiabatic combustion
are mainly due to radia tive lasses from the sys tem.
Figure 10 shows the time to peak pressure plotted as a function of
hydrogen concentration for various fan speeds. It is clear that the rate of
combustion and thus the total time are both strongly influenced by the level
of turbulence in the sphere, and depend upon the initial hydrogen concentra-
tion. At 10101 hydrogen concentrations, combustion times under turbulent
conditions are an order of magnitude shorter than the corresponding laminar
values; at high hydrogen concentrations this effect is only half as large.
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on Combustion for 20%
Hydrogen in Air
3.3 Theoretical Considerations
Variation of Combustion Peak
Pressure with Hydrogen Concentra-
tion
Theoretical calculation of the pressure transients, for a given vessel
geometry, depends upon the turbulent burning velocity St' An extensive
literature survey done by Andrews et al. [1] shows that the ratio St/Su
depends upon the quantity u'/Su' Although complicated relationships between
St /Su and u' /Su have been proposed, the simpler ones take the form
where B, m and n are constants. The earliest correlation, based on a con-
tinuously wrinkled laminar flame, was by Damköhler [5], with B = m = n = 1,
and is used here.
It has been noted by Karlovitz et al. [6] that the flame itself gener-
ates turbulence when propagating in a strongly turbulent medium. The flame-
generated turbulence diffuses upstream of the flame and should be added to
the burning velocity. The turbulent velocity should be modified to include
this, as follows
St = Su + u' + u"
where u" is the flame-generated turbulence and is given by
The flame-generated turbulence exists only when the initial turbulence is
strong, and is zero for laminar or mildly turbulent flame propagation.
Since u" depends on Su' its effect is ,ninirual at low hydrogen concentra-
tions, where the laminar burning velocities are small.
For comparison with experiment, calculations were performed assuming
that the flame propagates as a smooth spherical front in an adiabatic
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Figure 10. Variation of Combustion Figure 11.
Times with Hydrogen Con-
centration
Calculated Pressure Tran-
sients at 5% Hydrogen in Air
Figure 11 shows the ca1culated pressure transients for mixtures cün-
taining 51, hydrogen, for various fan speeds. Since S is very sLllall at
these concentrations, the flame-genera ted turbulence ~s also very small
compared to the fan-induced turbulent intensity. Hence, the flame-generated
turbulence was not included in the ca1culation. As expected, the adiabatic
model slightly overpredicts the peak pressures. Of more direct interest is
the comparison of combustion times. Comparing Figures 11 and 7, it is seen
that the calculated combustion times (times to peak pressure) are less than
those observed. This may be due to the assumption of uniform turbulent
intensity, whereas the measurements show a lower intensity towards the
centre of the sphere. The discrepancy between the observed and calculated
values mayaIso be due to the assumption of no heat loss from the system.
In reality, heat losses from the system reduce the flame speed, due to
cooling of the gases, and slow the rate of pressure rise. Spatial variation
of the turbulent intensity and mean velocity distort the assumed spherical
symmetry of the flame. Nevertheless, for the highest fan speed employed
(1050 r/min), the predicted and measured times of 0.6 sand 0.9 s,
respectively, agree reasonably weIl. For the lower fan speeds, incomplete
combustion may upset the predictions, since the calculations assume that the
extent of combustion is spatially uniform.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the theoretical predictions for a mixture
containing 20% hydrogen. Since in this case Su is large, the calculations
have been carried out with and without flame-generated turbulence. Without
flame-genera ted turbulence, the calculated combustion times are greater than
those measured. Even for the highest fan speed, the calculated combustion
time is greater than the experimentally observed value for combustion with a
fan speed of only 400 r/min. For example, at 1050 r/Lllin, the calculated
combustion time is 0.103 s, whereas the combustion time observed at
400 r/min is about 0.09 s. This clearly shows that flame-generated
turbulence must be affecting the rate of combustion. The results calculated
with flame-generated turbulence added to the initial turbulence are shown by
chained 1ines in Figure 12. It is clear from the figure that
flame-generated turbulence alters the combustion times by almost a factor of
two, although the calculations show a faster rate of pressure rise. The
measured pressure-time curve lies between the transients predicted with and
without flame-generated turbulence. This is reasonable, since inclusion of
flame-generated turbulence establishes an upper bound for the rate of
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Figure 12. Calculated Pressure Transients
for 20% Hydrogen in Air
4. CONCLlJSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from these experiments:
1. For low hyrogen concentrations (~ 7%), turbulence increases the
rate and extent of combustion. With large turbulent intensities,
the extent of combustion approaches 100%. Furthermore, combustion
ttmes are much shorter (by factors of Ö to 10) than those for
quiescent combustion.
2. At high hydrogen concentrations, the combustion rate increases
with increasing turbulence, but the effects of turbulence are
less pronounced than at low hydrogen concentrations.
3. Flame-generated turbulence has a significant effect on the
combustion rate, and establishes an upper bound for the rate of
pressure rise, for purposes of reactor safety assessment.
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ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION OF JET LOADS
Karsten Fischer and Wolfgang Häfner
Battelle-Institut e.V.
Am Roemerhof 35, D-6000 Frankfurt
West Germany
ABSTRACT
An empirical model for the estimation of jet forces on con-
tainment structures is presented. The model calculates the
pressure distribution on an impingement plate, using the
geometrical data of the break opening and plate distance as
well as the thermodynamic data of the discharging fluid.
Development and verification of the model was performed on
the basis of Battelle (RS 50) and HDR (RS 123) experiments.
The model can be applied for discharges of subcooled and
saturated water, two-phase flow and pure steam.
INTRODUCTION
Containment structures and components must be designed to
withstand hypothetical jet loads due to pipe breaks in the primary
loop. Th~ methods which are currently used in routine practice for
to calculate jet force distributions /1, 2/ are very simple ap-
proximations and do not in general take into account the thermo-
dynamic state of the discharging coolant. Numerical simulation cal-
culations are too costly for routine applications.
The German Federal Ministry for Research and. Technology
(BMFT) sponsored a project to analyze the available experimental
data on jet force distributions. The basic physical effects of the
two-phase jet hydrodynamics were investigated by applying the two-
dimensional numerical code K-FIX to some selected cases. The re-
sults of the experimental analysis and the numerical calculations
lead to the development of an empirical model for jet force cal-
culations, which is well suited for routine applications.
ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Figures 1 and 2 show the experimental arrangement for the
jet impingement tests. Data from the following experiments were
inspected: KWU (BMFT-project RS 93), Battelle (BMFT-project RS 50),
HDR (BMFT-project RS 123), Grenoble (project JERICHO), Japan (MIKT-
experiments). The following results were found:
a) For discharge of steam or saturated water, the pressure profiles
can be represented by a single Gaussian (Fig. 3)






where Pois the pressure (above ambient pressure), r is the
radial coordinate perpendicular to the jet axis, and ~ is the
width parameter.
b) For discharge of subcooled water there appears an additional
spiky,pressure peak in the center of the profile; this profile
can be represented by linear combination of two Gaussians
(Fig. 4)
p(r) = Po e
where the second term represents the additional pressure spike
and can be visualized as the contribution of a jet core con-
sisting of pure water.
Other profiles with off-center maximum pressure were ob-
served. However, these profiles were not considered in a special
manner because such a treatment would be very complicated and un-
necessary from a safety viewpoint; instead, they too were repre-
sented by equivalent single Gaussians for further investigations.
The formation of such profiles is governed by shock wave effects,
as was shown by similar single-phase gas dynamical experiments
elsewhere.
NUMERICAL SIMULATION
The numerical calculations with K-FIX(2D) lead to the fol-
lowing results:
a) During discharge of steam and saturated water there exist ap-
proximately homogeneous phase distributions and thermodynamic
equilibrium.
b) During discharge of subcooled water there exists a considerable
delay in evaporation. The pressure distribution is influenced
by a locally variable evaporation rate, the difference between
water and steam velocities is large.
c) The empirical models for the evaporation process currently in
use do not sufficiently take into account the influence of the
local distribution of nucleation sites.
In figure 5 apressure profile calculated with K-FIX is shown
in comparison with experimental data of the HDR-experiment V 42. In
this case, a steam discharge occurred, and the experimental data
are well reproduced by the numerical code.
, Figure 6 shows the comparison for a case with discharge of
subcooled water.
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EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR CALCULATING PRESSURE PROFILES
The model parameters Po' Go' P1 and G1 are determined em-
pirically (Fig. 7). For the steam part of the jet, a theory of
Lamkin et al. /3/ is used to calculate the width parameter Go'
This theory is modified in such a way that the water evaporating
in the free jet region is taken into account. The water part of
the pressure profile is calculated by the empirical relations
-ae
and
where Pstag is the stagnation pressure in the break opening and RM
is the break radius. The coefficients a and b depend on geometri-
cal conditions and thermodynamic parameters of the fluid. The re-
maining parameter of the pressure profile, po,is calculated from a
stationary momentum balance.
The empirical model equations are constructed in such a way
that the limiting cases of pure steam or cold water discharge are
represented reasonably. The model can be applied for quasi-statio-
nary conditions; the thermodynamic conditions in the break open-
ing (pressure, temperature, density and velocity) must be known.
Figure 9 shows a comparison between apressure profile cal-
culated by the present empirical model and a simpler correlation
/2/, together with experimental data from RS 50. In this case a
subcooling of 20 °c exists in the break opening. The central pres-
sure spike is represented well by the empirical model curve.
CONCLUSIONS
An empirical model for calculating pressure profiles was
developed, taking into account geometrical and thermodynamical
parameters. The model was verified against the available experi-
mental data (Fig. 5, 8, 9). Especially the pressure spikes caused
by subcooled discharge are represented well by the model. It is
suited for use on small computers (e. g. PDP 11) for routine
applications.
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LITERATURE
/1/ F.J. Moody, ASME Symp. Non-Equilibrium Two-Phase Flow,
Houston 1975, p. 27-36
/2/ W. Kastner, H. Lochner, KWU-Bericht RE23/053/75, Erlangen
1979

































O. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Experiment: HDR V67.1
Pressure profile, represented by a single Gaussian



























5.1.O. 2. 3. 4.
Experiment: Battelle RS 50-C12
Pressure profile, represented by superposition of 2 Gaussians
Figure 4: Timestep # 16 t=24.3Bms
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1. 2. 3. 4.
Experiment: HOR V42
Radial pressure profile during discharge of steam


















O. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Exper imen t: Battelle RS 50-C12
Radia] pressure profile during discharge of subcooled water


























Experiment: Battelle RS 50-Ci2
Interrelation between core pressure partial pi and













o. 1. 2. 3. 4.
Experiment: HDR V44
Radial pressure profile during discharge of steam



















5.1.o. 2. 3. 4.
Experiment: Battelle RS 50-C12
Radial pressure profile during discharge of subcooled water
Figure 9: Timestep # 64 t=B4.37ms
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BEHAVIOR OF CONTAINMENT AND STRUCTURES DURING
BLOWDOWN AND OTHER TESTS
AT THE HDR PLANT
K. Müller, G. Katzenmeier






The HDR-safety program includes various experiments to study the
component behavior under accidental loads as Blowdown, earthquake,
containment over pressure, thermal shock etc.
The construction of the HDR facili ty for test purposes will be
briefly described and the measured loads discussed. The functional
behavior of test equipment as valves during blowdown as weIl as
the response of the containment shell to blowdown loads will be
discussed. Examples of the effects of blowdown tests on the faci-
lity concrete structure and different equipment parts of the me-
chanical and electrical installations will be shown in load dia-
grams and illustrated by colour prints.
Furthermore , graphie information will be given about experimental
and theoretical studies concerning crack growth under cyclic ther-
mal shock on an RPV-nozzle. Other figures shown the effects of a
real quillotine pipe break NW 300 in the HDR-plant under operating
conditions.
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TESTS ON THE HDR-FACILITY
The HDR' is a former test reactor for demonstrating nuclear
steam superheating.
Its external form is not typical for current light water
reactors, as a comparison with a German 1300 MWe reactor plant
clearly shows (Fig. 1).
Nevertheless, the atypical geometry produces loss of coolant
accident loads on the containment that would be comparably
greater to those that would be expected in a modern nuclear
power plant.
The containment, consisting of approximately 50 compartments
of various volumes, the crane, elevator, and electric
equipment are conceptually typical of the state of the art in
reactor safety technology in 1966.
The realism of the large-scale experiments performed at HDR
allows the primary goal of reactor safety research, namely the
transfer of experimental results to commercial reactor plants,
to be achieved to large extent.
The components of interest include:
feed water check valves and steam isolation valves of
nominally 200 mm, 350 mm, and 500 mm in pipe diameter.
pipe systems up to NW 500
reactor pressure vessel (12 m high, 3 m Ld.) with nozzles
up to NW 450
. core barrel (7.5 m high, 2.6 m Ld".)
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steel shell containment (60 mhigh, 20 m i.d.)
reactor building, including concrete internals and sur-
rounding soil.
These components are either full-size of nearly full-size when
compared with the dimensions of their counterparts in a 1300
MWe light water reactor. üf particular importance is the fact
that the components are included in realistic plant configu-
rations and therefore to a great extent allow HDR experiments
to address specific reactor applications (Fig. 2).
The loads wich are exerted include:
Conditions close to operating conditions and test condi-
tions.
Boiling water reactor conditions
Pressurized water reactor conditions (110 bar, 310·C)




Emergency cooling ("cyclic" thermal shock)
Earthquake
Impulsive type loads (e.g., airplane crash, explosion).
The survey diagram in Fig. 3 shows the load cases wi th the
characteristic parameters as realized in the HDR, compared
with the characteristic parameters employed as a design basis
for nuclear power plants.
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LOAD EFFECTS Ta CONTAINEMENT STRUCTURES







temperature waves (steam front)
jet impingement loads
reaction forces in pipe supports
The long term static loads
deform plastic components
dissolve smooth stairway coatings
force oil out of valve bodies
corrode unprotected electrical contacts and relays
cause metal structures to rust
Static temperature loads act primarily in the containment dome.
The dynamic loads affect
ventilation ducts
insulation of Vessel and piping
doors/hatches




The following conclusions can be drawn from the HDR tests run
so far:
the HDR components can wi thstand the induced loads and test
conditions without-safety-relevant weakening.
concrete structures have up to now been damaged mostly from
thermal shock effects; differential pressures or jet forces
resulted in no significant structural loading •
• extensive damage has been limited to the individual blowdown
compartments and the main pressure wave propagation paths.
the severe dispersion of glass wool throughout the facility
indicates the potential difficulties of decontamination fol-
lowing a serious accident.
practical experience on the design and installation of blow-
down-resistant equipment has been gained at HDR, as weIl as
experience with the load-carrying capability of components
as pipes and valves etc. under overload conditions.
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FUTURE PLANS ON HDR
In Phase II of the HDR Safety Program (1984 - 1987) experi-
ments are planned with loads clearly severer than tho se
applied in Phase I. A. summary of the experiments planned is
given in the table in Fig. 4. On the one hand, tests will be
conducted to enlarge and supplement studies already conducted
Phase I, including
further Containment Blowdown Tests to clarify existing dif-
ferences between measurements and calculations with respect
to differential press ures
Reactor Pressu re Vessel Internals Blowdown Tests with simu-
la t ions of small breaks ( 0.1 F) and longer break opening
time
Cyckic Thermal Shock Tests with deeper cracks and extensive
non-destructive testing
"Earthquake Tests" with an extremely large excentric mass
shaker.
The shaker, wi th some 50 t of rotating mass, will be able to
cause the whole building to vibrate strongly in accordance
with the maximum European and American seismic criteria, with
vibrations extending clearly into the non-linear range.
On the other hand, some experiments are planned on new topics:
Temperatur stratification tests in pipes and vessel - injec-
tion of cold water emergency coolant test
Pipe failure tests
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BWR-ODeration 70 bar 285'( 220'(
PvlR-ODeration 110 bar 310'( 160 bar, 350'(
Blowdown Breaknozzle Rupture Nazzle Rupture
RPV-J NI, 200, Lenqlh 4,5/l.3m Opening NW 500-800 Length Om Opening
(on I NI, 1,501350 time time
Val,e OIV: NW 500 3ms Oiv: NW 1,50/700 15ms
SRV: NW 200/350 SRV: NW 350/450
Simulation: {Shaker, Snapback,
Earlhquake Blast) IKNK t1/KFKI
b max= 410em/s'at 19Hz b= 100em/s'
= 12cm/s 2at 4Hz
Thermal ,Shoek
K,O to K" 120-310'0 K,~K" 120-310'()
(rack propagation 0-114 W Crack propagation 1/4W
===============i*====
Parameter HDR-Test IPWR/BWR Design Fig. 3
TEST CATEGORY ABBREV.
'" THE51'"'" • (yetie Thermal Shoek ICraek Propagation I THEZN
" • RPV Emergeney eooUng Tests (tc penetraJionl NOTS/'" NOTZ'" • Pipe Fa"ilure Tests (tc penetrationl RORV'"
0.. • Pipe Blowdown with Valve {Plastificationl RORB
Vl
'" · Temperature Stratification {Cold \Vater Injecrionl TEMBI'" TEMR'"m • Blowdown with RPV Internals RBE
0.. · Blowdo!,/n in Containment CONVl
g .Shaker Tests (High-Level to Plastificationl SHAG/SHAM
...j" • Ambient Noise RAU
81 . Impact Test~ lAircraft Impact) STO
'" • Containment Leak Rate Tests-Cold LEK'"'" • Oecommissioning Tests in Containment ZERCf)
0.. • Fire Protection BRA
Vl
==========i*===
PHDR Test Ca te go ries, Phase ]I
1984-1987
Fig, 4
